L. SCOTT JOHNSON, Appellant, v BRYAN ROBERTSON et al., Respondents, et al., Defendant.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York
June 17, 2015
131 A.D.3d 670, 15 N.Y.S.3d 457
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
The defendants Bryan Robertson and Robertson Contracting (hereinafter together the Robertson defendants) and the plaintiff entered into an oral agreement, pursuant to which the Robertson defendants were to renovate the plaintiff‘s real property. Although the Robertson defendants presented the plaintiff with a written contract for execution, the plaintiff never executed it. The plaintiff claims that, after several months, he became dissatisfied with the Robertson defendants’ work, and that the Robertson defendants were rarely at the site supervis
In reviewing a determination made after a nonjury trial, the power of the Appellate Division is as broad as that of the trial court, and this Court may render the judgment it finds “warranted by the facts,” bearing in mind that in a close case, the trial justice had the advantage of seeing the witnesses (Northern Westchester Professional Park Assoc. v Town of Bedford, 60 NY2d 492, 499 [1983]; see Steenbuck v State of New York, 111 AD3d 819 [2013]; Perriello v State of New York, 106 AD3d 797 [2013]). Contrary to the plaintiff‘s contention, our review of the record makes clear that the trial justice did not prejudge him but, rather, properly determined that he lacked credibility. “[W]here the court‘s findings of fact rest in large measure on considerations relating to the credibility of witnesses, deference is owed to the trial court‘s credibility determinations” (Neiss v Fried, 127 AD3d 1044, 1046 [2015] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).
The testimony of the plaintiff‘s civil engineering expert did not support the causes of action. “The opinion testimony of an expert must be based on facts in the record or personally known to the witness” (Shi Pei Fang v Heng Sang Realty Corp., 38 AD3d 520, 521 [2007] [internal quotation marks omitted]). “An expert may not reach a conclusion by assuming material facts not supported by the evidence, and may not guess or speculate in drawing a conclusion” (id. [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Cassano v Hagstrom, 5 NY2d 643 [1959]). Here, the plaintiff‘s expert testified that his conclusions were based on reports prepared and photographs taken by others, and that he
The trial court‘s determination that the plaintiff‘s testimony and other proof were not credible was warranted by the facts. Hence, we agree with the trial court that the plaintiff failed to substantiate his causes of action, and conclude that the complaint was properly dismissed insofar as asserted against the Robertson defendants.
With respect to the Robertson defendants’ counterclaim to foreclose the mechanic‘s lien, we note that the absence of any written agreement between the parties precluded recovery based on a breach of contract cause of action (see
Moreover, “[p]roof of damages may be based solely on oral testimony as long as the witness has knowledge of the actual costs” (Electronic Servs. Intl. v Silvers, 284 AD2d 367, 368 [2001]). The record demonstrates that the Robertson defendants, who had 20 years of experience in construction and had built over 100 homes, had knowledge of the actual costs of the services being provided (see Austin v Barber, 227 AD2d 826 [1996]; Reed Paving v Glen Ave. Bldrs., 148 AD2d 934 [1989]). Therefore, the Robertson defendants’ testimony provided further evidence of the reasonable value of the services performed.
The plaintiff‘s remaining contentions are without merit. Since the trial court‘s determination was warranted by the facts, it properly awarded the Robertson defendants judgment in the principal sum of $555,609.86 on their counterclaim to foreclose the mechanic‘s lien.
Mastro, J.P., Austin, Sgroi and Barros, JJ., concur.
