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Johnson v. State
719 N.E.2d 445
Ind. Ct. App.
1999
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*1 and who stated the incident who witnessed “playing around” Neidige was at 261. tray. Record on the jumped

she hearsay. was objected that

Neidige that it was argue not Barrel did

Cracker excep- particular ato pursuant

admissible Nevertheless, hearing officer ad-

tion. it. The written statement

mitted 801(c), and it

hearsay, see Evid. R. exception. to an This pursuant

admitted support the cannot be used to

statement

Board’s conclusion. properly considered only evidence

The report. disciplinary was the

by the Board indicated, was insufficient this evidence

As conclusion the Board’s Ac- horseplay. engaged

Neidige denying erred

cordingly, the Board this conclusion. upon claim based

Neidige’s and remanded.1

Reversed J.,

NAJAM, concurs.

RUCKER, J., concurs in result. JOHNSON, Appellant-

Carlos

Defendant, Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.

STATE 49A02-9901-JV-15.

No. Appeals of Indiana.

Court of 17, 1999.

Nov. Neidige her has not met Neidige Barrel concludes bore 1. Cracker Barrel notes that injury claim. proof elements of her proving that she suffered on the burden of burden arising out of and in findings of an accident as a result and conclusions Board entered employment, Roebel v. see the course of her horseplay issue. On re only regarding the (Ind.Ct. Corp., Dana mand, may conclude that Board well specifically App.1994), the Board burden, but it is Neidige has not met her testimony regarding the cir found that her obligation these determina to make Board’s injury was not credible. of her cumstances in the first instance. tions credibility, Cracker Based this lack *2 adjudication as II. Whether Johnson’s Ar- child contravenes Indiana ticle Consti- tution.

III. Whether *3 child contravenes the delinquent a Amend- First and Fourteenth ments of the United States Consti- tution.

We affirm. to the delin-

The facts most favorable and his quency finding reveal that Johnson arguing were at their home. John- mother his mother that he did not intend son told proba- terms of his comply with certain juvenile delinquency a tion that arose from mother called determination. Johnson’s police. arrived Johnson When eating candy. Indianapo- in a chair sitting asked Police Officer Steve Atzhorn lis Record problem “what the was.” Johnson Atzhorn and at looked at 145. Johnson Atzhorn asked Johnson shrugged. up- question again. Johnson became same Atzhorn, his began arguing set mother, a officer. Johnson second attend the he was not stated that Indiana, Halbert, Indianapolis, Steven J. to.” “classes he was Attorney Appellant. for Atzhorn testified that be- Record at 145. in a voice cause Johnson Modisett, Attorney Jeffrey A. General else, no additional everyone than louder Scherrer, Indiana, Deputy Attor- E. Sarah regarding could be asked Indiana, General, Indianapolis, Attor- ney Johnson Atzhorn asked situation. neys Appellee. for with At- arguing continued quiet. Johnson Atzhorn arrested mother. zhorn and his OPINION a de- adjudicated Johnson was Johnson. STATON, Judge disorderly con- upon child based linquent duct, a B misdemeanor which is Class adjudication appeals Carlos by appeals. an adult.1 He when committed three child. He raises delinquent as a as: which we restate appeal, issues on I. sufficient the evidence is

I.Whether Johnson’s support Sufficiency the Evidence delinquent child based the evi contends that disorderly con- the commission of finding dence is insufficient duct. act would be (1998) an (disorderly the child commits § if 35-45-1-3 1. Ind.Code also, adult....”) statute). § by Ind.Code 31-37- See an conduct offense if committed an (1998) ("A act child commits 1-2 disorderly conduct. When the produced State seeks defendant decibels sound that juvenile adjudicated to have a as a delin were too loud for the circumstances.” quent committing an act that would be Whittington, (emphasis 669 N.E.2d at 1367 adult, a crime if committed the State original). Significantly, prove every element of the offense Whittington court observed in that a loud beyond a reasonable doubt. Al-Saud noise could be found unreasonable where it (Ind.1995). “disrupt[s] police investigations.” Id. review, Upon apply we the same sufficien Here, the evidence reveals that cy standard used criminal cases. Id. at argued in a voice louder than the reviewing a claim of When insuffi voices of others the room. evidence, reweigh cient we do not the evi prevented volume officers from dence or judge credibility of witnesses. *4 asking additional in an effort to (Ind. State, 816, Jordan v. 656 N.E.2d 817 resolve the situation. This was true both 1995), reh. denied. We look to the evi before and after Officer Atzhorn asked dence and the reasonable inferences there quiet. Johnson to be It makes no differ from judgment. that the Id. that ence Johnson not yelling or provides, pertinent IC 35-45-1-3 screaming. question is whether John part: person recklessly, “A knowing- who son’s volume was loud too under the cir ly, intentionally or ... makes unreason- Id. cumstances. Because Johnson’s loud able and noise continues to do so after manner speaking disrupted a police in being asked to stop commits disorder- vestigation, the trial court’s conclusion that ly conduct....” Johnson contends that Johnson made sup unreasonable noise is the State prove has failed to the unreason- ported by the evidence. See id. The evi able noise element of this Specifi- offense. dence is sufficient to support Johnson’s cally, argues Johnson that evidence of the as a child. speech volume of his is crucial a finding to noise, that he made unreasonable II. the only evidence indicates that he spoke louder than Officer Atzhorn and his moth- 1, § Article 9 the Indiana Constitution er. testimony cites Atzhorn’s Johnson argues right that his to that Johnson was not yelling screaming. or speak under Article 9 of the Indiana suggests that he was simply try- Constitution was violated by application of ing to be heard in a room with three disorderly the conduct statute the facts people arguing, and that the fact that he of this case. provides: Section 9 “No law was louder than the sup- others does not shall passed, restraining the free inter port the conclusion that he made unrea- change thought opinion, and or restrict sonable noise. right write, the speak, or print,

