Johnson v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore

874A.2d 439 Ernest A. JOHNSON

v. MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE CITY. Luster,

Daniel T. Jr. Mayor City City. Council of Baltimore 60, 77, Sept.

Nos. Term 2004. Appeals Maryland. Court of

May Clements, (Gregory Hopper, Salsbury, Paul D. Bekman G. Adkins, LLC, brief), Baltimore, Bekman, on for Marder & petitioner. Phelan, Jr., Counsel, Burgun- Herbert Principal

William R. der, Jr., City Special Principal (Ralph Tyler, Counsel S. Solicitor, brief), respondent. on for BELL, C.J, RAKER, WILNER, before

Argued BATTAGLIA, GREENE, CATHELL, HARRELL, JJ. GREENE, J. balancing opposing

The is often faced with Legislature difficult choices. This case discusses making interests and by Legislature distinguishing of the lines drawn some workers’ benefits for firefighters as different than for dependents. their areWe asked to decide the availability of dual benefits of firefighters who die particular occupational diseases. That issue has been by addressed and decided Legislature. (Mr. Johnson)

Both (Mr. Ernest Johnson and Daniel Luster Luster) were Baltimore City Firefighters died who of cancers by were caused their repeated contact toxic with sub- stances in duty. the line of prevented cancer both men from performing their duties firefighters. as Both Mr. John- son and Mr. are Luster survived their wives and both women receive benefits from their husbands pension service plans.

The issue before this Court is whether the widows collect the pension service benefits in addition to the full benefits, workers’ compensation death or whether the work- compensation ers’ death benefits must be reduced by the amount of pension service benefits the are currently widows receiving.

We hold that the statute does not permit the dependents to collect full workers’ compensation death benefits addition to service pension benefits.

FACTS facts both of these cases are undisputed. Conse- our quently, recitation of the facts is succinct. Mr. Johnson worked for thirty-two years as a City Baltimore firefighter. As a result of repeated his contact with toxic substances encountered in the line of duty, he contracted colon cancer and became unable to perform his duties as a firefighter. Mr. Johnson’s average weekly as a wage firefighter was $989.75. March On Mr. Johnson died from colon cancer.1 parties agree 1. The that Mr. Johnson's colon cancer is a "rectal cancer” and is an duty, disease that was suffered in the line of 9-503(c)(1) meaning within the of the Labor and on her husband at the wholly dependent

Mrs. Johnson was per death. receives week currently time of his She $603.90 pension plan. from Mr. service benefits Johnson’s con- City firefighter also a Baltimore who Mr. Luster was contacts toxic repeated a result of his with tracted cancer as duty. in the line of Because substances encountered cancer, his duties as a perform Mr. Luster was unable cancer2 on ultimately pancreatic died firefighter average weekly as wage 2000. Mr. Luster’s August wholly dependent on was Mrs. Luster was firefighter $821.52. receives currently her husband the time his death. She pension in benefits from Mr. Luster’s service per week $294.83 plan. compen- Mrs. Johnson and Mrs. Luster filed workers’

Both benefits, by claims which were heard sation for death Commission, for Workers’ the Circuit Court Compensation City, Special Appeals. Baltimore and the Court of The Com- that the agreed mission and the Circuit Court both cases they for and that were eligible permitted widows were benefits retire- compensation to receive a combination workers’ cases, granted ment benefits. In both the Circuit Court judgment filed the claimants and summary by motions for As a summary judgment by City. denied motions for filed these in both to the rulings, City appealed result of cases Special Appeals. Court of reported opinion, Special

In a the Court held Appeals benefits, but that her eligible that Mrs. Johnson was be workers’ death benefits must reduced Mayor received.3 pension amount service she (1991, 9-503(c)(1) Repl.Vol.), § article. Md.Code 1999 of the Labor Employment Article. 2. in Pancreatic cancer is also an that was suffered disease 9-503(c)(1) duty, meaning the line of within the of the Labor and 9-503(c)(1) Employment Repl.Vol.), § Article. Md.Code Labor and Article. eligible compensation Mrs. Johnson is receive workers' death per $510.00 in the benefits amount of week. Because she receives Johnson, City& Council Baltimore City 156 Md.App. 569, 596, (2004). 847 A.2d 1190 Mrs. Johnson filed a Petition Certiorari, Baltimore, granted. which we Johnson v. 687, (2004). Md. 856 A.2d 723 in an

Similarly, opinion, the unreported Court of Special held that Appeals Mrs. Luster was eligible for workers’ com- benefits, death pensation but that they must be reduced by the amount of pension service benefits that she received.4 We granted Baltimore, also certiorari in that case. Luster v. (2004). 857 A.2d 1131 Because the issue before the identical, in Court these cases is we shall decide the cases together and our report decision one opinion.

STANDARD OF REVIEW 2-501(e), Under Md. Rule summary judgment may granted be if “the motion and response show that there is no genuine as to dispute any material fact and party that the whose favor judgment is entered is judgment entitled to as a matter of We grant law.” review the of summary judgment Co., de novo. Walk v. Cas. Ins. Hartford (2004). Whether the Circuit Court properly granted summary judgment is a question of law. Id. There fore, we if must decide the trial court’s decision was legally correct. Id. case,

In this we are called upon interpret a statute. The question before us purely one. legal See Salomon v. Progressive Classic Company, Insurance (noting only presented issue week, pension $603.90

service in the per amount of once the off-set, compensation workers’ benefits are Mrs. Johnson no receives however, does, compensation workers' death benefits. She continue to pension receive the per $603.90 service benefits of week. eligible 4. Mrs. Luster is compensation to receive workers’ death bene- per $510.00 fits in the Offsetting amount of week. that amount benefits, pension amount she payment receives service in a results per $215.17 week workers’ death benefits. She also per $294.83 to receive pension continues week in service benefits. interpre- involving statutory of law question in that case was 599, 604, Slater, 861 A.2d 80-81 tation); v. Davis “[bjecause ... (2004) of interpretation provi- our (stating that ... classified as appropriately are Maryland sions of Code if law, de novo to determine of we review the issues questions these rulings in its on legally the trial court was correct matters.”).

