Johnson v. StateJohnson v. State
- Reporters:
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- Before:
- Grice
1. Counsel for the accused on trial made an objection to portions of a witness‘s testimony, and in reply to the objection the State‘s counsel, addressing the court, said, “Your honor, I insist upon it. I am willing to go up on it, your honor;” and thereupon counsel for the accused moved for a mistrial in view of the statement of the solicitor-general, which was alleged to be prejudicial and inflammatory. The court said to the jury: “The statement made in your presence a moment ago when some discussion of the admissibility of testimony was before the court, by the solicitor, to the effect that `he was willing to go up on that,’ was an improper statement by the solicitor and should not have been made. It is stricken from the case and ruled out, and you are instructed to give it no weight, and completely disregard it. Try the case fairly and impartially between the State and the accused. You may resume.” A ground of a motion for new trial, urging that the statement of the solicitor prejudiced the defendant‘s case and denied the accused a fair and impartial trial, that the statement by the court to the jury failed to remove its effect, and that this inflammatory remark of the solicitor-general entered into and controlled the verdict, and that for this reason a new trial should be awarded, is without merit. Nelson v. State, 187 Ga. 576 (1 S.E.2d 641); Wells v. State, 194 Ga. 70 (20 S.E.2d 580).
2. In a rape case, a charge that “There must be some corroboration of the woman‘s testimony. The defendant in this case should not be convicted upon the testimony of [the accuser] alone, however positive it may be, unless the same is corroborated by some concurrent circumstances,” is not erroneous by the inclusion of the clause “however positive it may be.” Compare Hamilton v. State, 143 Ga. 265 (84 S.E. 583).
3. The evidence supported the verdict; and the same having received the approval of the trial judge, and nothing being shown in the motion (the only two special grounds of which are dealt with above) to justify a new trial, the
Judgment is affirmed. All the Justiceconcur.
STATEMENT OF FACTS BY GRICE, Justice.
Adel Johnson was convicted of rape. The evidence was to the following effect: The defendant escaped from the Stonewall convict camp in Fulton County, where he was confined, about nine o‘clock on the night of January 3, 1943. On the following morning he went to 2670 Cascade Road in Fulton County, the home of a man who lived with his wife and a little girl. The defendant, a negro, asked the wife for a dose of soda, saying “My boss is sick.” The wife testified: “He followed me up the steps, and when I taken hold of the screen door . . he pulled his gun
The husband testified: “On Monday, January 4th of this year,
Y. H. Allen testified that he captured the defendant, who was hiding behind some bales of cotton on the campus of Gammon University, and that the defendant was wearing the pants exhibited to the witness. Joe Perry, a police officer, who was called on the morning of the commission of the crime, described the premises, and testified concerning photographs made at that time. Officer John Carter gave similar testimony, and testified that the defendant was wearing the pants exhibited to the witness. The pants identified by the witnesses were introduced in evidence, as were also photographs of the room in which the crime was committed, and of the bed.
The defendant made no statement and introduced no evidence. He moved for new trial on the general grounds, and on two special grounds dealt with in the headnotes. The court overruled the motion, and the defendant excepted.