Johnson is correct in his asser freely, any subject on whatever: but for tion that the speech volume of his is criti the right, abuse of that every person shall cal in determining whether was unrea be responsible.” In Whittington, our su sonable meaning within the preme of IC 35-45-1- a two-step inquiry created for stated, our supreme As court has “the reviewing the constitutionality of an appli criminalization of ‘unreasonable noise’ was disorderly cation of the conduct statute ‘aimed at preventing the harm which “First, § flows under 9. 669 N.E.2d at 1367. from the volume’ of noise.” Whittington v. reviewing court must determine whether State, 1363, (Ind.1996) 669 N.E.2d state action has restricted claimant’s ex (quoting Price v. Second, pressive activity. has, if it the (Ind.1993) denied). Therefore, reh. court must decide whether the restricted order to support a conviction for disorder constituted an right ‘abuse’ of the ly conduct, “[t]he State prove speak.” must that a Id.

Here, the has not it was Johnson has satisfied claimant established the by establishing that State and should prong political first evaluate the constitu- per A expressive activity. his any restricted tionality state-imposed restriction of unreasonable making son’s conviction expression rationality the under standard solely on noise based Id. review.” police investigation satisfies this during present ease, In the Johnson ar adjudi delinquency Id. at 1370. A prong. mother, gued and officers and his type of con cation based the same stated that he was not to attend restricting expres duct is also State action “classes he was to.” activity. sive at 145. that he Record Johnson asserts In order to meet second commenting on his earli the terms of that “the State prong, prove opin probation, expressing er re reasonably conclude that the could ion that unfair “conditions were ” of expression was an ‘abuse’ stricted and he did onerous not want to abide thus, right speak, Thus, Appellant’s them.” Brief at 8. properly proscribe could not State argues criticizing he was the State for conduct, via pursuant police power, its these imposing unfair conditions. disorderly conduct Id. at statute. *5 that We conclude comments Johnson’s way try a can to 1369. “One claimant ambiguous. Although implau- are it is not burden is to that his or her meet this show criticizing that Johnson the sible was State activity If a political. was expressive conditions, probation unfair it imposing attempt, in the claimant succeeds that equally plausible that was sim- is that its action has State demonstrate commenting ply on his own conduct and materially op the claimant’s not burdened merely intentions. Johnson stated that he engage political expres to in portunity to going required was not attend the that his ex argues sion.” Id. classes. This comment could be construed activity political. was pressive nothing to than Johnson’s reflect more param- supreme The discussed wants, opinion that can do what he expression Whitting- political in eters interpretation, when he wants. Under this ton. saying nothing about State political common ex- feature [T]he action. Because Johnson has estab- action.... pression is reference to state political, lished that his comments were if ... its Expressive political is rationality apply “we must review deter- ac- point government is comment on mining whether the could have con- state tion, policy or applauding whether an old activity, expressive cluded that [Johnson’s] one, can- opposing a new or a proposing volume, its of the because of was an ‘abuse’ criticizing office the con- didate for or was, words, speak or a right to other an official under color of acting duct of peace, safety, well-being.” threat contrast, In an individu- law.... where Id. at 1371. expression on the conduct al’s focuses speaker private party including a case, facts of it is reason- Under the this — political. himself or herself —it is not man- conceivable that ably Johnson’s ner of interfered with at 1370. The court noted Id. why investigation into the reasons John- expression the nature of should called her home. standard, son’s mother them to objective by an judged their perform must be able bears of establish- the claimant the burden interruption without been work unreasonable expression would have in- they legitímate are conducting “If political. Id. the ex- understood Therefore, context, could ambiguous, vestigation. viewed State pression, is rationally that Johnson’s reviewing court find that have concluded should I right prob- conduct constituted an abuse of the A. At first asked what the thus, just within the lem and he at speak, fell State’s looked me police power. shrugged. sitting Johnson’s did He was there I eating candy not contravene Article 9 of the in a chair. asked again got him upset, Indiana Constitution. and then he arguing with me and his mother and the other officer. Then he said he III. going wasn’t to his classes he was The First and Fourteenth Amendments to. And after that it was hard to talk what about Finally, Johnson contends that his on. I asked him to he adjudication contravenes the First and quiet argue and he continued Fourteenth Amendments of the United with me and And I his mother. argument States Constitution. arrested him. paragraphs on this issue consists of two and a are footnote. We unable to discern Q. making any Was he unreasonable precise argument nature of Johnson’s noises? from this abbreviated discussion. Johnson A. making impossible He was to talk Appellate has waived issue. Ind. Rule about the situation. 8.3(A)(7); Stevenson, Mitchell v. R. at 145. After cross-examination the N.E.2d 558 n. 3 (Ind.Ct.App.1997), following testimony resumed on re-direct: trans. denied. Q. clarify. you Just to When said Affirmed. upset. specifically he became What was he doing? NAJAM, J., concurs. got point A. His voice loud. Not to the *6 RUCKER, J., part concurs in and dis- screaming, where he was but he in part opinion. sents with speaking than everybody louder again kept talking else. And and RUCKER, Judge, concurring in part they just was ... any couldn’t ask in dissenting part other about what go- I on due parts saying. concur II and III of to what he was However, majority opinion. I respectfully R. at 146. part I dissent because I am not con- Relying Whittington on v. vinced there is sufficient evidence to show (1966) 1363, N.E.2d majority has that Johnson’s speech amounted to unrea- determined that Johnson’s manner of my sonable noise. Indeed review of the speaking was unreasonable because dis- convinces record me that the volume of rupted police investigation. In that case speech nothing had to do with present the defendant was in his home charge disorderly arrest and of con- police when the were summoned to investi- Rather, duct. it appears arresting of- gate a of report Upon domestic violence. ficer irritated argued because Johnson arrival, the Whitting- officers encountered

