*1 unobjected did not obtain that the Chitwoods to affidavits verted and (e) type required “judgment” order OCGA 33-7-11 under policy, liability subject I af- under to firm the trial court’s order. Southern General necessary Accordingly, I do not consider majority’s 2 of the in Division issue addressed to reach the release opinion. Presiding Judge Birdsong, I to state that Chief am authorized special Presiding Judge join
Judge Deen, in this concur- Banke and rence. — 5, 1988 December Decided 20, 1988
Rehearing denied December appellants. Hurst, William R. appellee. Fox, S.
Warner REALTY, HAND; 76956, 76958, INC. et al. JOHNSON 76959. (three cases). vice versa (377 SE2d Judge. Carley, appeals, Rudolph the John- Johnson was At the relevant to these times Realty, Inc., son, his Michael sole son, of Johnson shareholder company agent. employed Michael as a real estate was inquired Byron sell certain whether he wished to Johnson property. Hand willing prop- responded to sell his
Hand that he would specified Shortly erty price. thereafter, re- Johnson Michael for a net accept- presented for Hand’s with a sales contract which he turned price he amount Hand the ance. sale was sufficient to net to specified. disclose, however, had Michael Johnson did purchaser his father-in- contract was own who named in the sales was signed law. Hand contract. pur- closing, informed that at the he was When Hand arrived present. Instead, could not be chaser named in the sales contract prepared Johnson, wife, Rae was Michael Johnson’s Mrs. According purchaser. Hand, there to “sit in” for the absent purchaser purported again was Michael no disclosure that the absent agreed title to the transfer of Johnson’s father-in-law. convey subsequently property turn, she, did to Rae Johnson and Shortly property property been had after title to to her father. father-in-law, Johnson Michael from his wife to transferred price party property for a to third efforts to sell successful that was paid. greater A significantly been which Hand had than that part, large profit all, if not from this sale went to Michael John- son, rather than to his father-in-law. price property
When Hand learned had been resold greater paid, brought than he had been this action Johnson Rudolph Johnson, and Rae Johnson. *2 alleged duty to that Michael Johnson had breached the owed agent Hand as Hand’s for Kellett v. the sale of the See 292) (1953). Boynton, alleged It was also entirely separate whereby an that transaction Rae Johnson had been conveyed property to title real should set was void and aside. OCGA 18-2-22.The ma- defendants filed answers which denied the allegations complaint. terial before a of Hand’s for The case came on trial
jury. against returned a verdict favor Hand as against Johnson dolph Johnson, and Michael Ru- but not as Judgments Johnson and Rae Johnson. were entered on the jury’s Realty, Inc., verdicts and Johnson Michael Johnson and Hand separate appeals appeals hereby each filed therefrom. The three disposition single opinion. consolidated for in this
Case No. 76958 appeals case, In this from the entered jury’s on the verdict him and in favor Hand. general grounds.
