63 Fla. 200 | Fla. | 1912
— Ada Dupont recovered certain land in an action of ejectment and the defendant J. E. Johnson took writ of error. The court refused to direct a verdict for the defendant and directed a verdict for the plaintiff.
Section 1496 of the General Statutes provides that “If -upon the conclusion of the argument of counsel in any civil case, after all the evidence shall have been submitted, it be apparent to the judge of the circuit court, or county court, that no evidence has been submitted upon which the jury could lawfully find a verdict for.'one party, the judge may direct the jury to find a verdict for the opposite party.”
If the plaintiff showed title to the land which gave him a right to the possession and the defendant showed no title or right on which the jury could lawfully find for the defendant, the giving of the affirmative charge for the plaintiff was proper under the statute.
When the statute of 1893 was enacted the title of the plaintiff under her tax deed was not subject to the burden of a suit for the recovery of actual possession of land described in the tax deed, if the land was not in the adverse possession of another, and the statute can not impose this burden or as an alternative render the vested title “void and of no effect.” While the legislature may, subject to constitutional provisions, prescribe a reasonable limitation within which existing rights of action may be enforced in the courts, it cannot under the constitution impair or unlawfully burden title to property already vested in individuals.
It was not necessary to shoAV possession under the tax
The tax deed offered by the defendant bearing date May 1st, 1911, based upon a tax certificate issued in 1880 to the State and by it sold to an individual presumably in 1911, was admitted in evidence without objection, but as there was evidence that the notice required by Section 575 General Statutes to be given of the application for the tax deed was not received by the owner of the land or by the person “last paying taxes on said property,” the prima facie effect of the tax deed and its statutory recitations were destroyed and as the giving of the notice as required by the statute was not shown by the party offering the deed, it is ineffectual as title. See Clark-Ray Co.
A quit claim deed purporting to be from the heirs of the original owner of the land was introduced in evidence by the defendant, but it showed no title in the defendant as against the tax deed of the plaintiff.
The defendant showed no title by adverse possession and the court did not err in directing a verdict for the plaintiff. Bell v. Niles, 61 Fla. 114, 55 South. Rep. 392.
The judgment is affirmed.