Thе following opening remarks by Judge Hollander, writing for this Court in Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City v. Ernest A. Johnson,
A retired firefighter who is also disabled as a result of an occupational disease is entitled under the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act (the “Act”) to collect both service pension benefits and compensation benefits, in a sum not to exceed the firefighter’s weekly salary. Polomski v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore,344 Md. 70 ,684 A.2d 1338 (1996). In this appeal, we must determine whether a firefighter’s surviving, dependent spouse is similarly entitled to collect both service related pension benefits and workers’ compensation benefits when the firefighter’s death results from an occupational disease. Resolution of the case requires us to construe several provisions of the Labor and Employment Article (“L.E.”) of the Maryland Code (1991, 1999 RepLVol., 2003 Supp.).
Mrs. Johnson claims that, pursuant to L.E. § 9-503(e), she is also entitled to collect workers’ compensation benefits, so long as the total amount does not еxceed Mr. Johnson’s average weekly wage at the time of his death.
In Johnson, the surviving wholly dependent spouse of Ernest Johnson was ruled to be ineligible for dual benefits. The legislative response to the Ernest Johnson case is the starting point for the similar quest for dual benefits by the surviving
This is an appeal by Janice T. Johnson, claimant, from the decision by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City reversing an award of survivor’s benefits by a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commission.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURE
The employee, Felix L. Johnson, Jr., served as a firefighter for the City of Baltimore from October 13, 1964 until his retirement on June 9, 1990. On July 2,
On October 1, 2009, the claim went to a hearing before the Workers’ Compensation Commission. On December 4, the Commission awarded benefits to the claimant. This Order was amended on February 26, 2010 to effect a nominal change in the amount of the award. In the Amended Award, the Commission first ruled that the employee sustained an occupational disease and that he died as a result thereof on November 7, 2005. The Commission further ruled that claimant was “wholly dependent” upon the employee for support and also concluded that the “Employer and Insurer are entitled to a set off under Section 9-503 of the Labor Article.”
The Employer petitioned for judicial review of the Commission’s award in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. See Section 9-737 of the Workers’ Compensation Act, Md. Code (1999, 2008 ReplVol., 2009 Supp.), § 9-737 оf the Labor and Employment Article. Both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment in the circuit court. Md. Rule 2-501. On September 1, 2010, following a hearing on these motions, the court entered summary judgment in favor of the Employer and also denied appellant’s motion.
Discussion
Standard of Review
We recently pointed out that “[ajppellate scrutiny of a workers’ compensation decision depends upon the manner of the circuit court’s judicial review of the Commission’s decision.” Doe v. Buccini Pollin Grp., Inc.,
In the case before us, the issue was joined and decided on cross-motions for summary judgment. Where the case is in this appellate posture, our review of the circuit court’s judgment is plenary, see Hemmings v. Pelham Wood Ltd. Liab. Ltd. P’ship,
Introduction—First Principles
The fundamental purpose of the Workers’ Compensation Act
“is to ‘provide employees with compensation for loss of earning capacity, regardless of fault, resulting from accidental injury ... occurring in the course of employment.’ ”... The Act’s principle objective of compensating the injuredworker “pursuant to the statutory plan for disabilities which are occupationally related” is its “centerline.” See Richard P. Gilbert & Robert L. Humрhreys, Jr., Maryland Workers’ Compensation Law, § 2.02 at 2-2 (3d ed.2007).
Doe v. Buccini, supra,
LE §§ 9-502, 9-503—The Occupational Disease Provisions
An “occupational disease” has been defined as “one which arises from causes incident to the professiоn or labor of the party’s occupation or calling. It has its origin in the inherent nature or mode of work of the profession or industry, and it is the usual result or concomitant.”
