Following a trial by jury, Angel Johnson was convicted of two counts of involuntary manslaughter, one count of cruelty to children in the second degree, and one count of making a false statement to law enforcement. Johnson appeals from these convictions, arguing that (1) the evidence was insufficient to find that her actions were the proximate cause of the victims’ deaths and injuries, and (2) even if the issue of causation was purely a question for the jury, the trial court erred in failing to give her requested instructions as to proximate cause. For the reasons set forth infra, we affirm.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict,
On the day in question, December 10, 2010, at 3:35 p.m., Johnson and Pinkney left the three older children—who Johnson claimed were napping—alone in the apartment while they took K. P to pick up and cash Johnson’s paycheck. They returned to the apartment approximately 30 minutes later to find the children still sleeping. Then, later that afternoon, Johnson, Pinkney, and K. P again left the sleeping older children alone while they picked up fast food. Johnson again reported that the children were still asleep when they returned.
Later that evening, around 9:00 p.m., Johnson put the three oldest children to bed together in the same room with the space heater turned on. And once the children were asleep, Johnson, Pinkney, and K. P again left the apartment. But before doing so, Johnson shut the bedroom door, blocked the apartment’s hallway with a sofa, and blocked access to the kitchen using a table. Johnson later explained that she did these things because one of her children was capable of unlocking the front door, and another child had previously knocked over a lamp, which had burned the floor.
After leaving the apartment this third time, Johnson and Pink-ney first stopped by a friend’s home and then went to purchase food at Burger King at 10:32 p.m., which was confirmed by the receipt’s timestamp. Johnson and Pinkney then took food back to their friend before returning home to the apartment. According to a witness who was familiar with Pinkney’s white Escalade, she did not see the vehicle when she arrived at the apartment complex at 10:45 p.m. This same witness indicated that she could smell something burning in the building at the time of her arrival. Johnson and Pinkney returned to the apartment complex shortly after this witness (between 10:45 p.m. and 10:50 p.m.), at which point they were observed exiting Pinkney’s Escalade with K. P. still in his car seat.
Once Johnson opened the door to the apartment, she could smell smoke emanating from within, and she jumped over the sofa to access the children’s smoke-filled room, where she found them in their beds. Johnson grabbed A. Q. while Pinkney grabbed D. Q., and they attempted to resuscitate the children outside of the apartment. Neighbors heard Johnson scream at approximately 10:55 p.m., and one called 911 for assistance at 10:57 p.m. Another neighbor, after hearing that a third child remained inside the apartment, ran in to retrieve two-year-old M. Q., who he found on the sofa blocking the hallway. M. Q. was alive, but skin was peeling away from his body.
Three-year-old D. Q. was also transported to the hospital and, although he lacked a pulse and was not breathing, paramedics attempted to resuscitate him. D. Q. was pronounced dead at the hospital. His body was burned and blistered, and black mucous and soot were found in his airway, with smoke inhalation the determined cause of death. Four-year-old A. Q. was pronounced dead at the scene. Like her brother, A. Q.’s body was burned and blistered, and smoke inhalation was the determined cause of death.
In the children’s bedroom, firefighters found the walls covered with smoke and soot stains, and the space heater was discovered lying face down on or near one of the children’s mattresses. In addition to the mattresses, the room was also filled with other combustible materials, including blankets, toys, and bunk beds. And when firefighters entered the room, the space heater was still plugged in and running, the unit lacking an automatic cut-off switch that would have triggered when it tipped over. Finally, although the fire had smoldered out after approximately 45 minutes, most likely because the bedroom door was shut (which also prohibited the smoke detector from alerting), firefighters still extinguished “hot spots” upon arrival, including burning embers on the mattress.
During an interview with law enforcement, Johnson told an investigator that she was outside smoking a cigarette before discovering the fire, and she denied having left the apartment complex. But she later admitted to law enforcement that she had in fact been away from the apartment when the fire started, and she testified to the same at trial and admitted that her original statement to law enforcement was false.
Johnson was subsequently convicted of two counts of involuntary manslaughter as to A. Q. andD. Q., one count of cruelty to children in the second degree as to M. Q., and one count of making a false statement to law enforcement.
