2 Ala. 519 | Ala. | 1841
. The authorities cited on behalf of the motion are conclusive, that in such a case as the petition discloses the writ of mandamus must be allowed, if the refusal is persisted in.
The rule to show cause must be allowed on the facts disclosed by the petition.
We are perfectly satisfied, that the Chancellor, in refusing to carry into effect the mandate of this Court, has been conscien-ciously impressed with the belief, that the Court had fallen into
Although it is entirely unnecessary to support a mandate which we have no power to recall, it is at all times most satisfactory to us, to be able to show what we consider to be sufficient reasons for the judgment, which we then considered and now believe to be correct.
The answers of all of the defendants, asseit that letters of administration with the will annexed, were granted in April, 1834 ; that the estate was finally settled, and the assets paid over to the widow of the deceased, as his sole legatee, long before the commencement of the suit to set aside the will. It is very improbable therefore, that the rights of any creditors have been or could be impaired. In addition to this, if any special debts exist, binding on the heir, they may yet be sued, if they have assets by descent. If the administrators had in truth, as they aver, finally settled the estate with the Orphan’s Court, and paid over the assets under the direction of that Court, to one then supposed to be entitled; it is, to say the least of it, questionable, whether that Court could entertain any further jurisdiction over the subject matter.
The title of the widow of the deceased, to her property, obtained by fair course of settlement with the administrator, could not be impeached or divested by a Court of law, even, if any one of the complainants could make title, except through the administrator. These reasons seemed to us, and yet seem to be conclusive, that the equity of the case could alone be reached by declaring Glasscock and Wife, as trustees, with respect to the property of the. decedent, for those entitled to distribution.
The Chanceller seems to be of opinion, that there is no prayer for general relief, and therefore, that relief should have extended no farther than to set aside the will, and leave the parties to get at their rights as they could. It has already been shown, that their rights could only be reached in equity, therefore they were to be informed, that they had not asked for enough ; what they had asked for would be given to them, and the remainder of
We have thus, with some labor endeavored to remove doubts, which we believe, have been- most honestly entertained, but we hope, that hereafter it will not be supposed, that our decisions are inadvertently made.
We may remark further, that we have considered this case solely on the assertions of the petition; if the action of the Court of Chancery was refused on the specific action required by the complainants, it may be questionable, whether the Court of Chancery was not correct in thus refusing. We do not give any opinion on this matter at present, but it will be seen, that the decree only extends to distribution, as in case of intestacy.