113 S.E. 606 | N.C. | 1922
Plaintiff J. J. Johnson boarded the defendant's train on 10 July, 1920, at Bowden, N.C. en route to Norfolk, Va., having purchased a ticket at Bowden to Rocky Mount. He was ejected from the train by the conductor at Dudley, N.C. for failure to produce his ticket. The jury found that the ejection was wrongful, and answered the issue as to compensatory damages $1,000.
Exceptions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 are taken to the admission of certain evidence showing that the plaintiff had a logging contract with the Rowland Lumber Company, that he had an appointment to meet certain laborers in Norfolk, Va., and bring them to Bowden, N.C. to be hired by him for the purpose of performing the said logging contract, and that he was en route to Norfolk when he was ejected from the train of the defendant. That his contract depended upon the services of these laborers, and if he failed to keep the work going he would lose his job. That on account of being ejected from the train he missed his appointment, lost his men, and his contract with said lumber company was canceled.
The court submitted two issues to the jury, which were answered as follows:
"1. Did the defendant wrongfully eject the plaintiff from its train, as alleged in the complaint? Answer: `Yes.'
"If so, what damage, if any, has the plaintiff sustained thereby? Answer: `$1,000.'"
The court charged the jury as to certain elements of damage, such as humiliation, mental anguish, bodily pain, the loss of time and money, and then gave the following instruction: "And in addition to that, he was a man who had a contract on which he was making $300 a week clear profit by carrying men over to the Rowland Lumber Company and logging and digging railroads for them; that he had an engagement in the city of Norfolk that night and left Bowden intending to go there and fill that engagement and get those men and carry them back so he could continue to make $300 a week, and by reason of the fact that he was wrongfully ejected from this train, he was caused to lose a good deal of time, which made him lose this engagement in Norfolk, and by so doing these men were scattered and he couldn't round them up, and that fact caused him to lose his contract with the Rowland Lumber Company, and he lost a great deal of money, loss of profit and time and *103 money, all as he contends, naturally and reasonably and properly flowing from the wrongful conduct of defendant towards him, and that when you sum up all these elements of damages that he is entitled to — compensatory damages — that you ought to find some large amount, around $3,000." And again, in that connection, the court gave the following charge to the jury: "As to this issue of damages, the court charges you that if the plaintiff has satisfied you by the evidence, and by its greater weight, that he is entitled to damages, he is entitled to recover as actual or compensatory damages a fair and just compensation for all loss that he has sustained that naturally flows from the wrongful conduct, if you find from the evidence, and the greater weight thereof, that the same was caused wrongfully by the defendant towards him. This would include loss of time and personal inconvenience, if any, and any financial and pecuniary loss, if any. If you find from the evidence, and by its greater weight, that the conduct of the defendant was wrongful in ejecting him from the train, you will answer this issue whatever amount you are satisfied from the evidence, and by its greater weight, that the plaintiff had sustained according to that measure of damages, if you find he is entitled to recover at all. It is a question of fact for you. The court has no opinion of its own as to what your answer will be. The court has merely stated the contentions of the plaintiff and the defendant and the evidence bearing on the contentions."
Exceptions were duly taken to these instructions. Judgment upon the verdict, and defendant appealed. After stating the material facts: We are of the opinion that the learned judge erred in the instructions to the jury which are above stated.
The question as to the measure of damages, in cases of this kind, has been much discussed by this Court in several cases, and the law thoroughly settled.
The Court said in Lee v. R. R.,
It is said in Penn v. Tel. Co.,
And the present Chief Justice says, in Kennon v. Tel. Co.,
But how can it be said that indirect or consequential damages for the commission of a tort, if founded upon a contract, are the natural and probable effect of the wrong, under the facts as they exist at the time the same is committed, if they are such as are not known to the wrongdoer, and could not be contemplated by him? In such a case, he cannot be said to have intended a result as the one flowing naturally or consequentially from his wrongful act, of which he was totally ignorant. Therefore it is that, in such cases, the law does not charge him with such damages, but only with those which the parties contemplated as likely or probably would be caused by a breach of the contract of carriage, by requiring the plaintiff to leave the car, for this substantially is the tort or wrong complained of. The liability of the defendant would be stretched entirely too far, and much beyond what justice and the necessities of the case require, if damages, which would be greatly out of proportion to the injury wrought by the unlawful act, could thus be exacted. Responsibility for damages which would include his failure to realize the benefit of every contract or business transaction of the passenger thus ejected from a train would render transportation of passengers too hazardous and destructive in character to be undertaken by any prudent persons or association of them.
It was said in Squire v. Telegraph Co.,
Now, can it be said that damages arising from plaintiff's failure to meet the men at Norfolk, or the loss of plaintiff's employment by the lumber company, can both, or either, "be fairly and reasonably" considered either as arising naturally, i. e., according to the usual course of things, from the carrier's breach of contract, or his tort, by whichever name it may be called, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in contemplation of both parties at the time the contract of carriage was made, or at the time of the breach or tort complained of by the *108
plaintiff? Such a loss, or such damages as are now claimed, would not ordinarily nor naturally and probably flow from the wrongful act of the carrier in refusing to transport the plaintiff beyond the place where he left the train. The justice and wisdom of the rule, both in cases of contracts and of torts growing out of contracts, is apparent, and for this reason we have approved and applied it generally to cases such as the one we now have before us. Ashe v. DeRosset,
96 Am.Dec., 519; Landsberger v. Telegraph Co., 32 Barb., 530; Candee v.Telegraph Co.,
The other exceptions require no separate consideration or discussion at this time. The alleged errors may not occur again.
New trial.