S06A0400. JOHNSTONE et al. v. THOMPSON.
S06A0400
Supreme Court of Georgia
JUNE 12, 2006
(631 SE2d 650)
HUNSTEIN, Presiding Justice.
Joseph C. Thompson, a Cobb County taxpayer, brought a petition against the Cobb County School Board, its members and its superintendent (hereinafter “appellants“), seeking mandamus and injunctive relief regarding appellants’ use of proceeds from a special purpose local option sales tax (“SPLOST“) for educational purposes. At issue was the $75 million technology portion of the SPLOST proceeds, specifically, appellants’ decision to use $59 million of the technology portion to fund its “Power to Learn” initiative, which would provide a laptop computer for every middle and high school student in the Cobb County School District. Appellee contended that appellants’ decision constituted an abuse of discretion and that appellants were required by statutory and case law to use the SPLOST technology funds to implement the system-wide technology initiatives set out in documents, such as a SPLOST notebook, a facility group report and pamphlets, promulgated by appellants and widely disseminated to obtain voter approval of the SPLOST. The trial court granted appellee‘s petition for writ of mandamus and enjoined appellants from proceeding with the Power to Learn initiative. We affirm because appellants were not legally authorized to use the SPLOST proceeds for a purpose entirely different from that contained in the SPLOST documents and the evidence supports the trial court‘s conclusion that the Power to Learn initiative was such an entirely different purpose.1
Pursuant to
In this case, the resolution for the reimposition of the SPLOST provided that the funds generated by the SPLOST would be used, in part, on certain designated capital outlay projects, including
[m]aking system-wide technology improvements, including, but not limited to: acquisition and installation of instructional technology and information systems hardware and associated software, and infrastructure at all schools and selected other facilities....
The ballot language sought voter approval to impose the SPLOST for educational purposes including “new schools, land, additions, renovations, equipment, and technology systems.” The SPLOST notebook promulgated by appellants detailed eight “Curriculum/Technology Initiatives,” with an estimated cost for each initiative. Included among the initiatives was “refresh obsolete workstations,” which the notebook estimated required replacing 30,563 units5 that would affect “students and staff in all academic areas.”
Appellants argue that the Power to Learn initiative comports with the directive in
the Board is not authorized to use proceeds from the SPLOST tax [sic] for a purpose entirely different from that contained in the SPLOST budget and account reports. We further hold that the Board is bound by the SPLOST budget and account reports to complete all projects listed therein unless circumstances arise which dictate that projects which initially seemed feasible are no longer so. In this regard the governing authority has discretion to make adjustments in the plans for these projects, but may not abandon the projects altogether.
Id. Accordingly, we upheld the trial court‘s determination that the Board was required to complete the multi-purpose government facility at the site as specified in the plans and specifications drawn for the site, id., but reversed the ruling as to a recreational facility where it was “not apparent from the record before us that the Board has ever voted to abandon the original site” identified in the report adopted by the SPLOST committee. Id. at 455 (2).
Contrary to appellants’ argument that our holding in Thornton, supra, required the trial court to uphold the decision to use the technology SPLOST funds for the Power to Learn initiative, we find the trial court correctly recognized that Thornton is factually distinguishable, given the holding that none of the plans by the school board in Thornton violated that particular SPLOST referendum, id., 270 Ga. at 635 (2), and indeed that the school board in that case had specifically advised the public during meetings and public fora conducted in anticipation of the referendum about the particular plan option it eventually chose to pursue. Id. at 634. In contrast, the evidence in this case authorized the trial court to find, as in Dickey, supra, that the general language in the referendum and ballot about technology improvements and technology systems referred to the proposed capital outlay projects detailed in the SPLOST notebook and that appellants were bound by these specifically delineated projects in the SPLOST notebook, just as the county Board in Dickey was bound by the SPLOST budget and account reports promulgated in that case. The evidence also authorized the trial court to reject appellants’ argument that the Power to Learn initiative was the functional equivalent of the SPLOST notebook project to “refresh
“Mandamus will issue only where the petitioner has demonstrated a clear legal right or a gross abuse of discretion. [Cit.]” City of Alpharetta v. Estate of C.R. Sims, 272 Ga. 680 (533 SE2d 692) (2000). The evidence authorized the trial court to find that appellants failed to comply with their clear legal duties when they sought to “rebudget” the original technology initiatives in favor of the Power to Learn initiative and that they abused their discretion when they abandoned the original initiatives even though those initiatives remained feasible of completion. See Dickey, supra, 262 Ga. at 456 (3). For the reasons set forth above, the trial court‘s ruling was consonant with our decisions in Thornton and Dickey, supra, and thus we reject appellants’ argument that appellee had no clear legal right to the mandamus relief granted in this case.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Benham, J., who concurs in the judgment only, and Sears, C. J., and Melton, J., who dissent.
MELTON, Justice, dissenting.
