50 So. 911 | Ala. | 1909
Counsel, in briefs, have reduced ■controlling inquiry on this appeal to the single question: May a landlord lienor be a claimant in a trial of the right of property, and prevail thereupon, in an action of detinue instituted by an holder of the legal title, conveyed by mortgage, of crops grown upon the rented premises? As appears, the inquiry involves a •construction of Code 1907, §§ 8792, 6039.
The latter section (6039) contains the statute as written in the Code of 1886 and also the amendment thereof by the act approved February 28, 1887 (Acts 1886-87, p. 150), by which it was enacted that the “right of the trial to property shall (should) include any person who holds a lien or equitable title to such property.” Theretofore, of course, the right to try the property in the personalty did not extend to lienors thereof or to those possessing equities therein. With this status existing, the former statute (section 3792) was enacted in 1889 (Acts 1888-89, p. 57), and became section 1484 of the Code of 1896. By the letter of section 6039, it applies only to personal property levied on under writs of execution or of attachment. In the last phase of section 3792 it is provided: “And thereupon the same proceedings must he had as in other trials of the right of property.” Accordingly, the final inquiry, on construction looking to the ascertainment of the legislative intent, is whether the quoted provision effected to confer upon a lienor or equitable claimant of personal property, ■ for the recovery of which an action of detinue has been instituted, the right to invoke the court’s determination of the rights thereto between the plaintiff and such lienor or equitable owner.
So far as the letter of the statute is concerned, it is apparlent that “proceedings” is the key word in the statute on this occasion. If that word was employed
¡Leaving out of view the letter of the statute (section 3792), and omitting the controlling and indicated significance the word “proceedings,” we cannot avoid the conclusion that the difference between the two classes of plaintiffs, one in execution or attachment, and, on the other hand, one seeking the recovery of the property in specie, afford strong reason to incline to the view that the Legislature, not having expressly conferred the right of trial of property on lienors or equitable owners, as it might, of course, have readily done, did not contemplate the effect appellant earnestly contends was intended by the lawmakers. In both acts of enforcing rights through. writs of execution and attachment the plaintiff’s attitude and insistence is, and must be,
The court below applied the law, in this particular, as we unclerstand.it, and the judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.