DISCUSSION Article re- of the Labor and Section 9-502 covered compensate employ- and insurers to quires employers disability for or death that results ees and their dependents also limits the from an disease.5 This section occupational by requiring occupa- and insurers liability employers to be requirements to meet certain order tional disease part: compensable. provides pertinent The section (a) section, this “disablement” “Disablement” defined.—In employee becoming partially means the of a covered event totally or incapacitated:

(1) disease; and occupational because of an employee the work of the covered performing the covered was occupation employee the last which injuriously exposed to the hazards disease.

(c) Subject to subsec- Liability employer and insurer. — (d) an except provided, tion of this section as otherwise this shall employer applies insurer whom subsection in accordance with this title to: provide compensation " previously "occupational which 5. We have defined disease” as 'one profession party's arises from incident to the or labor of the causes calling. origin occupation or It its in the inherent nature or mode has industry, profession work of the and it is the usual result or " Baltimore, Mayor City & Council concomitant.’ Polomski (1996) (quoting Victory n. 1341 n. 8 Francks, Sparkler Specialty A. & Co. v. (1925)). employee a covered of the employer disability employee the covered from an resulting occupational dis- ease; or

(2) the the covered employee death of the covered employee resulting from an dis- occupational ease.

(d) Limitation on liability. employer and insurer are —An (c) liable to provide compensation under subsection of this section if: only

(1) the occupational disease that caused the death or disability:

(1) is due to the nature of an employment which hazards of the occupational disease exist and the covered employee disablement; was employed before the date of or

(ii) has manifestations that are consistent with those chemical, known to from exposure result to a biological, or physical agent that is type attributable to the of employ- ment in which the covered was employee employed before disablement; the date

(2) evidence, on weight reasonably may it be concluded the occupational disease was incurred as a result of the employment of the employee.... covered Repl.Vol.), § Md.Code 9-502 of the Labor and Employment Article.

Section 9-503 of the Labor and Employment Article carves out an exception to the general occupational disease noted in provisions by 9-502 treatment giving special employees particular professions suffering who are particular diseases. Section 9-503 affords employees those the benefit of a presumption that their condition a compen- is occupational sable disease.6 It permits also those employees production persuasion employer. The burden of remain on the "Although presumption compensability is a rebuttable one of fact, legislature manifestly impose intended that a statute party against operates. Montgomery formidable burden on the whom it in addition to retire- workers’

to collect weekly benefits, employee’s to the amount up ment part: pertinent © 9-503 states salary.7 Section from an suffering ... to be presumed is firefighter A paid duty line of that was suffered disease title if the individual: under this and is compensable rectal, or throat (1) prostate, or pancreatic, leukemia has a toxic substance contact with that- caused cancer is duty; in the line of encountered that the individual has firefight- as a years least 5 of service completed has currently individual is where the department er ... in the serves; employed firefighter normal duties of perform is unable currently the individual

... in the where department of the cancer or leukemia or because employed serves disability.... 9-503(c) § (1991, Supp.) 2004 Repl.Vol.,

Md.Code 9-503(e) in provides Article. Section Employment Labor and pertinent part: (2) subsection,

(1) in this paragraph as Except provided under ... is for benefits eligible who any paid firefighter (d) the (a), (b), (c), of this section shall receive subsection is benefits that the individual any in addition to benefits in the system the retirement which entitle to receive under claim. at the time of the a participant individual was adjusted under this title shall be The benefits received and retirement total of those benefits weekly so that the 245, 257, Fisher, County Md. 468 A.2d Fire Board v. (1983). Article, Contrast, which will By § of the Labor & 9-610 general employees opinion, rule that be discussed later in the states compensation receive both workers' bene- and their do not benefits, employee disability is owed more retirement unless fits and currently than he or she is money compensation benefits workers’ case, employee is receiving disability retirement benefits. In that County, v. Baltimore receive the difference. See Blevins entitled to (1999). 724 A.2d benefits does not weekly exceed the that salary was paid the ... firefighter.... Repl.Vol, 9-503(e)

Md.Code 2004 Supp.) § Labor and Employment Article.

There is no dispute either of the cases at bar regarding whether the firefighters themselves would have been permit- ted to collect workers’ benefits and retirement 9-503(e) benefits simultaneously. Section clearly permits fire- fighters suffering from particular occupational diseases benefits, receive both as long as those benefits do not exceed the weekly wage paid to the firefighters. See Polomski v. Baltimore, & Mayor City Council

1338, 1345 § (holding 9-503 required the firefight- er’s workers’ compensation benefits to be reduced “to the that, extent when combined benefits, with his retirement sum does exceed weekly his salary.”). The parties do not agree, however, that the dependents of are also benefits, entitled to collect dual after the death of the firefighters who have succumbed to one of the occupational diseases described in 9-503. 9-503(e)

We note that makes no mention of dependents. Rather, the language reads as if it only pertains to the statute; individuals (and mentioned namely, firefighters other public safety personnel) who are eligible for benefits they because suffer particular occupational diseases. Those individuals shall receive the workers’ compensation “in addition to any benefits that the individual entitled to receive under the retirement system in which the individual was a participant at the time of the claim.” Md. (1991, 9-503(e)(1) Code 1999 Repl.Vol., § 2004 Supp.) of the Labor and Employment contrast, Article. By § 9-610 of the Labor & Employment Article specifically mentions depen dents and discusses the usual offset of workers’ compensation benefits that applies to governmental covered employees states, their dependents. It in pertinent part: (a) Covered employee governmental unit or quasi-public corporation.—

(1) § 29-118 subject to an offset under for benefits Except statute, Article, if a Personnel and Pensions of the State ordinance, charter, resolution, regard- regulation, policy, a benefit pension system, provides of a part less of whether or, ... of a unit case employee governmental to a covered death, employee, pay- to the of the covered dependents satisfies, the extent the to by employer ment of the benefit and the Subse- liability employer the payment, under Fund for of similar benefits Injury payment quent this title.