Neither case law nor statutory authority supports a finding that the Cobb County School Board abused its discretion by allocating SPLOST tax proceeds to a small pilot program of its Power to Learn initiative. In addition, a holding that the Cobb County School Board may be bound by its statements of intent contained in informational pamphlets and documents contradicts our constitution, the statutory authority contained in
This Court considered limitations on the use of SPLOST funds in Dickey v. Storey, 262 Ga. 452, 456 (3) (423 SE2d 650) (1992), regarding a referendum which approved a tax for the purposes of raising funds to construct “‘recreational facilities and multi-purpose governmental facilities.‘” Shortly after this referendum passed in August of 1998, the Floyd County Board of Commissioners acquired land for a softball complex (the “recreational facilities“) and for a civic center (the “multi-purpose governmental facilities“), and afterwards the Floyd County Board listed its projects and created a budget for them to track expenditures as required by
With regard to the change in location and size of the civic center, we determined that the Floyd County Board abused its discretion for several reasons: (1) the architectural plans for the civic center showed that the original site was suitable for building, despite the Floyd County Board‘s concern that it was in a flood plain; (2) the majority of the $2.5 million spent to develop the original site would be wasted if the civic center were moved, as all of the plans were site-specific; and (3) “there might never be funds with which to build the contemplated complex if the site... is changed, and substantial sums of SPLOST monies expended, following each election of members to the Board.” Dickey, supra at 455 (1). For these reasons, we affirmed the trial court‘s order requiring the Floyd County Board to proceed with the construction of the civic center at the original site. Therefore, because the prior Floyd County Board had chosen a suitable site and had already spent a very large amount of unrecoverable funds on that site, the subsequent Floyd County Board could not wholly abandon the original plans simply out of a personal preference to do so.
On the other hand, with regard to the purchase of a second parcel of land to construct the proposed softball complex, we reversed the trial court‘s finding that the Floyd County Board was required to
Then, in a more general sense, we considered the interaction of
Construing these Code sections, we hold that the Board is not authorized to use proceeds from the SPLOST tax for a purpose entirely different from that contained in the SPLOST budget and account reports. We further hold that the Board is bound by the SPLOST budget and account reports to complete all projects listed therein unless circumstances arise which dictate that projects which initially seemed feasible are no longer so. In this regard the governing authority has discretion to make adjustments in the plans for these projects, but may not abandon the projects altogether.
(Emphasis supplied.) Dickey, supra at 456. Thus, Dickey stands for the proposition that a governmental entity may not simply choose to wholly abandon projects set forth in the required SPLOST budget and account reports required under
We next considered the direct implications of Dickey in Thornton, supra. In Thornton, Clarke County voters approved a SPLOST tax for the stated purpose of, among other things, “provid[ing] funds to pay the cost of acquiring, constructing and equipping a new Cedar Shoals
The referendum authorizing the school projects contained a maximum dollar amount that could be raised by the one percent sales tax, but did not itemize an amount to be spent on each project. While the referendum addressed neither the $18 million for construction of a new high school, nor plans for the existing high school, these matters were discussed by school board members at public meetings. Because none of the school board‘s plans violates the referendum, we find no violation of law or an abuse of discretion if the school board were to demolish the existing high school or to spend more than the estimated $18 million for construction of a new school.
Id. at 635-636 (2). Importantly, we also held that, unlike situations where a governmental entity issues revenue bonds under
Read together, Dickey and Thornton set forth a specific jurisprudential framework for considering a taxpayer‘s claim that a governmental entity is misusing or misdirecting SPLOST tax proceeds. At the most general level, the legal determination must be made whether the governmental entity clearly abused its broad discretion in determining the manner in which public funds are allocated and disbursed. Powell v. Studsill, 264 Ga. 109 (2) (441 SE2d 52) (1994). In turn, this legal determination may be resolved based on three major underlying factual determinations. First, it must be determined whether the governmental entity is using SPLOST funds “exclusively for the purpose or purposes specified in the resolution or ordinance
Upon the application of this legal rubric to the facts of this case, it simply cannot be said that the Cobb County Board abused its discretion by allocating SPLOST proceeds to a small pilot project of its Power to Learn initiative.10 First, the SPLOST resolution listed as one of its purposes to make “system-wide technology improvements, including, but not limited to: acquisition and installation of instructional technology and information systems hardware and associated hardware at all schools and selected other facilities,” and the referendum, itself, indicated that it was raising funds for “new schools, land, additions, renovations, equipment, and technology systems.” In turn, the goal of the Power to Learn initiative is to provide technology systems in the form of laptop computers to all middle and high school students in the Cobb County School District. The Power to Learn initiative, therefore, clearly falls within the explicit purposes set forth in both the resolution and the referendum to provide technology systems to all schools, and the Cobb County Board cannot be said to have abused its discretion on this basis.
In addition, the use of SPLOST funds for the Power to Learn pilot program also comports with the purposes and projects set forth in the budget and accounting prepared by the Cobb County Board in
Furthermore, the record indicates that the Cobb County Board has not affirmatively voted to abandon any of the projects or purposes set forth in the resolution, the referendum, or the budget. To the contrary, the Cobb County Board maintains that it intends to fulfill each and every one of these projects and purposes. Cobb County Board members explained, however, that due to the changing nature, price, and availability of technology such as laptop computers and wireless network hardware and software, the price and scope of each technology project could not remain static. The discretion to make such adjustments in the plans for SPLOST projects and their budgets is explicitly allowed in both Dickey and Thornton. Although both of these cases indicate that a project cannot be wholly abandoned, they do not mandate that the scope and budget for a project cannot be increased or decreased as circumstances might require.11 Therefore,
Therefore, application of the clear statutory mandates and case law to the proper facts and evidence of record require a ruling that, in this case, the Cobb County Board did not abuse its broad discretion in its decision regarding the allocation of SPLOST proceeds to the pilot program of the Power to Learn initiative. As such, the trial court erred by finding that an abuse of discretion did, in fact, occur, and, for all of the reasons set forth above, that ruling should be reversed.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Sears concurs in this dissent.
DECIDED JUNE 12, 2006.
Brock, Clay & Calhoun, Carlton L. Kell, Carol A. Callaway, for appellants.
Roy E. Barnes, Allison B. Salter, John F. Salter, Jr., for appellee.