Johnny Lee Jackson v. Daryl Gates City of Los Angeles

possibili- two further consider court should

ties, arise from fact that of which quasi-repre- in a brought her suit

Yniguez The first is capacity.

sentational may the interven- avoided

mootness against whose claim plaintiff

tion of a new English provision operation Kennerly moot. v. United

is not See

States, if other individuals who second pur- did provision

are affected on Yniguez’s in reliance their claims

sue own, pursuit Yniguez may her

continued standing result of their reliance. as a

have Coughlin, Bach v.

See these ini- leave matters

tially court. conclusion, reject sug- we state’s district court

gestion mootness. parties proceed to allow

may now and to conduct fur-

perfect appeals conformity our proceedings

ther

dispositions.3 JACKSON,

Johnny Lee

Plaintiff-Appellee, GATES; City Angeles,

Daryl of Los

Defendants-Appellants. 90-55728.

No. Appeals,

United States

Ninth Circuit. Dec.

Argued and Submitted Sept.

Decided Nov.

As Amended addition, necessary prior ings reject before the district are Park’s motion to recall 3. In respect taking Contrary to our this matter. further action with mandate. to his contention our as we supra, proceed- explained, have further Walsh, City Atty.,

Arthur B. Los Deputy Cal., Angeles, defendants-appellants. ‍​‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​​​​​​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‍Stone, Stonе, Feeley Michael P. De-& Cal., Pasquale, plaintiff- Angeles, appellee. woman,

returned with and the three apartment drove building to another also IAD considered officers to be a illegal drug location of sales and use. PREGERSON, CANBY and Before: Leach and the woman went into that build- RYMER, Judges. Circuit ing again while Jackson in the car. waited alone, Leach returned and the two drove to Judge: PREGERSON, Circuit in Hollywood. Leach’s residence North Angeles Ange- of and The Los Los residence, time at After some Leach’s (collectively “appel- les Police Chief Gates to the apartment the two returnеd second lants”) appeal the denial of their motions before, building. As entered the Leach verdict, summary judgment, directed for in the car. building while Jackson waited trial, notwithstanding and judgment new left, The Leach in driving two with a man- verdict, in jury award favor of and the by surveilling ner offi- characterized Angeles Johnny Officer Lee Los Police being cers “calculated to fol- avoid brought this action after Jackson. Jackson lowed.” refusing discharged comply being for sample a urine provide order to The of with an IAD’s undercover surveillance apрellants’ testing. February hold that ter- until drug Leach then ceased 1986. he refused to day, mination of Jackson because On that undercover IAD officers saw togeth- violated his Fourth comply with the order Leach Jackson leave the station and we hold that er after had finished work shifts. properly Exposition was instructed on Leach jury drove with Jackson to standard, officers, where, according applicable Fourth Park to the police to demonstrate required the two drank beer and talked. Later that suspect- basis returned evening, an articulable reasonable Leach alone to one of ordering use before by police of a “narcot- ing buildings Jackson believed to be urinalysis. to the ics him to submit location.”

The IAD officers then took Leach into warrant, BACKGROUND to a custody. Pursuant the Offi- car, uncovering cers Leach’s “a searched Angeles Department Police Los shape tinfoil which in and was bindle size and (“LAPD”) Leach Jackson Officers packaging of cocaine.” consistent with the same station. assigned to February captain, IAD the Inter- Under orders frоm their before Sometime (“IAD”) the LAPD home on Febru- officers went nal Affairs Division 21, 1986, a.m., ary at 1:30 and ordered conducting undercover surveillance began Leach, they suspect- provide specimen. urine ob- whom Jackson John Officer jected. IAD The officers then ordered Jackson illegal drug use. undercover ed of accompany Leach them to together Parker Center officers saw Jackson during Angeles.1 their in- Los separate occasions downtown on two vestigation. there, a union Once Jackson met with 13, 1986, February representative Police

