127 Mo. App. 377 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1907
Defendant appealed from a judgment ousting him from the office of alderman in the third ward of the city of Kirkwood, a city of the fourth class. Defendant was elected to that office April 3, 1906, and at the time of his election was a resident of the ward, but on April 26, 1907, he changed his residence into the second ward, of the city and has since dwelt there. The information charges that since his change of residence, defendant has usurped the office of alderman of the third ward.
The appeal depends on the construction to be given to section 5911 of the Revised Statutes of 1899, which prescribes the qualifications of aldermen of cities of the fourth class, saying no person shall be an alderman unless he is twenty-one years of age, a citizen of the United States, an inhabitant of the city for one year next preceding the election and a resident of the ward from which he is elected. The contention of defendant’s counsel is that said section prescribes the qualifications which render a person eligible to be elected to the office of alderman, but not qualifications essential to his continuing to hold the office after he is elected. The qualifications of the latter sort are said to be prescribed in section 5916 of the statutes, which says all officers elected or appointed to offices under the city government shall be qualified voters, and that no person shall be elected or appointed to any office who shall at the time be in arrears for unpaid city taxes, or forfeiture or defalcation in office, or who is not a resident of the city. It is apparent on the face of section 5916 that defendant’s contention regarding its interpretation is incorrect. It is true the catchwords of the section are “Requisite Qualifications for Holding Office;” but the body of the section prescribes what qualifications a person shall have in order to be eligible for election or appointment to any office in a city of the fourth class, as well as to hold it afterwards. Sec
“Nor are we impressed with the reasons that relator seems to think actuated the Legislature in refusing representation to the new wards till a general election. Taxation without representation has ever been resisted in the United States. When we consider that according to the allegations of the relator’s petition a new territory as large as the old city had been added to the city and that the city council might project pub-
Several incongruities arise if we accept the reasoning of defendant’s counsel. If a person elected alderman is a resident of the ward on the day of the election, but immediately moves into another ward, he could serve his two years’ term. And if all the aldermen of a city should happen to move into one ward during their respective terms of office, they would still constitute the board of aldermen. Such contingencies are opposed to the policy of the statute, which policy is to require aldermen to be residents of the ward, not only when elected but during their terms of office. As supporting this view we refer to the decisions in State ex rel. v. Orr, 61 Ohio St. 384, and Commonwealth v. Yeakel, 13 Co. Ct. (Pa.) 615.
A careful brief has been presented by defendant’s counsel and many authorities arrayed in support of their proposition; but we think these cases are not in point because the question before us turns on the particular language of our statute and such a statute was not before the courts in the cases cited. In one case the question was whether the office in controversy was local within the meaning of a statute providing that “local offices” should become vacant on the removal of their incumbents from the districts for which they were elected. [State ex rel. Atty.-Gen. v. Board of Supervisors, 21 Wis. 443.] In Smith v. State, 24 Ind. 101, the statute construed said no more than that one county commissioner should be elected from the residents of
The judgment is affirmed.