61 Pa. 58 | Pa. | 1869
The opinion of the court was delivered, May 11th 1869, by
This was an action brought, under the statute, by the parents of a minor son, to recover damages for his death, alleged to have been occasioned by the negligence of the defend
It is well settled that where an injury happens to a servant in the course of his employment, the master is responsible if it was occasioned by his negligence. If it was the result of the hazardous nature of the employment, without any fault on the part of the master, he is not liable; but if his negligence was the direct and proximate cause of the injury, he is responsible, whether the employment was hazardous or not. These principles are so plain and familiar that they require no argument or authority for their support. Was there, then, any evidence tending to show that the defendant was guilty of negligence ? The plaintiffs’ son, a lad of about fourteen years of age, was employed by the defendant in his carding and spinning-room in the fourth story of the building where he carried on the business of manufacturing woollen goods. He was working with the stripper at one of the cards, and while carrying an armful of waste from the carding-machine into the waste-room, he fell through an open trap-door or hatchway, a distance of sixty feet, to the bottom of the building, and was killed. The hatchway was in the carding and spinning-room, immediately in front, and within six inches of the door-way leading to the waste-room. It was about five feet square, and in going in and out of the room the employees had to pass over it — there was no other passage. There was no railing or protection of any kind around the hatchway, the trap-doors of which were ordinarily kept closed, on a level with the floor, except when it was in use. All the witnesses describe it as dangerous, and from its location, size, and proximity to the door, it could not have been otherwise. Was it not, then, the duty of'the defendant to have had a railing or other protection around it ? and was he guilty of no negligence in permitting it to remain open— without any notice or warning — to the hazard of the lives and limbs of his employees ? Had the court a right to assume that he was under no obligation to put any guard or barrier around it, or to give any notice or warning when it was open for use ? If the defendant was not absolutely bound to put up a railing around the hatchway, was it not his duty to have a watchman stationed there to guard it whenever it was open, and give notice of the danger ? And was it not negligence to intrust the duty of opening and using it to a lad of so little experience and
Again: if it had been shown that his misconduct contributed to his death, or that it arose from the omission of a duty defined or prescribed by law, then there would have been no question for the jury. But the evidence did not show that he was guilty of the omission of any defined duty, or of any misconduct whatever. On the contrary, he was in the discharge of his duty, and just where that required him to be, at the time he was killed. If there was anything in his conduct to prevent a recovery, it must have been negligence. This was his only fault, and negligence is ordinarily a question for the jury. It is always a question for their determination when there is any doubt as to the facts, or the inferences to be drawn from them. But the evidence may show a case of such clear negligence arising from obvious disregard of duty and safety, as to make it incumbent on the court to determine it as a question of law: Pittsburg and Connellsville Railroad Company v. McClurg, 6 P. F. Smith 294. Was this, then, such a case ? It was if, as suggested on the argument, the deceased, in the broad daylight of a summer afternoon, with his eyes open, deliberately walked into an open hatch, and fell. But this leaves out of view, and wholly ignores, all the surrounding and attendant circumstances. It is true that the accident occurred in the broad daylight of a summer afternoon, but there is nothing to warrant the inference that the deceased saw the open hatchway. It is evident that he did not see it; and the only question is whether his failure to observe it arose from negligence or carelessness. What, then, are the facts as shown by the evidence ? The card behind which he worked was about twelve feet from the hatchway. The wool-box at the side of the room was seven feet
Judgment reversed, and a procedendo awarded.