31 Minn. 57 | Minn. | 1883
This action was brought to recover for the burning of a barn and other property of the plaintiff, which is alleged to have been caused by fire negligently suffered to escape from a locomotive of the defendant. The fire occurred in the village of Farmington. It commenced either in a pile of corn-stalks, lying in an alley and against the barn of one Niskern, which stood just outside the depot-grounds of the defendant, or else it commenced within the barn. The wind was very violent, and fire was communicated from Niskern’s burning barn to another barn standing near, and thence to that of the plaintiff, which stood, perhaps, 60 feet from that of Niskern. By
Special findings of fact were returned by the jury in answer to questions put .to them, which are as follows: “Question. Was Niskern negligent or careless in placing or leaving the corn-stalks where he did? Answer. Yes. Q. Was the smoke-stack of that engine furnished with the most approved modern appliances to prevent the escape of fire; and were the smoke-stack and these appliances in good condition? A. Yes. Q. Was the ash-pan of that engine, and its connections, constructed in the most approved modern style to prevent the escape of fire; and were they in good condition? A. Yes. Q. Was Driscoll, on November 22, 1879, a competent, skilful, and careful engineer? A. Yes. Q. Did Driscoll, the engineer, at and before the time of the fire, manage the engine in a careful and prudent manner with respect to the escape of fire from his engine? A. No.”
One of the two principal questions presented in the case is as to whether the evidence sustains this last special finding, and upon which alone the general verdict against the defendant rests.
It appears that the engine was being operated upon a track about 180 feet from the barn and corn-stalks of Niskern; that the volume of sparks thrown out by an engine, and the height to which they are projected, depend a good deal upon the manner in which the engine is worked; that the harder an engine is worked, the more sparks are discharged and the higher they are thrown. Several witnesses testified to the fact that a very unusual volume of sparks was discharged from the engine on this occasion. We deem this to be evidence of negligence, although not of the most satisfactory or conclusive character in this case; and so it has often been considered in adjudicated cases. Caswell v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 42 Wis. 193, 198; Henry v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 50 Cal. 176; Great Western R. Co. v. Haworth, 39 Ill. 346; Toledo, etc., Ry. Co. v. Maxfield, 72 Ill. 95, 98.
But of more importance, in our estimation, is this: By force of Gen. St. 1878, c. 34, § 60, the defendant was presumed to have been
The injury was not, as a matter of law, too remote to justify a recovery. The result was such as may well be considered might have been reasonably anticipated. Griggs v. Fleckenstein, 14 Minn. 62, (81;) Milwaukee & St P. Ry. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Hope, 80 Pa. St. 373; Kellogg v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 26 Wis. 223.
The denial of the application for a continuance was a proper exercise of the discretion iof the court'. AftSr a fruitless search of several days to ascertain the nanie and whereabouts of the person whose tes
The court should have granted the motion to strike out the evidence of Darrow and Aiken. It was irrelevant, relating as it did only to the fact of the throwing of the fire by another engine three hours before the setting of the fire to which this action relates. But it is apparent that such evidence cannot have affected the result, in view of the special findings of the jury, which exculpate the defendant from negligence except in respect to the conduct, on the particular occasion, of the engineer of locomotive No. 45. It is hence no cause for a new trial. We find no error in the excluding of evidence.
Judgment affirmed.