1. Michael Johnson enumerates the agent, “The law is uniform and well an settled that who has been engaged directly owner, not, to sell real estate for the either indirectly, purchase principal express himself, it without the consent of the knowledge a
after full of all the facts. This is so declared Realty Holley, Code, [OCGA our § 10-6-24].” Dolvin Co. v. (2) (48 109) (1948). policy 618, 621 “The of the law an forbids agent employed place antagonism to sell to himself an attitude principal, by associating to the interest of his himself with another purchase agent express land; of the a and sale an without the principal consent of his another, to himself association with knowledge agency, prin of his will be set aside at the instance cipal. agent It will be no defense for the and his associate to show agent good faith, acted in and that the transaction was Callaway, principal.” fact for the best interest of the Reeves v. relationship principal Ga. and alty SE “The agent fiduciary, agent loy is confidential and and demands of the good principal ([cits.]); [OCGA 10-6-25] to faith provides agent personal profit that ‘The shall not make a from ” principal’s property; all Kellett v. such he is bound to account.’ Boynton, supra forbidding agent 696. “The . . from at rule an . purchasing principal’s express property, without the consent and inapplicable principal, because knowledge property price. made minimum fixed or at a with the listed for sale price [he] owner, minimum named [Hand], When guide manifestly property, accept a intended as [his] it was expectation implied just negotiating agent sale, [his] part agent’s engagement part he would [his] on [his] and an higher price.” Co. Dolvin to obtain make an honest endeavor Holley, supra at 622 although find- demand a would not that, evidence It follows ing Hand as owed to Johnson had breached that Michael property, such it would authorize sale of the Hand’s finding. testimony and docu- 2. The trial court admitted into evidence presented relating original sales contract ments purchaser. as the father-in-law was named wherein Michael Johnson’s error, contention The being evidence is enumerated as admission only property sale of the that was irrelevant because actually wife. that Michael Johnson’s closed was clearly original the initia- relevant to show sales contract was *3 part by earn a effort on his to tion secret Johnson of an undisclosed by property personal profit the eventual resale of Hand’s indirectly purchase through attempting his father-in-law. to first ‘“ loyal agent principal interests, his adherence to “An owes to his principal, the would contravene and it be a the and fraud knowledge policy, agent, public permit an without the and to full duty, principal, involving to into relation such a consent of his enter already having allegiance pledged one adverse when his had been to personal antagonistic interests, to or when his own interests would be principal.” of his The rule has stated: “An those also been thus place position will not and interest to himself in a in which be allowed profit permitted conflict, secret out of or be to amake ’ Harrington agency.” (Emphasis original.) Spratlin, & [Cits.]” 402) (156 Thomas, Hawn, 175, 116 SE2d v. Ga. 181-182 (1967). properly v. Vinson evidence was admitted. See 204) Co., 306, E. SE2d W. Buschman 172 Ga. (1984). charges objection, gave
3. Over the trial court several with refer- by regulations promulgated Georgia ence to Real the rules and the charges giving Estate ror. as er- Commission. The of these enumerated authority granted and “Where an or commission leg- scope power adopt. regulations . to . rules and within regulations enactment, force islative and effect such rules and have same supplied.) v. [Cit.]” that of statute. Panfel Boyd, (2b) App. As an exam- pie, legislature delegated to Service has the Public Commission the business plenary power regulate common quasi-legislative to carriers in granted this state and has also to that Commission the authority adopt regulations may to such rules as it neces deem sary 46-7-2; to power. the exercise of that OCGA delegated 46- §§ Dykes, Maner v. (3) (190 7-27; SE Co., See also Cambron v. Canal Ins.
426) (1980), holding Supreme power Court has inherent to practice regulate authority of law this adopt state and the to regulations such rules and itas deem to necessary the exercise of power. inherent Accordingly, regulations the rules and promulgated the Su Court, preme power, its through inherent Public Service Commission, through its delegated authority legislature, from the supplant necessity statutory enactment of provisions with ref erence to the in which actually manner profession is to and, be conducted having the same supplanted force and effect as the statutes, those regulations rules and controlling legal become the However, of professional standards Court, conduct. unlike the Supreme Georgia Real Estate Commission has no power inherent over the profession and, real estate in this state unlike the Public Ser Commission, vice legislature delegated has not Georgia