We granted this discretionary appeal to review the trial court’s judgment revoking the probation granted to Caecer Lydell Johns undеr the First Offender Act. OCGA § 42-8-60 et seq. Johns was originally indicted in 1993 under the alias “Kevin Nunnally” for sale of cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. He and his attorney negotiated a guilty plea to a single charge of simple possession of cocаine. At the plea hearing on March 18, 1993, Johns’ attorney asked the court to consider first offender treatment, as “Nunnally” apparеntly had no prior record. The trial court agreed and granted “Nunnally” first offender status for the conviction.
On June 29, 1993, a warrant was issued for “Nunnаlly’s” arrest because he had not reported to his probation officer or paid any of the fines assessed against him by the trial court. He was arrested on December 1, 1995. At the probation revocation hearing on December 18, 1995, the trial court sentenced him to 15 years, the maximum sentence for a first offense of possession of cocaine. See OCGA § 16-13-30 (e). The court specifically directed that this time be served in addition to the time he had successfully served on probation.
1. Johns claims the State did not meet its burden оf showing he entered the 1993 guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily. See
Dean v. State,
At the plea hearing, the assistant district attorney explained to Johns (who swore he was “Kevin Nunnally”) the chargеs against him and the possible sentences on those charges. She reminded Johns that he had the right to a trial at which he could testify or remain silent, subpoena witnesses in his behalf, and confront the State’s witnesses. She told Johns he would give up those rights by pleading guilty. Johns told the cоurt he had discussed the charges with his *554 attorney, that he was aware of the State’s recommendation and that he was also aware that the trial court did not have to follow that recommendation, and that he was entering the plea freely and voluntarily. After the assistant district attorney summarized the facts of the case, the trial court asked “Nunnally” if he wished to add anything. He declined.
Johns claims the triаl court violated Uniform Superior Court Rule 33.8 by failing to remind him of every right he would relinquish by pleading guilty. But as in
McClendon v. State,
2. After Johns pled guilty, his attorney asked the court to impose first offender sentencing because “Kevin Nunnally” had no prior offenses. Jоhns actually had two prior felony convictions, one under his own name and one under the alias “Cecil Jackson.” He now contеnds that the court erred by failing to determine that he was not eligible for first offender treatment, even though he told the court under oath thаt he was the “Kevin Nunnally” named in the indictment and that his name was spelled correctly in the indictment. He similarly argues his trial counsel was ineffеctive for not informing him he was ineligible for first offender treatment because of his other felonies. These contentions are spurious. Johns’ attempt to defraud the court by concealing his true identity allowed him to receive special treatment available only to those with clean records. He will not now be heard to complain that the trial court or his attorney should not have let him “get away” with this fraud. See
Bevil v. State,
3. Johns argues the evidence was insufficiеnt to support the revocation of his probation. The record reveals that as a condition of his first offender probatiоn, Johns was ordered to report to his probation officer as directed and to pay a fine. At the revocation hearing, the
*555
probation officer told the court Johns had done neither. Johns presented no evidence, but his attorney told the trial court that Johns was afraid to report to the probation officer because “he had given an alias name and was concernеd that if he did come into the probation office it would catch up with his alias names and he would get into trouble.” Even without construing the statement of his attorney as an admission that Johns did not report, a preponderance of the evidence supports the triаl court’s finding that he failed to do so as required. See OCGA § 42-8-34.1 (a); see also
Riggins v. State,
Furthermore, pursuаnt to his first offender agreement, the court had authority to revoke Johns’ probation “upon the Court’s determination that the defendаnt is or was not eligible for sentencing under the First Offender Act.” As Johns was never eligible for first offender treatment, his fraud on the court gave the trial court yet another reason to revoke his probation.
4. Johns is correct that the court erred under the facts of this casе in directing that the 15-year sentence it imposed after revoking his probation be served in addition to time actually served on probation. The State does not dispute Johns’ claim. A defendant whose first offender probation is revoked should generally be given credit for time successfully served on probation.
Stephens v. State,
Judgment affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded with direction.