Johnson v. Gupta

prod- to the inherent characteristic of ed age age it product

uct’s is the of the JOHNSON, Appellant-Plaintiff, Charlotte dangers creates costs and the Gen- Assembly sought eral to avoid. The statute therefore, repose, prong satisfies the first Arjum GUPTA, M.D., and Wallace of the Collins test. Sherritt, D.O., Appellees- Defendants. Collins, satisfy prong

To the second preferential “the treatment must be uniform- No. 64A03-9611-CV-401. ly applicable equally per- and available to all Collins, similarly sons situated.” Appeals Court of of Indiana. claim, at 80. McIntosh does not nor do we July find, apply that the statute does not uniform- ly equally persons and to all the in both

classes of tort victims. Tort injured victims

by products years more than ten old are

uniformly barred from bringing product

liability action the statute repose injured by products

those tort victims less uniformly

than ten old are able to

bring product liability action within the We, therefore,

statute of limitation. hold repose

that the statute of satisfies the second

prong of Collins. repose

Because the statute of satisfies both

prongs test, of the Collins we hold that the

product liability repose statute of I, §

violate Article 23 of the Indiana Consti- was, therefore,

tution. The trial court cor-

rect in ruling that the statute of repose does I, § violate Article 12 and 23 of the correctly

Indiana Constitution granted summary judgment.

Melroe’s motion for

Affirmed.

HOFFMAN, J., concurs.

SULLIVAN, J., concurs and concurs in separate

result with opinion.

SULLIVAN, Judge, concurring and con-

curring in result. fully concur respect with II Part

majority opinion. I concur in result as to opinion.

Part I of that See Prior v. GTE (Ind.Ct. Incorporated,

North (Sullivan J.,

App.1997) concurring and Kirsch

J., dissenting opinion). with Miller, Miller, A.

Richard Gouveia & Mer- rillville, Appellant-Plaintiff. Jensen, Clarke, Sherry David C. L. Judith Snare, Eichhom, Hammond, I. Eichhorn & Appellees-Defendants. OPINION STATON, Judge. appeals

Charlotte Johnson the trial court’s grant in favor of Ar- jum Gupta, presents M.D. She two issues for our review which restate as follows: we I. Whether the Indiana Medical Mal- practice Act’s occurrence-based stat- ute limitations violates Article Section of the Indiana Constitu- tion.