to the Real plenary Estate quasi-legislative power gen Commission over the eral conduct of the real estate Assembly business. The General has determined that it will legislative power retain its control man ner in which actually conducted, the real estate business is to be granted has Georgia only Real Estate Commission limited quasi-legislative power to qualified practice determine who is real estate business in seq., this state. Pursuant 43-40-1 et OCGA § the Georgia only Real promulgate Estate Commission is authorized rules and regulations “regulatory which are in nature. rules [Those and regulations] limited to action Real Estate Campagna in the Commission exercise of licensing powers.” Sara Hudson Realty *4 App. SE2d (1976). Accordingly, the rules and mini regulations recognize “certain Kim mum for persons standards engaged in the real business.” estate ball Bridge Rd. v. Everest Realty Corp., (2) 141 Ga. 696) (1977). recognized, SE2d These “minimum standards” however, solely and, for regulatory licensing civil purpose of a upon misconduct, action based only a real estate agent’s alleged unsupplanted statutory relevant provisions applicable. which are “Some of the [by conduct regulation] condemned the rules and also serve as recovery monetary the basis for action judicial for damages under Campagna statutes.” supplied.) [relevant] v. Sara Hudson supra at It 452. follows that the rules Georgia same regulations Commission have Estate Real licensing and, to in the area as that of statutes force and effect comply Those keep them. with license, must therefore his a realtor regulations effect not, however, same force and have the do rules and liability profes- for breach of of civil as of statutes the area that comply judgment, must with and, a realtor avoid conduct sional statutory principles agency. relevant concerning regulatory licens- issue involved no case Clayton Holding Corp. Inc., Compare McLendon, ing. v. Diversified 863) (1969). only issue was legal to Hand in his Johnson had breached whether Michael connection with in is arise does not This issue the sale of Hand’s negligence action, conduct wherein the defendant’s context of a ordinary against general reasonable standard measured illustrate that admissible to of custom would be man and evidence general Compare Doster, v. standard. Coffeen is measured Michael Johnson’s conduct statutory concerning against provisions the law of the relevant provisions by licensing regulatory agency, and not the irrelevant Regardless promulgated of in Commission. Real Estate compliance with or conduct is whether Michael Johnson’s breach sis for sions. As regulatory provisions, no ba- conduct affords Hand statutory provi- recovery proscribed relevant if it is not supplant simply regulations discussed, the statu- do not tory principles standards the relevant judged must in a civil action. See realtor’s actions Panfel (2b), Boyd, Regulations supra holding of the Real “[t]he at 645 panacea nor a shield which will insu- Commission are neither a Estate late realty compliance of a the clear terms real estate broker from party.” regulations are the contract to which it While determining his should lose relevant whether a realtor standards para- practice profession, which are it is statutes license mount and establish the relevant standards determining whether civilly violating that the trial he is duties. It follows liable predicated upon giving any charge irrele- court erred in which was statutory regulations, vant rules and rather than principles agency. proper objection, into evidence a
4. admitted Over the trial court Plaza, Inc. of Jonesboro collection of checks written on the account Hand owned a small corporation apparently corporation in turn and the owned this managed Realty, shopping Inc., center. Johnson capacity manager, shopping and, in was authorized center checking Inc., Plaza, account. write checks on Jonesboro management appears relevancy shopping in the trial of issue involved center had no *5 present only issue was the conduct of Michael case. relevant entirely for the capacity Johnson in sale of an as Hand’s relationship that separate only tract of real It is breached, allegedly which was conduct connection with management shopping bearing center would have no on It follows allowing case. trial court erred this irrelevant separate evidence transaction to be admitted. See Head 276, (1) 662) v. Deere Plow John (1944).
5. The trial court in charging provisions did not err of OCGA 1, jury. principle 10-6-24 to the As discussed Division of law enunciated that statute clearly applicable under the evidence. 6. The trial court princi- did not err on the charging ples of law regarding relationships. confidential As discussed in Divi- legal sion those principles clearly applicable were under the evi- dence.
7. The gave following “Misrepresentation trial court charge: of a material fact wilfully recklessly made deceive without knowledge by party innocently and acted on or made opposite and mistakenly by and acted on opposite party constitutes (Emphasis fraud.” supplied.)