Section 9-502 of the Labor and Employment Article sets forth the compensation provisions for occupational diseases. LE §§ 9-502(a)-(d) provide:
(a) In this section, “disablement” means the event of a covered employee becoming partially or totally incapacitated:
(1) because of an occupational disease; and
(2) from performing the work of the covered employee in the last occupation in which the covered employee was injuriously exposed to the hazards of the occupational disease.
(b) Subsection (c) of this section applies only to:
(1) the employer in whose employment the covered employee was last injuriously exposed to the hazards of the occupational disease; and
(2) the insurer liable for the risk when the covered employee, while employed by the employer, was last injuriously exposed to the hazards of the occupational disease.
(c) Subject to subsection (d) of this section and except as otherwise provided, an employer and insurer to whom this subsection applies shall provide compensation in accordance with this title to:
(1) a covered employee of the employer for disability of the covered employee resulting from an occupational disease; or
(2) the dependents of the covered employee for death of the covered emрloyee resulting from an occupational disease.
(d) An employer and insurer are liable to provide compensation under subsection (c) of this section only if:
(1) the occupational disease that caused the death or disability:
(1) is due to the nature of an employment in which hazards of the occupational disease exist and the covered employee was employed before the date of disablement; or
(ii) has manifestations that are consistent with those known to result from exposure to a biological, chemical, or physical agent that is attributable to the type of employment in which the covered employee was employed before the date of disablement; and
(2) on the weight of the evidence, it reasonably may be concluded that the occupational disease was incurred as a result of the employment of the covered employee.
In Polomski, the Court of Appeals observed that thе Genera] Assembly in 1971 addressed the need for legislation
A little more than three decades after its formal recognition of occupational diseases, the General Assembly turned its attention to certain fire fighters, concluding that they were susceptible to diseases formerly not recognized as occupational. See Board of County Comm’rs for Prince George’s County v. Colgan,274 Md. 193 , 208,334 A.2d 89 , 97 (1975)(holding that the Legislature may properly determine that fire fighters are exposed to health hazards not shared by other government employees); Soper [v. Montgomery County,] supra, 294 Md. [331] at 335-36, 449 A.2d [1158] at 1160 [ (1982) ]. By Chapter 695 of the Acts of 1971, the Legislature amended the Act and granted a presumption of compensability in favor of certain classes of fire fighters suffering from heart or lung disease, or hypertension ____The аmendment was first codified as Md.Code (1957, 1971 Cum.Supp.), Article 101, § 64A. In 1972, the scope of § 64A was expanded to include certain police officers as well, Ch. 282 of the Acts of 1972, and is currently codified and amended as § 9-503(a)-(b).
Polomski,
Of particular relevance, LE § 9-503(a) provides:
(a) A paid firefighter, paid fire fighting instructor, or sworn member of the Office of the State Fire Marshal employed by an airport authority, a county, a fire control district, a municipality, or the State or a volunteer firefighter, volunteer fire fighting instructor, volunteer rescue squad member, or volunteer advanced life support unit member who is a covered employee under § 9-234 of this title is presumed to have an occupational disease that was suffered in the line of duty and is compensable under this title if:
(1) the individual has heart disease, hypertension, or lung disease;
(2) the heart disease, hypertension, or lung disease results in partial or total disability or death; and
(3) in the case of a volunteer firefighter, volunteer fire fighting instructor, volunteer rescue squad member, or volunteer advanced life support unit member, the individual has met a suitable standard of physical examination before becoming a firefighter, fire fighting instructor, rescue squad member, or advanced life support unit member.
Md.Code (1991, 2008 RepLVol., 2009 Supp.), § 9-503(a) of the Labor & Employment Article. The offset provision at LE § 9-503(e) in turn now permits the recovery of dual benefits, subject to the amount capped by the employee’s weekly salary, as follows:
(e)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, any paid firefighter ... who is eligible for benefits under subsection (a), (b), (c), or (d) of this section or the dependents of those individuals shall receive the benefits in additiоn to any benefits that the individual or the dependents of the individual are entitled to receive under the retirement system in which the individual was a participant at the time of the claim.
