105 Ark. 278 | Ark. | 1912
(after stating the facts). The ordinance in regard to the impounding of animals in the city of Fort Smith provides that it shall be the duty of the chief of police to sell them under the orders of the police court. The testimony in this case shows that the sale was conducted by the day captain of police, and that the chief of police was not present at the sale, and, for aught that appears from the record, the chief of police did not know that the sale was to take place or that it did take place. The chief of police being the person designated to conduct the sale, the sale could be made only by him, or at least must be made under his immediate direction and supervision; that is to say, if he were present, he might employ an auctioneer or other person to cry the sale. It follows that there is no testimony tending to show that the defendant Johnston converted the horses to his own use.
It is contended by the defendants that the court erred in instructing the jury that the burden of proof was upon them to show that the ordinance in regard to the impounding of animals had been strictly complied with to justify an action brought against them by the owner of the horses, but their contention in this respect has been determined against them by the principles announced in the case of the city of Fort Smith, v. Dodson, 51 Ark. 447.
It is finally insisted by the defendants that the court erred in giving the following instruction:
“If the defendants, or either of them, purposely or knowingly misled plaintiff as to the horses being in the pound, such defendant so purposely or knowingly misleading him would be liable, notwithstanding .the ordinances were complied with in the impounding and sale of the horses.”
We agree with the defendants in this contention. As we have already seen, there is no testimony in the record upon which to base a verdict against the defendant Johnston; In regard to the defendant Williams, it may be said that there is no testimony tending to show that he made any statement whatever to the plaintiff in regard to the horses prior to the sale. What he said to the plaintiff was said after the sale had been made and after Williams had disposed of the horses. Hence there was no testimony in the record upon which to .predicate such an instruction against him. The necessary effect of the instruction was to confuse and mislead the jury, and the instruction is therefore prejudicial.
For the errors indicated, the judgment must be reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial.