102 Ala. 1 | Ala. | 1893
Lead Opinion
Before entering upon the trial of this case upon its merits, the defendant, by his counsel, moved to quash the venire of thfe petit jury which had been drawn and summoned for the, then, present week of the term. We mean the regular panel drawn and summoned to do jury service for that week ; not the jury specially drawn to complete the number required in capital cases. Several grounds were assigned in support of the motion, but only one is insisted on . here, namely, that when the names were drawn, the work of determining who were suitable and qualified persons to do jury service in the county had not been completed by placing their names' in the box, and that, consequently, the names composing the panel were drawn from an imperfect list of names. The venire for summoning these jurors was issued March 8, 1893, and the drawing must have takén place before that time. The term of the court, as fixed by law, would commence early in April, and the drawing must needs take place about the time it did, to meet legal requirements.
The facts attending the drawing were shown by the undisputed testimony of the president of the jury commission, and were as follows: “The jury commission met the day after the adjournment of the last term of the court of county commissioners for the year 1892, and commenced their duties as jury commissioners, and adjourned from time to time until the 30th day of March, 1893. The jury commission found it necessary to draw the venire 'in this case from the box containing all the names of qualified j urors of the county which had been selected and put upon the list at the time of the drawing of said venire ; and that the selection and list were only partially made, and had not been completed at the time of the drawing of said venire, and at the time it was .received by the clerk of the court; and that said selection and list were not completed until the 29th day of March ; and the certified copy thereof Was filed m the office of the judge of probate on the 30th day of March, 1893.”
For several years Jefferson has been a mining and manufacturing county, and it is common knowledge that in such communities population is more or less variable. To obtain a complete census of such county, or of any
Another thought: When the jury box is once filled to be drawn from, the law makes no provision for refilling the box until all the names are drawn out. The intention and purpose of this legislation were to equalize, as far as could be accomplished, the burden of jury service among all the persons qualified therefor. It is not regarded as an occupation to be sought after. Now, when many drawings have been made, and the number of names left in the box has become relatively small, it follows necessarily that in trials had in these conditions the jury must be drawn from the reduced number left in the box. It would be difficult to formulate an argument that the accused had been denied a legal right in this case, which would not include in its condemnation all organizations of juries, if accompanied with the attendants we have supposed. The argument proves too much.
We do not wish to be understood as saying that in no case should the array or venire be quashed because drawn from an incomplete list. If the process of filling the box had been carried to only a very limited extent, or if any circumstance attending the drawing gave evidence that it had not been fairly and impartially conducted, we will not say the presiding judge should not quash the venire. The right of trial by an impartial jury is a constitutional privilege, sanctioned by long observance, and should at all times be jealously guarded as one of the essential safeguards against the abuse of official power. But such abuse is not presumed. It must be shown, to authorize the imputation of error.
The most severely contested question in this case arises out of the admission in evidence of what is claimed to have been the dying declaration of the deceased. The mortal wound was inflicted Friday night. On Saturday the declaration was carefully written by a justice of the peace, from statements made by the wounded man, and in his presence. It was then read over to declarant, some alterations or additions made to it at his suggestion, then signed by him and sworn to before the justice, and certified as being sworn to. Declarant had not then lost all hope of recovery. On Sunday evening the justice of the peace called to the attention of -thq
We can not doubt, in view of the testimony, that when Kimbro, the wounded man, made the reply on Sunday evening that the statement was true, “every word of it,” he had then lost all hope of recovery. Many expressions of his, and his really desperate condition prove this. It is not required that the declaration should be made in articulo mortis. It is enough that it be made after the infliction of the mortal wound, and after all hope of recovery is surrendered. Such is the rule in this State. — Hammil v. State, 90 Ala. 577; 3 Brick. Dig., 226.
When the declaration was made, written down and sworn to, Kimbro had not lost all hope of recovery. • The declaration proves this to be true. It is shown, however, that when, on the next day, Sunday, he affirmed the truth of the statement previously made, he had then given up all expectation or hope of recovery. It is objected to the legality and sufficiency of 'this testimony that the paper containing the declaration was not then re-read to him, before he asserted its truth. This precise question has been many times presented, and the ruling has been that a re-reading is not a necessary prerequisite to its admissibility in evidence. Sufficient that the declarant retains his reasoning faculties, and affirms the correctness of the statement made, after he has given up all hope of recovery. — 6 Amer. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, 116-7; Whar. Cr. Ev., § 287; Reg. v. Steele, 12 Cox. Or. Ca. 168; Young v. Com., 6 Bush. (Ky. Rep.) 312; Mockabee v. Com., 78 Ky. 380; State v. McEvoy, 9 Rich. (S. C.) 208; Snell v. State, 29 Tex. Ct. of App.236; s. c. 15 S. W. Rep. 722; People v. Hodgdon, 55 Cal. 72; People v. Gray, 61 Cal. 164.
There were several motions made to .exclude parts of the declaration, as not being sufficiently connected with the act of killing to justify their admission as parts of the res gestae. Each of these motions was overruled, and separate exceptions were reserved to each ruling. The portions which defendant moved to exclude were decedent's statement as to where he was, and what he
Defendant testified that he was passing the gate of deceased, that the latter, standing at his gate, hailed him, and immediately commenced the angry altercation. All the testimony agrees that the quarrel was very brief, and that the pistol shot followed very quickly upon the meeting. These two accounts presented a well defined and striking issue of fact for the jury to solve. Presented as this issue was — in fact, in every conceivable case, in which it becomes material to ascertain the matter of bringing on a difficulty — the position, occupation, conduct and manner of'the respective parties at the time the quarrel had its inception, are pertinent circumstances to be weighed in determining who was the aggressor. They shed light on what was done, and are incidents of the main fact. That is the true test. — 21 Amer. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, 99, and notes.
If there had been a motion to exclude the words, uttered by declarant, in which he stated his purpose in pulling off his shoes — “to retire” — and if the motion had been confined to these words alone, we will not say it should have been refused. These simply expressed his own mental purpose, were not given expression to, and could shed no light on the main inquiry. But there was no motion made to exclude these words alone. Each motion asked the exclusion of some asserted fact which tended to show where deceased was, and what he was engaged in, at the very time he was called out. The entire statement objected to, and each part of it, save that which expressed his intention in pulling off his shoes, were material and pertinent to the inquiry, as tq
McCoy was examined as a witness for the defendant, and testified that he saw the encounter in which Kimbro lost his life. He testified favorably to the defendant. He was asked by the prosecution, with a view of assailing his testimony, if he had not said in the presence of one Hamilton that he knew nothing about the difficulty. He answered that he had. To counteract any effect this might have on the weight to be given his testimony, he was asked by the defendant to state the reason why he made said statement, and was proceeding to state that his reason was that he “did not want to talk about the subject at all.” On motion of the prosecution, this and other similar questions and answers were ruled out, and defendant excepted. It is the rule of this court, many times assorted, that uncommunicated motives or intentions wil] not be allowed to be proved, as a means of weakening or imparing the force of conduct or conversation proved, which, unexplained, tends to prejudice the claim set up, or attempted to be established. We think our rule a good one, although in many States the rule is otherwise. The trial court did not err in excluding the testimony. — McCormick v. Joseph, 77 Ala. 236; Whizenant v. State, 71 Ala. 383; Burke v. State, 71 Ala. 377; Brewer v. Watson, Ib. 299; Brown v. State, 79 Ala. 51; Harrison v. State, 78 Ala. 5.
There was a motion made by the defendant for a continuance on account of absent witnesses, with separate written affidavits setting forth what they were severally expected to prove. There was an admission that witnesses, if present, would testify as therein set forth. As to one of the absent witnesses, Crowell, whose name was also embraced in the showing, there was a misunderstanding, but it was not discovered until the affidavit setting forth his testimony was offered in evidence, and, on motion of the prosecution, ruled out The testimony pertaining to the admission is set out, that given against,
Counsel for the defendant, after consultation, declined to move that the case be taken*from the jury and continued, “but wished to submit whether it was not the duty of the court, of its own motion, to continue the cause.” In reply to this, “the court stated that, at this stage of the trial,, the court had no right of its own motion to continue the cause.”
We need not decide whether, if the defendant had moved to take the case from the jury and continue it, it would not have been legal and proper to do so. As a rule, no one can object to a judicial ruling which is rendered at his request. 'But no such motion was made. Clearly the court had no power of its own motion to make such order ; and if it had done so, the defendant, would have been entitled to his discharge. He made no motion, and can not be beard to complain that the trial was conducted to the end. — Ned v. The State, 7 Por. 187; McCauley v. The State, 26 Ala. 135; Henry v. The State, 33 Ala. 389; Ex parte Vincent, 43 Ala. 402; Bell & Murray v. The State, 48 Ala. 684; McGehee v. The State, 58 Ala. 360; Hawes v. The State, 88 Ala. 37.
Arising, as this question did, while the trial was in progress, the only recourse open to the defendant after the verdict was rendered, would have been a motion for a new trial, on account of the misunderstanding and consequent surprise. No such motion appears to have been made, and we need not speculate as to what would or should have been its fate, if it had been made.
Other questions were raised pending the introduction of the testimony, but we think there is no merit in them.
Thirteen written charges were severally asked by de
Charges six and eight a.ssert the broad, naked proposition, that good character alone may generate a doubt of defendant’s guilt. These charges are faulty in two respects. They employ the single word doubt, instead of reasonable doubt, which the rule requires. Second, they assert broadly that proof of good character may generate a doubt. The charge, to meet the requirements of the rule, should have been that “good character, when considered in connection with the other evidence in the case, may generate a reasonable doubt, &c. — Pate v. State, 94 Ala. 14; Johnson v. State, 94 Ala. 35. These charges were rightly refused.
Charge seven asserts, that mere words of provocation may be sufficient to arouse passion to such a degree, as that a homicide committed under its influence can not be murder in either degree. This is not the law. — Reese v. State, 90 Ala. 624; Ex parte Sloane, 95 Ala. 22.
Charges 9, 11 and 12 employ severally the words, “suppositions,” “hypotheses” and “theories,” and assert if two of-them “may be drawn,” or “may arise,” out of the testimony, one consistent with the defendant’s innocence, and the other tending to establish his guilt, the defendant should be acquitted. These charges are faulty in several respects. Supposition has no legitimate sphere or habitation in judicial administration. So, in the connection in which they were invoked,-the words hypotheses and theories have very doubtful and indefinite significations It is certainly the law that if the testimony in As weight and effect be such, as that two
Charge 10 sets out with the postulate that if the accused was “properly and reasonably free from fault in provoking, or encouraging the difficulty,” &c. On this postulate it claims an acquittal. The charge was rightly refused. To invoke the doctrine of self-defense, the slayer must be without fault in provoking, or bringing on the difficulty. This doctrine is too important, too conservative of human life and of good order, to allow it to be frittered away. — Storey v. State, 71 Ala. 329, 336, and citations; McDaniel v. State, 76 Ala. 1; Kirby v. State, 89 Ala. 63; Watkins v. State, Ib. 82.
Charge 13 seems to be incomplete, but we must deal with it as we find it. Its language is, “That in passing on the evidence, if the jury finds the evidence is' in conflict on any particular, it is the duty of the jury to reconcile the conflict, if it can, favorably to the defendant.” Not to notice any other clause of the charge, the word reasonably ought to have been inserted, as a qualification of the attempted duty to reconcile. If they reasonably can, is the extent of their power and duty, and they should not attempt any reconciliation which is not reasonable, and justified by the language employed. This duty to reconcile, if they reasonably can, is due alike to the State and to the accused. It is due to the solemn oaths the jurors take. It is faithfully and honestly discharged when giving fair play to their reasoning faculties, and according to the accused the benefit of every reasonable doubt which arises out of the testimony, or its omissions, their verdict is the honest expression of the effect the testimony has produced on their minds and judgments, under the law as delivered to them in the charge of the court. This charge is. imperfect, would have tended to mislead, and was rightly refused.
Affirmed.
Rehearing
RESPONSE TO APPLICATION EOR REHEARING.
We are satisfied with the opinion delivered heretofore in this case, by the late Chief Justice, Stone, except in the particulars we now proceed to notice. The facts on the questions we refer to need not be restated, further than to explain more fully the views we now take, different from those announced in the former opinion.
First. In our former opinion, we held that the court committed no error in rilling that the witness, McCoy, could not be allowed, on rebutting examination by defendant, whose witness he was, to explain his motive in telling the State’s witness, Hamilton, that he knew nothing about the matter. According to our repeated rulings, it is certainly well settled, that witnesses are not permitted to testify to their motives, belief, or in- ' tentions, when secret and uncommunicated, such motives and intentions when relevant, being for the determination of the jury ; and it is not our purpose to question this rule, now too well settled to be disturbed. To have admitted this evidence would not, however, have infringed the 'rule.
