Hаzel Johnson appeals her conviction of voluntary manslaughter. Johnson testified that she and Cato Mathis were living together *62 in a trailer. They attended a party at a friend’s home. Mathis was drinking and smoking marijuana. Johnson was also aware that Mathis was using “dope.” As Johnson and Mathis were driving home, he began to curse her and accuse her of wanting to be with another man. Johnson told Mathis to move out of her trailer. When they got home, Mathis slapped Johnson. Johnson handed Mathis his clоthes and started to pack his belongings. Mathis continued to yell at Johnson and struck her in the head with his fist. Johnson got a pistol from a drawer and again demanded that Mathis leave. Mathis grabbed Johnson’s arm, and a struggle began. Johnson either broke free or was pushed away by Mathis; she fell backwards, striking her head on the television set or a drawer. Johnson heard a loud noise but could not see anything as she suffered a “blackout.” As she began to see, she observed that Mathis had fallen backwаrds. Johnson screamed and ran from the bedroom. She told her daughter to call the police, an ambulance, and Mathis’ sister. She testified that she did not intentionally fire the gun.
Prior to trial, Johnson told several law enforcement personnel thаt the shooting was accidental. However, during the course of police interrogation, her statements did not remain consistent. Johnson initially stated that after she and Mathis went home, a “tussle” occurred and a gun went off; she could not remеmber where the gun came from or who had the gun at the time. Johnson made another statement substantially the same as her first. In this statement, Johnson said that she did not know whether she or Mathis got the gun first; Mathis grabbed her, she must have pushed him off, and the gun just went off. She also said that if she shot Mathis, she did not mean to do so. Upon further interrogation by a GBI special agent and after again claiming that she did not know who had the gun when it fired, Johnson changed her statement once more. She stated that Mathis pushed her and then went to the closet to get his clothes. She took the gun off the dresser and it went off as she was lowering it. Mathis was standing approximately nine to ten feet from her when he was shot. Johnson did not tell the special agent that Mathis had been using drugs or that he had refused to leave her home.
The police found no furniture out of place in the room. The pistol was found lying on a table on the opposite side of the bedroom from Mathis’ body. A firearms examiner testified that the рistol had three different safety mechanisms and that the pistol and its safety mechanisms were functioning properly. He also testified that it would take 4.2 pounds of force to pull the trigger on this pistol with its hammer cocked. It would take 11.2 pounds to рull the trigger when its hammer was not cocked. The pistol had one spent round and five live rounds when it was found. The live round immediately preceding the spent round had an indentation on the primer indicating that it too *63 had been struck by a firing pin.
A forensic pathologist who pеrformed the autopsy on Mathis’ body testified that Mathis died from a gunshot wound to the head. There were no soot deposits, gunshot residue, or stippling around Mathis’ wound, and the gun was fired no closer than 18 to 24 inches from Mathis’ head.
1. Johnson contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant a new trial as the verdict was contrary to the evidence. On appeal the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to support the verdict, and appellant no longer enjoys a prеsumption of innocence; moreover, an appellate court determines evidence sufficiency and does not weigh the evidence or determine witness credibility.
Taylor v. State,
A person commits voluntary manslaughter when he causes anоther person’s death under circumstances which would otherwise be murder and acts solely as a result of a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable рerson. OCGA § 16-5-2 (a). A person’s intent and whether she acted in the heat of passion with adequate provocation or with justification depend largely on the credibility of witnesses. This was for the jury to assess. See
Brown v. State,
It was for the jury to determine how and why this wеapon was fired and, if Johnson intentionally shot Mathis, whether that shooting was in the heat of passion or with justification. A jury has unlimited discretion to accept or reject a defendant’s testimony as a whole, or to accept it in part аnd reject it in part. See
Wilson v. State,
Even assuming that the jury based its finding of guilty solely on circumstantial evidence, we are satisfied that there exists sufficient evidence to support Johnson’s conviction. To support the verdict, circumstantial evidence must exclude only reasonable hypotheses; it need not exclude every inference or hypothesis except that of the defendant’s guilt.
