Johnson v. HowellJohnson v. Howell
This appeal involves two separate and conflicting Itawamba County Chancery Court decrees each of which adjudicated the intestate distribution of Dalton Johnson‘s estate. While the family tragedy which led to this case makes it all too clear that intestate statutes are imperfect tools for determining how a decedent would have distributed his property had he been able to divine the future, the laws of this State, as well as the principle of res judicata, require that after a matter has been litigated and finally adjudged the parties and their privies are bound by the final judgment, and further litigation is precluded.
The first decree was entered on April 1, 1980, and it provided the property of Dalton Johnson descended to his only child, Keith Ivy Johnson. The second decree was entered on August 31st 1988, and it provided that the property which had passed under the previous decree had been held “in the nature of a trust,” and should be distributed to the Appellees. The Appellees or their predecessor in interest were original petitioners bringing the first action, and no appeal was taken from the 1980 decree.
Feeling aggrieved by the 1988 decree, Keith‘s guardian ad litem, the Mississippi Protection and Advocacy System, appeals asserting six assignments of error:
1. Since there was an adjudication that Keith Ivy Johnson did inherit from his parent‘s estate, by Judgment entered April 7, 1980, that Judgment is final and res judicata as to any claims of competing heirs raised a decade or more out of time.
2. A finding by a jury that Keith Ivy Johnson was not competent to stand trial, his civil commitment, the appointment of a Guardian of his person and his estate, and the dismissal of the two criminal indictments against him due to his mental incompetency, preclude a finding of willfulness such as to bar his inheritance pursuant to
Section 91-10-25 Miss. Code Ann. (1972) .3. The Judgment against Keith Ivy Johnson entered August 31, is void for lack of service of process over the ward Keith Ivy Johnson.
4. Since the Guardian‘s Notice of Appeal was filed out of time, and after the Guardian had confessed the issues in this case and filed his Petition to Disburse the Assets of the Estate of Keith Ivy Johnson, the Guardian‘s failure of fiduciary duty removes any binding affect of his actions on behalf of the ward, Keith Ivy Johnson.
5. The failure of State officials, including the Administrators of the Mississippi State Hospital at Whitfield, Mississippi, to preserve their claims against the estate of Keith Ivy Johnson will forever bar their assertion of those claims.
6. The claims against the assets of the estate of Keith Ivy Johnson are barred by statute of limitations and laches.
The guardian of Keith‘s estate and person, Roy C. Ivy, also appeals asserting an additional two assignments of error:
1. The trial court erred in not dismissing the claim of Appellees under the doctrine of laches and/or the appropriate statute of limitations.
2. The trial Court erred in finding that Keith Ivy Johnson willfully killed his parents and is thereby precluded from inheriting from them.
We find the action brought by the Appellees which led to the August 31st 1988 decree was barred both by
The Facts
Allegedly, on the evening of May 29th 1977, Keith Ivy Johnson (Keith) became inexplicably and irrationally displeased with his parents and decided to kill them, so he drove to his parents’ home in Itawamba County, purchasing a pistol along the way, where on May 30th he fatally shot his father, Dalton Johnson (Dalton), and his mother Lorene Ivy Johnson (Lorene). The authorities found Dalton shot three times lying in a reclining chair, and an eyewitness saw Keith shoot Lorene five times in the back as she ran screaming from the house. Though mortally wounded, Dalton survived Lorene for a short time, and both husband and wife died intestate. Keith was their only child. Although Keith was indicted for the murders, he was found to be incompetent to stand trial, and was committed to the Mississippi State Hospital where he is currently a patient undergoing treatment for paranoid schizophrenia.
On October 5th 1977, the Itawamba County Chancery Court was petitioned to probate the estate of Dalton Johnson who, in the short time he survived his wife, inherited all of the property she had possessed; this petition was brought by the people who are either Appellees or the person from whom the Appellees’ interests derive in the case sub judice. (Alvia Johnson, one of the original petitioners, has died and was succeeded in interest by Dr. Dwight A. Johnson and Dr. Charles D. Johnson who are both Appellees to the present action.) On January 18th 1980, the administrator of the estate filed a petition to close the estate and discharge the administrator; this petition stated there was a question as to whether Keith could inherit, as
Over eight years later, on July 1st 1988, the Appellees filed a complaint in the Itawamba County Chancery Court praying that the funds which had been distributed to Roy C. Ivy under the 1980 decree were “wrongfully inherited” because Keith wilfully caused Dalton‘s death, and that these funds should be distributed as if Keith had never been born. On August 31st 1988, the Chancery Court decreed that
ANALYSIS
I.
