¶ 1 We granted certiorari in this case to determine whether a district court may order nunc pro tunc resentencing of a defendant without first determining that the defendant satisfies the jurisdictional prerequisites of the Post-Conviction Remedies Act (“PCRA”).
¶2 Our recently issued opinion in Manning v. State
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶ 3 In 1993, the Kane County attorney initiated proceedings charging Johnson with forty counts of various crimes (the “first case”). After entering and then withdrawing a guilty plea, Johnson filed a petition seeking a competency evaluation. The district court granted the petition and ordered that Johnson “be examined for competency” to stand trial.
¶ 4 While the first case was still pending, Johnson was charged with assault in a separate criminal proceeding (the “second case”). The district court also ordered a competency examination in that case.
¶ 5 On March 21, 1997, the district court held a status conference on the first and second cases. While the court acknowledged receipt of the competency evaluations during this hearing, it spent the majority of the hearing considering a motion to withdraw that had been filed by Johnson’s attorney. It failed to allow Johnson to testify or to present or cross-examine witnesses regarding his competency, as required by Utah law.
¶ 6 At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw, but required that counsel serve in a standby capacity during the trial in the first ease, which was scheduled for some three months later. The court made no formal findings regarding Johnson’s competency and held no further hearings on the competency issue.
¶ 7 Johnson did not appear at his trial in the first case, claiming that he was mentally incapacitated. In his absence, he was convicted of one count each of possession and production of a narcotic and possession of a firearm by a restricted person. Johnson was similarly absent from his sentencing. Although the sentencing order indicates that Johnson had thirty days within which to appeal, it is unclear whether this information was conveyed to Johnson. Johnson failed to file a timely appeal of his conviction in the first ease.
¶ 8 Johnson was similarly convicted in the second case. He did, however, timely appeal that conviction. On appeal, Johnson asserted that the district court failed to follow the competency hearing procedures set forth in Utah Code section 62A-15-631(9)(b) through (9)(f).
¶ 9 In May 2001, Johnson filed a petition under the PCRA seeking relief from his conviction in the first case. Johnson asserted that he was entitled to relief because of the flawed competency hearing, ineffective assis
¶ 10 Noting that Johnson had failed to file his PCRA petition within the one-year statute of limitations, the district court recognized the possibility of “extend[ing] the deadline in the interest of justice.” But rather than pursuing that course, the district court opted to resentence Johnson nunc pro tunc, thereby reviving his right to file a direct appeal:
Petitioner has asked that I exercise that discretion [to extend the limitations period] because, he says agents of the respondent prevented him from meeting the deadline. Assuming respondent denies this, the only way to resolve the dispute is to listen to witnesses testify about events.
While this is a potential resolution, the cleaner and more effective method would be to resentence the defendant in the criminal case so that his right to appeal is renewed. The main issues that he raises in this case are issues that should have been raised in an appeal. I would like to provide him that opportunity, should he desire to avail himself of it.
¶ 11 The State filed an interlocutory appeal, and the court of appeals vacated the district court’s resentencing order.
¶ 12 We granted certiorari to decide whether a district court may resentence a deféndant nunc pro tunc without first determining whether that defendant complied with the limitations period of the PCRA or satisfied the interests of justice exception to that limitation.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 13 “On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of appeals for correctness.”
ANALYSIS
¶ 14 We begin by addressing the question on which we granted certiorari — whether written factual findings are a prerequisite to application of the interests of justice exception under the PCRA. But our resolution of that question does not entirely resolve Johnson’s claim because the district court ordered that Johnson be resentenced nunc pro tunc, thereby allowing him to proceed with a direct appeal and obviating the need for him to proceed under the PCRA. Prior to our recent decision in Manning, resentencing nunc pro tunc was an appropriate remedy for a defendant who had been unconstitutionally denied his right to appeal. Our opinion in Manning replaced nunc pro tunc resentencing with a new procedure for reinstating a defendant’s
I. DISTRICT COURTS ARE REQUIRED TO MAKE FACTUAL FINDINGS JUSTIFYING APPLICATION OF THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE EXCEPTION
¶ 15 To obtain relief under the PCRA, a petitioner must seek relief “within one year after the cause of action has accrued.”
¶ 16 The PCRA contains an explicit bar to any petition that is not brought within one year of the cause of action accruing. But the limitations period is not absolute. It contains a safety valve providing the district court with discretion to excuse any untimely filing when the interests of justice so require. We have recognized that a district court presented with an untimely post-conviction petition must consider the interests of justice exception before disposing of the petition.
¶ 17 We hold that factual findings supporting the application of the interests of justice exception are required. In other words, a district court may not grant relief on an untimely petition without identifying the interests of justice that excuse the untimely filing. This conclusion is dictated by the statutory language and supported by practical considerations.
¶ 18 We begin with the plain language of the PCRA. The relevant subsection states that “[i]f the court finds that the interests of justice require, a court may excuse a petitioner’s” untimely filing.
¶ 19 Practical considerations are consistent with the statutory language. Requiring an explicit finding with respect to the applicability of the exception ensures the proper focus on the relevant legal standard and provides the parties with a concrete ruling upon which to base any subsequent appeals.