(2) The benefits received under this title shall be adjusted so that the weekly total of those benefits and retirement benefits does not exceed the weekly salary that was paid to the ... firefighter[.]
LE § 9-503(e) (emphasis added). The emphasized language reflects an amendment to Section 9-503(e) that extends the dual recovery to qualified surviving dependents. See 2007 Md. Laws, Chaps. 350, 351. This is the measure of recovery that has been sought by claimant in the case before us, and had been claimed unsuccessfully by Mrs. Ernest Johnson in 2005. We first review the decisions from this Court and the Court of Appeals in Ernest Johnson v. Mayor & City Council that provide a context for claimant’s attempt to recover dual benefits subject only to the LE § 9--503(e)(2) offset.
Ernest Johnson v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City
Ernest Johnson (no relation to the firefighter in the case before us), had served as a Baltimore City firefighter for thirty-two years. He was diagnosed with colon cancer, and died from that disease on March 11, 1994. There was no dispute that his illness constituted an occupational disease, or that Mrs. Ernest Johnson was a wholly dependent survivor. She began receiving a service pension benefit from the City. She also filed a claim for survivor’s benefits under the Worker’s Compensation Act. Both the Workers’ Compensation Commission and the circuit court concluded that Mrs. Johnson was entitled to both the pension and the compensation benefits, subject to a set-off as provided in LE § 9—503(e)(2), which capped the total weekly recovery in the amount of the firefighter’s weekly salary, instead of the dollar-for-dollar offset directed by LE § 9-610, the Act’s general offset provision.
The City appealed to this Court, which reversed. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City v. [Ernest ] Johnson,
The Court of Appeals affirmed. In so doing, the Court emphasized that a court may not “assume authority to read into the Act what the Legislature apparently deliberately left out.” [Ernest ] Johnson,
The “preferential treatment” for firefighters ... does not pertain to the provision for dual benefits found in § 9-503(e).... The dependents of deceased firefighters, along with living firefighters, are entitled to that statutory presumption of compensability if the firefighters suffer from one of the diseases mentioned in § 9-503.
That does not mean, however, that the dependents of deceased firefighters are entitled to the dual benefits provided to firefighters and others by § 9-503(e). As previously noted, § 9~503(e) does not mention dependents. The language in that section reads as if the Legislature intended to provide benefits to firefighters and (other public safety employees) who are living but unable to work as a result of their occupational diseases.
The statute in the instant case is not ambiguous. Moreover, even if it were, a review of the treatment of dependents throughout the Act would lead to the same result. In the present case, there is no limited restriction on benefits that implies a general entitlement to benefits. Rather, there is a general restriction on collecting dual benefits (§ 9-610) and a limited exception for certain public safety workers suffering from particular occupational diseases (§ 9-503).
Johnson,
Amended LE § 9-503(e)
Clearly aggrieved by the Court of Appeals’ decision in Ernest Johnson, the General Assembly sought to remedy what was viewed as a defect in the current law, and amended LE § 9-503(e) to include surviving dependents of the enumerated public employees so they, too, would be entitled to benefit from the offset afforded by LE § 9-503(e). 2007 Md. Laws, Chaps. 350, 351. The title clauses for Senate Bill 752
FOR the purpose of clarifying that surviving dependents of certain individuals are eligible to receive the same workers’ compensation benefits as the individual received at the time of death; and generally relating to workers’ compensation benefits fоr dependents.
The temporal reach of the amended version of LE § 9-503(e) lies at the heart of this appeal. If the current Statute applies, then claimant is entitled to dual recovery of her survivor’s benefits under the Act as well as the employee’s service pension. If the amendment is not applied retroactively, the instant claim is covered by the statute in force at the time of the employee’s death. In that instance, claimant’s recovery would be subject to the general offset provision found at LE § 9-610.