We have found the meaning of these statutes to be clear, in that when the notice provisions of the statutes are followed, a Chancery Court decree is binding as to the persons cited to appear from the date it is rendered, and such a decree is conclusive as to the rights of all others following the expiration of two years from its rendition. Matter of Heirship of McLeod, 506 So.2d 289, 291 (Miss. 1987); Shephard v. Townsend, 249 Miss. 383, 391-392, 162 So.2d 878 (1964) (construing the predecessor to the present Code section,
In the case sub judice, the Appellees or their predecessor in interest were original petitioners to the action leading to the 1980 decree; further, upon being petitioned to determine heirship and terminate the estate, the Chancery Court ordered process to issue over the Appellees or their predecessor in interest, and with the exception of Alvia Johnson, from whom two of the Appellees interest derive, the Appellees waived service of process. Under these facts, we find the 1980 decree was a final adjudication and binding from the date of its rendition as to the rights of the Appellees who were cited to appear and waived process. Concerning the two Appellees whose interests derive from Alvia Johnson, Dr. Dwight A. Johnson and Dr. Charles D. Johnson, we note that Alvia Johnson submitted to the Chancery Court‘s jurisdiction by being one of the original petitioners and that he was properly cited to appear in the determination of heirship. Under these facts, the interests that derive from Alvia Johnson‘s rights to Dalton‘s estate were finally adjudicated and bound by the 1980 decree.
II.
Res judicata is an affirmative defense that ordinarily must be pled under
We have stated the rule of res judicata as, “[a] final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties and their privies from relitigating claims that were or could have been raised in that action.” Walton v. Bourgeois, 512 So.2d 698, 701 (Miss. 1987) (citing Dunaway v. W.H. Hopper and Associates, Inc., 422 So.2d 749, 751 (Miss. 1982)). See also, Estate of Smiley, 530 So.2d 18, 23 (Miss. 1988); Estate of Stutts v. Stutts, 529 So.2d 177, 180 (Miss. 1988); Mississippi Employment Security Commission v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 394 So.2d 299, 301 (Miss. 1981); Cowan v. Gulf City Fisheries, Inc., 381 So.2d 158, 162 (Miss. 1980); Standard Oil Co. v. Howell, 360 So.2d 1200, 1202 (Miss. 1978). Thus, res judicata applies to bar an action where the parties or their privies have previously litigated a legal claim to a final judgment. Further, where res judicata lies, it bars litigation in the second action “of all grounds for, or defenses to, recovery that were available to the parties regardless of whether they were asserted or determined in the prior proceeding.” Dunaway at 751 (quoting Key v. Wise, 629 F.2d 1049, 1063 (5th Cir.1980) reh. denied, 645 F.2d 72 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1103, 102 S.Ct. 682, 70 L.Ed.2d 647 (1981) (quoting Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131, 99 S.Ct. 2205, 2209, 60 L.Ed.2d 767 (1979)).
Res judicata applies in the case sub judice because both the action leading to the 1980 decree and the action leading to the 1988 decree concerned identical claims, that is the interest in Dalton‘s estate, and both of the actions involved the same parties or persons standing in privity to the parties. Further, the 1980 decree was dispositive of the issue of whether Keith could inherit under
III.
Keith‘s guardian ad litem asserts that claims by the Mississippi State Hospital against Keith‘s estate, in the form of medical bills, should be barred because the Hospital did not join the present action. We note that the subject matter of the action leading to the 1988 decree was whether Keith was prohibited from taking intestate under
IV.
In conclusion, we find the 1980 decree was binding as to the Appellees’ rights to Dalton‘s estate under
REVERSED AND RENDERED.
ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., HAWKINS, P.J., and PRATHER, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN, PITTMAN, BANKS and McRAE, JJ., concur.
Notes
If any person wilfully cause or procure the death of another in any way, he shall not inherit the property, real or personal, of such other; but the same shall descend as if the person so causing or procuring the death had never been in being.