JOHNSON v. MIDWEST CITY DEL CITY PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Case Number: 118088
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA
Decided: 05/25/2021
2021 OK 29
NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL.
DARLENE JOHNSON, Petitioner/Appellant
v.
MIDWEST CITY DEL CITY PUBLIC SCHOOLS, OWN RISK #16102, and THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION, Respondents/Appellees.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION NO. II
¶0 Darlene Johnson, Appellant, was a school cafeteria worker who sought treatment and compensation from her employer for injuries sustained from a fall inside the employer‘s parking lot. Employer denied the claim, arguing Johnson was not in the course and scope of employment because her injuries did not occur “inside the employer‘s facility” within the meaning of
85A O.S.Supp.2013, § 2(13)(d) .1 The administrative law judge awarded benefits to Johnson, finding that her accidental personal injuries occurred inside the employer‘s facility and arose in the course and scope of employment as defined by Section 2(13)(d). The Workers’ Compensation Commission reversed this decision finding the administrative law judge misapplied the law and determined that Johnson was not in the course and scope of employment at the time of her injuries because the parking lot was not “inside the employer‘s facility.” The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the decision by the Commission. We vacate the opinion by the Court of Civil Appeals and hold that the decision of the administrative law judge was neither against the clear weight of the evidence nor contrary to law and further that the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commission was in excess of statutory authority or jurisdiction and affected by other errors of law.
COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS’ OPINION VACATED; ORDER OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION EN BANC REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.
William R. Emig, PARRISH DEVAUGHN, PLLC, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Petitioner
W. Jeffrey Dasovich, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Respondent
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶1 Johnson, an employee of the Midwest City Del City Public Schools, fell in the school parking lot sustaining injuries on September
¶2 Midwest City Del City Public Schools have a smoke-free campus policy.2 At the time of this accident, the use of tobacco products inside the school premises was prohibited. Johnson explained that because of this policy, she would leave the school property to smoke. On this day, she walked off of the school facility grounds and onto a nearby city street and smoked her cigarette. When Johnson finished smoking, she walked off of the city street, re-entered the school premises and walked through the school parking lot to return to the school building. While in the parking lot, her foot hit a piece of broken concrete causing her to stumble and she “just went on over and slammed into the building and then fell back to the ground.”3 Johnson was so close to the school building that her head bounced off the outside wall, causing her to fall backwards onto the ground. In an attempt to brace her fall, she stretched her right arm out as she hit the ground, breaking her upper arm and damaging her rotator cuff. Employer described Johnson‘s injuries as occurring after her smoke break once she was back on school property.4
¶3 Johnson was transported by ambulance to a local hospital for immediate surgical repair of the broken arm. Two months later she required a second surgery to repair her rotator cuff. The doctor did not authorize Johnson to return to work until almost two years after her accident. Employer terminated Johnson‘s employment in September 2019. She never returned to work for the school after her injuries. At the time of this accident, Johnson was 72 years old, and she had been employed with the Midwest City Del City Public School system for more than eleven years.
¶4 Johnson filed a claim to recover damages for her injuries under the Oklahoma Administrative Workers’ Compensation Act (AWCA).
¶5 This claim was tried before an Administrative Law Judge who determined that because Johnson was on an authorized work break at the time she fell “inside the employer‘s facility (parking lot), her injuries arose in the course and scope of her employment.5 The ALJ found that the injuries to her right arm and right shoulder were compensable under the AWCA.6 The ALJ rejected the employer‘s argument and found all of the requirements of Section 2(13)(d) were met and that Johnson met the definition of course and scope of employment when she was injured. The ALJ awarded benefits and directed Employer to provide reasonable and necessary medical treatment.
¶6 Employer filed a request for review of the decision by the ALJ, and the Workers’ Compensation Commission en banc heard the matter. The Commission reversed the decision of the ALJ, concluding that Johnson was not in the course and scope of employment because she was in the parking lot at the time of injury following her authorized work break. In reaching this finding, the Commission
¶7 The Commission found that (1) Johnson performed all of her work-related duties in the cafeteria building, (2) she did not perform any work-related duties in the parking lot, (3) she was not required to leave the cafeteria or school building for work breaks, and (4) “therefore, we find that Claimant‘s injuries did not occur inside the employer‘s facility.”11 Based on these findings, the Commission concluded that Johnson was not “inside the facility” within the meaning of
¶8 Johnson filed a Petition for Review raising the issues of (1) whether the Commission‘s findings as outlined in the Order by the ALJ were against the clear weight of the evidence, contrary to Oklahoma law or not supported by testimony presented at trial; (2) whether the Commission en banc‘s findings were against the clear weight of the evidence, clearly erroneous in view of the evidence, arbitrary and capricious, or contrary to Oklahoma law; and (3) whether
d. any injury occurring while an employee is on a work break, unless the injury occurs while the employee is on a work break inside the employer‘s facility or in an area owned by or exclusively controlled by the employer and the work break is authorized by the employer‘s supervisor.