On the afternoon car, League (“League”). Jackson got Leach's and the two Protective Jackson into provide building Holly- then a formal order apartment to an received drove sample contemporaneous urine ob- building known under The wood. public in the an IAD officer the site narcotics servation IAD officers to be testing. building He refused entered the restroom for and use. Leach sales Leach order.2 car. while Jackson remained by IAD point, 2. At informed parties agree Jackson was not under some claims, however, refusing investigators that he was could result arrest. Jackson the order against Appellants his will. taken to the station disciplinary action. subject disobey, free to claim that “only discipline.” to the risk administrative 24,1986, trial, suspended Following July returned

On a ver- $154,747. hearing on the dict for pay pending a Jackson of without verdict, An administra- charge judgment of insubordination. entered refusing guilty of denied panel by appellants tive found Jackson motions filed for a order, verdict, and recom- directed comply judgment lawful notwith- standing or, Pоlice discharge alternative, from the LAPD. mended verdict finding, panel’s for a accepted the new trial. jurisdiction Chief Gates We have over July timely appeal pursuant and terminated Jackson effective to 28 U.S.C. Ange- City of Los Charter of the See 202(12) (13). les §§ — DISCUSSION grievance proce- pursued the I. Fourth him, provided Amendment Claim that dures available to the LAPD be submitted to dispute his with Appellants contend that the district court The arbitrator con- binding arbitration. by denying erred their motion for summary agreement the labor between cluded that judgment on Jackson’s Fourth Amendment League and the LAPD did not autho- the claim under 42 Specifically, U.S.C. 1983. in compulsory urinalysis Jackson’s rize appellants argue that the order to Jackson later, LAPD year case. A and one-half the urinalysis drug to submit to a test was his reinstated Jackson and restored ‍​‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​​​​​​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‍lost reasonable under the Fourth Amendment benefits, including pay, in back accordance even absent reasonable individualized and the decision. arbitrator’s use, suspicion articulated impair- ment, ingestion.5 or claiming filed dam- this lawsuit alleged 42 1983 for ages under U.S.C. § A. Rights Under Fifth, Fourth, his аnd Four- violations of the Fourth Amendment parties on teenth summary judg- grant sides filed motions for We review the district court’s of a granted summary judgment sum- motion for ment.3 The district de novo. mary judgment Corp., for all defendants sued in Kruso v. International Tel. & Tel. 1416, (9th Cir.1989), capacity, including Police 1421 their individual 872 cert. denied, 937, 3217, grounds qualified immu- 110 Chief U.S. S.Ct. Appellants’ summary Viewing motion for L.Ed.2d 664 the evidence nity.4 light in judgment on the issues of Jackson’s Fourth the most favorable to the non- municipal liability moving party, Amendment claim and we must determine whether any genuine there are of material was twice deniеd. issues poses determining presence claims under the Fifth and Four- of a narcot- 3. Jackson’s ic, alcohol, and under state law were drug, employee teenth Amendments or nor shall an summary judgment. Although not denied on required sobriety exami- submit to field initially appeal, requested par- raised on nation unless: concerning briefs whether the ties to submit objective employee symptoms exhibits dismissing erred the Fifth district court in being under the influence of alcohol claim. drugs; a narcotic or OR and/or indicate There is substantial evidence to Specifically, the district court found that the ingested has or absorbed officer compulsory urinalysis right in to be free from body an alcoholic bev- other manner suspicion absence of reasonable was not the clearly narcotic, erage, drug. February established Understanding, Memorandum Article 37. trial, appellants 5. Before contended that "objective symptoms” Due to the absence of drug testing given order to Officer Jackson was that Jackson was under “substantial evidence” Under- with the Memorandum Of consistent standing narcotics, the arbitration board the influence of ("MOU") under the collective in effect request improper. to Jackson found the IAD’s bargaining agreement between the LAPD and Accordingly, with back Jackson was reinstated specific League. The MOU addressed the prior appeal pay position This