Johnson v. Knorr

JOHNSON, Appellant, Gamal Individually KNORR, and as

David M. for the Commonwealth

Parole Officer Penna.; Jones, Individual- William

of

ly Parole and as a Officer Penna.; Common-

Commonwealth Pro- Board of

wealth Parole; Doe, Individ- John

bation

ually a Police Officer for the and as Roe,

City Philadelphia; Richard

Individually as a Police Officer City Philadelphia;

for the

Philadelphia.

No. 04-2870. Appeals, Court of

United States

Third Circuit. 29, 2005.

Argued March

Decided & (Argued), Stanshine

Martin Stanshine PA, Appel- P.C., Philadelphia, Sigal, lant. (Argued), Calvin McMonagle

Patrick J. Knorr, III, Koons, Office John G. R. PA, for General, Philadelphia, Attorney Appellee. BECKER, his office and confront- AUTO, SMITH, Agent Knorr exited and

Before Johnson, kneeling who was over ed Judges. Circuit implored probationer. Johnson stricken Knorr response, THE Knorr to render aid. OPINION OF COURT pushed and cursed Johnson repeatedly SMITH, Judge. Circuit and Johnson way. him out of the Knorr challenges the District Gamal Johnson Knorr, ut- angry words. When exchanged granting Court’s tering profanity, also ordered Johnson rights on his civil claim the defendants waiting room area and enter one leave the alleging that Board of Proba- offices, replied that Knorr of the Johnson Agent Knorr arrest- tion and Parole David out of the people “better call some other probable cause. John- ed Johnson without something.” Knorr testified back the District denial appeals son also Court’s interpreted Johnson’s remark as he complaint to file an of leave claim, prosecution add a malicious which eventually walked toward Johnson alleged claim Johnson first at the sum- office, behind. indicated with Knorr close mary judgment stage proceedings. of the office, pushed Knorr they As neared the Johnson asserts both actions as constitu- door, swung open which Johnson into the violations, invoking tional 42 U.S.C. Angry Jones. curses and struck ju- § 1983. The District Court exercised exchanged again, and Johnson was were §§ pursuant risdiction to 28 U.S.C. subdued, handcuffed, Knorr and arrested. jurisdiction and 1343. This Court has un- Philadelphia police, contacted and based Knorr, der 28 U.S.C. as an indi- solely on Knorr’s version of the confronta- official, government vidual not as a but tion, simple as- charged Johnson was with only remaining defendant. sault, assault, aggravated follow, For the reasons that we will af- endangerment. and reckless firm the judgment days, held for two and the Johnson was claim the false arrest and will reverse the pre- at charges were dismissed denial of leave to amend the hearing later. liminary six weeks On assert a malicious claim. We 29, 2001, Johnson filed suit in the Court will remand to the District for fur- against alleging, Pleas in- Common proceedings. ther alia, seizure, un- ter unlawful search and Pacts imprisonment, and due lawful arrest facts, following 4th, 5th, The in a most taken process violations under the Johnson, Appellant favorable to who was 14th amendments of the federal Constitu- non-moving party on the motion for tion. The defendants removed the case summary judgment, are culled from the court. federal record before us. The relevant substantial denying After Knorr’s motions for sum

facts related to the denial of Johnson’s reconsideration, mary judgment and for motion to amend his are uncon- requested supplemental the District Court tested. briefing on the rule of Barna v. (3d Cir.1994), 6, 2000, September Amboy, Gamal Perth 42 F.3d 809 On Johnson waiting was in a room with about a dozen which teaches crime, no matter probationers proba- when another arrest existed for minor, then no unconstitutional arrest apparently epileptic tioner had an seizure. how commotion, supple- claim can maintained. In his Upon hearing ensuing be brief, judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. argued mental for the first 56(c). P. time that he had stated a claim under a theory, not grounded agree confrontation, but Knorr’s the incident statements about making for arrest Johnson Philadelphia police made to which led to law, one threats. Under prosecution. Johnson’s of if “commits the crime terroristic threats 11, 2004, the On June communicates, person directly the either probable ruled that because Knorr had indirectly, any a threat to commit crime cause to arrest Johnson for terroristic of violence intent to terrorize anoth threats, 2706(a)(1) con- originally Johnson’s asserted § er.” 18 Pa. Cons.Stat. claim stitutional false arrest must fail. assuming, stage, Even as we must at this claim, Regarding the malicious Agent that Knorr initiated and escalated confrontation, the District Court concluded: the we conclude that John son’s statement to Knorr that he “better request Johnson’s for leave to file an call people some other out of the back or comes more than a something” provided be year and a half after the close discov- lieve that Johnson had uttered a terroristic ery, after Defendants’ Motion for Sum- essentially Johnson concedes as briefed, mary Judgment fully was after pages much on 24-25 of his brief. parties pre-trial the submitted their memoranda, roughly three weeks recognize that the terroristic threats after the scheduled trial of this lawsuit designed penalize spur- statute not to “was Moreover, March on John- of-the-moment threats that arise out of son’s claim is in anger dispute.” the course of a Com- based on facts of which he was well Tizer, monwealth v. discovery.