Statutory Interpretation
To determine the meaning and application of a statute, we must adhere to the “cardinal rule of statutory interpretation,” which dictates that we “ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” Chesek v. Jones, ante,
An Amendment’s Temporal Reach— The Issue of Retroactivity
This appeal requires a corollary inquiry into whether the Legislature intended the statutory provision at issue to have retroactive effect. “Generally speaking, [t]he legislative function is principally concerned with the establishment of future rules of conduct.” Doe v. Roe,
a general presumption in the law that an enactment is intended to have purely prospective effect. In the absence of clear legislative intent to the contrary, a statute is not given retrospective effect.... In examining both the statutory language and the legislative history, this presumption must be considered to detеrmine whether there are sufficient indicia of a contrary legislative intent.
Traore v. State,
The Court’s decision in Langston v. Riffe,
A majority of the Court of Appeals in Langston ruled that the amendment to FL § 5-1038(a)(2)(i)2 should аpply retroactively to afford relief to the adjudicated fathers, who were thus given the opportunity to rule out their paternity. Instead of the strict revisory rule set forth in Md. Rule 2-535 with its restrictive time constraints, FL § 5-1038(a)(2)(i)2 afforded access to a post-declaration blood or genetic test. The Court concluded that the General Assembly, in amending the statute, sought to negate the effects of the Tandra S. decision. Mindful of the presumption that amended statutes would be limited to prospective effect, the Court determined that the amendment was remedial and that it was aimed at all paternity claims and declarations. The legislative history of FL § 5-1038(a)(2)(i)2 likewise showed the Legislature’s concern with the Tandra S. decision and its implications. The Court explained that, “[cjlearly, the perceived injustices to putative fathers in situations similar to the putative fathers in the Tandra S. case could not be remedied by legislation with a strictly prospective effect.” Langston,
We hold that the extensive legislativе history in this case indicates that, in enacting Chapter 248, the General Assembly intended the Act to be remedialin nature. As the Court of Special Appeals pointed out below, Chapter 248 “is remedial in that it is an expansion of the equitable grounds on which a court may relieve from the effect of a paternity judgment an adjudged father who later has been determined not to be the biological father of the child in question.” ... More simply, it is procedural and remedial in that it relieves putative fathers from the effects of the Tandra S. opinion by expanding the procedure for remedying the perceived problem. In this case, it is appropriate to apply section 5-1038 retrospectively, due to the Legislature’s clear intent to restore that provision to its originally intended purpose by providing putative fathers with an additional procedure or remedy to challenge prior paternity declarations.
Langston,
Although we recite the facts in Langston at length, we also conclude that Langston is inapt. The remedies and prudential underlay in that case bear little resemblance to the legislative relief fashioned in LE § 9-503(e). While the value of that decision is the exposition of the applicable law, the facts before us part company with those before the Court in that case because the legislative relief sought for the adjudicated fathers was “procedural and remedial,” while the amendments to LE § 9-503(e) are, at bottom, substantive. To place more focus on our inquiry, we turn to an exposition of relevant law as set forth by Judge Wilner, writing for the Court of Appeals:
We have, over the years, stated a number of rules regarding the application of statutes to events that occurred prior to their effective date, and, although we have generally applied those rules consistently, we have not always been consistent in articulating them. In WSSC v. Riverdale Heights Fire Co.,308 Md. 556 , 563-64,520 A.2d 1319 , 1323 (1987), we confirmed four basic principles of Maryland law: (1) statutes are presumed to operate prospectively unless a cоntrary intent appears; (2) a statute governing procedure or remedy will be applied to cases pending in court when the statute becomes effective; (3) a statute will be given retroactive effect if that is the legislative intent; but (4) even if intended to apply retroactively, a statute will not be given that effect if it would impair vested rights, deny due process, or violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws. We have restated several of those principles in subsequent cases, and they remain the framework for analysis.
