102 Ga. 471 | Ga. | 1897
Tested by the law as it stood when the judgment of default was entered in the case at bar, there is no merit in the complaint made by the plaintiff in error that no terms were imposed upon the defendant as a condition to allowing him to open the default and file a plea; for this was a matter within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Lambert v. Smith, 57 Ga. 25; Sasser v. Sasser, 73 Ga. 283; Russell v. Hubbard, 76 Ga. 621; Jones v. Grantham, 80 Ga. 474. Moreover, it appears from the record that the plea alleged payment to have been made subsequently to the entry of the judgment by default; and if it were necessary to open the default to file such a plea, there certainly was no error in so doing.
Judgment reversed.