The charge states a principle correct abstract law. See OCGA § however, 23-2-52. In emphasized portion, relates principle of principle constructive fraud and applicability has no to the fraud claim damages present asserted case. tort, “To fraud, establish the which was the actual be fraud must shown and constructive will fraud not suffice. Southeastern [Cit.]” Greyhound Lines, Fisher, v. innocently misrepresentation made material “[A]n opposite party right has a to act on and does in fact act to his
injury is made constitute 23-2-52]; fraud fact but the [OCGA § opposite party may occupy relationship] confidential does [a operate not to change that which would otherwise be mere construc- fraud, tive on account of lack of intent, the element of into guilty actual intentional fraud. It follows that be rule in whatever foreign certain jurisdictions misrepresenta- reference innocent tions when made one charged special opposite with a to the party to know impart ([cit.]), and to the truth under the statutes and decisions of this misrepresentations State such any- cannot amount to thing fraud, and, such, more than constructive not creative any independent right of damages action for in tort favor of the injured party; they may equity but an support action to rescind a contract so they may pleaded induced. Or to a be [Cits.] defense seem, suit on a procured. contract thus they may, might Or [Cits.] under estoppel, the doctrine an employed support action Penn supplied.) on the contract itself. [Cits.]” founded SE Taggart, Ins. Co. Mut. Life relief of case, seeking equitable Hand was contract, suing on the contract neither rescission *6 asserting Hand was an on the contract. against nor action defending legal issue applicable Accordingly, fraud and deceit. the tort of Johnson, whether and the evidence was pleadings under the fraud committed actual property, had for the sale of Hand’s with that transac- fact connection failing to disclose a material “ trust relation of person sustains toward tion. ‘Where [another] confidence, speak, his failure to when he should or his silence disclose, in law as an is as much a fraud ought disclose what Hack- Sutlive v. representation. false actual affirmative [Cit.]” [Cit.]’ (1982). It follows ney, App. 740, 742 ., or constructive . . dealt with “portion charge which plead- fraud, presented to the issues properly adjusted was not Bucher evidence, given. not have been ings and the and should [Cit.]” Murray, that, charge was raised urges although objection an below, review preserved appellate particular ground this was that, sufficient, any giving error in objection if the below was However, any adequacy of harmless. consideration charge was non, below, applica- harm or of the objection question vel (c) ultimate bility bearing have no on the of OCGA 5-5-24 would § must reversed on disposition judgment this case. Since the discussed, we need not determine grounds previously which have been fraud con- charge whether the erroneous on constructive giving this charge was erroneous independent stitutes basis for reversal. an given in retrial of this case. and should not be over documentary evidence admitting 8. There was no error objection subsequently an withdrawn. timely to which no giving charge
9. There was no error objection was raised in the trial court. trial court given
10. For the Divisions 3 and reasons erred and a new trial be held. must
11. to the admission Remaining enumerations of error relate regarding Hand’s OCGA giving jury evidence and instructions 18-2-22 claim. These need not be addressed. enumerations no and he has filed against returned a Hand as to this claim verdict jury’s Accordingly, appeal from the entered on the verdict. judgment at the retrial of the the OCGA 18-2-22 claim will not be an issue case.
Case No. 76956 case, from appeals en- jury’s tered on the it in favor of verdict Hand. 12. The admitting trial court not err in into evidence testi- did mony original presented and documents concerning the sales contract to Hand wherein Michael Johnson’s father-in-law was named purchaser. See 2. Division
13. The trial in admitting testimony concerning court erred regulations promulgated by rules and Real Com- Estate mission and it in giving any predicated also erred charge which was upon those rules regulations rather than principles of of agency. the law 3. Division
14. The trial
giving
charge
court’s
of a
principle
on the
of ratifi-
cation is
Realty, Inc.,
enumerated as error. Johnson
urges that
erroneously
given because
was no
there
evidence which
would authorize a
finding
had ratified
the acts Michael
Johnson in connection with the sale of
Hand’s
appear
there was no evidence which would author-
*7
ize a finding
Realty,
of Johnson
Inc.’s
of
of
ratification
the acts
evidence,
Michael Johnson. Under
however,
Realty,
Johnson
legal liability
Inc.’s
dependent upon
would not be
its
of
ratification
“
the acts of Michael Johnson.
by per-
‘Ratification is the affirmance
prior
son of a
act which did not bind him but which was
or
done
professedly
account, whereby
act,
done on his
as to some or all
persons,
given
is
effect
if originally
as
him.’
authorized
[Cits.]”