When an issue is raised regarding whether a statute may be given retroactive effect, we engage in a two-part analysis. First, we must determine whether the Legislature intended the statute to have the kind of retroactive effect that is asserted. That implicates the first and third principles. Applying the presumption of prospectivity, a statute will be found to operate retroactively only when the Legislature “clearly expresses an intent that the statute apply retroactively.” Waters v. Montgomery County, supra, 337 Md. [15] at 28, 650 A.2d [712] at 718 [ (1994) ]. The issue of intent sometimes becomes clouded when, as here, a statute can be regarded as being prospective in one sense and retroactive in another. As noted in State Comm’n on Human Rel v. Amecom Div. [of Litton Sys.],278 Md. 120 , 123,360 A.2d 1 , 3-4 (1976), “a statute, though applied only in legal proceedings subsequent to its effective date and in that sense, at least, prospective, is, when applied so as to determine the legal significance of acts or events that occurred prior to its effectivedate, applied retroactively.” Context becomes important.
If we conclude that the Legislature did intend for the statute to have retroactive effect, we must then examine whether such effect would contravene some Constitutional right or prohibition. That implicates the second and fourth principles.
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kim,
Claimant emphasizes that two of the basic principles apply to this case, the second and third, and that their application dictates a retroactive application of LE § 9-503(e). To reiterate, the four principles announced in Kim and prior cases are
(1) stаtutes are presumed to operate prospectively unless a contrary intent appears; (2) a statute governing procedure or remedy will be applied to cases pending in court when the statute becomes effective; (3) a statute will be given retroactive effect if that is the legislative intent; but (4) even if intended to apply retroactively, a statute will not be given that effect if it would impair vested rights, deny due process, or violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws.
Kim,
We may even assume that, absent clear language to that effect in the amendment, the General Assembly intended a retroactive application of the amendment to LE § 9~503(e). We recognize that there is language in both legislative bills that amended LE § 9-503 to suggest that the General Assembly thought that the prior version of LE § 9-503(e) authorized dual benefits to wholly dependent survivors such as the claimant before us. The title clause for each bill, Senate Bill 752 and House Bill 1117, states that the аmendments were proposed “[for] the purpose of clarifying that surviving dependents of certain individuals are eligible to receive the same workers’ compensation benefits as the individual received at the time of death[.]” In Chesek v. Jones, the Court noted that the use of the term “clarifying” in the purpose clause of a bill would be one factor in legislative interpretation. Chesek,
... even if intended to apply retroactively, a statute will not be given that effect if it would impair vested rights, deny due process, or violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws.
Assuming that the General Assembly sought to endow LE § 9-503(e) with the temporal reach that claimant seeks, the inquiry does not end with a finding of legislative intent. Langston,
Notwithstanding legislative recognition of a “custom” prior to the Court’s decision in [Ernest ] Johnson, the operative fact is that an enlarged class of persons is eligible to receive benefits not lawfully available to it prior to the 2007 amendments. We consider the decision by the Arkansas Court of Appeals in Clevenger v. City of Jonesboro,
An administrative law judge ruled in Clevenger’s favor, but the Commission reversed. The intermediate appellate court sided with the City on appeal and affirmed. The Court rejected Clevenger’s complaint that the Commission erred by ruling that the statute was substantive and would not have retrospective application. The Court’s rationale is relevant and merits extensive quotation:
Clevenger concedes that section ll-9-411(a)(2) contains no language to suggest retroactivity; however, he relies on the holding ofArcher [v. Sisters of Mercy Health Sys., 375 Ark. 523 ,294 S.W.3d 414 (2009) ] and attempts to draw a parallel that, like in Archer, and [sic] retroactive application is appropriate because the amendment alters only the City’s available recovery remedies, not its vested rights. Indeed, in Archer, our supreme court concluded that the direct-action statute—the subject of its review—did not create a new cause of action, because the negligence cause of action was firmly grounded in our state’s common law and was regulated by statute. Id. at 529,294 S.W.3d at 418 . The court went on to note that merely the remedy for recovery had changed, not the underlying fight to recover. Id. at 529,294 S.W.3d at 418 . Thus, there is a notable distinction between the case presently at bar and the Archer precedent—the underlying “cause of action” remained constant in Archer, the only thing that changed was the potential tortfeasors.