in his to trial. right of an officer’s to be free from ran- issue or arbitra- does not concern that reinstatement arbitrary searches as follows: dom or tion award. employee required to submit a An shall not be breath, blood, pur- sample of or urine for the аdded). (emphasis fact, Applying the district court correct- this bal- and whether test, ancing law. the Court concluded that relevant substantive ly applied the Casualty Fire government’s safeguarding interests Farm Tzung v. State public safety national border and out- Co., 1339-40 expectations weighed privacy of em- Supreme that argue Appellants sought who ployees promotions. certain Treasury in National decisions Court’s Id. at at 109 S.Ct. Raab, v. Von Employees Union Labor, Railway upheld (1989), 103 L.Ed.2d 685 109 S.Ct. constitutionality drug testing of rail- Railway Labor Executives’ and Skinner way employees involved in acci- certain Ass’n, U.S. safety dents or who violated certain rules. require degree of (1989), no L.Ed.2d government’s The Court concluded that the ordering a suspicion before individualized compelling in ensuring public interest safe- to an officer to submit administrative outweighed ty employee privacy concerns they contend drug test. justified post-accident drug uri- compelling Jackson to submit order Rail- suspicion. even absent individualized constitutionally unreason- nalysis was not Labor, way at at agree cases these We do аble. suggest. appellants support the result purpose requiring gov The urinaly that a is established well It warrant, to a to have ernment obtain or meaning a within the drug test is search sis probable suspicion cause or reasonable be Raab, Fourth Amendment. See Von of the search, conducting prevent fore a is ran to Railway 1390; 665, 109 at S.Ct. at 489 U.S. arbitrary by government dom or intrusions 1412; Labor, at at 621-22, 109 Id. at agents. at 1415. v. De Bhd. Teamsters International Railway Raab an Von Labor provide Transp., 932 F.2d partment of to exception requirement where the reasonable, a To be deemed government compelling demonstrates by a supported must be generally search safety interest. cause. Von probable upon warrant issued case, Raab, In the present appellants at S.Ct. at dem special compelling onstrate no un However, probable a warrant nor interests “neither Labor, Railway der Von Raab cause, nor, indeed, any individu measure of justify would a search there was because indispensable compo suspicion, is an alized pre- triggering employment nо event or in every circum nent of reasonableness promotion requirement6 involved. Id. stance.” Federa National Appellants also offer Raab, Supreme Court consid- In Von Employees Cheney, tion Federal constitutionality testing of drug ered the (D.C.Cir.1989) support to employees interested Service U.S. Customs degree contention that no of individualized involv- promotion positions in transfer is suspicion required for administrative such as inter- ing exceptional duties In Nation drug testing police officers. The use of firearms. Court diction and the Federation, al police civilian officers em in- Fourth Amendment held that “where ployed by Army subjected to ran were needs, special governmental trusion serves drug testing pur dom for administrative need law beyond the normal enforce- poses “limiting than with no factor” other ment, necessary to the individ- it is balance mere randomness. court found privacy expectations against Gov- ual’s constitutionally despite program acceptable to determine whether interests ernment’s suspicion. any the absence individualized require a or some impractical warrant is However, Federation suspicion par- inap- National level of individualized 665-66, case. was context.” Id. present at 109 S.Ct. at to the posite ticular upheld suspi- Supreme Raab. Drug testing Von absent individualized requirement which pre-promotion cion urinalysis part not ordered to submit to discipline Gibson when he refused to drug testing program of a random targeted allow a garage.” search of his Id. at 886. police Rather, at the entire force. case, In present Jackson did not actu- singled out for based on ally submit to the IAD order provide his association with another officer who specimen urine However, testing. was under IAD surveillance. necessary it is not for the physical search sum, articulable, to have the IAD had no occurred. The indi- firing of Jackson for his refusal suspecting vidualized basis for Jack- submit to the unconstitutional using son was search is narcotics. Nor was he test- sufficient maintain