Golucke,
supplied.)
(1)
Greene v.
provide liability. The cor- no trial court defense to give inapplicable charge. refused to request following give 16. The trial court’s refusal charge charge you that error: “I members of the is enumerated as among things, contends, act- [Hand] Michael Johnson was other that you capacity Georgia, ing agent.’ I ‘dual theory agency apply . dual if . . Hand knew Michael does Johnson’s interest the transaction.” request
Assuming deciding without that the refused was correct (but concept Spratlin, Har- dual see statement of the rington supra, Thomas, Hawn, & agency” concept case. “Dual was not *8 principal acting particular agent also in a arises when the of one is agent principal. agency’ as the another “The ‘dual transaction of concept original prin- primarily designed protection to afford to the (and cipal principal) where under some circumstances to the second agent [Cit.]” the supplied.) acts in same for another transaction. Anderson Redwal Music Ga. alleged nor case, neither principal
proved for more than one that Michael Johnson had acted alleged It was when he undertook the sale of Hand’s proved acting him- in transaction that Michael Johnson was any principal. This additional self, not as of undisclosed
concept “self-dealing agency” of is controlled statute. “Without express principal knowledge all the consent of the after a full may agent employed pur- facts, an to sell not himself be the give . . .” chaser. OCGA 10-6-24. The trial court did concept “self-dealing agency” language OCGA 10-6- refusing give 24. It follows that the trial court did not err requested charge inapplicable concept agency.” as to the of “dual objection, expert
17. Over the trial court allowed one of Hand’s give opinion response hypothetical question. witnesses to an to a evidentiary ruling This error. enumerated as propounded, question hypothetical assumed, As had as one predicates, presentation original its factual to Hand of the sales contract wherein Michael Johnson’s father-in-law was named as the purchaser. According Realty, original to Johnson contract any objected was not relevant to issue the case and it inclu- presentation sion of the of that contract to Hand of the ele- as one hypothetical question. ments of the As discussed Division how- concerning original properly ever, evidence contract was admitted against any objection relevancy. Accordingly, as did not question to its the trial court allowing expert hypothetical
err witness to answer the predicates, assumed, which had as one of its factual the exis- properly opinion tence of a relevant fact which “The evidence. expert given response hypothetical ques- of an witness be ato placed testimony tion based on facts other witnesses or in evidence either by competent evidence nature.” Mutual Health Hickman, &c. Assn. v. Benefit admitting documentary 18. There was no error in evidence over objection subsequently
an which was withdrawn. 19. For the reasons discussed in Division the trial court erred and a new trial must be held.
Case No. 76959 appeals case, In this from the entered on the jury’s Rudolph verdict returned favor Johnson. grant 20. Hand enumerates as error the failure to his motion for liability Rudolph a directed verdict as to the Johnson, vicarious personal capacity, for the acts of Michael Johnson. Rudolph Realty, Johnson was the sole shareholder of Johnson employed by corporation, Inc. Michael Johnson was and not Accordingly, Rudolph his father. Johnson could not be held vicari ously liable for the acts of his son unless the evidence authorized a finding pierced. corporate veil of Johnson Inc. should Intl., Jenkins v. Judith Sans *9 which would no evidence produced demand, Rudolph Johnson’s authorize, finding a much less even corporate veil was such that Realty, operation Johnson pierced. should be deemed seq. as et of OCGA 43-40-1 provisions
Hand relies vicariously liable Rudolph Johnson is authority holding the cor- piercing concept regard to the of his son without the acts however, provisions are discussed, those previously As porate veil. changing effect not have the merely regulatory in nature and do for a real to recover civil action the substantive law Hudson Re- v. Sara Campagna alleged misconduct. agent’s estate the ne- seq. et obviated alty 40-43-1 OCGA supra. Nothing Realty, Inc. corporate of Johnson cessity veil pierce for Hand to capacity. in her personal against Rudolph to recover Johnson order verdict motion for a directed correctly The denied Hand’s trial court for the acts of Johnson liability Rudolph as to the vicarious Michael Johnson. Judgment and 76958.
