31 Wash. 554 | Wash. | 1903
— Action for damages for personal injuries. The complaint alleges that plaintiff was operating for defendant an edger, which was defective, in that it was not provided with a moving conveyor, such as is usually used with such machines; that it was provided with only a stationary chute, into which sawdust, slabs, and other refuse from the mill fell, and that the only way of freeing the chute from such obstructions was to push out such refuse with a stick, which had to be inserted between and under the revolving saws; that the edger machine was not provided with sufficient light; that the plaintiff had called that fact to the attention of the foreman several times, and that said foreman had agreed to fix the electric light, which hung back of the edger, and put it in running order; that, while attempting to clear out the chute on the morning of February 0, 1900, by reason of the darkness and want of light above the edger machine, the stick which plaintiff was using for that purpose came in contact with a revolv
A discussion of the testimony involves, in effect, a discussion of the complaint, as the testimony followed closely the allegations of the complaint. The testimony is very brief, and fails to show any substantial defect in the construction of the edger machine. In any event, appellant, who was a saw mill man of five years’ experience, and who had been operating this particular edger between three and four weeks, knew of its plan of construction when he commenced to work. According to his testimony, his principal complaint was that the electric lamp, which furnished light at the back part of the edger, where he had to operate in clearing out the chute, hadbeenallowed to get out of repair, and that the foreman had neglected to repair it, although his attention had been called to it several times, and he had agreed and promised to so repair it. Appellant attributes his misfortune to this circumstance, and relies upon the doctrine announced by this and many other courts, that, if the master promises to amend a defect, and by such promises induces a servant to remain at service, the fact of his continuing in the employment does not, as a matter of law, exonerate the master from liability, but simply furnishes a question of fact for the consideration of the jury. Conceding, as we do, the soundness of this doctrine, the employee, even supported by a promise to repair, is still expected to act with ordinary prudence and judg
Affirmed.