Here, prior to 2009, the employer had a vested right to a setoff, yet after the amendment that right was obliterated. Our case law directs that any changes in statutes relating to vested rights are characterized as substantive and require application of the law as it existed at the time the claimant sustained a compensable injury. Ark. State Police v. Welch,28 Ark.App. 234 ,772 S.W.2d 620 (1989). A vested right exists when the law declares that one has a claim, or that one may resist enforcement of a claim.
The statutory amendment at issue in this case deals not with the procedure for enforcing a remedy provided under the Workers’ Compensation Act, but rather with the substance of the remedy itself, i.e., entitlement to retirement disability benefits. Bеfore section (a)(2) was enacted, a claimant had no vested right to retirement disability benefits that had already been paid by other parties, and the employer had a vested right to a full setoff for those amounts. When section (a)(2) was enacted, it created a new vested right for injured workers and altered that of employers. Accordingly, because the statute is substantive and therefore cannot be applied retroactively to cover Cleven-ger’s injury, the decision of the Commission is supported by substantial evidence, and we affirm.
Clevenger,
The decision by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Yaeger v. Delano Granite Works,
Where, as here, the liability of the employers and insurers has been fixed ... their vested right in such determined liability may not be destroyed by legislation which imposes a new obligation or an additional liability____In these cases the statute imposed a new obligation on the employer and insurer in that they were made liable for the payment of ... additional ... compensation.
Yaeger,
[A]n injured claimant receiving total disability benefits prior to enactment of a statutory retirement offset ... has a reliance interest in ... continued disability benefits.... Statutory amendments may not operate retrospectively to abrogate or change WSI’s obligation to pay benefits.
Tedford,
In the final analysis, we conclude that the 2007 amendment to LE § 9-503(e) may not be applied retrospectively. The change in LE § 9-503(e) was intended by the General Assembly to address the Court’s decision in Johnson and to clarify the law to provide for dual benefits to the surviving dependents of certain public employees who are presumed to have died because of their occupational disease. There is no clear directive from the General Assembly that the amendment should apply retrospectively. The amendment has an adverse impact on the size of the class of eligible claimants who would benefit, and this effects a substantive change in the “legal landscape” and enlarges the obligations of public employers. The amended law creates an “obligation” that the employer had not previously been required to meet. See Layton v. Howard County Bd. of Appeals,
Postscript
Claimant points out that, according to the legislative history, the financial impact on the State would be negligible. Yet, the impact from retroactive application of LE § 9~503(e) would not only be borne by the State, but by local governments. It is thus not clear that the impact of the new law on municipal and county employers such as the City of Baltimore would be de minimus, as claimant suggests.
We are also mindful of the Court’s decision in Janda v. General Motors Corp.,
(1) “Ordinarily a change affecting procedure only, and not substantive rights, made by statute (and an amendment of the Maryland Rules has essentially the same effect) applies to all actions!.... ] (2) Ordinarily a statute affecting matters or rights of substance will not be given a retrospective operation as to transactions, matters and events not in litigation аt the time the statute takes effect:
“ * * * unless its words are so clear, strong and imperative in their retrospective expression that no other meaning can be attached to them, or unless the manifest intention of the Legislature could not otherwise be gratified. * * * (citing cases). An amendatory Act takes effect, like any other legislative enactment, only from the time of its passage, and has no application to prior transactions, unless an intent to the contrary is expressed in the Act or clearly implied from its provisions.”Tax Comm. v. Power Company, 182 Md. 111 , 117 [32 A.2d 382 (1943) ].
