64 Mo. App. 590 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1896
Plaintiff delivered to defendant, on May 23, 1892, a car load of-corn, to be earned from Kansas City, Missouri, to Chicago, Illinois. The delivery was in time to have arrived in Chicago, if defendant had been diligent in transportaion, so as to have been prepared for and put on the market and sold on the thirty-first of May. But defendant, having unreasonably delayed the corn, it did not arrive in time for the market of that day, and plaintiff was compelled to, and did 'afterward, on June 1, sell for a lower price, whereby he alleges he was damaged in a sum representing the difference between the market price on the day it should have arrived and such price on the day he sold. The case stated in the petition is a claim for damages, based on the difference in the market price. The judgment of the trial court was for the plaintiff. The evidence showed that there was no market on the twenty-ninth and thirtieth of May, the former being Sunday and the latter Decoration Day; that on the twenty-eighth the market price for corn was between forty-five and forty-nine cents, and that that was the market value and price on the latter part of the thirty-first, and for several succeeding days. But during a portion of the thirty-first, it sold at the board of trade for as much as $1 per bushel. So, in short, it may be stated that the case shows that just before the thirty-
The defendant offered evidence tending to prove that the price of $1 per bushel, at which corn sold on a portion of the thirty-first, was not the real value of the corn in the Chicago market, and that such price was not made as the result of any natural or legitimate demand — that it was a fictitious price, brought about by option dealers and manipulations of the market at the board of trade — that it was the result of what is known, in the parlance of such manipula-, tors, as a “corner.” The trial court excluded such evidence.
It may be said that the case presents two questions: One, whether plaintiff is entitled to recover the difference in the market price of the corn, as claimed in his petition, as distinguished from market value; the other, whether the high price at which he showed corn sold on May 31, was the market price.
The market price and market value of an article of commerce are ordinarily the same, and, therefore, generally and ordinarily, the two terms mean the same thing, ■and courts ordinarily permit the market price of an article to be the measure of its market value. The market price is evidence of market value, but it is not conclusive. There are instances — instances of more frequent recurrence of late years — where the market price is not the market value, as understood in the law. Tiedeman on Sales, sec. 47; Acebel v. Lacy, 10 Bing. 376; Kountze v. Kirkpatrick, 72 Pa. St. 376. The maket value is that which arises from the ordinary transactions of buying
In Acebelv. Levy, 10 Bing. 376, it is said: “A contract to furnish a cargo at a reasonable price means such a price as the jury shall, under all the circumstances, decide to be reasonable. This price may, or may not, agree with the current price of the commodity at the port of shipment, at the precise time when such shipment is made. The current price of the day may be highly unreasonable from accidental circumstances, as on account of the commodity having been purposely kept back by the vendor himself, or with reference to the price at other ports in the immediate vicinity, or from various other causes.”
When there are extraordinary convulsions of the market, brought about by illegal combinations, or by the manipulations of parties dealing in what are known as “options,” or where the market is “cornered” on particular articles of property, the price which may be forced (whether up or down) on the article in question, can not be said to be the market value of such article, even though it may be so general in its application and effect as to be the market price. The general market price of property in a locality may be fictitious, and may be suddenly brought about by unlawful combinations for illegal or speculative purposes, whereby prices in the general market are made to double or quadruple within a few hours, when, at the same time, there has been no change in the quantity or quality of the article thus enhanced, or any legitimate demand at
But the foregoing cases are, in important particulars, not applicable to this case, as it has been presented by counsel for plaintiff. Plaintiff seeks to recover the-difference in the market price when the corn arrived at Chicago and when it should have arrived. Neither of those cases is of this sort. Those cases concerned a buyer or seller of property at an unnamed price; or one-whose property had been damaged in shipment but had not been shipped for sale on the market. In such eases the market value is the measure of damages. This is for the reason that the injured party can obtain or replace the property with the amount recovered as-damages — a thing which can always be done except in the short and transitory periods of market convulsions.
But plaintiff is not in such a situation. He did not want the property, except for the purpose of sale on a. certain day, which defendant knew, and he was deprived of the power of sale on that day by reason of a negligent delay in transportation. He did not want the market value of the corn, wherewith he might have-resupplied himself. • The only full measure of his-recompense, according to his petition, is the market, price which he alleges he would have obtained, had it been delivered without delay. So, in general terms, we hold that the shipper of a commodity to the market for sale, who fails to get it to the market through the negligence of the carrier, is entitled to base his claim for
It therefore only remains to be seen whether there has been a proper trial of the cause, on the theory which we have indicated as applicable to the case stated in the petition.
It appears that at the board of trade in Chicago there were certain individual dealers, who had, at times previous, sold corn, which they did not own or have in possession, who were called upon to deliver, and in an endeavor to obtain the grain for delivery, they (who’ seem to be known as “shorts”), laboring under a necessity peculiar to them in their situation, were paying, on May 31, as much as $1 per bushel for corn which graded as number 2. On account of the ruling of the court on the evidence, we must assume that this
It follows from the foregoing views that the cause was not tried on a proper theory. If plaintiff’s case had been founded, as was, in substance, stated during the course of the argument, on the proposition that he expected that an extraordinary and unusual price would be paid by a class of individuals at the board of trade in Chicago, on account of a corner in the market, whereby they were compelled to have the grain, and that he endeavored to ship his corn to said city in time to sell to such parties, then a different case would have been presented for our consideration. Whether plaintiff, knowing of the unlawful combination which brought about the extraordinary results on the board of trade on the thirty-first of May, would find any impediment to his recovery of damages on account of failing to get his grain delivered in time to become a part of the trade, is a question which has not been examined and which it is unnecessary to decide. At all events, plaintiff may possibly desire to amend his petition and thereby place his case on somewhat different ground from that now stated, and we will therefore reverse the judgment and remand the cause, so that he may not be deprived of an opportunity to do as may seem to be proper.