Johnson v. Edgewood City School Dist. Bd. of Edn.Johnson v. Edgewood City School Dist. Bd. of Edn.
Frost Brown Todd LLC, Thomas B. Allen, Joseph W. Scholler, 9277 Centre Pointe Drive, Suite 300, West Chester, Ohio 45069, for defendant-appellant
O P I N I O N
BRESSLER, P.J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Edgewood City School District Board of Education (Board), appeals from the August 13, 2008 decision of the Butler County Court of Common Pleas reversing the decision of the Board to terminate plaintiff-appellee, Kevin Johnson. For the reasons outlined below, we affirm the decision of the common pleas court.
{¶2} Appellee was a teacher at Edgewood High School from November 25, 1991
{¶3} The Board decided to terminate appellee, but appellee elected to have a hearing before an appointed referee pursuant to
{¶4} Upon termination, appellee initiated an administrative appeal of the Board‘s decision to the Butler County Court of Common Pleas. The common pleas court reversed the decision of the Board stating that appellee‘s termination was against the greater weight of the evidence. Appellant then filed this timely appeal, raising the following assignments of error:
{¶5} “THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY SUBSTITUTING ITS JUDGMENT FOR THAT OF THE BOARD.”
{¶6} “THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY REVERSING THE TERMINATION DECISION OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION.”
{¶7} In both assignments of error appellant argues that the common pleas court abused its discretion in not following the Board‘s decision to terminate appellee for immorality
{¶8} A thorough review of the appropriate standards of review for both the common pleas court and the appellate court is necessary. “Although the common pleas court‘s review of a board‘s decision is not de novo,
{¶9} Comparatively, the scope of review by an appellate court is “extremely narrow” and “strictly limited to a determination of whether the common pleas court abused its discretion.” James v. Trumbull Cty. Bd. of Edn. (1995), 105 Ohio App.3d 392, 396. “Absent an abuse of discretion, an appellate court may not engage in what amounts to a substitution of the judgment of the common pleas court.” Id. An abuse of discretion is “more than an error of law or judgment” but a “perversity of will, passion, prejudice, partiality, or moral
{¶10} In this case, the common pleas court found that the Board‘s decision was not supported by the weight of the evidence and reversed its decision to terminate appellee. The common pleas court relied on the evidence presented to the referee that appellee had a strong employment record, was praised as being an “outstanding teacher” by the Board just prior to this incident, had been assigning this project for 12 years without previous issue, had no malicious intent to harass the students, and was not provided with unambiguous instructions regarding the assignment.2 The common pleas court weighed the evidence, rendered factual determinations, and reversed the board‘s termination of appellee as being against the weight of the evidence. We cannot say that the common pleas court abused its discretion in making this determination.
{¶11} Most instances of abuse of discretion result from decisions which are “simply unreasonable,” having “no sound reasoning process that would support [the] decision.” James at 396. Reversal is inappropriate if the sole reason for it is that the reviewing court is not persuaded by the reasoning process of the lower court. Id., citing AAAA Enterprises, Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment Corp. (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161. A reviewing court must not substitute its own judgment for the judgment of the lower court but, rather, determine whether, through the evidence presented, the lower court acted without reason.
{¶12} In Graziano v. Board of Education of Amherst Exempted Village School District (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 289, 293, the Ohio Supreme Court determined that the common pleas court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the school board‘s termination of a teacher was not supported by the “preponderance of the evidence.” The Court held that “given the precise language of
{¶13} In Oleske v. Hilliard City Schools, the Tenth Appellate District upheld the common pleas court‘s ruling that the school board‘s termination of a teacher who told students “dirty” jokes and used derogatory terms to describe another teacher was not against the weight of the evidence. Oleske at 65. The appellate court stated that it “simply [could not] find an abuse of discretion on the part of the common pleas court in affirming [the school board]‘s order.” Id.
{¶14} In James v. Trumbull County, the Eleventh Appellate District upheld the common pleas court‘s reversal of the school board‘s termination of a teacher who used controversial treatments for students with severe handicaps. James at 399. In determining whether the common pleas court‘s decision was unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable the appellate court concluded that the common pleas court‘s opinion was a “well-reasoned and articulated basis” for reversal. Id. at 396. The court concluded that it was “unable to deduce that the trial court abused its discretion by reversing the decision of [the school board].” Id. at 399.