Judgments reversed in Case Nos. 76956 J., J., McMurray, P. Birdsong, No. 76959. C. in Case affirmed J., Banke, Benham, J., Deen, specially. concurs J., P. P. and concur. JJ., Sognier, part. and dissent in Pope Beasley, part and concur in J., disqualified. specially. Judge, concurring
Deen, Presiding the case of opinion great relies extent on dissenting to a 374) (1974), Gordon, Gordon v. spe-A “finis sit litium.” concluding opinion being three words of this “I concur in the indicating, cial concurrence was written that case court,” challenging portion of judgment affirming the lower and relied of that opinion. part questioned appears part not to be the dissent. 11, 12, 1, 3, 4, 6, 9, 10, through I and concur Divisions majority opinion. and of the Judge, part dissenting part.
Beasley, concurring and 8, involving I fully except regard concur to Divisions 3 13, involving Division appeal, case no. Johnson’s appeal, Inc.’s case no. 76956. charges in connection with These divisions relate to court testimony Michael Johnson Georgia Real Estate Manual and about it. regarding the charges, of four three giving enumerates error the Georgia Real Es- one Georgia regarding Real Estate Manual and manual licensing tate law. He also the admission enumerates enumerating joins into evidence. Johnson Michael Johnson giving error the admission of the manual and connection with the enu- licensing Real Estate law. further testimony licensing merates as error the regarding admission of law.
As document, to the admission objections were withdrawn consequently the issue and the manual was admitted dissolved *10 into evidence. About appellants complain, having cannot acceded.. 3, The majority addresses charges the court in Division and both the charges testimony and In properly in Division 13. order to con- charges sider the testimony, and we must understand what the man- ual is and purpose and, the limited it which was offered obedi- ence to the court’s charge, used. published by
The manual was Georgia Association Real- tors, Inc., under authorization of Real Estate Commis- sion, a statutory agency which regulates profession. OCGA 43- ’ foreword, 40-2. The Commission, states that Commis- “[t]he responsible sion is for preparing the contents manual.” also that, states in addition to its a being preparatory aid for license exam-
ination, Commission may also intends that “[t]he current licensees utilize the contents of this as an manual aid to and ethical bro- kerage activity.” A caveat is added to warn that it is not a intended as substitute for legal advice or service. The manual contains Title 43 (the Chapter 40 law), of OCGA licensing Regulations the Rules and (Chapters through 520-5), procedures explanatory 520-1 and and regarding aspects *11 not would be relevant albeit agency regulates profession determinative. in subject giving would aid testimony on the expert
Just as law, stick, regulations, and jury measuring would the rules and so proper practice profes- of the practices in manual for the outlined City in trade. See custom the sion. would be akin evidence of of (64 (2) The Yaughn, 610, Macon v. 614 SE2d App. 83 Ga. 327) Doster, 529, SE2d court in 161 Ga. Coffeen in practice persons stated the rule: “evidence of custom can be engaged one a similar trade is admissible to show whether so cus- degree of care negligence failing faulted for to exercise tomarily trade, in . .” the breaches followed . Relevance to than would be no less alleged this action for fraud deceit in a negligence action. are not
The minimum the law and the standards set licensing,” as “solely purpose recognized regulatory law for the v. Sara Hudson Campagna from majority. quoted ruled As 102) (1976): Realty 451, “Some SE2d action may judicial the conduct condemned also serve as the basis for monetary court recovery under other statutes.” damages Bridge 835, Kimball Rd. v. Everest 673) (1977) recognizes “[h]ence, this Act quoted this and stated: real estate persons certain minimum engaged standards statutory business.” cause of action. OCGA 51-6-1. Fraud is a § things empowered to “do such agency is acts profes- seem to the in the advancement advisable commission sion and the standards of the real 43-40-2 estate OCGA business.” § (b). “ ‘Questions relevancy court, of evidence ... are for and in discretion, absence of an abuse judicial will inter- this court not ” Wages, supra fere. at 15. There was no abuse of discretion [Cit.]’ applying OCGA 24-2-1 testimony relates to the concerning the manual, which evidence, document particularly light was limiting instruction. The charge subject proper on the and did supplant but rather supplemented charges the court’s extensive principles on the agency.