1. First, Johnson argues that no rational finder of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that her “act of leaving her children alone in her apartment was unlawful or that it was the proximate cause of their injuries.” In other words, she challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support her convictions for involuntary manslaughter and cruelty to children in the second degree.
At the outset, we note that when a criminal conviction is appealed, the appellant no longer enjoys a presumption of innocence.
A person commits involuntary manslaughter “in the commission of an unlawful act when he causes the death of another human being without any intention to do so by the commission of an unlawful act other than a felony.”
did unlawfully while in the commission of Reckless Conduct, a misdemeanor, cause the death[s] of [A. Q.], a four-year-old human child [and D. Q., a three-year-old human child], by consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk that [her] acts would cause harm and endanger the safety of. . . [A. Q. and D. Q.] in that the accused person[ did leave . . . four-year-old [A. Q.] [and three-year-old D. Q.] without adult supervision in said accused person[’s] home, residence, and dwelling place[,] ... [A. Q. and D. Q.] being left by the accused person[ ] with ... a two-year-old child in a bedroom with a space heater which caught fire to items in the bedroom thereby inflicting injuries and death upon . . . four-year-old [A. Q.] [and three-year-old D. Q.] by smoke inhalation, such disregard by the accused person[ ] being a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation.
As for cruelty to children in the second degree, a person commits this offense when “such person with criminal negligence causes a child under the age of 18 cruel or excessive physical or mental pain[.]”
with criminal negligence, cause [M. Q.], a two-year-old child, cruel and excessive physical pain by consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk that [her] acts would case harm and endanger the safety of. . . [M. Q.] in that the accused person[ ] did leave . . . two-year-old [M. Q.] without adult supervision in [the] accused person[’s] home, residence, and dwelling place[,] said two-year-old [M. Q.] being left by the accused person[ ] with a three-year-old child and a four-year-old child in a bedroom with a space heater which caught fire to items in the bedroom thereby inflicting injuries upon . . . two-year-old [M. Q.] and burning him, such disregard by the accused person[ ] being a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation.
Our Supreme Court has recognized that “[b]oth cruelty to children in the second degree and reckless conduct are crimes involving criminal negligence.”
2. Johnson next argues that even if the evidence was sufficient to sustain her convictions and that the question of proximate cause was solely for the jury, the trial court nevertheless committed reversible error by failing to give her requested instructions as to proximate cause. Once again, we disagree.
Jury instructions must be read and considered “as a whole in determining whether
Here, Johnson requested numerous instructions as to proximate cause, but the trial court declined to give Johnson’s specific requested instructions. Instead, the record reflects thatthe trial court instructed the jury, in relevant part, as follows:
A person commits involuntary manslaughter when that person causes the death of another human being without any intention to do so by the commission of the offense of reckless conduct.
In that connection, I charge you that the offense of reckless conduct is defined as follows: A person who causes bodily harm to or endangers the bodily safety of another person by consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk that her acts or omissions will cause harm or endanger the safety of the other person and the disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation commits the offense of reckless conduct.
An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act whenever it appears from the evidence in the case that the act played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury and damage and that the injury and damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act.
A person commits the offense of cruelty to children in the second degree when such person with criminal negligence causes a child under the age of 18 cruel or excessive physical or mental pain.
Criminal negligence is an act which demonstrates a willful, wanton, or reckless disregard for the safety of others who might reasonably be expected to be injured thereby.16
Our Supreme Court has explained that “[pjroximate causation imposes liability for the reasonably foreseeable results of criminal (or, in the civil context, tortious) conduct if there is no sufficient, independent, and unforeseen intervening cause.”
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
See, e.g., Muse v. State,
It is undisputed that Pinkney was indicted for the same offenses as Johnson and pleaded guilty to them on March 3, 2015. Pinkney is not a party to this appeal.
Johnson does not challenge her conviction for making a false statement to law enforcement.
Arbegast v. State,
Jackson v. Virginia,
Miller v. State,
OCGA § 16-5-3 (a).
OCGA § 16-5-60 (b).
OCGA § 16-5-70 (c).
Corvi v. State,
OCGA § 16-2-1 (b); accord Corvi,
See Bohannon v. State,
See Johnson v. State,
Kinsey v. State,
Kinsey,
(Emphasis supplied.)
State v. Jackson,
See Flournoy v. State,
See Kinsey,