II. Whether the Indiana Medical Mal- practice Act’s occurrence-based stat- ute of limitations violates Article Section of the Indiana Constitution. tags, depositions, interrogatories, affirm. answers to admissions, judicial notice, matters of The facts most favorable any other matters on which it relies for non-movant, Gupta performed a reveal that 56(C). purposes of T.R. the motion. mucopexy hemorrhoidectomy on Johnson began September 1990. Johnson then ex- entry reviewing summary When an Gupta periencing fecal incontinence. assured judgment, we stand in the shoes of the trial symptoms disappear. that the would Johnson weigh court. We the do not evidence but will in Johnson saw other her effort to doctors light consider the facts in the most favorable 1994, find the cause of her incontinence. In party. to the nonmoving Luzny, Reed v. 627 in that a doctor Ohio discovered her rectum denied, 1362, 1363(Ind.Ct.App.1994), N.E.2d reh. 1990, during surgery had been severed the may ns. denied. sustain We a sum tra gave complete her a and total loss of mary judgment upon theory supported sphincter. only control over her anal The 56(C). by designated the T.R. materials. colostomy. treatment for this was a condition Open provision The Courts of the claim, After her Johnson filed Indiana Constitution has received a fair Gupta moved for because scrutiny amount twenty years. of in the last expired the statute of on limitations had Our courts have addressed whether various trial granted Johnson’s claim. The court liability, limitations on such as the Act’s stat Gupta’s appeal motion and this ensued. limitations, See, § ute of e.g., violate 12. Co., Gypsum Bunker v. Nat’l 441 N.E.2d 8 I. dismissed, (Ind.1982), 1076, cert. 460 U.S. Open Courts (1983) (statute 1761, 103 S.Ct. 76 338 L.Ed.2d argues two-year Johnson first that the oc exposure); Dague limitations for asbestos currence-based of limitations of statute the Piper 520, v. Corp., 275 Ind. 418 Aircraft (the “Act”) Malpractice Medical Act1 violates (1981), (products N.E.2d 207 reh. denied lia 1, § Article 12 of Indiana the Constitution.2 limitations); bility statute of Johnson v. St. Johnson reasons that she was unable Inc., 374, Hospital, Vincent 273 Ind. 404 Gupta’s to discover until after (1980) (medical malpractice N.E.2d 585 stat expired, the statute of limitations had she limitations); Chicago ute of v. Dillon So. required was denied access to the courts as Co., Shore & No. Bend RR 654 N.E.2d 1137 §by initially 12. note our standard of (Indiana (Ind.Ct.App.1995), reh. denied Tort summary judgment. Summary review for liability). Claims Act limitations on each judgment appropriate only is when there is instance, the held to statute was be constitu genuine no issue of material fact and the however, Recently, tional. another district of moving party judgment is to as a entitled this court determined that the Act violates 56(C). matter of law. Trial Rule Ind. The § 12 plaintiffs because a claim could be moving party prove is on the burden there injury before the is discovered. Mar barred genuine no material fact issues of and he Richey, (Ind.Ct.App. tin v. judgment is entitled to as a matter of law. 1997), disagree reh. denied. We burden, Once the movant has sustained this reasoning Court of the Martin and decline to opponent respond setting the must forth Instead, analysis. follow its we will follow specific genuine showing facts issue for precedent established the Indiana Su trial; may simply allega he not rest on the preme Court. Stephenson pleadings. tions of his v. Ledbet (Ind.1992). ter, 1369, 1371 Contrary 596 N.E.2d At Martin inter to the Court’s § filing response, party pretation, require every time of or 12 that motion designate parts injuries all plead- plaintiff remedy shall to the court have a suffered. (1993). reputation, remedy by § due course of 27-12-7-1 shall have Ind.Code freely, law. administered Justice shall be provides: 2. Art. 12 purchase; completely, without and without de- open; every person, All courts shall be nial; speedily, delay. and without injury person, property, done to him in his or 830 “ within two requiring that claims be filed long recognized that ‘there courts have Our malpractice. Contrary alleged any right without or demand may be a claim characterization of this to the Martin Court’s recovery.’” v. Rendle State for its

to sue dying being equivalent requirement as (Ind.1992) 1333, 1337 man, (quot 603 N.E.2d conceived, being an occurrence-based before State, 567, N.E. 133 Ind. 33 May ing Martin, is not absurd. statute of limitations (1893)). limita- at 1027. The statute of pro does Indiana Constitution The begin to run the claim tions does not before taking away vested legislature hibit the mal- The claim exists as soon as the exists. law. the common property rights created plaintiff simply is not practice occurs. The (citing at 594 Munn v. N.E .2d of the claim at that time. aware (1876)). Illinois, L.Ed. 94 U.S. agree with the Martin Court While we However, prop rights no vested or there are sleepwalk way our that we should here. A claim for medi erty rights at issue law, compelling rea- through the we find no law from a common malpractice stems cal precedent based not to follow established son patient. a by physician a to John duty owed analysis reasoning. re- upon sound and son, plaintiff has no at 594. A 404 N.E .2d analysis § 12 ject the Martin Court’s as remedy a of action in cause right vested a Instead, that the unworkable. we conclude at the time a limita had not accrued § 12. Act not violate does action. Ba placed the cause of tion was on Neither does a gue, 418 N.E.2d at 213. II. property right in a vested or plaintiff have Privileges Equal right Id. to any “[T]he common law rule. argues also that the Act Johnson a action is not funda bring a common law 1, § Constitut violates Art. 23 the Indiana Instead, legislature the right.” mental Id. rights protections guaranteed ion.5 The restrict common power modify or has the to by equal § 23 are not co-extensive involving in cases rights law and remedies protection guaranteed by the Federal Consti Rendleman, at personal injury. 603 N.E.2d 72, Day, 75 tution. Collins v. 644 N.E.2d 1336.3 (Ind.1994). unequal Where a statute confers statute of limitations The occurrence privileges immunities to various classes of or in one such restriction enact found the Act is factors must be considered to persons, two policy by legislature. It made the § ed the the statute violates 23. determine whether that, availability of to ensure the decision First, disparate the treatment accorded doctors, malpractice insurance for Indiana legislation reasonably must be related the and, turn, for Indiana medical services which distin to inherent characteristics residents, stringent statute of limita more guish unequally treated classes. Sec the necessary.4 Simply the tions was ond, preferential treatment must be the legislature or restricted a rem applicable equally has abolished uniformly available edy similarly render a statute unconstitution persons to all situated. al. Id. Id. at 80. case, constitutionality legislature analyzing the has restricted In the of a statute this § remedy malpractice by give we must considerable defer- right

