121 Wash. 608 | Wash. | 1922
The purpose of this action was to recover damages for personal injuries claimed to have been due to the negligence of the defendant. One of the defenses pleaded was that of contributory negligence. The cause came on for trial before the court and a jury. At the conclusion of the plaintiffs’ evidence, the defendant made a motion for nonsuit, which was sustained upon the ground of contributory negligence. From the judgment entered dismissing the action, the plaintiffs appeal. The appellants are husband and wife. The respondent is a corporation.
It was a clear day and nothing was present to obstruct her vision. In her testimony, Mrs. Johnson says that she thought there was a step at the end of the plank, and that the failure to have a step there was what caused her fall. She did not look to see if there were such a step, but walked off the gang plank without using her faculties to determine whether the employees had placed a step at the end of the plank before the passengers alighted.
Without deciding, it will be assumed that, under the facts as presented in the record, the question of negligence on the part of the respondent was one for the jury. The controlling question, however, is that of contributory negligence. The law requires a person to use his faculties so as to avoid danger, if he can reasonably do so, and failure in that regard, if it contributes to the injury, will prevent a recovery, and a person will be deemed to have actually seen what could
It is argued that whether Mrs. Johnson’s negligence contributed to the injury was a question which should have been submitted to the jury, but the undisputed facts show that the thing which caused the injury was the failure of Mrs. Johnson to use her faculties when, if she had looked, she could have seen that no step had been placed at the end of the plank.
The argument in appellants’ brief takes a somewhat wider range than this opinion would seem to indicate, but the question which is determinative of the controversy is that of Mrs. Johnson’s contributory negligence, which was such as would, as a matter of law, prevent a recovery.
The judgment will be affirmed.
Parker, C. J., Holcomb, Mackintosh, and Hovey, JJ., concur.