{¶15} In Katz v. Maple Heights, the Eighth Appellate District reversed the judgment of the common pleas court upholding the school board‘s termination of a teacher for the falsification of a sick leave statement. Katz at 264. The common pleas court affirmed the school board‘s decision to terminate the teacher even though he was considered “an
{¶16} Finally, in Kitchen v. Board of Education, this court held that the common pleas court did not abuse its discretion in upholding the school board‘s decision to terminate the assistant superintendent after appearing at a school football game while intoxicated and, subsequently, being arrested for operating a vehicle while under the influence. Kitchen, 2007-Ohio-2846 at ¶1-2. The referee, school board, and common pleas court determined that there was significant evidence of the assistant superintendent‘s inappropriate conduct. Though the referee suggested punishment other than termination, the school board disagreed and terminated the assistant superintendent. Upon review of the facts of the case, the common pleas court determined that it was not against the weight of the evidence for the school board to terminate the assistant superintendent, relying on evidence that the conduct of the assistant superintendent was a “public, serious and hostile matter” which would prevent the assistant superintendent from performing “her many leadership responsibilities” including “her involvement in programs such as drug and alcohol education for the district.” Id. at ¶34. Based upon these facts, this court held that the common pleas court‘s decision was not “unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable” and, therefore, “no abuse of discretion” existed. Id.
{¶17} In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining the grounds for appellee‘s termination were not established by the evidence.
{¶19} Though accepting appellee‘s history of strong employment, the Board rejected other factual determinations made by the referee, even though the referee is an impartial party “best able to observe the demeanor of the witnesses and weigh their credibility.” Graziano at 293. The Board rejected the referee‘s findings that one of the student-witnesses was not credible. Even though the student made a statement which differed from the recollections of the other students who testified—a statement the referee felt reflected poorly on the credibility of the student—the Board determined that the statement was “irrelevant” to the student‘s credibility.
{¶20} Instead, the Board relied heavily on testimony of the school district‘s Superintendent. The Superintendent testified about the importance of teachers not ridiculing students and provided reasons why it was possible many of the students in appellee‘s sociology class would not want to complain about being embarrassed by the comments read
{¶21} In its review of the referee‘s findings and the Board‘s decision, the trial court first stated that appellee‘s termination must be rationally based on conduct that the Board “perceived to be immoral or conduct that constituted a good and just cause for termination” pursuant to
{¶22} Upon conclusion of its careful review of the relevant case law, the briefs, the referee‘s decision and the Board‘s Order of Termination, the trial court determined that: “the weight of the evidence indicates that the Referee‘s Decision should have been given the appropriate level of deference. The Referee, an impartial party charged with reviewing all evidence and testimony, issued a fair and rational decision, indicating that termination of a
{¶23} Through its very language, the trial court followed the guidelines of
{¶24} Although it is the province of the Board to determine the significance of the facts and make a determination accordingly, it is also the province of the common pleas court to determine when the decision to terminate is not supported by the weight of the evidence. See Kitchen at ¶39. Because there is evidence in the referee‘s Findings and Recommendation as well as the Board‘s Resolution and Order of Termination to support the common pleas court‘s decision, it cannot be said that the common pleas court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably. Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion in this case.
{¶25} Because we find that the common pleas court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the Board‘s decision was not supported by and consistent with the weight of the evidence, appellant‘s two assignments of errors are overruled.
{¶26} Judgment affirmed.
YOUNG, J., concurs.
RINGLAND, J., concurs separately.
{¶27} Because I am bound to review the trial court‘s decision under an abuse of discretion standard, I concur with the judgment of this court. However, I cannot say that the school board‘s decision to terminate appellee was incorrect. Ohio legislators place great responsibility on boards of education to govern school districts throughout Ohio. Specifically,
{¶28} Given the facts, it is obvious that the school board adopted a remedy based on the authority conferred by statute. Though this remedy differed from the trial court‘s, I maintain that an appellate court and trial court should grant deference to a school board‘s decision. It is impossible to ignore the reality that a school board‘s decisions are subject to review as much, if not more so, by its constituents than a reviewing court. Because of that realization, a trial court‘s remedy should be tempered by the responsibility a school board has to its students, community, and legislative duties. As such, the trial court should be limited in its review and should not disturb a school board‘s decision unless that decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable. Therefore, and until the Ohio Supreme Court broadens our scope of review (if ever) when considering a trial court‘s review of a school board‘s decision, I will concur in judgment only.