OPINION
delivered the opinion of the court, in which
We granted appeal to determine whether the vicarious liability of a private hospital may be based upon the acts or omissions of a state-employed physician resident. We hold that a private hospital may be vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior based solely upon the acts of a state-employed physician resident when the resident is acting as an agent of the hospital. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
BACKGROUND / PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Amman Johnson underwent surgery at LeBonheur Children’s Medical Center (Le-Bonheur) on November 4,1991, to repair a heart condition. During the surgery, Amman sustained permanent neurological damage resulting frоm cardiac arrest. Mary Johnson, Amman’s mother, filed suit against LeBonheur and other health care providers involved in the surgery seeking damages for the injuries sustained by Amman.
The complaint alleges, inter alia, that Dr. Michael Citak and Dr. Michael Martin-dale were acting as the agents and servants of LeBonheur during Amman’s surgery and that LeBonheur is vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for their negligence. Dr. Citak and Dr. Martindale were physician residents in the University of Tennessee (UT) training program. They were compensated by UT and thus were state employees pursuant to Tenn.Code Ann. § 8-42-101(3). While in the UT training program, both resident physicians worked on rotation at LeBonheur. 1 During their rotation, they were required to follow LeBonheur’s protocols, rules, and regulations in providing treatment or services, or otherwise in attending patients of LeBonheur. Amman Johnson was one of the LeBonheur patients for whom the resident physicians provided services. Dr. Citak assisted in performing Amman’s surgery, and Dr. Martindale assisted in providing the anesthesia care during the surgery.
*342 LeBonheur filed a motion for partial summary judgment. LeBonheur asserted that it could not be held vicariously liable based solely upon the actions of Dr. Citak and Dr. Martindale because the physician residents were immune from liability as state employees under Tenn.Code Ann. § 9-8-307. On December 8,1998, the trial court entered an order overruling the motion. LeBonheur was granted permission to seek an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tenn. R.App. P. Rule 9. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s overruling of the partial summary judgment motion. We granted appeal.
I. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. A ruling on a motion for summary judgment involves only questions of law and not disputed issues of fact.
Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. Concord EFS
,
Inc.,
ANALYSIS
II. Tennessee Code Annotated § 9-8-307
To determine whether LeBonh-eur may be held vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the actions of physician residents employed by the State, we begin with an examination of the relevant portions of Tenn.Code Ann. § 9-8-307 (1998). The statute provides in pertinent part:
(a)(1) The commission or each commissioner sitting individually has exclusive jurisdiction to determine all monetary claims against the state based on the acts or omissions of “state employees,” as defined in § 8-42-101(3), falling within one (1) or more of the following categories:
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(D) Legal or medical malpractice by a state employee; provided, that the state employee has a рrofessional/client relationship with the claimant;
* * *
(b) Claims against the state filed pursuant to subsection (a) shall operate as a waiver of any cause of action, based on the same act or omission, which the claimant has against any state officer or employee. The waiver is void if the commission determines that the act or omission was not within the scope of the officer’s or employee’s office or employment.
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(h) State officers and employees are absolutely immune from liability for acts or omissions within the scope of the officer’s or employee’s office or employment, except for willful, malicious, or criminal acts or omissions or for acts or omissions done for personal gain. For purposes of this chapter, “state officer” оr “employee” has the meaning set forth in 8-42-101(3).
Tenn.Code Ann. § 9-8-307 (1998) (emphasis added).
*343
When construing statutes, we are required to ascertain and effectuate the legislative intent and purpose of the statutes.
State v. Walls,
Section 9-8-307 of the Tennessee Code Annotated vests the Tennessee Claims Commission with exclusive jurisdiction for medical malpractice claims against the State of Tennessee based upon the actions of physician residents employed by the State. The filing of a claim against the State in the Claims Commission waives any cause of action against such a physician resident based on the same act or omission occurring within the scope of employment. Tenn.Code Ann. § 9 — 8—307(b) (1998). The statute further provides that state employees are absolutely immune from liability unless their acts or omissions are willful, malicious, criminal, or done fоr personal gain. Tenn.Code Ann. § 9-8-307(h) (1998). Nothing in the statute, however, immunizes a private hospital from liability for the acts or omissions of physician residents employed by the State who are also acting as agents or servants of the private hospital. Section 9-8-307 of the Tennessee Code Annotated therefore provides LeBonheur no protection against the imposition of vicarious liability based upon the acts or omissions of Dr. Citak and/or Dr. Martindale if the residents are found to have been the agents of the hospital.
III. Traditional Agency Principles
We must now determine whether Le-Bonheur may be held vicariously hable under traditional agency principles for the acts of state-employed physician residents who are “immune” from individual liability. We begin with a review of relevant agency principles.
Thе creation of an agency relationship does not require a contract, an explicit agreement, or an understanding between the parties.
White v. Revco Disc. Drug Ctrs., Inc.,
When an agency relationship exists, the principal may be bound by the acts of the agent performed on the principal’s behalf and within the actual or apparent scope of the agency.
White, 33
S.W.3d at 724. In Tennessee, the doctrine of re-spondeat superior permits the master/principal to be held liable for the negligent actions of his servant/agent.
Smith v. Henson,
*344
Moreover, an agent may serve two masters simultaneously when the objectives of the dual masters are not contrary.