¶9 In response to the Petition for Review, employer noted that Johnson was required to leave the school‘s campus to smoke and that “after the break” she returned to the school property and slipped on loose rock, fell, and bounced off the side of the school building, sustaining injuries to the right side of her body. Employer argued that if Johnson had not been a smoker, “she would not have been required to leave the premises to smoke her cigarette and she would not have been injured.”12
¶10 The Court of Civil Appeals noted the 2019 amendment to Section 2 (13)(d) of the
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶11 The standard of review to be followed in appellate review by the Supreme Court of a decision or order from the Commission is specified in the AWCA. It may be modified, reversed, remanded or set aside only for limited reasons including when it is (1) in excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the Commission, (2) made on unlawful procedure, (3) affected by other error of law, or (4) arbitrary or capricious.
¶12 In order to determine if the Commission has acted in excess of statutory authority, we turn to the parameters given in the AWCA. The Commission may reverse or modify the decision or award of an ALJ only if it determines the decision was (1) against the clear weight of the evidence or (2) contrary to law.
¶13 We review questions of law under a de novo standard, which is plenary, independent, and non-deferential. Legarde-Bober v. Okla. State Univ., 2016 OK 78, ¶ 5, 378 P.3d 562, 564.
ANALYSIS
¶14 To determine if the Commission acted within its legislative authority, we begin with a review of the record to determine if the findings and conclusions of the ALJ are supported by the clear weight of the evidence or contrary to law. The administrative law judge made the following findings in the Order:
Title
85A O.S. § 2(13)(d) provides that an employee who is on a work break and is injured is not in the course and scope of employment unless the employee is on a work break inside the employer‘s facility and the work break is authorized by the employee‘s supervisor. Claimant meets both of these criteria. She was on a work break inside the employer‘s facility (parking lot) and was on a work break authorized by the employee‘s supervisor. She was not smoking at the time of her injury.13
The uncontroverted facts revealed that at the time of Johnson‘s injury: (1) Johnson was clocked in; (2) her supervisor had authorized a work break; (3) Employer prohibited the use of tobacco within the school premises; (4) immediately prior to injury, Johnson was off-site to smoke, where no injury occurred; (5) Johnson tripped on loose concrete on school premises, in the employer‘s parking lot; and (6) Johnson injured her right arm and shoulder as a result of this fall. Johnson had to leave the school facility grounds to smoke a cigarette, because of the policy prohibiting tobacco inside of the educational facility grounds. Thus, even the school treated the parking lot as part of the facility grounds. Not only are the findings and conclusions supported by the clear weight of the evidence, there is no evidence to refute any of the findings of the ALJ. We hold that the clear weight of the evidence supports the factual findings outlined in the Order issued by the ALJ.
13. “Course and scope of employment” means an activity of any kind or character for which the employee was hired and that relates to and derives from the work, business, trade or profession of an employer, and is performed by an employee in the furtherance of the affairs or business of an employer. The term includes activities conducted on the premises of an employer or at other locations designated by an employer and travel by an employee in furtherance of the affairs of an employer that is specifically directed by the employer. This term does not include:
. . . .
d. any injury occurring while an employee is on a work break, unless the injury occurs while the employee is on a work break inside the employer‘s facility and the work break is authorized by the employee‘s supervisor.