(2) If under of this subsection paid paragraph a benefit title, the provided than the benefits under this is less Fund, pro- or both shall employer, Subsequent Injury an benefit that the difference between equals vide additional (1) of subsection and paid paragraph the benefit under this under this title.... provided the benefits 9-610(a) § of the Labor and Repl.Vol.) Md.Code Article. In County, Blevins Baltimore (1999), predecessor A.2d 22 discussing while “ section, unmistakably to noted that ‘the scheme that this we that emerges Assembly provide only the General wished a single recovery single injtbry governmental employ a for covered both a by pension plan compensa ees and workmen’s ” Blevins, (quoting tion.’ 352 Md. at 724 A.2d at 31 Frank v. Baltimore 399 A.2d County, (1979)). Legislature’s We also noted that intention “ passing provision this set-off was to ‘minimize the burden on that result from public treasury providing duplicate would ” Blevins, public employees.’ 352 Md. at benefits 254). Frank, (quoting A.2d at 31 284 Md. at that because 9-503 does not City argues include benefits, eligible general as for dual offset dependents Luster, §of 9-610 provision applies Mrs. Johnson Mrs. governmental employees. as covered As result, asserts, their death City workers’ benefits be reduced the amount of pension should service Luster, they receiving. are Mrs. and Mrs. Johnson however, argue provision the offset 9-610 does not

11 Rather, apply they them. they contend that are included under the § more favorable provision 9-503 because their husbands were eligible those dual benefits they when were alive.

Clearly, Mrs. Johnson and Mrs. Luster would have a much easier claim if the provided statute that the “individual and his or her dependents” are entitled to collect dual benefits. assert, however, They that even though dependents are not 9-503(e), § mentioned in the statute does not explicitly ex- clude dependents and, from dual benefits when considered within the context of the § rest of 9-503 and the purpose of laws, workers’ dependents should not be exclud- ed.

We remind ourselves that the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature. v. 102, O’Connor Baltimore County, 382 Md. 113, 1191, (2004). 854 A.2d 1198 As by noted this Court Connors, 24, v. 35, (1995): Oaks 423, Md. 660 A.2d The first step determining legislative intent is to look at the statutory language and statute, words of the “[i]f construed according to their common and everyday mean- ing, are clear and unambiguous and express plain mean- ing, give we will effect to the statute it as is written.” Jones, 261, supra, 336 Md. at 647 A.2d 1204. See also Parrison, 559, Rose, supra, 537; Md. at 644 A.2d supra, 906; 335 Md. at State, 643 A.2d Outmezguine v. (1994). 641 A.2d 870 State,

See also Greco 701 A.2d that our (noting goal give is to statutes their “most reasonable interpretation, in accord logic with and common sense, and to avoid a construction not otherwise evident used”). words actually

A review of the context of all of 9-503 and the general statutory purpose will assist us in determining Legislature’s 9-503(e). intent and our construction of See State, 125, 137-38, Frost v.

(noting seek to interpretations we avoid that are “illogical, sense,” and that

unreasonable, common or inconsistent with statutes includes interpreting approach the commonsensical scheme in which statute statutory of the general a review Mutual, found); 322 Md. Harleysville v. in is Forbes question 696-97, 944, that do 689, (stating A.2d 947-48 we context “in or out of statutory language [but not read isolation and in legislature’s general purpose light construe it] whole.”). As stated in Kaczo- of the statute as a the context Baltimore, 505, City and Council Mayor rowski of (1987), determining the context when statute, a critical, that must be dis- purpose purpose is

legislative context, that are to be cerned in “statutes light to the to be reasonably purpose construed with reference ” short, determined in purpose, accomplished.... context, purpose And that key. of the statute’s light apply plain-mean- becomes the context within which we rule. ing Fire

(Quoting Dept., Potter v. Bethesda (1987).) addition, In context include related statutes, history and “other material that pertinent legislative ... of legislative pur- bears on the fundamental issue fairly ” Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 525 A.2d at pose goal.... (1987). regard history general purpose With to the Act, Compensation explained: Workers’ this Court has 1914, Maryland 800 of the Acts of Workers’ By Chapter Act was enacted into law this State. Since Compensation time, revisions, that the Act gone through has several attitudes, both real- reflecting changes workplace societal ities, and, course, Despite some political compromises. proper over the aims of the Act and the peripheral sparring Commission, role of the the core this prompted values beneficial been abandoned.... In legislation have never employers, the Act and the reality, protects employees, sure, Act public alike. To be maintains no-fault compensation system and their families.... employees time, however, recognizes At the same the Act also the need to protect employers from the nature unpredictable and' expense litigation, public and the from the overwhelming tax burden of for the human “caring helpless wreckage found the trail of modern [along] industry.” course, twenty-five Of years experience inevit- brought Act, able to the maturity Legislature and the eventually recognized that accidents were not the sole cause of employ- ee harm. By Chapter 465 of the Acts of certain diseases occupational were deemed if contract- compensable ed during employment. course of The 1939 amend- ments to the Act entitled disabled or employees killed specific enumerated diseases to compensation if “as such disablement or death an injury were acci- 465, § dent.” Ch. 32B of the Acts of 1939.... Eventually, the of practice enumerating specific diseases aban- was doned, were, and all occupational subject diseases to certain relevant, conditions not here deemed compensable.... As injuries, with accidental the burden of a disease proving as occupational generally fell to the claimant.

