It аppears from tbe complaint and replication that tbe defendant bad leased bis store, cornering оn Fourth and Evans streets, in tbe town of Greenville, to one Burnett, for retailing liquor; that Burnett sold bis liquor business to B. E. Jolly, one of tbe plaintiffs, who subse *143 quently sold out bis business to W. E. Jolly, the other plaintiff; that on or about January 3, 1900, the defendant agreed with plaintiffs thаt, if they would purchase the stock of said Burnett and his interest in the lease, together with the bar fixtures in said store-room, the plaintiffs should occupy the premises during the year 1900, at a rental of $30 per month, and that the defendant during the said tеrm would not engage, directly or indirectly, in the retail of liquor in the town of Greenville, and that he would not use, or permit аnyone else to use, the room adjacent to said corner room for the purpose of retailing liquor; that, in violation of said contract, the defendant has engaged in retailing liquor in said adjacent room in his building. The defendаnt denies that he agreed with plaintiffs, or either of them, at any time, not to engage in the liquor business in the town of Greenville. The plaintiffs obtained an order restraining the defendant from selling liquor in the town, and on the final hearing of the motion his Hоnor vacated the restraining order, upon the defendant executing a bond in the sum of $400, conditioned to pay such costs and damages as the plaintiffs may sustain by reason of the Court’s refusal to continue said order to the hearing. It now appears that at the hearing of the motion the only fact in issue is whether the defendant agreed not tо engage in selling liquor in the town during the year 1900. The defendant offered no proof of his contention, except his аnswer as an affidavit. The plaintiffs filed their affidavits in support of their allegation. They also filed an affidavit of said W. B. Burnеtt to the effect that “it was then and there agreed by J. A. Brady that the plaintiffs should have the use of said store until January, 1901, and that he (Brady), the defendant, would not during said year enter the retail liquor business in the town of Greenville, and that he would not rent the adjacent room department during the year to anyone *144 for the retail liquor business; * * * and that, in Mg opinion, the stаnd is very materially damaged by a similar business being run in the adjacent room, and especially so by J. A. Brady, who occupied the corner for ten years or more, the place he is now occupying being separated only by a thin partition.” The plaintiffs also filed an affidavit of Edward Eorbes, who said he was present with Burnett, the two Jol-lys and the defеndant when the latter contracted as follows: “That the plaintiffs should have and use the corner store— the ‘Old Brady Stаnd’ — for and during the year 1900, and that the defendant, J. A. Brady, should not rent or use the other apartments for the retail liquor business during thе year 1900, and that he (the said Brady) would not enter or operate, directly or indirectly, any retail liquor business in the town of Greenville during the year 1900and, in consideration of these matters, the plaintiffs agreed to pay $30 per month as а rental, which is an exorbitant price for said store; that a similar business in the adjacent room would materially damаge the trade of the plaintiffs; and that in frequent subsequent conversations the defendant has admitted the contention of the plaintiffs. None of these witnesses are impeached, and we have to assume that all of them arе credible. Whatever the fact may be, the evidence now preponderates in favor of the plaintiffs’ allegation.
Granting injunctions is a serious question for the Court. It is a general rule, well settled, that when the injury complained оf, actual or apprehended, can be compensated in damages, a court of equity will not interfere. But when the damage can not be reasonably compensated in a court of law, or the injury is irreparablе, the Court will stay the injury, by injunctive order, until the parties shall have the main facts determined by jury. In some instances the Court finds seriоus difficulty in putting the case under either of the
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above classes. In snob cases the Court will act upon its general jurisdiction as a court of equity, and administer relief ea;
aequo et bono,
according to its own notions of general justice and equity between tbe parties. In doing so the Court will consider the facts, such as appear; also the conditions and сircumstances surrounding each case. When the subject-matter is one of public concern, its object being thе development of important industries, in which the public are interested, the Court will hesitate to enjoin the parties in such an enterprise. It refused to do so in
Commissioners of Burke Co. v. Catawba Lumber Co.,
It is said in the argument that, as a bond to cover damages was required and given, the restraint should not continue, as the rule was laid down in Commissioners of Burke Co. v. Catawba Lumber Co., supra. In that case the act complained of was injuring and destroying county bridges crossing the river, and the damage could be easily ascertained. The Court refused to restrain the defendant’s business upon condition that he file a sufficient and good bond to satisfy plaintiff’s damages whenever they were ascertained. The present case differs from that in the rеspect already mentioned, i. e., the difficulty in ascertaining the damage. The bond would *146 avail but little, if, in tbe nature of the subject-matter, the plaintiffs could not show their damage.
Error.