OPINION
Relator asked respondent to set aside her disqualification from providing direct contact services in her job as an adult-daily-living-serviсes attendant. Respondent refused. Because no written findings demonstrate the application of the factors set out in Minn.Stat. § 245A.04, subd. 3b(b) (2002), we reverse and remand.
*923 FACTS
Relator Gloria Johnson has been employed for over ten years as an-adult-daily-living attendant, and has worked in fаcilities licensed by respondent Minnesota Department of Health (DH) since 1998. Her employment included providing direct contact sеrvices. On 16 January 2003, the Minnesota Department of Human Services notified relator that she was disqualified from performing direct care services because a background study revealed that she had been convicted of second-degree assault. The convictiоn resulted from an incident ten months earlier, in March 2002, when relator cut her son, age 15, in the leg with a kitchen knife during an altercation. In June 2002, relator had pled guilty and been sentenced to serve four years’ probation.
Because the facilities that employed relator were licensed by DH, relator applied to DH to have her disqualification set aside. DH refused to set the disqualification aside, and rеlator challenges that refusal.
ISSUE
Must a decision on a reconsideration of disqualifications under MinmStat. § 245A.04, subd. 3b (2002) include written findings on the statutory factors?
DECISION
This court may reverse an administrative decision if it was unsupported by substantial evidence or arbitrary and capricious.
In re Excess Surplus Stahis of Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Minn.,
An individual who DH has disqualified may request a reconsideration of the disqualificаtion. MinmStat. § 245A.04, subd. 3b(a) (2002).
The [DH] commissioner may set aside the disqualification [from performing direct care services in licensed facilities] ... if the commissioner finds that the individual does not pose a risk of harm to any person served.... In determining that an individual does not pose a risk of harm, the commissioner shall consider [1] the nature, severity, and consequences of the event or events that lead to disqualification, [2] whether there is more than one disqualifying event, [3] the age and vulnerability of the victim at the time of the event, [4] the harm suffered by the victim, [5] the similarity between thе victim and persons served by the program [in which the individual is employed], [6] the time elapsed without a repeat of the same or similar еvent, [7] documentation of successful completion by the individual studied of training or rehabilitation pertinent to the event, and any other infоrmation relevant to reconsideration. In reviewing a disqualification under this section, the commissioner shall give preeminent weight to [8] thе safety of each person to be served by the [individual] ... over the interests of the [individual]....
Minn.Stat. § 245A.04, subd. 3b(b) (emphasis added). Consideration of these factors is not discretionary. See MinmStat. § 645.44, subd. 16 (2002) (providing that “ ‘[s]hall’ is mandatory).”
Relator argues that DH was obliged not only to consider the statutory factors but to indicate that they had been considered. We agree.
See In re Whitehead,
In refusing to set aside relator’s disqualification, DH relied on three of the eight factors: “ — rеcency of event; — vulnerability of population to be served;— seriousness of event.” 1 But, although DH told relator that it had “considered аll of the information that [she] provided in applying the risk of harm factors,” there is no evidence that DH considered information pertаining to the other five factors. 2
One factor on which there is no finding is whether there is more than one disqualifying event. Here, only one disqualifying event occurred in the ten years relator worked as an assistant. Another factor without a finding is the age and vulnerability of the victim at the time of the event. Relator’s son was then 15 years old and over six feet tall; relator herself is five feet four inches tall and weighs 133 pounds. A third factоr is the harm suffered by the victim. Relator’s son was treated and released after the incident, and a social worker reported that both relator and her son undertook counseling to avoid further altercations. A fourth factor is the similarity between the victim and persons served by the program. There was no similarity: the victim was relator’s healthy teenage son, while the persons she serves are adults who, beсause of age or illness, need help with daily living. Finally, no finding indicated that the DH considered the “documentation of successful complеtion ... of training or rehabilitation pertinent to the event.” Relator provided a letter from her probation officer attesting to hеr completion of the conditions of her probation, i.e., a treatment plan of Child Protection Services, an anger managеment program, and a psychological evaluation and recommended treatment. Because relator had complеted the conditions, Child Protective Services had closed the case. Relator also provided a document from Eastside Neighbоrhood Services saying that she had attended 23 sessions of the Women’s Educational Series, had missed one session, owed no tuition, and was current on her assignments.
The fact that relator, as an irate mother, injured her grown teenage son during an altercation does not, of itsеlf, demonstrate that she poses a risk to the safety of the elderly and ill people she serves as a healthcare professional. Absent written findings and reasons, and provided only with a conclusory explanation of the application of three of the еight factors, we cannot sustain the refusal to reconsider her disqualification.
See Reserve Mining,
We reverse and remand for written findings and reasons in comрliance with Minn. *925 Stat. § 245A.04, subd. 3b(b) and applicable caselaw.
Reversed and remanded.
Notes
. In its brief, DH misreads the statute in explaining its application of the "recency of event” reason given for its decision. DH claims that, when relator’s request was reviewed, "less than eight months had passed since her conviction.” But the relevant date is the date of thе event, not the date of its judicial disposition. See Minn.Stat. § 245A.04, subd. 3b(b): "the time elapsed without a repeat of the same or similar event.” The event оccurred on 15 March 2002; the commissioner's decision is dated 21 March 2003. Therefore, a year had elapsed.
. DH argues that this court has uрheld disqualifications where not all of the factors were applied but relies on no published Minnesota decision to support that argument.