A little more than three decades after its formal recogni- diseases, tion of the General Assembly turned its attention to certain fire fighters, concluding they that were susceptible formerly to diseases not recognized as oc- 1971, cupational.... By Chapter 695 of the Acts of Legislature amended Act granted a presumption of of compensability favor certain classes of fire fighters disease, suffering from heart or lung hypertension. Baltimore, 70, Polomski v. & Mayor City Council 344 Md. of 76-78, 1338, (1996) (footnotes 684 A.2d 1340-41 and internal omitted). citations Legislature The later added additional public safety employees and occupational diseases to the list of persons See, a presumption entitled to of compensability. e.g., 282 of the Chapter Acts of 1972 (expanding scope officers); include certain police 760 of the of Chapter Acts 1985 (adding firefighters and others that become disabled cancer); 179 of the Acts of Chapter

from certain of types are who employees Natural Resources of (adding Department disease). suffering Lyme 9-503, noted that it “is §to we Discussing predecessor treatment affording preferential policy reflective of social Montgomery County by heart disease.” fighters fire disabled Board, 625, Fisher, 245, 257, 468 A.2d 298 Md. Fire (1983).8 the Legislature before us is whether question to the depen- treatment preferential intended to extend and Mrs. Luster of those Mrs. Johnson firefighters. dents intended Legislature frame this as whether question as well as treatment to live preferential extend think the answer is way, Either we firefighters. deceased “yes, but.” “ liberally to construe the Act ‘as favor required

We are in order to injured provisions permit of as its will employees in the purposes. Any uncertainty its benevolent effectuate ” claimant’ Harris v. should be resolved favor of the law County, Board Education Howard City& Council (quoting Mayor 88, 97, 656 A.2d 761-62 Cassidy, Baltimore v. (1995)). that, however, “that it is also well settled Having said the Act in disregard plain meaning the court ” of liberal construction.... & Council Mayor City the name Cassidy, Baltimore v. (1995). that not read into a statute is may language We there, of the if are not satisfied with the outcome even we to read into the Act authority case. “We cannot assume what deliberately left out.” Howard Legislature apparently the (1945). 41 A.2d Yeager, Co. v. Contr. (1946), Schmeizl, A.2d 619 In v. Schmeizl inherit, a to this wrote: discussing right while widow’s Court Clearly, Legislature "preferential to the extended that treatment” types firefighters that disabled certain of cancer. Md. become 9-503(c) Repl.Vol.), of the Labor and Code Article. court to Appellants urge exception the read an into the of on theory statute distribution the that the Legislature never any unjust. could have intended so The consequences construction, of equitable by doctrine the Roman accepted law, in England was introduced before the rise of courts of chancery. It conception existing was a of side power, by the not in of yet side with law it.... But the derogation giving judge power doctrine the to the statute in mould justice place accordance with his notions has no in our of law. We the rule a court that is not at follow fundamental to liberty legislative surmise a to contrary intention the statute, the to indulge letter or in the inserting license of of omitting making or words with the view the statute of express an intention iohich is not in the original evidenced A be statute should according construed the form. ordinary and import language, natural its unless a of context, meaning clearly is indicated with- different or resorting interpretation out subtle forced for or purpose extending limiting its Where operation. of statute, provisions there is in the a ambiguity or the doubtful, intention of the is court legislature look to consequences; but where the language statute is clear and explicit, expresses a definite and sensible meaning, the court cannot the mandate disregard Legislature and an exception, insert none has been where by the for Legislature, relieving made the sake of against hardship injustice.

Schmeizl, added). 186 Md. at (emphasis at 621 “preferential treatment” for mentioned in Fisher, Board Montgomery County pertain Fire v. does not 9-503(e). Rather, provision dual benefits found in the Court referenced the specifically presumption compens- ability when the issue addressing preferential treatment. Board, Fisher, Fire Montgomery See County 257-58, preferential treat- (explaining “[ajlthough ment and stating presumption compensabili- fact, ty rebuttable the legislature manifestly one impose intended the statute a formidable burden on the party against whom it both the burden operates. Accordingly, fixed on remain of persuasion the burden production

of ”). firefighters, of deceased dependents ... The employer statutory to that are entitled living firefighters, with along from suffer firefighters if the compensability presumption §in 9-503. mentioned of the diseases one de- however, mean, that the That does to benefits provided to the dual are entitled firefighters ceased noted, 503(e). As previously §by and others firefighters 9— 9-503(e) language dependents.9 mention does not § provide intended to if the Legislature reads as that section (other safety employees) public to benefits of their occupa- as a result but unable work living who are tional diseases.10 contrast, compensation statute By numerous workers’ there are

9. stark evidencing dependents, provisions that do mention the treatment provi- made Legislature dependents and has considered fact that the compensation scenarios. workers’ them in a number of other sions for See, dependents of the (requiring compensation to "the e.g., § 9-501 resulting employee” from covered employee for death of the covered dependents of (requiring compensation § injury); 9-502 accidental resulting employee death the covered employee covered for (“A disease); employ- dependent § of a covered occupational 9-678 an the death of the covered compensation for ee who is entitled to injury occupational resulting personal accidental employee from an Part XII of compensation in accordance with this paid be disease shall subtitle.”); (establishing death benefits to be § the amount of this 9-681 wholly dependent a deceased covered were on paid "individuals who resulting personal from an accidental employee at the time of death disease”); (establishing the amount of 9-682 injury or partly dependent); § 9- paid who were to be individuals death benefits multiple payment (establishing system for of death benefits liability (limiting employers and insurers if dependents); § 9-684 (discussing happens to benefits dependents); § what there are no 9-685 paid); 9-686 dependent the death benefit has been if the dies before receiving alien (discussing system benefits for nonresident for abundantly clear that list. It is dependents). That is not an exhaustive of time and effort Legislature spent a considerable amount has dependents in workers’ providing for the treatment of Legislature provide dependents with the intended to cases. If the bar, well to do so urged it was able particular benefit in the case explicitly. subsection, any paid Except provided paragraph of this as (c), (a), (b), firefighter eligible ... under subsection who is Mrs. and Mrs. Luster contend that by refusing Johnson benefits, them the dual has living firefight Court treated differently firefighters. ers from deceased their Contrary to assertions, (vis in place living firefighters a better position compensation) a-vis than the dependents firefight deceased ers, is not at statutory odds with the overall scheme. For § example, 9-681 of the Labor and Article Employment dis compensation cusses workers’ death benefits for dependents and limits those benefits to two-thirds of the average weekly wage (1991, 1999 of the deceased employee. covered Md.Code Vol., 9-681(b) § Repl. Supp.), of the Labor Employ 9-503(e)(2) contrast, § ment Article. By permits the firefight ers to receive dual benefits to the full up amount of their (1991, weekly salary. Md.Code Repl.Vol., Supp.) 9-503(e)(2) § of the Labor and Employment Article.

