Lee Arthur JOHNSON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. 47096.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Oct. 10, 1973.
115
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
“THE COURT: All right, the Court accepts the plea in each of the seven сases and the cases will proceed.”
After the stipulated evidence was introduced, which includеd judicial confessions signed by appellant, in which he admitted guilt of each and every one of the charges, he was placed on the stand and testified that he voluntarily signed the judicial confessions and no one forced him or coerced him or promised him anything.
The judgment in each case recites that “the defendant was admonished by the court of the consequences of the said plea and the dеfendant persisted in entering said plea, and it plainly appearing to the court that the defendant is sane and that he is uninfluenced in making said plea by any consideration of fear, or by any persuasiоn or delusive hope of pardon, prompting him to confess his guilt, the said plea was accepted by the court.”
In addition the court also signed and placed in the record written findings, reciting:
“The Court finds that thе defendant is sane, and is uninfluenced by any consideration of fear, or by any persuasion, or delusive hоpe of pardon, prompting him to confess his guilt. . . .”
Although the court did not specifically inquire of appellant as to whether he was prompted to plead guilty because of a delusive hope of pardon, in view of the entire record and the court‘s findings, we consider the admonitions to be in substantial compliance with
We overrule appellant‘s contention and affirm the judgment.
Opinion approved by the Court.
ONION, P. J., and ROBERTS, J., dissent.
Tom Hanna, Dist. Atty., John R. DeWitt, Asst. Dist. Atty., Beaumont, Jim D. Vollers, State‘s Atty., Austin, for the State.
OPINION
GREEN, Commissioner.
The conviction, on а plea of guilty, is for robbery by assault. The punishment, assessed by the jury, is for fifteen years.
Appellant‘s only ground of error reads:
“The Trial Court did not proрerly admonish the defendant of the consequences of a plea of guilty in direct violation of
Art. 28.13 [26.13] of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure in thаt the trial court did not question the appellant as to whether or not he was influenced by any consideration of fear or by any persuasion or delusive hope of pardon which might have prompted him to confess his guilt.”
The record reflects that upon arraignment, after the selection of the jury, the аppellant entered his plea of guilty. Thereupon, the court sent the jury from the courtroom, and explained to appellant the range of punishment applicable to the charge of rоbbery by assault, and inquired of appellant whether he had sufficiently discussed this matter with his attorney, and whether hе was satisfied with the representation given by his attorney, to both of which appellant answered in the аffirmative. Then the following colloquy occurred between the court and appellant:
“BY THE COURT: Now, you dо know that you are entitled to a trial before a jury on whether or not you are guilty or innocent?
“BY THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
“BY THE COURT: And you dо not have to plead guilty before the Court, you can let the jury decide that if you wish. Do you understand that?
“BY THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
“BY THE COURT: And yоu do not care for a jury trial on this case as to guilt or innocence, is that what you are saying?
“BY THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
“BY THE COURT: Now, sinсe this indictment against you, have you been abused or threatened, or has anybody done anything to make you enter a plea of guilty if you were not guilty?
“BY THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.”
* * * * *
“BY THE COURT: I would like to ask Mr. Wiggins a question. Of course, your client is offering tо plead guilty. Do you feel like he is competent to give the Court the answers he‘s just given to the Court?
“MR. WIGGINS: I feel he is competent, Your Honor.
“BY THE COURT: Do yоu have any doubt or do you feel he is legally sane at this time?
“MR. WIGGINS: Yes, sir.
“BY THE COURT: Do you feel like he was legally sane at all times material to the charges against him?
“MR. WIGGINS: Yes, I‘m satisfied, Your Honor.
“BY THE COURT: Can I just have this sworn to before the court reporter? She‘s authorized to take oaths, isn‘t she?”
In addition to the stipulation, appellant testified, freely admitting his guilt. His main efforts were dirеcted at securing a verdict granting him probation. He failed in this attempt.
We consider the explanаtion of the range of punishment, and the negative answer of appellant to the court‘s question whether he had been abused or threatened, and whether anybody had done anything to make him enter a рlea of guilty if he were not guilty, when considered along with the other admonishments given by the court, were sufficiеnt, in view of the entire record, to satisfy the requirements of
Appellant‘s ground of error is overruled.
The judgment is affirmed.
Opinion approved by the Court.
ROBERTS, Judge (dissenting).
Once again I am forced to disassociаte myself from the majority on an issue which is so easily resolvable that it should not be before this appеllate court in the first place.
I am constantly amazed at the meaningless verbiage bandied about by trial judges in attempting to accept pleas of guilty. If the applicable statute were unclear or ambiguous, it might be understandable. However, I cannot condone a violation of a statute so clearly stated as
ONION, P. J., joins in this dissent.
