Johnson v. StateJohnson v. State
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen. and Virlindia Doss, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.
ALLEN, Judge.
The appellant appeals her conviction for possession of cocaine, which followed a plea of nolo contendere with express reservation of her right to appeal the denial of a motion to suppress tangible evidence. Two issues are presented for review: (1) whether Officer Ratcliff had probable cause to arrest the appellant, and (2) whethеr the trial court improperly limited the appellant‘s cross-examination of Ratcliff at the suppression hearing. Although we determine that the evidence presented at the suppression hearing revealed an adequate basis, if believed, for a finding of probable cause to arrest the appellant, we conclude that the trial court reversibly erred in limiting cross-examination. Accordingly, we reverse the appellant‘s conviction and sentence, and we remand for further proceedings.
Taken in the light most favorable to the state, the evidence presented at the suppression hearing revealed the following. The appellant was arrested shortly after midnight on July 10, 1990. Prior to the arrest, Officer Ratcliff of the Tallahassee Police Depаrtment had taken a position of concealment and observed appellant engage in a suspected drug transaction. Shortly after observing the suspected drug
During cross-examination of Officer Ratcliff at the hearing on the appellant‘s motion to suppress the cocaine, defense counsel asked where the officer was located when he observed the appellant‘s actions. The state raised an objection to this question. Defense counsel argued that effective cross-examination, by which counsel hoped to challenge the officer‘s ability to see the activities leading to appellant‘s arrest, required disclosure of the officer‘s point of observation. The trial court ruled that the officer could be questioned regarding his ability to see, but determined that the officer‘s location was not relevant.
First, we reject the appellant‘s argument that the evidence presented at the suppression hearing, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the state, failed to reveal a basis for a finding of probable cause to arrest the appellant. Officer Rаtcliff‘s testimony about the appellant‘s actions just prior to her arrest revealed an adequate basis for the trial court to find that Ratcliff reasonably believed that the appellаnt had committed a felony.
Turning to the second issue, we observe that we previously decided this issue in Mathis v. State, 545 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). Mathis concerned an arrest for possession of crack cocaine effected by thе same officer involved in this case, who, as in the instant case, observed the accused from a concealed location. Just as in this case, after observing Mathis engage in a suspected drug transaction, Officer Ratcliff arrested Mathis and found him to be in possession of cocaine. The trial court denied the defense counsel‘s motion to compel Officer Ratcliff to reveal the location from which he made his observations, finding, as did the trial judge in this case, that the officer‘s location was irrelevant. We determined that the trial court erred in denying the motion to сompel the officer to reveal the location from which he observed the alleged drug transaction. Because Mathis is controlling precedent, and because it was rightly decided, we fоllow it in holding the limitation of cross-examination herein to be error.
The threshold test for admissibility of evidence elicited on cross-examination is relevance, and the controlling provisions оf the Florida Evidence Code are
As noted in Brown, logically relevant evidence “may yet be inadmissible if it is not legally relevant.”
Because the testimony was relevant, Ratcliff should have been required to reveal the location from which he made his observations, unlеss such testimony was barred by some privilege, constitutional right, statute or rule. See State v. Williams, 417 So. 2d 755 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982);
The only reasons given for barring the testimony were (1) preserving the secrecy of the observation point for purposes of other investigations, and (2) protecting Ratcliff‘s safety, should he use the same observation point in the future. These reasons are not recognized by any privilege, constitutional right, statute or rule. Accordingly, the evidence was not exempt from disclosure.
The foregoing analysis reveals the admissibility of the evidence under the provisions of the Florida Evidence Code. There is, however, an even more fundamental basis for the admission of the evidence.
Long before the enactment of the Florida Evidence Code, case law forcefully acknowledged the constitutional right of a defendant in a criminal case to fully cross-examine a prosecution witness as to transactions and events about which the witness had testified during direct examination. In Coco v. State, 62 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 1953), the court said,
It is too well settled to need citation to authority that a fair and full cross-examination of a witness upon the subjects opened by the direct examination is an absolute right, as distinguished from a privilege, which must always be accorded to the person against whom the witness is called * * * Cross-examination of a witness upon the subjects covered in his direct examination is an invaluable right and when it is denied to him it cannot be said that such ruling does not constitute harmful and fatal error. Moreover, the right to cross-examination stems from the constitutional guaranty that an accused pеrson shall have the right to be confronted by his accusers.
Coco v. State, 62 So. 2d at 894-895 (emphasis supplied). The court then quoted the following language with approval:
* * * it is error for the trial court to refuse to permit the cross-examination to extend to all matters germane to the direct examination, for such a cross-examination is a matter of absolute right and is not a mere privilege. * * * if a question is within the scоpe of direct examination it is not objectionable on cross-examination because it tends to establish a defense to the action.
* * * when the direct examination opens a gеneral subject, the cross-examination may go into any phase, and may not be restricted to mere parts which constitute a unity, or to the specific facts developed by the direct еxamination. Cross-examination should always be allowed relative to the details of an event or transaction a portion only of which has been testified to on direct examination. As has been stated, cross-examination is not confined to the identical details testified to in chief, but extends to its entire subject matter, and to all matters that may modify, supplement, contradict, rebut or make clearer the facts testified to in chief by the witness on cross-examination.
Coco v. State, 62 So. 2d at 895, quoting 58 Am.Jur. Witnesses § 629 at 350 and § 632 at 352 (1948). See also Coxwell v. State, 361 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 1978) (discussing “the expansive perimeters of subject matter relevance which the constitutional guarantee оf cross-examination must accommodate to retain vitality“).
The testimony which the appellant tried to elicit related directly to the transaction, event, and subject which the witness had testifiеd to on direct examination by the prosecutor. Therefore, in addition to her right to offer the evidence under the evidence code, the appellant also had a constitutional right to conduct the examination and receive answers to her questions.
Because constitutional error is present, the state, as the beneficiary of the error, has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute
The appellant‘s conviction and sentence are reversed and this cause is remanded to the trial court for a new suppression hearing or for other proceedings consistent with this opinion.
JOANOS, C.J., concurs.
BOOTH, J., dissents.