(4) A statute which affects or controls a matter still in litigation when it became law will be applied by the court reviewing the case at the time the statute takes effect although it was not yet law when the decision appealed from was rendered, even if matters or claims of substance (not constitutionally protected), as distinguished from matters procedural or those affecting the remedy are involved, unless the Legislature intеnded the contrary.
Jando,
The amendments to LE § 9-503(e), as to the instant claim, do not apply.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY AFFIRMED.
EACH PARTY TO BEAR ITS OWN COSTS.
Notes
. The "appellant” is listed in the caption of the briefs as "Felix L. Johnson, Jr.,” who is claimant’s decedent. We shall refer to Mrs. Johnson as the "claimant,” and Mr. Johnson as the employee.
. Appellant sets forth the following specific argument:
I. The Circuit Court Improperly Concluded that Lab. and Empl. § 9-503(e) Did Not Apply to the Present Case, Even though Mrs. Johnson’s Claim Was Pending at the Time of the 2007 Statutory Amendment.
A. Lab. and Empl. § 9-503(e) is Remedial.
B. Lab. and Empl. § 9-503(e)(l) Does Not Create a New Substantive Right.
C. There is No Indication the General Assembly Intended for the 2007 Amendment to Lab. and Empl. § 9-503 to Apply Prospectively-
. At the time of Mr. Johnson’s death, the Workers' Compensation Act provided with respect to offsets:
§ 9-610.
(a)(1) Except for benefits subject to an offset under § 29-118 of the State Personnel and Pensions Article, if a statute, charter, ordinance, resolution, regulation, or policy, regardless of whether part of a pension system, provides a benefit to a covered employee of a governmental unit or a quasi-public corporation that is subject to this title under § 9-201(2) of this title or, in case of death, to the dependents of the covered employee, payment of the benefit by the employer satisfies, to the extent of the payment, the liability of the employer and the Subsequent Injury Fund for payment of similar benefits under this title.
(2) If a benefit paid under paragraph (1) of this subsection is less than the benefits provided under this title, the employer, the Subsequent Injury Fund, or both shall provide an additional benefit that equals the difference between the benefit paid under paragraph (1) of this subsection and the benefits provided under this title.
(3) The computation of an additional benefit payable under paragraph (2) of this section shall be done at the time of the initial award and may not include any cost of living adjustment after the initial award.
(c)(1) The Commission may:
(1) determine whether any benefit provided by the employer is equal to or greater than any benefit provided for in this title; and
(ii) make an award against the employer or the Subsequent Injury Fund or both to provide an additional benefit that equals the difference between the benefit provided by the employer and the benefits required by this title.
(2) A claim that comes under this section is subject to the continuing powers and jurisdiction of the Commission.
Md.Code (1991, 1999 Repl.VoL, 2005 Supp.), § 9-610 of the Labor & Employment Article (“LE”).
. The Commission’s holding on these issues specifically provides:
The Commission finds on the first issue that the above-named deceased employee sustained an occupational disease (heart disease) arising out of and in the course of employment with a disablement date on July 11, 2005, and as a result thereof, died on November 7, 2005. The Commission finds on the second issue that at the time of the occupational disеase and death, the deceased employee left surviving Janice Johnston [sic], widow, who was wholly dependent upon the deceased for support; and the Commission will award compensation for such whole dependency in accordance with Section 9-681 of the Labor Article; and further compensation shall be paid unto Janice Johnston [sic], widow, at the rate previously awarded, if she continues to be wholly dependent. The Commission finds on the third issue that the Employer and Insurer are entitled to a set off under Section 9-503 of the Labor Article. Average Weekly Wage—$625.00[.]
. We need not set forth the circuit court’s ruling, for, as recently noted by the Court of Appeals, "in judicial review actions of final decisions of administrative agencies, we 'look through’ the decisions of the lower courts and review the final decision of the [Commission].” Kim v. Md. State Bd. of Physicians,
. LE § 9-745 provides:
(a) The proceedings in an appeal shall:
(1) be informal and summary; and
(2) provide each party a full opportunity to be heard.