It appears firefighters suffer disability who as a result of an accidental or an injury occupational disease not men- § tioned in subject 9-503 are also to the offset provisions of Moreover, § 9-610.11 it is clear that the of fire- dependents fighters who die as a injury result of accidental or occupational subject § disease not mentioned in 9-503 are to the offset §of provisions 9-610. We cannot think of any logical reason why Legislature intended to place would have the depen- firefighters dents of who die saving people while from a burning building in a than position dependents worse (d) any this section shall receive the in addition to benefits that the individual entitled receive under is the retirement benefits system participant in which the individual was a at the time of the claim. adjusted The benefits received under this title shall be that the so weekly total of those benefits and retirement benefits does not exceed weekly salary paid firefighter that was to the ... ... 9-503(e) Repl.Vol., Supp.) §

Md.Code of the Labor added). (emphasis Article general provision prohibiting payment 11. Section 9-610 is a dual 9-503(e) provides in benefits workers' cases. Section an exception general particular persons suffering to the rule for particular occupational exception provid- diseases. There is no similar 9-501, (accidental 9-502, personal injury), (occupa- ed or in general). tional disease in they die from cancer that contracted while who firefighters express an burning building.12 from a Without saving people scheme, we will not statutory provision delineating such “to treat all Legislature obligated one. The impose pension to their and retirement public employees relation Polomski, 344 Md. at 684 A.2d at similarly.” treat the is not Similarly, Legislature required manner as the firefight- the same ers themselves. argue

Mrs. and Mrs. Luster that our decision Johnson Handy, in Breitenbach v. N.B. a different result. As noted requires disagree. We “ Breitenbach, ‘if the plain meaning

this Court statutory unambiguous, is clear and and consistent language and the purposes legislation, both the broad with our specific purpose provision being interpreted, inquiry ” Breitenbach, 473, is at an end.’ 366 Md. at 784 A.2d (citation omitted). only language ambiguous It is when the sources, legislative history that look to additional such as we ambiguous. or case Id. Section 9-503 is not prior law. Moreover, our of the statute discussed in interpretation Breitenbach does not illuminate the situation before us. In case, Vol.), § 9- Repl. that we read Md.Code 660(a)(1) Employment sufficiently of the Labor & Article to be broad and from encompass expenses reasonable travel treatments, medical the cost of which are covered under the Breitenbach, 482, statute. 366 Md. at A.2d at 579. The may require payment statute notes that the Commission “medical, treatment,” surgical, or other attendance or to a employee personal covered who has suffered an accidental hernia, injury, or disease. Breiten- compensable bach, addition, 366 Md. at 784 A.2d at 574. In we Charter, Educ., Chesapeake County 12. See Inc. v. Anne Arundel Bd. of (2000) (noting that we " consequences resulting meaning consider ‘the from one rather than another, illogical adopt that construction which avoids an result, unreasonable or one which is inconsistent common with ”). sense.’ § interpreted 9-674 of the Labor & Article to an “place obligation on employers and insurers pay for the all transportation expenses of claimants receiving vocational rehabilitation services except, circumstances, unusual those receiving Breitenbach, vocational rehabilitation training.” Md. at 784 A.2d at 578. We that reached result by that concluding the limited restriction on transportation, found 9-674, §in that implied there was a general benefit for transportation expenses. Concluding § that 9-660 was ambig- uous regarding reimbursement of travel expenses, we considered the affect of 9-674 on 9-660 and applied the “rule of liberal construction” to resolve the ambiguity favor Breitenbach, of the claimant. 366 Md. at at 579. The present case bears no resemblance to the circumstances just described. The statute in the instant case is not ambigu- Moreover, were, ous. if it even a review of the treatment of dependents throughout the Act would lead to the same result. case, In the present there is no limited restriction on benefits that implies general entitlement to Rather, benefits. there is a general (§ 9-610) restriction on collecting dual benefits and a limited exception for certain public safety workers (§ suffering particular 9-503). occupational diseases Mrs. Johnson and Mrs. Luster also that argue our decision Streidel, United States v. 620 A.2d 905 us to requires decide in their Again, favor. disagree. we In Streidel, we concluded the limitation on noneconomic in damages personal injury cases did not apply wrongful Streidel, death actions. 537, 329 Md. at 620 A.2d at 907. We reached that decision by relying on “the language of the context, statute and its the legislative history, extensive and the practical and unresolved difficulties of applying the cap statute to reduce an award of in a damages death wrongful Streidel, 539, action ...” 329 Md. at 620 A.2d at 908-09. The statute at issue in that case limits the for award noneconomic “ damages in ‘any action for damages personal inju- for ’ ” Streidel, ry.... 329 Md. at 620 A.2d at 908 (quoting § Article). 11-108 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings We considered the fact significant that the statute say did not the death”, that statute determining when injury, or

“personal Streidel, 329 Md. at death actions. wrongful not apply did addition, “remain- noted that the 911. In we 620 A.2d at whole, statute, indicates that read as a when cap der of injury’ to include ‘personal not intend Assembly did General action.” Strei- wrongful recoverable in a death damages those del, at 911. no in this case makes before the Court

Similarly, statute (in decided, have view dependents we mention 9-503(e) §of 9-610 of application § and the plain language Article), apply that it does Employment the Labor and of the Act’s treatment also considered the rest them. We fits that that our decision within concluded dependents is consistent with the method of decision structure. Our fact, Streidel.13 In that case contains the follow- in reasoning ing relevant admonition: might death actions well wrongful the inclusion of

