89 Minn. 310 | Minn. | 1903
The defendant, in this action, a corporation, was the proprietor of what was known as the “Hotel Vendóme,” in the city of Minneapolis. The plaintiff and his wife, residents of Morris, in this state, while on their way-to Florida, stopped for a few days at the Vendóme, making preparations for their journey. They were undoubtedly transients, and were in this building when a fire occurred, February 7, 1902. They lost a quantity of personal property, such as wearing apparel and ornaments, and brought this action to recover the value of the same.
There was a general verdict for defendant, and the jury also answered three questions submitted to them by the court. By these answers they found that the defendant was not guilty of negligence by reason of its failure to remove or cause to be removed the plaintiff’s property from the building at the time of the fire.
The complaint alleged that the defendant was a hotel or inn keeper, and also that the goods were lost through its negligence. The answer denied that the establishment in question was a hotel or inn, and thereby the burden of proof was cast upon the plaintiff to show, by competent testimony, .that the defendant was such a proprietor, as alleged in the complaint. Upon the testimony the court below charged the jury that the establishment was not a hotel or an inn, within the meaning of the law, and that the defendant was not a hotel or an inn keeper. The view taken by the trial court seems to have been that the establishment was shown to be nothing but' a lodging house, and then the rule was applied governing common lodging-house keepers — in effect, that the plaintiff could not recover unless the defendant failed-to exercise ordinary care at the time of the ñre, and was thus guilty of negligence by reason of which the goods were lost. In instructing the jury upon the subject of defendant’s negligence, .the trial court also charged that the burden of proof was upon the plaintiff to show that the defendant was negligent.
1. The first question which we wish to consider grows out of the fact that the court charged the jury that the building in question was not a hotel or an inn, and that the defendant was not a hotel or an inn keeper. The facts in relation to the character of the establishment were undisputed. The building was originally fitted up for offices in the upper stories, with stores upon the ground floor. One of these stores had been used as a restaurant, the proprietors being Regan Bros. The defendant finally converted the upper stories of the building into first-class sleeping apartments. The office was upon the ground floor in one of the storerooms before mentioned. The business was conducted, concededly, as is the business in any large, first-class hotel, except that the defendant itself did not furnish meals for the guests. It had
The establishment did not come within the definition sometimes given to the term “hotel” or “inn,” and yet it answered the description of Petersdorf, who, in his Abridgment, says that an inn is a house for the reception and entertainment of all comers for gain-. That the Vendóme received and. entertained all comers, to the extent of supplying them with rooms, for compensation, is not •disputed. Justice Best describes an inn as a house, the owner of which holds out that he will receive all travelers and sojourners who are willing to pay a price adequate to the sort of accommo■dation provided, and who come in a.state in which they are fit to be received. Other writers have defined an inn as a house where •a traveler is furnished with everything he has occasion for while on his way, and that in an inn there must be provision for the essential needs of a traveler upon his journey — lodging as well as food.. An inn has often been defined as a place for the lodging and entertainment of travelers and passengers, their horses and attendants, for a reasonable compensation. There is no doubt that ■circumstances and changes in modes of life and innovations in methods of traveling have very much affected and qualified the character of hotels and inns, and consequently the definitions thereof, of fifty years ago. At that time an inn was a house where the entertainment was for both man and beast — for one quite as much as for the other. In these days very few people travel with horses, and the old hostelries have almost entirely disappeared. Few-hotel keepers in the state, in places of any size, have barns •of their own in connection with their hotels.