Id.
“A person may be the servant of two masters, not joint employers, at one time as to one act, if the service does not involve abandonment of the service to the other.”
Id.
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 226 cmt. b.). Two pаrties “may agree to employ a servant together or to share the services of a servant. If there is one agreement with both of [the parties], the actor is the servant of both [when] the servant is subject to joint control.” Restatement of the Law, Second, Agency, § 226. Thus, a person serving two masters may subject both to liability for the same act “if the act is within the scope of employment for both.”
White,
LeBonheur argues that if physician residents may also be agents of a private hospital, then the absolute immunity granted physician residents would be removed, contrary to legislative intent. Le-Bonheur contends that the immunity provided by statute ' to resident physicians could not apply to residents who have dual masters. LeBonheur’s argument incorrectly presumes that an agent can act for only one master at a time. When a state-employed physician resident performs a rotation at a private hospital, the same acts or omissions may be within the resident’s scope of employment with the State and within the resident’s scope of employment with the private hospital. Permitting a finding of dual masters, therefore, does not serve to abolish the absolute immunity granted to a state-employed physician resident pursuant to section 9-8-307(h).
LeBonheur also asserts that a principal/master may not be held vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior based solely upon the acts of an agent who is immune from liability. In support of this proposition, LeBonheur cites numerous cases. Our analysis of Tennessee case law, however, reveals that this proposition is not without limitation.
Loveman Co. v. Bayless,
Subsequently, the Court, in
Raines v. Mercer,
addressed the issue of whether a father could be held liable to his son’s wife under the doctrine of respondeat superior for his son’s negligent conduct.
In
Stewart v. Craig,
These cases indicate that a principal may not be held vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior based upon the acts of its agent in three instances: (1) when the agent has been exonerated by an adjudication of non-liability, (2) when the right of action against the agent is extinguished by operation of law, or (3) when the injured party extinguishes the agent’s liability by conferring an affirmative, substantive right upon the agent that precludes assessment of liability against the agent.
See Rankhorn v. Sealtest Foods,
The first and third categories above clearly do not apply to the facts of this case. The resident physicians in this case have not been exonerated by an adjudication of non-liability; and Ms. Johnson has not taken any affirmative action to prevent an assessment of liability against the residents. The second category similarly provides no basis for LeBonheur’s assertion that the resident physicians’ personal immunity should insulate LeBonheur from vicarious liability. The marital unity rule extinguished a spouse’s right of action that was based upon the other spouse’s tor-tious conduct. The statute conferring immunity upon the residents, however, does not extinguish a claimant’s right of action. Section 9-8-307(h) of the Tennessee Code Annotated simply immunizes physician residents from individual monetary liability. The residents’ conduct remains available as a basis for the imposition of liability in the Claims Commission against the *346 State. Thus, Ms. Johnson’s right of action against the residents survives. Fault may be assessed for the residents’ tortious conduct, but the State has assumed responsibility for the damages assessed as a result of that fault. Accordingly, we hold that a physician resident’s personal immunity does not prohibit LeBonheur from being held vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior based upon the actions of a physiсian resident.
LeBonheur further maintains that it may not be held vicariously hable for the actions of the resident physicians because to do so would violate common law indemnity principles. Courts in Tennessee have long recognized that a principal is entitled to seek indemnification against a negligent agent.
See Continental Ins. Co. v. City of Knoxville,
Finally, LeBonheur argues that our holding in
Carroll v. Whitney,
placed on the employer because, having engaged in an enterprise, which will on the basis of all past experience involve harm to others through the torts of employees, and sought to profit by it, it is just that [the employer], rather than the innocent injured plaintiff, should bear [the risk]; and [liability is placed on the employer] because [the employer] is better able to absorb [the risks], and to distribute them, through prices, rates or liability insurance, to the public, and so to shift them to society, to the community at large.
*347 Thus, fairness to the parties requires that a private hospital may be held vicariously hable under the dоctrine of respondeat superior solely for the acts of a state-employed physician resident when that resident is found to be the agent or servant of the hospital.
IV. Denial of Summary Judgment
Having determined that Le-Bonheur may be held vicariously hable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the actions or omissions of state-employed physician residents who are acting as agеnts or servants of LeBonheur, we must now consider whether LeBonheur is entitled to summary judgment. We are required to “take the strongest legitimate view of the evidence in favor of the non-moving party, allow ah reasonable inferences in favor of that party, and discard ah countervailing evidence.”
Byrd v. Hall,
CONCLUSION
We hold that a physician resident may be the agent of both the State and a private hospital. Further, the absolute immunity granted pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-307(h) to a state-employed physician resident is not removed by the creation of a dual master relationship. A material issue of fact exists as to whether Dr. Citak and/or Dr. Martindale were acting as the agents of LeBonheur at the time of Amman Johnson’s surgery. Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ judgment affirming the trial court’s overruling of LeBonheur’s motion for partial summary judgment. The case is remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs of this appeal are taxed to the Appellant, Le-Bonheur Children’s Medical Center, for which execution may issue if necessary.
Notes
. LeBonheur and UT entered into a written affiliation agreement on January 22, 1975.
. Marital unity, a rule that declared husband and wife to be one person, extinguished ante-nuptial actions for tort between husband and wife.
Raines,