89 P. 677 | Kan. | 1907
The opinion of the court was delivered by
The parties to this action are farmers, living, near each other, in Phillips county. Veneman was injured by a prairie fire and sued Johnson for damages sustained thereby.
There was a strip of burned ground more’than forty rods wide between the burning straw stack and where the fire started in the grass south of Johnson’s field. The jury found that the fire which burned the property of Veneman originated on the premises of Johnson, and escaped therefrom through his negligence. This finding was approved by the court.
It is contended here by the plaintiff in error that the evidence fails to establish any negligence on his part, but on the contrary shows that he exercised the utmost care and prudence in setting out and managing the fire on his premises; that he selected the most favorable timé possible for such a fire, the weather being unusually calm, clear and bright; that the straw stack, while on fire, was surrounded' with such a wide stretch of land freshly burned that no person would think it possible for fire to escape therefrom.
It may be conceded that farmers may set out fires on their premises for proper' agricultural purposes, and when done and cared for with proper prudence and diligence they will not be liable for damages resulting
In this case the jury found that Johnson was guilty of negligence. The verdict might well have been otherwise. It appears from the evidence, however, that a straw stack was left on 'fire which would necessarily ' continue to burn, if permitted to do so, for more than twenty-four hours; that although the fire was set out while the weather was calm and fair, yet it was in March, when strong winds might be expected at any time. Johnson says that he watched the burning stack all the following night, because he was afraid that fire would be blown therefrom and set out a new fire in the adjoining grass-land. This shows that he did not feel secure even with the wide margin of burned stubble-ground that surrounded the stack. A jury taken from the county where a prairie fire occurs is an eminently competent and proper tribunal to decide finally all questions of negligence relating thereto, and when so determined this court cannot disturb the finding, except for rare and exceptional reasons. In this case we are asked to do so because there is no evidence of negligence on the part of Johnson. No other question is presented.
We think the jury would have been justified in finding otherwise, but we cannot say that there is no evidence of negligence on the part of the plaintiff in error, and therefore the judgment is affirmed.