through ed Jackson’s claim that testing program some random his Fourth rights being administered to the violated. force. Further, appellants special demonstrate no Jury C. Instructions compelling interests justify which would given the order to Jackson. it was We review instructions to de unreasonable under the Fourth Amend- whether, termine “considering the charge ment IAD pro- for the to order whole, Jackson to as a the court's fairly instructions sample vide a urine drug testing. and adequately covered present the issues ed, correctly law, stated the and were not B. Constitutional Basis misleading.” Kelly, Thorsted v. for Jackson’s Claim “The judge trial has substantial latitude in tailoring the in issue raised whether Jack structions, challenges to the son’s Fourth formula were actu adopted by tion the court are ally reviewed for comply violated since he did not abuse of discretion.” U.S. v. Beltran- urinalysis Supreme order. As the Rios, (9th Cir.1989). pointed Broderick, Court out in Gardner v. 273, 276-79, 1915- The district court instructed the (1968), 20 L.Ed.2d 1082 improper it is to jury that testing by urinalysis is a discharge an officer duty punish from to search meaning within the of the Fourth exercising rights guaranteed for to addition, Amendment. In the court in Thus, him under the constitution. it is jury structed the that the search was rea established law that no one should suffer if only supported by sonable “an individual harm asserting state action for a consti ized, suspicion, articulated reasonable tutionally protected right. facts, objective use, based on im pairment, ingestion.” By returning a jury found that the order Jackson Jackson, jury verdict for the found that the disobeyed required him to submit to an order to Jackson was unreasonable accord unconstitutional right search. Because the ing to the standard set out the court’s to be free from unreasonable searches is instructions. explicitly contained in the Fourth Amend- ment, right it follows that the to be free City Angeles Chief Gates and the of Los consequences from refusing adverse for argue that the district court’s instructions submit to an unreasonable search must they were erroneous because instructed the also found there. be jury apply overly stringent an standard determining the reasonableness of com- League Police Protective pelled addition, urinalysis. they contend (9th Cir.1990),supports 907 F.2d 879 refusing prof- that the court erred in There, proposition. this we held that disci- fered instructions that the Fourth Amend- plining police officer for his Gibson refusal require finding ment does not of individu- to accede to an unconstitutional search suspicion justify alized the reasonable- warrant violated his Fourth Amendment ness of the order to search Officer Jackson. rights. Although we did not state that this disagree. protection specifically was enumerated un- Amendment, assertions, der the Fourth there “lit- Contrary appellants’ improper [City] tle that it jury given represent doubt for the instructions an interpretation charged of our Fourth be held liable it because cannot be accurate knowing are consistent that punishing case law and with Jackson for Supreme refusing decisions that the order Court would amount to a recent already The district discussed. Fourth violation. It contends we have concluded, agree, that and we any impose that other result would be to developed by Supreme liability municipality standards whenever random, post-acci- validity upholding interim action was later found to have vio- dent, drug testing pro- pre-ascension person’s lated a constitutional Amendment chal- grams against Fourth above, specified As noted the MOU susрicion-based inapplicable to lenge are under an officer could circumstances in- Accordingly, drug testing. subjected urinalysis ‍​‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​​​​​​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‍to a order. See were correct. structions Despite supra, note 5. whether the policy-makers knew would order Municipal Liability under II. § City liability, they subject liable City contends that it cannot be improp- the order arguably aware that disciplined pursu- Jackson was because Further, in this policy er. circuit a itself municipal policy. ant to an unconstitutional violation; need cause constitutional inju- Sрecifically, claims that because per it need not be unconstitutional se. product not a ry suffered McKinley City Eloy, 705 F.2d purpose of policy for the of a intended rights, it