aware before close (1996); A.2d 18 Pa. Cons.Stat. request The Court finds that Johnson’s Comment 1972. 2706—Official Ann. untimely to amend is and thus the interpretation While this would seem unduly prejudicial amendment would be insulate from conviction for mak- Johnson Accordingly, Knorr. ing terroristic we cannot demand request for leave to amend is denied. nuanced probation officers make such fly. legal determinations on the We ask False Arrest only proba- here whether commit- grant Our review of the District Court’s ble cause to believe Johnson had Further, plenary, agree is and we ted the crime. we with the apply the same test as the District District that context matters. The Court. Co., Knorr and Goodman v. Mead Johnson & 534 altercation between Johnson (3d Cir.1976). Viewing waiting occurred in a full F.2d dynamic in room and in the situation of an- facts most favorable to probationer suffering a a seizure non-moving party, “if room. Knorr misread or judgment appropriate pleadings, is same Whether situation, ad- interrogatories, overreacted to the depositions, answers ordered, file, than as together on with the mitted that rather retreat and admissions affidavits, confrontation engaged there no he in a face-to-face any, show is weighs context genuine agent. material fact and with the This issue as finding that Knorr had moving party is entitled to a favor of however, counsel could pressed, ed. When terror cause to arrest Johnson basis, necessary arrest to a sum- Upon single fact istic threats. not state unconstitution justified and Johnson’s claim that inquiry was on the mary judgment Barna, 42 F.3d claim must fail. al arrest rec- the extensive already part not was at 819. inquiry focus of the Though the ord. the altercation Malicious Prosecution will shift from remand po- Philadelphia Knorr’s discussions with of John review of the denial Our existing deposi- prosecutors, lice and amend his request Police De- testimony Philadelphia tion Edge Berger of discretion. an abuse and Assistant Detective Dove partment Steel, 911, 916 Cir. water 911 F.2d suffi- 1990). Attorney Francis should be District concerning any pre-trial for motions cient rounds of recounting multiple After the However, claim. prosecution the malicious long briefing noting discovery and had well as the defenses question, as closed, since the District Court denied prolonging this Knorr avers would make an request for leave to file futile, briefed, and are case have not been complaint to assert a malicious by the District in event best addressed prosecution claim. The District Court request to amend is stated “Johnson’s in the first instance. untimely and thus the amendment would Conclusion unduly to Knorr. Ac- prejudicial

be request to

cordingly, Johnson’s leave will affirm the amend is denied.” constitu- judgment for Knorr on Johnson’s claims related to his false arrest tional

Although we share the District Court’s long delay frustration be- reverse the District theory. with Johnson’s We will explicitly seeking fore a malicious assert request denial of Johnson’s Court’s claim,1 prosecution we believe the District amend his to assert constitution- by equating delay Court erred on John- prosecution al violations under malicious part prejudice son’s with Knorr. theory, and will remand the case “Delay ground alone ... is an insufficient proceedings. for further amendment, deny delay an unless the unduly prejudices non-moving party.” BECKER, in Judge, concurring Circuit Co., Safety Occupational Cornell & Inc. v. dissenting part. in part Comm’n, 820, F.2d & Health Review 573 Cir.1978). (3d 823 join majority’s I decision to reverse on the malicious and remand Court, In did not his brief to this However, company I part issue. allowing amendment specify how finding that Knorr had majority on its argu- to him. At oral prejudicial would be for mak- probable cause to arrest Johnson ment, that allow- Knorr’s counsel asserted I ing terroristic threats. would reverse go claim to ing the well, for further this issue as and remand prejudicial forward would be because addi- discovery proceedings. tional would have to be conduct- alleges pleading that Knorr related to the fact that our notice Philadelphia police John- regime supplemented by the false claim that a liberal standard amend, agent, para- and that granting plaintiffs leave to Adams son had assaulted Gould, Inc., alleges were graph 27 that Knorr’s actions 739 F.2d Cir. 1984), paragraph 14 of John- "malicious.” we note law, clarity