¶16 School has urged that injuries occurring inside the employer owned parking lot should not be considered “inside the employer‘s facility.” Respondent failed to cite any case that supported this narrow interpretation. In the Order reversing the decision of the ALJ, the Commission en banc cited to “facility” definition from two separate dictionaries. The Commission did not refer to any Oklahoma legal authority adopting either of these definitions in application to Section 2(13)(d). The Commission goes on to reach a finding and conclusion “according to these definitions, a facility functions to serve a particular purpose. Within the context of
¶17 The Commission en banc stated that their newly applied construction of course and scope of employment and the newly created definition of the term “facility” were supported by Legarde-Bober. However, the Commission cited no legal holding within Legarde-Bober that supports the narrow definition of course and scope of employment nor for the conclusion that injuries occurring inside of an employer‘s parking lot are excluded
¶18 There is additional related legislation that provides guidance with regard to what constitutes the “employer‘s facility” in the context of an educational facility. The very reason why Johnson had to leave the school premises to smoke stems from public health legislation banning smoking on any educational facility like Midwest City Del City Public Schools. This legislation makes clear that an “educational facility” includes parking lots and grounds. The public health legislation in effect at the time of this incident which prohibited smoking at a school stated:
B. 1. Except as otherwise provided in paragraph 2 of this subsection, an educational facility which offers an early childhood education program or in which children in grades kindergarten through twelve are educated shall prohibit smoking, the use of snuff, chewing tobacco or any other form of tobacco product in the buildings and on the grounds of the facility by all persons including, but not limited to, full-time, part-time, and contract employees, during the hours of 7:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., during the school session, or when class or any program established for students is in session.
. . . .
B. 4. Smoking tobacco or marijuana or vaping marijuana shall be prohibited in an educational facility as defined in the 24/7 Tobacco-free Schools Act and as provided for in Section 1210.213 of Title 70 of the Oklahoma Statutes.
C. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit educational facilities from having more restrictive policies regarding tobacco or marijuana smoking or marijuana vaping and the use of other marijuana or tobacco products in the buildings or on the grounds of the facility.
¶19 We have noted the amendment to
c. any injury occurring in a parking lot or other common area adjacent to an employer‘s
place of business before the employee clocks in or otherwise begins work for the employer or after the employee clocks out or otherwise stops work for the employer unless the employer owns or maintains exclusive control over the area, or d. any injury occurring while an employee is on a work break, unless the injury occurs while the employee is on a work break inside the employer‘s facility or in an area owned by or exclusively controlled by the employer and the work break is authorized by the employee‘s supervisor.
CONCLUSION
¶20 The Commission‘s authority to modify or reverse the decision of the ALJ was limited to either finding that the decision was not supported by the clear weight of the evidence or contrary to law. We hold that the uncontroverted evidence meets the clear weight of the evidence standard and supported the findings and conclusions of the ALJ. We further hold that there has been no legal authority presented to this Court supporting a finding that the decision from the ALJ was in any respect contrary to law. Accordingly, the Commission acted in excess of its authority and contrary to law in reversing the Order Finding Compensability and Awarding Temporary Total Disability.
COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS’ OPINION VACATED; ORDER OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION EN BANC REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.
CONCUR: DARBY, C.J., KAUGER, EDMONDSON, COMBS, and GURICH, JJ.
DISSENT: KANE, V.C.J., (by separate writing), WINCHESTER, J. and ROWE, J. (by separate writing).
KANE, V.C.J., with whom Winchester, J. joins, dissenting:
¶1 I write separately to clarify the proper standard of review.
¶2 “The law in effect at the time of the injury controls both the award of benefits and the appellate standard of review.” Pina v. Am. Piping Inspection, Inc., 2018 OK 40, ¶ 13, 419 P.3d 231, 235. Johnson was injured on September 15, 2017, after the effective date of the Administrative Workers’ Compensation Act (AWCA). Therefore, the AWCA provides this Court‘s standard of review. Section 78(C) of the AWCA provides, in pertinent part:
C. The judgment, decision or award of the Commission shall be final and conclusive on all questions within its jurisdiction between the parties unless an action is commenced in the Supreme Court of this state to review the judgment, decision or award within twenty (20) days of being sent to the parties. Any judgment, decision or award made by an administrative law judge shall be stayed until all appeal rights have been waived or exhausted. The Supreme Court may modify, reverse, remand for rehearing, or set aside the judgment or award only if it was:
1. In violation of constitutional provisions;
2. In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the Commission;
3. Made on unlawful procedure;
4. Affected by other error of law;
5. Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, material, probative and substantial competent evidence;
