This is аn appeal by Robert Lee Johnson, appellant (defendant below), from a conviction for assault with intent to kill. Appellant and another were charged jointly with the offenses of entering to сommit a felony and assault with intent to kill. Appellant entered a plea of not guilty and waived trial by jury. He was tried separately to the court and was found not guilty on the charge of entering to commit a fеlony and guilty on the charge of assault with intent to kill. Appellant was sentenced to the Indiana Reformatory for not less than two (2) nor more than fourteen (14) years. His Motion to Correct Errors was overruled аnd this appeal followed.
Appellant has five main contentions.
(1) The State failed to establish a prima facie case against the appellant in its case in chief and it was therefore error not to grant appellant’s Mоtion for Discharge.
(2) The evidence was insufficient to support a finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
*650 (3) The Court erred in denying appellant’s Motion in Arrest of Judgment which claimed the affidavit failed to statе a public offense.
(4) The Court committed prejudicial error in denying appellant’s Motion to Separate Witnesses.
(5) The Court erred in denying appellant’s Motion to Consolidate for hearing on the Motion to Quash and in denying appellant’s Motion to Consolidate this case with two other cases apparently pending.
We will consider together the first two contentions concerning whether or not the State established a prima facie case and whether the evidence was sufficient. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court has stated that we will not weigh the evidence on appeal nor will we determine the credibility of witnesses. Only that evidence most favorable to the State and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom will be considered. As long as there is substantiаl evidence of probative value sufficient to establish every material element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, the judgment will not be disturbed.
Jackson
v.
State
(1971),
The evidence most favorable to the State is as follows. Two men wearing ski masks entered the Jenkins Gun Shop at about 9 :15 A.M. on February 20, 1971. One of the men removed a .22 caliber rifle from a box he was carrying, pointed it at the teller and announced it was a hold-up. At this point, the other man, who was described as wearing a red and blue ski mask and who was not carrying a gun, noticed the owner of the store walking* in from the back and instructed the man with the rifle to “Get the onе in the back.” An exchange of gun fire followed and the masked men ran from the store.
At approximately this time, a man in the barbershop next door heard the shots and ran to the door. He saw two men *651 weаring ski masks running from the direction of Jenkins Gun Shop. One of the men was wearing a red and blue ski mask, a red sweat shirt, and dark trousers. He ran to a white Ford automobile and drove away. About half-way down the block, he slowеd down and the other man climbed into the car. The witness from the barber shop then leaped into his own car and followed. Eventually the white Ford stopped and the witness pulled up behind it. At this point, neither man was wearing a ski mask. The driver of the car who was wearing a red sweat shirt jumped out of the car and ran. The witness from the barber shop positively identified this man as being the appellant.
At this time, the State restеd its case. Without considering whether this evidence was sufficient to convict, it was undoubtedly sufficient to establish a prima facie case by the State. “Prima facie” means such evidence as is sufficient to establish a given fact and which will remain sufficient if uncontradicted.
Rene’s Restaurant Corp.
v.
Fro-Du-Co Corp.
(1965),
Appellant was completely unable to contradict this evidence during the presentation of his case. On the other hand, on rebuttal the State presented furthеr evidence to establish appellant’s guilt. A policeman testified that he came upon the scene as the driver was running from the white Ford. He noted that the man was wearing a red sweat shirt and he pоsitively identified appellant as being that man. The officer found the other man still in the car and also found two ski masks and a .22 rifle.
Appellant asserts vigorously that, because there were no witnesses from the actual scene of the crime who could positively identify him and the possibility existed that the man who followed them may not have had the car in sight at all *652 times, the evidence was circumstantial and every reasonable hypothesis of innocence was not precluded. However, the key to this is “reasonable”. We are unable to imagine any reasonable hypothesis to indicate his innocence; on the contrary, the evidence leads inalterably to his guilt.
The elements of this crime are an assault together with the intent to kill. See IC 1971, 35-13-2-1 (Ind. Ann. Stat. § 10-401a [1971 Supp.]) Although it appears that appellant was not the man who fired the shots, he was clearly an accomplice and can be charged the same as a principal. See IC 1971, 35-1-29-1 (Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-102 [1956 Repl.]) ;
Tibbs
v.
State
(1970),
“Whoever, having the present ability to do so, attеmpts to commit a violent injury upon the person of another, is guilty of an assault . . .”
In this case, there was clear proof of an attempt to do violent injury and it was at the command of the appеllant. Intent to kill may be inferred from the deliberate use of a deadly weapon in a manner calculated to produce death.
Stock
v.
State
(1969),
Appellant’s next contention is that the affidavit failed to state a public offense. The pertinent portions of the affidаvit are that appellant:
“. . . did then and there unlawfully, feloniously, and purposely attempt to commit a violent injury to the person of *653 one Howard Jenkins, a human being . . . then and there having the present ability tо commit such violent injury, by then and there feloniously and purposely attempting to shoot said Howard Jenkins . . . with the intent then and there and thereby to feloniously and purposely kill said Howard Jenkins . . .”
Appellant cоntends the affidavit charges an attempted assault which would thus be an attempted attempt, and this is not an offense under any statute. However, the affidavit says “attempt to commit a violent injury” and “attemрting to shoot.” As noted above, an assault is defined as an attempt to commit a violent injury. These are the exact words used at one point in the affidavit and the other phrase used, “attempting to shoot,” is unquestionably one form of attempting to commit a violent injury. Appellant’s contention has no merit.
Appellant’s next assertion is that the trial court committed prejudicial error in denying appellant’s Motion to Separate Witnesses. A motion for separation of witnesses is wholly within the discretion of the trial court as it is required by neither statute nor common law. Separation is not a right, but may be grantеd at the judge’s discretion.
Brown
v.
State
(1971),
Appellant’s final claim is thаt the trial court erred in denying appellant’s Motion to Consolidate for hearing on the Motion to Quash and in denying appellant’s Motion to Consolidate this case with two other cases appаrently pending. Appellant has completely failed to comply with AP. 8.3 (A) (7) in “arguing” this point. The record contains only the Motion
*654
for Consolidation for hearing on the Motion to Quash. After a thorough search of the entire record, we are unable to find any motion or indication that appellant wanted this case consolidated for trial with any other cases. The only enlightenment we get from appеllant’s brief is the numbers of the other cases and the naked claim that all these cases arose out of the same fact situation. No further description of the other cases is to be found. It is incumbent uрon appellant to present a sufficient record to allow an intelligent decision of the issues.
Burns
v.
State
(1970),
There is one final contention contained within appellant’s brief which was also unsupported by any argument in the brief. Appellant claims it was erroneous for the trial court to exclude a photograph of an intersection involved in the case. Admission or rejection of photographs is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed unless there is an abuse of discretion.
New
v.
State
(1970),
For all the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Arterburn, C. J., DeBruler, Givan and Prentice; JJ., concur.
Note. — Reported in