Although statute, cap principal purpose be consistent with the rely Although and Mrs. Luster on our decision Mrs. Johnson Streidel, Compensation Act in of the Workers' our brief discussion question particularly helpful to the before us and does not Streidel is not change analysis. We stated: (1991), Employment Similarly, in 9-101 of the Labor and Code Article, person- Compensation Act defines an accidental the Worker's injury in the injury part "an accidental that arises out of and al as employment." express reference is made in this defini- course of No personal injury to whether an accidental includes tional section Act, however, Compensation wrongful The Worker's from the death. outlining has included a section time of its enactment decedent, family system compensation of a in the event of a employment. in the course of death which arises out of and occurs Consequently, compensation “injury" under the for an Worker's family compensation Compensation Act includes for a decedent’s event of an accidental death. Streidel, question Md. at A.2d at 911. There is no in the deceased are entitled to collect benefits arising employment, either event of a death out of and in the course of injury Md.Code accidental or from disease. Vol.), Repl. § 9-678 of the Labor and Article. The howevei', family, expressly amount of for a decedent’s Compensa limited 9-610. Our brief discussion of the Workers' question Act in did not address the of dual benefits or tion Streidel limitations on benefits. in many ways there are other which the statute could be broadened that would also be principle consistent with its statute, however, purpose. Amending the not the func- is tion judiciary. wrongful Inclusion of death actions is not consistent with the language, context and legislative history of the statute ... cap we are not free to a rewrite statute merely because the Court believes that the legisla- ture’s would have purpose effectively been more advanced by an additional provision.

Streidel, 550, 329 Md. at 620 A.2d at 914. case,

In the instant it clear that the found it Legislature acceptable living to treat firefighters suffering certain cancers and other occupational differently diseases than the dependents of those firefighters. While that result seem some, unfair to the Court is not free ignore statutory to in requirements remedy any order to perceived unfairness. “ The Workers’ Act Compensation ‘reflects the Legislature’s considered judgment as to the appropriate allocation of re- sources between employers, employees, and the taxpayers of ” O’Connor, this State.’ Ametek v. 364 Md. (2001) (citation omitted). In view of that admoni-

tion, we will not violate the statutory any mandate particu- lar case in an to a attempt perceived unjust avoid result. See State Retirement and Pension System Thompson, 368 Md. 53, 67-71, A.2d 285-88 (discussing case which a claimant received disability reduced retirement bene- fits because he was also receiving workers’ benefits and refusing permit the Circuit Court to order the State Retirement and System Pension pay claimant more than the relevant statutes permitted, though even claimant was in a difficult financial position).

We have previously noted that the be the Legislature must body remedy any Compensation unfairness the Workers’ Act, should they necessary. Gleneagles, consider it Inc. v. Hanks, (2005). As this Court Glidden, (1944), stated Paul v. 39 A.2d 544 to Compensation passed promote Workmen’s Act was [t]he and to general prevent of the State State welfare injured its from to care for workmen taxpayers having and previously and their under the law as it dependents, when existed, could recover for their damages such workmen not enactment, were, injuries. inequal- There in its first certain time, have, been ities which from time to corrected amendment. be a for further amendment. There need this, to no as it our express opinion, As we is within provisions may inequita- of the be province. present Some this, the scope ble. To consider is also outside of our duties. enactment made in ... pursuance police power is left judgment Legisla- and the details must be to the ture, right infringed. unless some basic is Glidden, at

CONCLUSION conclusion, §§ In that the language we hold 9-503 and 9- 9-503(e) 610 is clear and unambiguous. provides Section an to the rule for exception general firefighters offset and other public safety employees suffering particular occupational diseases, enabling they them collect dual benefits while are not, however, It does living. provide exception same of those dependents individuals. JUDGMENTS THE AP- OF COURT OF SPECIAL PEALS AFFIRMED. PAY IN PETITIONERS TO COSTS AND COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS COURT OF AP- PEALS.

BATTAGLIA, J., Dissents. BATTAGLIA,

Dissenting Opinion by J.

I dissent. respectfully

In this case have been if we asked to decide under Section 9-503(e) of the Labor and Article firefighters die from during who cancer contracted the course of employment may collect full worker’s death compensation and benefits retirement benefits to which a who firefighter survives cancer be would entitled. According Majority, survives, a firefighter when he or she is entitled to receive both benefits, worker’s retirement but if the firefighter perishes from cancer contracted during his or her employment, general then the compensa- worker’s 610(a)(1) tion provision off-set contained Section applies, 9— substantially reducing the benefits to the dependents of those who themselves would otherwise be entitled to the dual benefits. The Majority’s argument premised upon absence 503(e). word “dependents” Section I 9— 9-503(e) disagree, would hold that Section permits the dependents of firefighters die from an occupational who cancer to collect full worker’s death benefits and retire- ment benefits. 503(e)

Section pertinent states in part: 9— (1) as Except provided subsection, in paragraph of this any paid firefighter ... who eligible for benefits under (a), (b), (d) (c), subsection or of this section shall receive the benefits in addition any benefits that the individual is entitled to receive under the retirement system which the individual was a participant at the time of the claim.

(2) The benefits received under this title adjusted shall be weekly so that the total of those benefits and retirement benefits does not exceed the weekly salary that paid was the ... firefighter.