6. Arbitrary or capricious;
7. Procured by fraud; or
8. Missing findings of fact on issues essential to the decision.
¶3 Johnson commenced this action in the Supreme Court for us to review the Workers’ Compensation Commission‘s decision that her injuries were not compensable. In her brief-in-chief, Johnson raises a single issue
¶4 Johnson does not seek review of any factual determinations. The material facts are not in dispute. Johnson was injured while on a work break. She was in the parking lot when she was injured. The work break was authorized by her supervisor. “[W]here there is no dispute as to the facts, whether an accidental injury occurred in the course of employment is a question of law.” Pina, 2018 OK 40, ¶ 15, 419 P.3d at 236. This case turns on a single question of law: does the statutory language “inside the employer‘s facility,” as used in
¶5 Rather than reviewing the Commission‘s decision for an error of law, pursuant to
¶6 According to the AWCA, “against the clear weight of the evidence” is the standard the Commission--not this Court--is to follow when reviewing an ALJ‘s factual determinations. Section 78(A) provides, in pertinent part:
A. Any party feeling aggrieved by the judgment, decision, or award made by the administrative law judge may, within ten (10) days of issuance, appeal to the Workers’ Compensation Commission. After hearing arguments, the Commission may reverse or modify the decision only if it determines that the decision was against the clear weight of the evidence or contrary to law.
¶7 The majority indicates it is reviewing whether the Commission acted in excess of its statutory authority. See Majority Op. ¶¶ 11-12, 18. “The Supreme Court may modify, reverse, remand for rehearing, or set aside the judgment or award only if it was . . . [i]n excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the Commission . . . .”
¶8 Confusion about the proper standard of review is further compounded by the Court‘s apparent abandonment of the “substantial evidence” standard of review pronounced in Brown v. Claims Management Resources Inc., 2017 OK 13, 391 P.3d 111. The AWCA provides that the Supreme Court may modify or reverse the Commission‘s decision if it is “clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, material, probative and substantial competent evidence.”
¶9 I respectfully dissent.
ROWE, J., with whom WINCHESTER, J., joins, dissenting:
¶1 The Administrative Workers’ Compensation Act (“AWCA“) makes clear that injuries incurred while an employee is on a break are not within the course and scope of employment, “unless the injury occurs while the employee is on a work break inside the employer‘s facility and the work break is authorized by the employee‘s supervisor.”
¶2 In reaching this interpretation, the majority relies on Bober v. Oklahoma State University, 2016 OK 78, 378 P.3d 562. In Bober, the employee sustained injuries after slipping on an icy sidewalk outside the building in which she worked prior to the beginning of her shift. Id. ¶2, 378 P.3d at 563. We determined that the employee‘s injuries occurred in the course and scope of her employment, as defined in
¶3 Our primary goal in interpreting statutory language is to ascertain and, if possible, give effect to the intent and purpose of the Legislature. Hamilton v. Northfield Ins. Co., 2020 OK 28, ¶8, 473 P.3d 22, 26. In so doing, we presume that every provision was intended for some useful purpose. Id. (citing Darnell v. Chrysler Corp., 1984 OK 57, ¶5, 687 P.2d 132, 134). If possible, we will interpret a statute in a manner which renders every word operative, rather than one which makes some words idle and meaningless. Id. ¶9, 473 P.3d at 26. Moreover, we consider relevant provisions together, with the purpose of giving force and effect to each. Id. In keeping with these principles, we must attempt to ascertain the Legislature‘s intent in using the phrase “inside the employer‘s facility” in § 2(13)(d), rather than the phrase “on the premises“--which is used earlier in the text of the statute.
¶4 The terms “inside” and “employer‘s facility” are not explicitly defined in the AWCA. Absent a statutory definition, words are to be understood in their ordinary meaning unless context indicates the Legislature intended a different meaning. In re Protest of Hare, 2017 OK 60, ¶10, 398 P.3d 317, 319-20. Thus, we understand the operative phrase “inside the employer‘s facility” in context to mean that the injury must have occurred inside a building or establishment where the employer conducts its business in order to be compensable under the AWCA. Conversely, injuries that occur outside that building or establishment would not be compensable. It appears that the Legislature‘s intent in using the “inside the employer‘s facility” language was to narrow the scope of compensable injuries that occur while an employee is on an authorized break, as compared to those that occur in the course and scope of an employee‘s work.
¶5 The majority‘s interpretation of the “inside the employer‘s facility” language, although not unreasonable, is not in accord with our principles of statutory interpretation, as it would render the phrase idle and meaningless. Hamilton, 2020 OK 28, ¶9, 473 P.3d at 26. If the Legislature had intended to make the scope of compensable injuries that occur on an authorized break as broad as those which occur in the course of an employee‘s work, it could have used the phrase “on the employer‘s premises,” or simply omitted the qualifying language altogether. Instead, the Legislature incorporated the language at issue, and we must apply its ordinary meaning as written.1
¶6 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.