¶ 20 Our recent opinion in Adams v. State
¶21 In this case, the district court explicitly declined to make any findings regarding the applicability of the interests of justice exception because doing so would have required an evidentiary hearing. But holding an evidentiary hearing is precisely what a district court must do before it may allow a petitioner to proceed with an untimely filing under the PCRA. Indeed, once
¶ 22 While resentencing a defendant nunc pro tunc is no longer an available option, the district court’s instincts in this case were sound. The district court resentenced Johnson nunc pro tunc as a “cleaner and more effective” alternative to a PCRA hearing. The district court reasoned that Johnson’s claims should be raised in a direct appeal rather than in a post-conviction petition for relief. We agree. Relief under the PCRA is available only to a “person who challenges a conviction or sentence for a criminal offense and who has exhausted all other legal remedies.”
¶ 23 Because Johnson asserts that he was denied his right to appeal, his proper course is to seek to have his right to appeal reinstated pursuant to the procedure we outlined in Manning.
II. JOHNSON MAY ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH THAT HE WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO APPEAL AS EXPLAINED IN MANNING
¶ 24 In Manning, we recognized that the nunc pro tunc resentencing remedy had been obviated by the advent of the PCRA and subsequent changes in the rules of procedure.
[U]pon a defendant’s motion, the trial or sentencing court may reinstate the time frame for filing a direct appeal where the defendant can prove, based on facts in the record or determined through additional evidentiary hearings, that he has been unconstitutionally deprived, through no fault of his own, of his right to appeal.29
We then identified a nonexclusive list of circumstances, drawn from our prior case law, under which we had found an unconstitutional denial of a defendant’s right to appeal.
(1) the defendant asked his or her attorney to file an appeal but the attorney, after agreeing to file, failed to do so; (2) the defendant diligently but futilely attempted to appeal within the statutory time frame without fault on [the] defendant’s part; or (3) the court or the defendant’s attorney failed to properly advise [the] defendant of the right to appeal.31
¶ 25 Johnson alleges that he was denied his right to appeal in the first case. On remand, the trial court should therefore conduct an evidentiary hearing where Johnson may present evidence to support that assertion.
¶26 Johnson has alleged a number of facts suggesting that he was denied that right. We noted in Manning that a defendant is denied his constitutional right to appeal if “the court or the defendant’s attorney failed to properly advise [the] defendant of the right to appeal.”
¶ 27 Alternatively, Johnson asserts that he was denied his right to counsel because the district court failed to ensure that his waiver of counsel was knowing and intelligent as required by State v. Heaton.
¶ 28 Finally, Johnson asserts that he was mentally incapacitated during the time following his conviction and sentencing in the first case. He alleges that his incapacitation was a direct result of jail staff administering some form of poison to him and that he was thereby rendered unable to file his appeal. Resolving this claim will require an eviden-tiary hearing.
¶29 Because the record before us is incomplete, a remand is necessary. On remand, Johnson should be given an opportunity to prove that he was denied his constitutional right to appeal. If he is successful, Johnson will be entitled to reinstatement of his right to appeal as described in our Manning opinion.
¶ 30 Should the district court find that Johnson was not denied his right to appeal, his remedy would be to proceed with a petition for relief under the PCRA as he initially attempted to do. Because his petition was filed outside of the one-year limitations period, the district court will be required to make specific findings if it excuses Johnson’s untimely petition under the interests of justice exception to the limitations period. As we explained in Adams, if the district court finds that Johnson has meritorious claims and that he had a sufficient reason for his untimely filing, it may allow Johnson to proceed.
CONCLUSION
¶ 31 We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals vacating the district court’s resen-tencing order and remanding the matter to the district court for further proceedings. On remand, the district court should first provide Johnson an opportunity to prove that he has been denied his right to appeal. If he does so, the court should reinstate his right to appeal his conviction in the first case pursuant to our Manning decision. If Johnson fails to establish that he was denied his right to appeal, the district court should consider his petition under the PCRA by first determining whether he has satisfied the interests of justice exception to the PCRA limitations period.
Notes
. Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-35a-101 to -110 (2002).
.
. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-5(1) (1997).
. See id. § 62A-15-631(9)(b) (2000) (requiring that a defendant whose competency is in question be provided "an opportunity to appear at [a competency] hearing, to testify, and to present and cross-examine witnesses").
. See Utah R.App. P. 4(a).
. State v. Johnson, 2000 UT App 127U, at *2-3,
. Id. at *5.
. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107(3) (providing that a district court has discretion to "excuse a petitioner’s failure to file within the time limitations” if "the interests of justice require”).
. Johnson v. State, 2004 UT App 108U, at *1,
.Id. at *3-4.
. Id. at *3-5.
. Manning v. State,
. Adams v. State,
. Manning,
. Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a~107(l) (2002).
. Id. § 78-35a-107(3).
. See Adams,
. Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107(3).
. Id. (emphasis added).
.
. Id. ¶ 16.
. Id.
. Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(j).
.
. Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-102(l) (2002).
.
. Id. ¶ 25.
. Id. ¶ 31.
. Id.
. Id.
. Id. (citations omitted).
. Id. (citing State v. Hallett,
.
. Adams v. State,