. With these' changes in the ways of the traveling public, and innovations in hotel keeping, the definitions which have heretofore prevailed must also be changed and modified. In many cities all of the first-class places for entertainment of travelers are conducted upon the European plan solely — the rooms being furnished and rented, and the guests permitted to dine where they please—
Upon the grqund of public policy, we think it must be held that where the proprietor of such an establishment as this was .advertises and represents to his guests that he is keeping a hotel or inn — a.public place for the entertainment of transient guests— by means of signs upon the outside of the building, posts notices in the rooms as an inn keeper, and advertises and represents that there is a café in connection with his sleeping apartments, thus representing to them that he furnishes not only rooms, but meals, he must be bound thereby, and cannot avoid his duties and responsibilities as a hotel or an inn keeper by simply showing that thecafé in the same building is owned and operated by other persons, and that he has no hand or voice in its management. ■
2. The second question in this case, of importance, is as to the
In the case of Lusk v. Belote, 22 Minn. 468, the common-law rule was adopted, and it was held that a landlord is responsible for the loss in his inn of the goods of a traveler who is his guest, except when such loss arises from the negligence of the guest, or the act of God or of the public enemy. There the guest’s goods had been stolen from his room. It must be admitted that there has been a strong indisposition upon the part of courts to admit of any relaxation, just or unjust, of this rule, and it has been applied to-all classes of public hotels. In Edwards on Bailments, § 462, it is stated as a reason for so stringent a rule that it was established in a period when theft and robbery were quite frequent, and inn keepers were thought to have many opportunities, and some temptations, to combine and connive with ruffians and others in the plunder of strangers, and that it has been continued in more modern times on the ground of public utility and convenience. In two cases the reason for the continuance of such a doctrine has been discussed with great vigor, and, under the circumstances there appearing, not improperly. Hulett v. Swift, 33 N. Y. 571; Wilkins v. Earle, 44 N. Y. 172. But the- fact is that, in nearly all of the cases supporting the doctrine of absolute liability, unexplained thefts or losses of property were involved. No distinction was made between goods stolen, and goods destroyed by fire for which the landlord was in no manner responsible. That there might be a well-defined distinction does not seem to have been thought of.
But it must be admitted that the logical consequence of the strict rule is that no discrimination can be made between losses
Conceding that the rigorous rule before stated was just and necessary in its day, there never was any reason or foundation for it in cases where the loss was occasioned by an accidental fire, for which the landlord was not responsible, and when no negligence in connection therewith could be attributed to him. In the present case the fire originated upon premises not occupied by the defendant, and over which it had no control, although in the same building. From the record, it does not appear that the fire spread into that part of the building occupied by the defendant through .its negligence; and, as before stated, the jury found, in answer to a special .question, that the defendant was not negligent in any manner which contributed to the loss. With these conflicting rules in respect to the liability of the proprietor of a hotel or inn, we are justified in stating one to govern this case which is more just and sensible than the common-law doctrine, before referred to; but we are not quite willing to go to the extent that some of the courts have, and absolve the landlord from all liability in case of loss through thefts if he can show that they were unavoidable accidents, or were otherwise committed without fault or negligence or his part. We do not think that the landlord of a public
We therefore adopt what is known as the “rule of prima, facie liability.” All losses of property incurred by guests at. a public hotel or inn by ñre are- prima facie due to the negligence of the-proprietor, but he may discharge or relieve himself from liability by showing that the loss happened by an irresistible force or unavoidable accident, such as a ñre originating upon premises over which he had no control, without fault or negligence on his part. This doctrine does not infringe upon the common-law rule, which makes him responsible for all thefts from within his house, or unexplained, whether committed by guests, servants, or strangers, upon the general principle that an inn keeper guaranties the good behavior of all who may be under his roof — particularly his servants. The doctrine which we adopt, and which must control this, case, is that an action cannot be maintained against a hotel or inn keeper by a guest to recover for property lost by ñre which was occasioned by unavoidable casualty or superior force, and without any negligence on the part of the inn keeper or his servants. A landlord is not liable for a loss by ñre happening through a cause beyond his control. He must be reasonably diligent under the circumstances known to exist after the ñre breaks, out, but it is not necessary that he should be extremely vigilant or cautious.
This rule is more in accordance with our views of justice, and will, we believe, commend itself to all. As before stated, the jury found that there was no negligence on the part of either plaintiff or defendant. If this cause had been properly submitted to the-jury, and the jury had been instructed along the lines herein indicated, judgment could properly have been ordered for the defendant, but such was not the case. The trial court was in error not only as to the nature of the establishment kept by the defendant, but it also charged that the burden of proof was upon the plaintiff to show that the defendant was negligent. Such is> not the rule, under the doctrine of prima facie liability, herein, indorsed.
Order reversed and new trial granted.