Smith v. State,
Viewing the evidence of this case in a light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that the jury rationally could have found that the cirсumstantial evidence excluded every reasonable hypothesis except that of the defendant’s guilt of voluntary manslaughter; the jury was authorized by the evidence presented to exclude other possible hypotheses as unreаsonable.
Ross,
supra at 699. Review of the transcript reveals ample evidence from which any rational trier of
*64
fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Johnson was guilty of voluntary manslaughter. See
Jackson v. Virginia,
2. Johnson asserts that the trial court erred in failing to give her requested charge on accident. As the trial court properly refused to give the requested instruction, this contention is without merit.
Johnson’s admission in open court that she armed herself with a revolver which wаs loaded because she thought Mathis would see the gun and leave “was not even slight evidence that [s]he acted accidentally, with ‘no criminal scheme or undertaking, intention, or criminal negligence.’ OCGA § 16-2-2.”
Johnson v. State,
Even assuming without deciding that the requested accident charge was both authorized by and adequately adjusted to the evidence, it is not complete. See
Roberson v. State,
The jury was properly charged that they had to find the killing intentional in order to convict the defendant of voluntary manslaughter. See
Brooks,
supra at 189 (3). As the jury believed Johnson guilty of voluntary manslaughter, it cоuld not have believed Mathis’ death to be the result of accident. See generally
Connor v. State,
3. Johnson contends that her defense counsel was inadequate. Applying the two-prong test and the presumptions regarding counsel’s performance found in
Strickland v. Washington,
(a) Johnson’s contention that her lawyer failed to file any discovery or other pretrial motions is factually inaccurate. Cursory exami *65 nation of the record reveals that Johnson’s counsel filed a discovery motion to produce her oral and written statements and to furnish a copy of any scientific reports or tests in the prosecution’s possession. He also filed a request for discovery of exculpatory information, a demand for a list of witnesses, and requests for jury instructions. We find no deficiency in trial counsel’s performance in the pretrial investigative stage of this case.
(b) Johnson claims her counsel was ineffective as he was not prepared to challenge the admission in evidence of the spent cartridge and the cartridge preceding it which were found in the cylinder of the pistol. However, she fails to present any conceivable theory which would have precluded the admission in evidence of these two evidentiary items. The Georgia rule favors the admission of any relevant evidence, no matter how slight its probative value; evidence of doubtful relevance or competency should be admitted and its weight left to the jury. See
Norman v. State,
(c) Johnson claims that her counsel’s performance was inadequate because he did not, prior to trial, challenge the admission of her pretrial statements. See generally
Jackson v. Denno,
(d) Johnson asserts that her counsel was inadequate because he failed to have witnesses available to lay the foundation for admission of the GBI crime lab report. She argues that this failure caused hеr to be unable to show that Mathis had cocaine and other drugs in his *66 system at the time he allegedly attacked her and to establish that Mathis was large in size and weighing in excess of 280 pounds.
We question the probative value of evidence that Mathis had drugs in his system at the time of the incident. Johnson did not affirmatively testify that she believed herself in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury from Mathis’ attack, but rather, that she armed herself so that he would leave her trailer. At trial, Johnson testified that Mathis was smoking marijuana and using “dope” just before the incident. She testified that Mathis was a medium-sized man and that he was a little taller and much larger than she. The medical examiner testified that Mathis was well-built, well-nourished, weighed 290 pounds and was 73 inches tall; he had musсular extremities. Pretermitting the issue whether trial counsel’s performance was deficient in failing to obtain the admission of the crime lab report is whether counsel’s performance was prejudicial to her defense. See generаlly
Strickland,
supra. Johnson has failed to show a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different if the crime lab report had been admitted. See
Cofield v. State,
(e) Johnson’s contention that the cumulative effect оf trial counsel’s performance establishes inadequacy of counsel also is without merit. The cumulative error doctrine is not recognized in Georgia.
Carl v. State,
Judgment affirmed.