the to a under Johnson, 404 N.E.2d at 595 for a more holds that the Framers in- 4. See 3.The Martin Court altering prevent legislature policy or tended to abolishing the the reasons for the detailed discussion of Martin, law. 674 N.E.2d the common Act. contrary Indiana at 1026. This is to settled precedent legisla- that one of the “functions provides: 5. Art. change to tion is to change the common law reflect Dague, Assembly grant of time and circumstances.” shall not to The General reasoning citizen, citizens, N.E.2d at 213. Under the of the Mar- privileges or immu- or class of Court, legislature terms, tin be unable to nities, which, the would upon shall the same not abolish outdated common law actions such as equally belong to all citizens. alienation of affections because it was common right law of action. (Ind.1991). chey, legislature’s balancing ence to the Ac competing pre- interests. Id. The statute is cordingly, unequal because the treatment challenger sumed to be constitutional and the afforded medical claimants is “ ‘every negate must conceivable basis which reasonably to distinguishing related the might supported have the classification.’” characteristics of the class and the treat Johnson, 597). (quoting Id. 404 N.E.2d at uniformly applied ment is to all class mem bers, we conclude that the Medical Mal apply analysis We now the Collins practice 1, § Act does violate Art. Act’s statute of limitations. Under the Act, medical claimants and Affirmed. providers differently health care are treated personal injury

than other claimants. This GARRARD, J., concurs. disparate upon treatment is based claim patients ant’s status as and the fact that the FRIEDLANDER, J., dissents with injuries duty arose from a breach of the separate opinion. provider. owed a health care Too, 404 N.E.2d at 597. the health care FRIEDLANDER, Judge, dissenting. providers distinguished by type respectfully dissent from majority’s they services render. Id. disparate This affirmance of in favor of response treatment is a to the reduction in appellees. health care services available to Indiana resi dents and the financial uncertainties in the majority The affirms Thus, industry. health care Id. there is a upon based its two-year, conclusion that the relationship reasonable legisla between the occurrence-based statute of limitations in the tion and the inherent characteristics which Malpractice Medical Act is constitutional. distinguish receiving unequal the class holding, rejects so majority Martin v. Rohrabaugh treatment. Wagoner, v. Richey, 674 (Ind.Ct.App.1997). N.E.2d 1015 (1980), Ind. 894-95 reh. panel The Martin concluded that the statute denied. in question limitations runs afoul of the The Act’s statute of limitations also sur open guarantee court contained Article prong vives the analy second the Collins § 12 of the Indiana Constitution. I agree prong sis. The requires equal second analysis Martin and conclude that treatment within malpractice the class of the statute of limitations is unconstitutional. argued claimants. It has been that all Raymond, also See Harris v. members equal of the class are not treated (Ind.Ct.App.1997) (agreeing with Martin that ly because who those do not discover the unconstitutional). the statute of limitations is malpractice years within the two are barred summary judgment upon would reverse filing claims while those who do dis my conclusion that the occurrence-based years cover the within two statute of Malprac- limitations in the Medical proceed allowed to with their claims. This tice Act is unconstitutional. is not different treatment because all mal practice years claimants have two from the

date of the occurrence to file a claim.

Even those who discover the only

have two from the date They

occurrence. are not awarded

“bonus time” discovery. virtue of that only

The difference is in the result of the unequal

treatment. The results caused harsh,

the statute of limitations can be but

that does not render it unconstitutional be

cause the is in light limitation reasonable policy

other considerations. Havens Rit

Case Details

Case Name: Johnson v. Gupta

Court Name: Indiana Court of Appeals

Date Published: Jul 21, 1997

Citation: 682 N.E.2d 827

Docket Number: 64A03-9611-CV-401

Court Abbreviation: Ind. Ct. App.