Since I find no error I matter ruled Division dissent to the judgment against Realty, Inc., reversal of the Johnson Case No. 76956.
I am authorized to that Judge Pope joins state opinion. — Decided November Rehearing denied December Oliver, Duckworth, Winkle, Sparger Oliver, & G. Robert Warren Sellers, A. & W. R. Johnson.
Remar & Graettinger, Jr., John S. Graettinger, E. Marcia Fish man, Megan Gideon, E. for Hand. & Foster,
Brown Larry Foster, A. for Michael Johnson. 77059. CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC. v. DARLING. Banke, Presiding Judge.
Darling $800,000 awarded verdict of personal in a injury System action Railroad, Seaboard brought pursuant Employers’ (FELA), Federal Liability Act seq. 45 USCA 51 et While the suit *12 pending, Seaboard known became as CSX Trans- portation, Inc. In appeal this from the denial of its motion for new trial, CSX contends that the verdict and should be reversed as excessive.
Darling had worked for the since railroad 1961 as a at switchman yard, a rail where large freight trains were broken down and their cars reassembled into smaller trains headed towards the same destination. process, individually cars were set motion a switch engine and then guided proper to their yard by destinations opening switches, closing they ultimately until struck and cou- pled with the other making up cars the same train. Darling’s job was switches, operate and in get order to to them he would some- notes various of the practice. real estate The court charge about which both Michael Johnson and John- Realty son complain, here, and which is controlling states: “I charge that a person holding Georgia a real estate license not be sued for his failure to comply governing with statutes real es- brokers, tate but those statutes set out the relevant standards and may be to in determining referred whether the has or broker violated fiduciary fulfilled his duties.” Thus the court limited the use to which jury put could the manual. Plaintiff had introduced this docu-" mentary testimony evidence and the it connection with for the lim- ited purpose serving as a guideline minimum standards the real profession. estate While of course great portion is manual not relevant the standard of behavior required of Michael Johnson and Johnson Hand, dealing with objections go heart relevancy of it to expressly this issue. Since the court circum- scribed the use relevant, of it to what was there no harm ad- mitting the whole thing so as to provide the context. “Where objected to, evidence is competent offered and if it any purpose, Gordon is not to admit it. erroneous [Cits.]” Gordon, (1) (211 374) (1974). SE2d As in that case, the evidence here purpose “was admissible for stated.” “ evidence, tends, how with other which, in connection ‘Evidence fact, it is though even or illustrate slightly, prove, explain, ever fact, rele finding of such alone, sufficient, to sustain standing not toas against objection vant, and is admissible probative value has value; the latter should as to doubt relevancy probative sufficiency exclusion, not resolved in favor of admission Dept. admissibility being a test or condition [Cits.]’ [Cits.]” Whitehead, Transp. v. admitted, relevancy and even should be of doubtful Evidence un admitted, a new trial require it does if irrelevant evidence is Sibran, Wages v. prejudiced. rights objector’s less relationship be- fiduciary dispute here involved Much of of the latter to duties of each plaintiff and the tween and defendants each had professional issue was whether capacity. him in their At plaintiff, dealing up profession lived to the standards in addi- they professional standards whether had violated their pro- what to determine aiding tion committed fraud. by the were, required the minimum standards fessional standards