This Court has often stated that our goal in interpreting statutes is to “identify and effectuate legislative the intent statute(s) underlying at issue.” Serio v. Baltimore Coun- 373, 952, (2004), 384 ty, Md. 863 A.2d 962 quoting Drew v. First Guaranty Mortgage 318, 327, 1, Corp., 379 Md. 842 A.2d (2003), 6 State, in turn quoting 325, 335, v. Derry 358 Md. 748 478, (2000); State, 47, A.2d 483 57-58, Pete v. 384 Md. 862 419, (2004); State, A.2d 425 329, 346, Graves v. 364 Md. 772 1225, (2001). A.2d stated, 1235 As we have the best source of legislative intent is the statute’s plain language and when the language is clear and our unambiguous, inquiry ordinarily Serio, 373, ends there. 962; Pete, 384 Md. at 863 A.2d at 384 24 Drew, 327, A.2d 425; Md. at 842 57-58, at 379 at 862 A.2d

Md. Univ., 335, 349, 800 A.2d State 369 Md. Beyer Morgan v. 6; at State, 672, 665, A.2d v. (2002); 659 Whack 707, 338 Md. 715 (1995). of the statute 1347, plain language Although 1350 intent, we do not read understanding legislative our guides Serio, 373, Md. at 863 in a vacuum. See 384 language Drew, Derry, 358 6; 327, 962; at 842 A.2d at 379 Md. A.2d at Rather, statutory- read 336, at 483-84. we at 748 A.2d Md. scheme, consider- statutory the context of language within Serio, aim, body.” the enacting or “purpose, policy ing Pete, 57-58, 962; Md. at 862 373, at 384 Md. at 863 A.2d 384 Drew, 6; Beyer, 327, 369 425; at 842 A.2d at at A.2d M., 711, 687, In re Mark 715; Md. 350, 800 A.2d at Md. Tracey, v. (2001)(quoting Tracey A.2d (1992)). that, have stated We are statutory language, we the context pursue we [w]hen print- are they of the statute as not limited to the words other “external and often must consider ed.... We evidence,” including.... oth- or “persuasive manifestations” on the fundamental issue of fairly material bears er becomes the context with- goal, which legislative purpose us in a language before particular in which we read given case. Baltimore, City Council Mayor

Williams Kaczorowski v. (quoting Baltimore, 505, 514-15, 525 City& Council 309 Md. Mayor of (1987)). of a 628, interpreting language A.2d 632-33 When statute, ordinary their and natural the words assign “we 962; Pete, Serio, 373, Md. at 863 A.2d at 384 meaning.” 384 Baltimore County, v. 57-58, 425; O’Connor at A.2d at Md. 862 State, v. 1191, (2004); Lewis 102, 114, Md. 854 A.2d 1198 382 (1998). Thus, 1128, 648, 653, 1131 Md. 705 A.2d 348 perspective must be read “a commonsensical provisions Serio, 373, Md. at 863 384 interpretation.” avoid farfetched State, 329, 346, 1225, 962; 772 A.2d Graves A.2d at 364 Md. State, 106, (2001); 125, 137, A.2d Frost v. 336 Md. 647 1235 State, 163, 171, Dickerson v. (1994); Md. 596 A.2d 324 (1991). At the heart of this matter is the General intent Assembly’s in creating the of presumption for compensability certain occupational diseases and the provision entitling firefighters and other specified public employees to worker’s compensation and retirement benefits. We have often stated that Worker’s Compensation Act is remedial in nature and “should be construed as liberally injured favor of the employees as provisions its permit will in order to effectuate its benevolent purposes. Any uncertainty in the law should be resolved favor of the claimant.” Harris v. Board Education of 21, 57, Howard County, 375 Md. 825 A.2d (quoting Mayor City& Council Baltimore v. Cassidy, 338 88, 97, (1995)). 656 A.2d 761-62 As this Court has explained, the Act’s purposes include “protecting workers and their families from hardships inflicted by inju work-related ries,” “preventing State and its taxpayers from having to injured care for workmen and their dependents,” provid “sure ing and certain relief injured for workmen in extra- hazardous employment and their families and depen dents ....” B. Isaac, Frank Joy 628, 634, Co. v. (quoting the Preamble to 1914 Md. Laws, 800). Chap. When effectuating “benevolent pur Act, poses” of the this Court has opined that “all sections of the Act must be read together, conjunction with one anoth er, to discern the true intent of the legislature.” Breitenbach v. N.B. Handy, (2001). 784 A.2d Thus, contrary to the Majority’s emphasis on the absence of the term “dependents” in outcome, the statute to justify its 9-503(e) Section must be considered in light of the overall history purpose of its enactment and should not be read in 482-87, a vacuum. Id. at 577-81.

Section 9-502 of the Act requires that employers and compensate insurers employees covered and their dependents for a disability or death that results from an occupational disease: “a covered employee of the employer for disability the covered from employee resulting disease; an occupational or the dependents the covered employee death covered employee resulting an occupational disease.”

26 9-502(c) Article

Md.Code, Employment § the Labor and of added). liability limits the The statute (emphasis only must be that employer/insurer providing if: paid death or dis- disease that caused the occupational (i) nature of an which employment is due to the

ability: and the covered disease exist occupational hazards disablement; or before the date of employee employed was (ii) those known has manifestations that are consistent with chemical, physical to exposure biological, to result from to the of agent type employment that is attributable the date employed the covered was before employee which disablement; evidence, reasonably may it be weight on the incurred as a occupational concluded that the disease was employee. result of the of the covered employment 9-502(d) (1991, § Repl.Vol., Cum.Supp.), Md.Code of the Labor and Article. section, 9-503,

In the next and other very suffering occupational from certain specified public employees diseases, cancer, heart disease and are including “presumed an suffering be disease was suffered (1991, duty the line of and is' Md.Code compensable.” Em- Repl.Vol., Cum.Supp.), 9-503 of the Labor and from former ployment Article. Section 9-503 was derived Maryland Repl.Vol., Cum.Supp.) Code Article 101, 64A; clearly Chapter its set forth 695 of purpose was the Acts of 1971:

An Act to add 64A to Article 101 of the new Section (1970 Annotated title Maryland Supplement), Code Compensation,” immediately “Workman’s after follow thereof, provide that there is a presumption Section compensable occupational disease in cases certain fire sustaining or total or death fighters temporary disability conditions, provide under certain and to that payable system also be under a retirement under certain conditions. added). Laws, Act, Chap. (emphasis enti- Disability Payments

tled “Death and stated Fighters” —Fire in part:

Any impairment any condition or of health of munici- paid or fire pal, county, airport authority, control district fire diseases, diseases, caused heart fighter by lung hyperten- or in resulting partial disability sion total or or death shall be presumed compensable be under this article and to have duty been suffered in the line of and as a result of his employment. Laws, 695. In Chap. this section was amended throat, cancer,

to include rectal or prostate, pancreatic leukemia, see Md.Code 1985 Repl.Vol., 1990 Cum. 64A(b), Supp.), Art. and has been recodified into the 9-503(a) (d) current through Sections of the Labor Em Laws, ployment Article. See 1991 Md. Chap. consistently recognized

We have intent un- legislative derlying presumption of under 9- compensability Section firefighters 503 for from an suffering occupational disease: Maryland legislature created the presumption light “[T]he general public knowledge firefighters in the course daily of their activities are to inhalation exposed of smoke subjected noxious fumes and are to unusual stresses and Fisher, strains.” Fire Montgomery County Board (1983). Furthermore, the pre- sumption is

reflective of a social policy affording preferential treatment disabled heart Although disease. fact, presumption compensability is a rebuttable one of legislature intended that manifestly impose the statute a formidable burden on the it party against operates. whom Id. at 468 A.2d at 631. 9-503(e),

Section permits firefighters suffering which one enumerated diseases to collect work- er’s benefits and retirement benefits to the up amount of the firefighter’s weekly salary, also was derived Code, from former Section 64A of the which stated: any this article fire any provision paid Notwithstanding from a condition or claim results compensable whose fighter diseases, heart dis- by lung of health caused impairment and has been suffered the line of hypertension eases or provided benefits as are this duty shall receive such as he be entitled to article in addition to such benefits fire system fighter under the retirement which said was at the time of his claim. The benefits received participant however, that the adjusted this article shall be so under one hundred weekly total of all benefits shall exceed salary paid was said fire percent weekly which fighter. Laws, in was added 1985 to Chap. Language Repl. cancer. Md.Code firefighters

add with See 64A(b). Vol.), statutory language Art. The was recodi fied substantive into the current Section 9- change without 503(e) the notion that “fire are fighters and underscores other exposed by government to health hazards shared Board Commissioners Prince employees.” County for George’s County Colgan,

(1975). the read in relation to one anoth-

Essentially, statutes when er that a one of the enu- provide firefighter diagnosed with merated diseases in 9-503 is to presumed Section have satis- 9-502(d) the that requirements fied of Section he or she is from a that suffering prescribed occupational disease resulted job. from the nature of The remaining provi- hazardous the 9-502, sions of Section that the must com- employer/insurer pensate employee dependents, the covered and their are still thus, it applicable; entirely permissible is suffer from cancer or heart disease to rely who on the same to all of presumption compensability receive 9-503(e), benefits afforded to the under firefighter Section the term in though “dependents” even is not mentioned provision. Majority places on the absence of the term significance 9-503(e)

“dependents” Section because its view “the as if it language only pertains reads individuals men- tioned in the statute.... Those individuals shall receive the worker’s ‘in compensation benefits addition to any benefits that the individual is entitled Maj. to receive....’” at op. at 444 added in (emphasis original). Apparently, Majority on juxtaposition relies of the word “individual” in 9-503(e) Section against the listing specified public service employees the same section in order to exclude dependents. 9-503, however, The Revisor’s Notes to Section explain the use of the term “individual” : “the word ‘individual’ is substi- tuted for the former ‘person’, only word since a human being instructor, be a firefighter, fire fighting squad or rescue member. As to the definition of ‘person,’ see 1-101 of this article Employment].” Laws, [Labor Chap. Therefore, § Revisor’s Notes.1 the Majority’s reliance on 9-503(e) the term “individual” to conclude that Section does not contemplate dependents misplaced and reads more into than language was intended Assembly.2 General

Likewise, the Majority states that the “language [Section 9-503(e) reads as if the Legislature ] intended provide (other benefits to firefighters and public safety employees) who are living but unable to work as a result of their Maj. 16-17, diseases.” op. 874 A.2d at 448-49 added). essence, In (emphasis the Majority’s holding awards the more favorable those firefighters who have the good cancer, fortune of surviving their but denies those bene- fits to the widows and children dependent on those firefighters whose lives were lost. Such a narrow construction of the Repl.Vol., 1. Md.Code Cum.Supp.), § 1-101 of the Article, individual, Labor and "person” defines as: "an receiver, trustee, guardian, personal representative, fiduciary, repre- firm, association, any any partnership, sentative of tion, kind and corpora- entity.” or other 2. Majority points provisions specifi- also to various of the Act that cally dependents refer to the of a deceased worker as evidence that the 9-503(e) "dependents” absence of in Section means that the General Assembly provide did intend to the same benefits to note, however, provision. under this off-set I that none of the refer- resulting enced sections contain an exclusion for benefits from an presumption. disease under the established Section 9-503 in light Assembly’s protecting

statute of the General focus on face, hazards firefighters recognition many they contrary Assembly’s expressed General concern for those their lives in the line of firefighters duty. who sacrifice judice, cases sub

In the dispute spouses there is no wholly dependent were on the who died from their firefighters occupational cancers and that worker’s com- underlying claim pensation compensable. death was A liberal construc- 9-503(e) tion of Section in favor of deceased firefighters supports the benevolent of the statute and the purposes conclusion that for the firefighters qualified worker’s compensation benefits addition to the retirement benefits. Because I would hold that themselves are entitled full benefits in of their recognition great sacrifices protect our duty, communities while the line of dependents also should be entitled to those benefits. There- fore, I respectfully dissent.

874A.2d 457 Joseph David BRYANT HOWARD COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL ex rel.

SERVICES Cassandra COSTLEY. 93, Sept. Term, No. 2004. Appeals Maryland. Court of May

Case Details

Case Name: Johnson v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore

Court Name: Court of Appeals of Maryland

Date Published: May 12, 2005

Citation: 874 A.2d 439

Docket Number: 60, 77, September Term 2004

Court Abbreviation: Md.