(b) In each court proceeding under this title:
(1) the decision of the Commission is presumed to be prima facie
correct; and
(2) the party challenging the decision has the burden of proof.
(c) The court shall determine whether the Commission:
(1) justly considered all of the facts about the accidental personal injury, occupational disease, or compensable hernia;
(2) exceeded the powers granted to it under this title; or
(3) misconstrued the law and facts applicable in the case decided.
(d) On a motion of any party filed with the clerk of the court in accordance with the practice in civil cases, the court shall submit to a jury any question of fact involved in the case.
(e) (1) If the court determines that the Commission acted within its powers and correctly construed the law and facts, the court shall confirm the decision of the Commission.
(2) If the court determines that the Commission did not act within its powers or did not correctly construe the law and facts, the court shall reverse or modify the decision or remand the case to the Commission for further proceedings.
Md.Code (1991, 2008 Repl. Vol., 2010 Supp.), § 9-745 of the Labor and Employment Article.
. "Occupational diseases ... differ significantly from work-related traumatic injuries.” Junius C. McElveen, Jr. and Lawrenсe P. Postol, Compensating Occupational Disease Victims under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 32 Am. U.L.Rev. 717, 719 (1983). "Although some states maintain lists of occupational diseases, all fifty states have general occupational disease coverage!.]” Gencarelle v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 892 F.2d 173, 177 n. 2 (2d Cir.1989) (citation omitted).
. In Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City v. Ernest Johnson,
. The amendment provided:
22. (a) Where an employee of an employer subject to this Article suffers from an occupational disease, [as hereinbefore listed,] and is thereby disabled from performing his work in the last occupation in which he was injuriously exposed to the hazards of such disease, or dies as a result of such disease, and the disease was due to the nature of [an] the occupation or process, [described in Section 21 hereof,] in which he was employed within the period previous to his disablement as limited in Sections 23 and 24 hereof, the employee, or, in case of his death, his dependents shall be entitled to compensation in the amount and payable in the manner provided elsewhere in this Article, as if such disablement or death were an injury by accident, except as otherwise provided in Sections [21] 22 to 30 hereof; and the practice and procedure prescribed elsewhere in this Article shall apply to proceedings for compensation for such diseases, except as in said Sections [21] 22 to 30, and Sections 53, 57 and 67, as hereby amended, otherwise provided.
1951 Laws of Md., Chap. 287, § 22(a).
. The Court of Appeals has pointed out with respect to the predecessor to LE § 9-503 that the provision "is reflective of a social policy affording preferential treatment to fire fighters disabled by [occupational disease].” Montgomery County Fire Bd. v. Fisher,
. At the time of the decision in Johnson v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore,
(e)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, any paid firefighter ... who is eligible for benefits under subsection (a), (b), (c), or (d) of this section shall receive the benefits in addition to any benefits that the individual or the dependents of the individual are entitled to receive under the retirement system in which the individual was a participant at the time of the claim.
(2) The benefits received under this title shall be adjusted so that the weekly total of those benefits and retirement benefits does not exceed the weekly salary that was paid to the ... firefighter!.]
Md.Code (1991, 1999 Repl.Vol.), § 9-503(e) of the Labor and Employment Article. Notwithstanding suggestions that dual recovery for qualifying dependents had been authorized by § 9-503(e) prior to the 2007 Amendments, we view the Johnson Court’s holding to the contrary to be conclusive. We hasten to note that we would not construe a legislative amendment as overruling the Court of Appeals’ holding in Johnson. See Langston v. Riffe,
. Claimant contends, in her brief, that "[w]hen the Legislature intends prospective application, it so states.” This turns the presumption against retroactive application of an amendment on its head. The Court’s decision in Roth v. Dimensions Health Corp.,