67 Ind. App. 606 | Ind. Ct. App. | 1918
Appellant brought suit against appellee to collect an alleged unpaid premium' for insurance. The complaint in one paragraph was answered by a general denial. The case was tried by the court without a jury, and the.finding and judgment were for the defendant. Appellant filed a motion for a new trial, which was' overruled, and this appeal prayed and granted. The only error assigned is the overruling of the motion for a new trial’.
It appears without controversy that on May 18, 1914, the Employers’ Indemnity Company, an insur
Over appellant’s objection the court permitted wit- ' nesses to testify to certain statements made by Mr. Wolf to appellee, which tended to prove that appellee was not required to pay the premium on the policy in question, and that, in order to hold his business, other interested parties had arranged temporarily for his insurance until they could write his insurance in a company they were organizing.
The gist of appellant’s contention is that there is no evidence, other than the statements of Wolf, himself, which tend to prove that he was the agent of the Employers’ Indemnity Company; that the authority of an agent to represent his alleged principal cannot be proved by the statements of the agent.' The latter proposition is not controverted.
There was evidence tending to show that appellee had carried such insurance in another company which had gone out of business, and that certain parties were engaged in organizing a new company with a view of carrying insurance formerly carried by such other
Appellee contends that the evidence fully authorized the inference that Mr. Wolf acted as an insurance broker and as such procured the policy from the company; that acting in that capacity he was the agent of the company in the transaction with appellee relative to the policy and premium in controversy; also that the facts show a ratification of the agency of Wolf by the insurance company.
Appellant’s contention goes to the admissibility of the evidence aforesaid, and it is not contended that if such evidence was properly received it does not tend to sustain the decision of the trial court.
The evidence also tends to show that no demand was made on appellee for payment of the premium while the company was doing business as a going concern, and that the first demand made on him therefor was made by a representative of appellant about two years-after the policy was issued.
The case seems to have been fairly tried on its merits. No intervening error harmful to appellant has been pointed out.' Judgment affirmed.
Note. — Reported in 119 N. E. 494. See under (2) 9 C. J. 50S; (3) 9 C. J. 553; (4) 22 Cyc 1428, 1429; (5) .16 Cyc 1242.