Johnson v. StateJohnson v. State
Kenneth Johnson appeals his conviction and sentence for grand theft. We reverse.
During the selection of defendant Johnson‘s jury, the state exercised peremptory challеnges striking two of the three black venire members. When defendant objected to the challenge of Franklin James, the first black venire member, the state responded that its strike was based on his unclear responses to questions. The trial court disallowed the strike and seated James. The state used another peremptory challenge to strike the second black prospective juror, George Ellis. Upon dеfendant‘s objection, the state explained that it challenged Ellis because he lived in a high crime area, because he had worked with people who had problems, and because there wеre other black jurors on the panel. The state did not ask Ellis any questions. The trial court allowed the strikе.
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found defendant Johnson guilty of grand theft. The trial court sentenced him as an habitual felony offender to ten years imprisonment, with five years mandatory minimum. After considering defendant‘s аppeal, we reverse the conviction and sentence.
Defendant Johnson argues that the trial court committed reversible error in consolidating three cases for simultaneous jury selection. Assuming, without deciding, that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in consolidating these cases fоr jury selection, see United States v. Quesada-Bonilla, 952 F.2d 597, 599 (1st Cir.1991), and cases cited therein, we find that the trial court erred in overruling defense counsеl‘s objection to representing multiple clients during jury selection. “To deny a motion for separatе representation, where a risk of conflicting interests exists, is reversible error.” Foster v. State, 387 So.2d 344, 345 (Fla. 1980); Belton v. State, 217 So.2d 97 (Fla. 1968); Baker v. State, 202 So.2d 563 (Fla. 1967); Bellows v. State, 508 So.2d 1330 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); Washington v. State, 419 So.2d 1100, 1100 n. 2 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); see Main v. State, 557 So.2d 946 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). Defendant‘s counsel stаted his objection to representing all three defendants in the consolidated jury selection, asserting that his clients’ interests conflicted. The record demonstrates a risk of conflict. Foster; Main; Bellows. Thus, we hold that the court erred in overruling the objection.
Defendant Johnson cites as error the trial court‘s grant of the statе‘s peremptory challenge of juror Ellis over defense objection. State v. Neil, 457 So.2d 481 (Fla. 1984), clarified, State v. Castillo, 486 So.2d 565 (Fla. 1986), and clarified, State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18, 22 (Fla.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219, 108 S.Ct. 2873, 101 L.Ed.2d 909 (1988), sets forth the test
The state‘s reasons for its peremptory challenge of juror Ellis were insufficient. A prospective juror‘s occupation is not a valid reason for challenge unless there is some connection between the occupation and the facts of the case. Slappy; Mayes v. State, 550 So.2d 496 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). A review of the record reveals no such connection. Furthermore, the record discloses no connection between the juror‘s residing in a high crime area and the facts of the case before us. Accordingly, we conclude the reason was pretextual. Slappy, 522 So.2d at 22; see Albury v. State, 541 So.2d 1262 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (strike against juror from low socioeconomic background pretextual). Our conclusion gains support from the state‘s failure to question prospective juror Ellis on either of the stated grounds. Slappy; Hicks v. State, 591 So.2d 662 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991); Gadson v. State, 561 So.2d 1316 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990).
The state‘s final reason for striking prospective juror Ellis, the presence of other black jurors on the panel, has repeatedly been ruled an invalid reason fоr excluding a black juror. Bryant v. State, 565 So.2d 1298 (Fla. 1990); Slappy, 522 So.2d at 21; see Norwood v. State, 559 So.2d 1255 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Smellie v. Torres, 570 So.2d 314 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). Under these circumstances, reversal is mandated.2
Reversed and remanded for new trial.