The crime of parole no reasonable 2706(a)(1), under 18 Pa. difficulty distinguish- Cons.Stat. is officer should have in exactly requires ing argument what it sounds like: it a heated from a calculated threatening violence with the intent to terroristic Probable cause re- terror, designed quires “was not facts “sufficient themselves to penalize spur-of-the-moment threats that warrant a ofman reasonable caution in the out of anger arise the course of a dis- being belief that an offense has been or is Tizer, pute.” States, Commonwealth v. Brinegar committed.” v. United 160, 175-176, 684 A.2d 338 U.S. 69 S.Ct. (1949) (citations opaque Even Johnson’s rather comment L.Ed. 1879 and internal omitted). that Knorr people quotation “better call some other simply marks I cannot out of the back or something” could be see how a reasonable man could believe threat, certainly considered a it was not a that Johnson had committed the offense of Pennsylva- terroristic threat. Numerous terroristic threats based on his conduct in nia cases it make clear that threats made parole office. during “a heated verbal exchange or a Noting matters,” that “context the ma- J.H., confrontation,” heated In re 797 A.2d jority decides that the charged atmosphere 260, 263 (Pa.Super.Ct.2002), or “an ex- “weighs in favor of change during heated, of threats made finding probable

perhaps hysterical, argument,” Common- arrest making Johnson for terroristic Anneski, 580, wealth v. Pa.Super. 362 525 threats.” Ante at 553-54. I respectfully (Pa.Super.Ct.1987), A.2d 376 do not fact, disagree. cases constitute the offense of suggest that opposite is the case: the threats. Reyn- See also Commonwealth v. heated confrontation and mutual exchange olds, 835 A.2d (Pa.Super.Ct.2003); 730 obscenities, in the context of the need to Kidd, Commonwealth v. aid the epileptic, stricken should have 393, 442 A.2d 826 made it even clearer to Knorr that John-

Although majority acknowledges alleged threat was not a violation of and, view, See, J.H., precedent my implicitly e.g., section 2706. In re (“[A] concedes that did not make ter- A.2d at 263 Court must consider the roristic threats Pennsylvania ju- totality under the of circumstances to determine risprudence, attempts it play- shift the whether the threat was a of a result heat- confrontation.”). ing ground by noting that the exchange issue here is ed verbal cause, only matter, one of and that “we Context does indeed but the con- cannot that probation dispute demand officers text of Johnson and Knorr’s is the legal make such nuanced finding determinations best reason for that Knorr lacked fly.” But, given probable Ante at 553-54. arrest Johnson.2 that, 63.4(5)(iii) (2004) majority correctly (requiring parolees Third Circuit Submitted Under 34.1(a) 9,May

LAR 2005.

Decided actually probation violation. though was not arrested for The notes under Amboy, "[rjefrain Barna v. behavior”); Perth F.3d 809 from assaultive Moore Cir.1994), probable person cause to arrest a Parole, v. Pa. Bd. Probation & 95 Pa. arresting crime insulates the officer & 4 Cmwlth. 505 A.2d n. from all unconstitutional arrest claims. Al (1986) (defining to in "assaultive behavior” Court, though not raised in the District “a clude willful offer with force or violence to here, probability not briefed I note case, another”). was do hurt If this might have had cause to ar then in favor of Knorr for, among things, rest Johnson a viola Bama, appropriate would be under even probation. tion of his See 37 Pa.Code reasons, respectfully I For the above affirm- majority’s decision dissent from summary judgment on the ing claim. false arrest JARAMILLO, Maria Guillermo o/b/o MESA, Appellant, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY. No. 04-2817. Appeals, United States Court Third Circuit.

Case Details

Case Name: Johnson v. Knorr

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Date Published: May 10, 2005

Citation: 130 F. App'x 552

Docket Number: 04-2870

Court Abbreviation: 3rd Cir.