3 A.2d 229 | Conn. | 1938
The only issues pursued concern the conclusions of the trial court that the defendant was negligent, that this was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, and that the plaintiff was free from contributory negligence. The relevant facts found by the court are in substance these. Windsor Street in Hartford has a concrete surface thirty-four and one-half feet in width and at the place where this accident happened is level, straight and heavily traveled. In broad daylight on June 14, 1937, the defendant was operating an automobile northerly along the dry roadway of this street, following a lumber truck which was one hundred feet ahead, and followed by another truck which was twenty-five feet behind. All of the three vehicles were traveling at about the same speed of twenty miles per hour, with their right sides about ten and three-quarters feet from the east edge of the street, and were overtaking a bicycle also proceeding northerly about six and one-half feet from this edge. William Cupe, a twelve year old boy, was pedaling the bicycle standing up, at a much slower speed than that of the three motor vehicles, and the plaintiff, a *62 ten year old girl, sat on the seat behind him with her arms around his waist, but the positions of the children did not interfere with the boy's ability to operate the bicycle. They had been riding in this manner for a considerable distance.
When at least one hundred feet south of it, the defendant first saw the bicycle as the lumber truck came abreast of it, and observed there were young children on it. A continuation of the courses they were then following would have brought the defendant's automobile and the bicycle within less than four feet of each other as they came side by side. From his first sight of the bicycle until the collision the defendant did not change his course, sound any horn, give any warning of his approach, or slacken his speed. When the lumber truck had passed the bicycle and the defendant's automobile was about ten feet from the rear of it, Cupe started to turn to his left. He had not told the plaintiff he was going to nor did she know he was about to do so. He did not know defendant's automobile was approaching nor did he look to see if there was any traffic before he started to turn. When he had turned slightly and part of his front wheel was more than ten and a quarter feet from the east edge of the street, the right front corner of the defendant's bumper struck it, throwing the plaintiff to the pavement, causing her serious injuries. There was no traffic other than that above stated. When the bicycle started to turn, the defendant's automobile was so close that it was impossible for him to stop or turn it and avoid the accident.
These facts are undisputed, since the appeal does not attack the finding. No conclusion of the trial court can be disturbed by this court, therefore, unless it appears either that it involves the application of some erroneous rule of law material to the case, or that the *63
conclusion has been unreasonably drawn from the facts found. Davis v. Margolis,
In attacking the court's conclusion that the defendant's negligence in failing to give a warning of his approach "was a proximate cause of the accident, even though the negligence of the bicycle operator materially contributed to it," the defendant's claim is that since, when the bicycle started to turn, the automobile was so close that it was impossible for the defendant to stop or avoid a collision, it cannot be said that the substantial factor which caused the accident was his failure to give a signal. The purport of this argument is that even though the defendant had been negligent in failing to give any warning of the approach of the automobile, the subsequent left turn by the bicycle without signal must be held to have constituted the sole proximate cause of the accident, as distinguished from a concurring cause only, as found by the court. The answer to this contention is that, as was recently stated by this court in a case where the act of a third party had intervened between the defendant's negligence and the plaintiff's injury, "the fact that the defendant was negligent is still a ground of recovery rather than a mere condition if the plaintiff's harm results from a hazard because of which the defendant's conduct was negligent." Cuneo v. Connecticut Co., *65
The final conclusion of the court challenged by the defendant, is that "the plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence." The negligence of the boy Cupe is not imputable to the plaintiff. Sullivan v. Krivitsky,
There is no error.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.