with him and quit talking refused to ton, who had drinking, along been with his ordered do following so. The direct sister and the boyfriend. sister’s Par- examination of the officer is instructive: amedics had also arrived on the scene. Q. Okay. you And after arrived there While the attempting officers were to de- you speak did per- [Johnson] termine what had happened, argument sonally? erupted Whittington between and the sis- A. IYes did. boyfriend. ter’s Whittington became “loud Q. And what was said or what were his and boisterous” and when asked to settle

actions at that time? persisted down he very “a loud and on this and would I therefore dissent issue The officers Id. at 1366. angry manner.” trial judgment of the court. reverse disorderly con- Whittington arrested charged and he was convicted duct during the on his loud

based Discussing the facts investigation. disorderly to the applied case as

of the statute, our ob-

conduct

served: found unreasonable noise could be

Loud on a number Whittington’s like a case REID, Appellant-Defendant, Lorenzo safety It could threaten the grounds. their injured by aggravating parties medical by distracting the trauma or Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. STATE them. Loud out- tending personnel No. 89A01-9806-CR-222. agitate witnesses dis- bursts could It could investigations. rupt police Indiana. Appeals Court of investigations and coordination of make Nov. more difficult. Final- medical treatment annoying quite can ly, loud noise at the scene. present

others added). Although (emphasis

Id. at 1367 to stand for the

Whittington does seem loud outbursts “can” dis-

proposition that investigations, proposition

rupt police differently, the

is fact sensitive. Stated Whittington clearly show that the

facts in speech was “loud boister-

defendant’s were dis- and as a result

ous” contrast, By investigation. in their

rupted us the record is clear

in the case before *7 nor speech was neither loud

that Johnson’s

boisterous, can it nor be characterized I fail to importantly,

an Just as outburst. speaking manner of

see how Johnson’s The offi- investigation.

disrupted by Johnson’s were called to the scene

cers arguing

mother because had been violence, no indication of

her. There was violence, any other crimi- or that

threat had occurred or was about

nal nothing to In essence there was

occur. why had been

investigate other than a son even as- his mother. Thus

arguing with not, manner I do that Johnson’s

suming, as noise, po- constituted home did not in the Johnson presence

lice anticipated by investigation

amount to disrupt. noise could

Whittington that loud

Case Details

Case Name: Johnson v. State
Court Name: Indiana Court of Appeals
Date Published: Nov 17, 1999
Citation: 719 N.E.2d 445
Docket Number: 49A02-9901-JV-15
Court Abbreviation: Ind. Ct. App.
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