’• The witness on his cross-examination by the State, conducted with the view of impeaching him, hacl, as we have seen, made an answer to the question, which, unexplained, tended to throw discredit on his evidence. To refuse to allow him, under such circumstances, to ex•plain his motive in making the statement, would violate well established rules. Mr. Greenleaf says: “Common
Second. On are-argument of the cause, and a re-examination of the question, we are led to the conclusion, that the jury which tried this defendant was illegally organized. Section 3 of the act of 28th February, 1887, (Cr. Code, p. 132), requires the jury commissioners to -prepare a list of all persons between 21 and 60 years of age, who are qualified by the terms of said act to serve as jurors ; and section 4, — copied in the main opinion,— gives specific directions how grand and petit jurors are to be drawn from the jury-box. We may fairly assume, from common knowledge, and from the internal evidence furnished by the terms of the act itself, and the statutes it replaced, that one of the main purposes of the legislature in this enactment was to remove, as far as practicable, all opportunity for any officer, or set of officers, to select out of his or their own heads'a jury to try a party indicted for crime, or to pack one in his favor. The temptations to organize a jury for the occasion to acquit or convict, as the person or persons selecting them might desire, were too great, and the consequences to the welfare of the cummunity and State too serious, not to provide as ample safe-guards as practicable against such a practice, and secure a fair and honest administration of the criminal- law of the land.
To this end, the statute requires the commissioners to take an oath to faithfully discharge the duties required of them by the act, to keep secret the counsel of themselves and their associates, and not to declare the name
We have referred thus particularly to the precaution
Section 12 of said act provides, that if, at any time, when said jury commission meets to draw the juries, as provided in sections 4 and 6 of the act, there should be an insufficient number of jurors’ names in the jury-box from which to draw the necessary juries therein required, then, it is made their duty to proceed, as required by said sections 3 and 4 of said act, to provide the necessary list of jurors and place the same in the said jury-box, and proceed to complete the drawings of said j uries.
At the time the defendant’s trial came on, the box having before .that been exhausted, the commissioners had only partially completed the list and box, preparatory for use in future trials. G. L. Thomas, president of the jury commission, testified, that “the jury commission found it necessary to draw the venire in this case from the box containing all the „ names of qualified jurors of the county which had been selected and put upon the list at the time of the drawing of said venire, and that the selection and list were only partially made and had not been completed at the time of the drawing of said venire, and at the time it was received by the clerk, and said selection and lists were not completed until the 29th day of March” (1893).
To proceed to draw from the box a jury to try the defendant, under such circumstances, was a violation of law, and against its whole spirit and policy. We would not intimate any unfairness on the part of the commisioners in arranging this box with reference to this or any other criminal case in that court, or that they were not proceeding fairly to discharge their duties. We have no evidence to lead us to suspect such a thing ; but, if such a practice as we review were held to be lawful, it removes one of the safeguards provided by the legislature against the possibility of having an unfair selection of jurors put upon a defendant.
It is no answer to our conclusion, that criminals tried under this law, after the first and successive drawings from said box, have fewer persons than the whole number first in the box, from which to have juries made up. This is the chance the law, and not the commissioners, puts upon them. The one results by operation of law from the drawing of previous juries, and the other may arise from the evil purpose of the parties making up the jury-box. To have completed the lists and filled the box as required by sections 3 and 4 of said act, after it had been exhausted, was mandatory and not directory to the commissioners, before any drawing therefrom by themselves or the court could proceed.
We see no reason why these commissioners may not, if they are diligent, always have these lists made and the box filled in time to prevent delay and expense to the county in the drawing and empanelling of jurors. But, if for any reason, ‘ they have failed to have the box in readiness for the trial in the manner required by the statute, and delay in trials occurs in consequence, better that, than proceed in violation of the letter and spirit of the statute.
When for any cause, the court may not be able, in the trial of a capital case, to proceed under this statute to
The foregoing are the only two grounds to which our attention has been called, which lead ns to correct our former rulings in this case. In other respects we find no error in the record, and the original opinion stands affirmed.
Reversed and remanded.