violating constitutional case, present In the concedes by the caused was not liable the harm policy requiring had no unrea- it con- unconstitutional order. sonable searches its officers. His that the of Police Chief Gates tends actions termination was result of the Review do not the Police Board of municipal policy and mani- official custom party is a liability neither create because “obey grieve fested later” now— required under policy-maker” “final Although policy per rule. is not se U.S.C. 1983. unconstitutional, implementa- Chief Gates’ satisfied requirements must be Several policy in a tion of resulted constitution- First, liability. municipality incur for a against City is al tort Jackson.7 to a constitutional injury must amount damages, liable to Jackson civil wheth- Praprotnik, 485 deprivation. St. Louis v. they not or had er or intended result 121, 108 915, 923, 112, 99 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. U.S. knowledge possible full of conse- above, found (1988). As noted 107 quences of their actions. unreаson drug testing order was that the requirement Fourth specifies and thus violated Jackson’s The third able rights. municipal “final only officials who have policy-making by their ac authority” may, Second, municipality held to will be tions, subject the 1983 municipality to § only the acts injury an when have caused Cincinnati, liability. Pembaur City v. it sanctioned produce of at 1299. The 475 U.S. 106 at S.Ct. municipality. City v. Cincin- Pembaur of a “final determination of who constitutes 469, 478, nati, 106 475 U.S. S.Ct. is a policy-maker” purposes of 1983 § (1986). City con- L.Ed.2d 452 89 question City of state St. law. See officially it did order or tends that 112, 122-30, Praprotnik, Louis v. poliсe department’s violation condone 915, 924-28, L.Ed.2d 107 108 99 Therefore, S.Ct. civil of Jackson’s (1988); County, 867 Maricopa v. Gobel the action it did not sanction claims that Cir.1989). (9th The district 1207 constitutional which resulted Jackson’s is re interpretation no of state law Although City cites to court’s deprivation. College v. Regina that it cannot Salve authority, it further asserts viewed de novo. “obey challenge, challenge City’s pears no and our now— have been such to the policy, applied by grieve municipal liability later” as focused discussion orders, policymakеr is even to unconstitutional carrying City policy out absence of on the case from Los what differentiates this po- searches of administrative unconstitutional League Police Protective 907 homes. id. at 890. officers’ See lice ap- League, there In Protective — U.S.-,-, 1217, However, Russell, inapposite. Gearhart is Despite (1991); claim, L.Ed.2d 190 Matter his First Amendment Gearhart was (9th Cir.1984) McLinn, 739 F.2d ultimately found to have suffered no con- banc). (en stitutional violation. He was therefore lim- ited to the provided by remedies the griev- Appellants contend that Chiеf Gates Here, policy. ance Jackson was found to authority concerning the is not the final have suffered a constitutional violation. of an officer because ultimate termination This entitles him damages to receive as ly may the officer submit the matter to well as the pay arbitration award of back for consideration under the col arbitration and reinstatement. agreement bargaining lective between League City. Following hearing, and the Appellants also cite McKinley City City to rein may require the arbitrator Eloy standing рroposition for the the officer. state damages. Jackson is not entitled to This argument misapprehends our holding in contention is without merit as it

This Although appellants that case. correctly roles of completely misconstrues the quote person discharged engag- that “a Gates and the arbitration board. Un- Chief ing constitutionally protected activity Angeles, of the of Los is der Charter reinstatement”, case, entitled to McKinley, applicable state law this uphold F.2d at clearly authority chief is the final we went on to McKin- ley’s jury disсiplining monetary damages is a award of officers. The arbitrator pain entity interpre- suffering, neutral who “is confined to emotional as well as application of the collective pay. tation bar- reinstatement and back merely gaining agreement,” imple- thus Thus, where a constitutional violation menting parties. the intent of the United occurred, may pursue has an individual Enterprise Workers America v. Steel beyond provided by remedies those estab- 593, 597, Corp., and Car Wheel grievance procedures. lished Under the 1358, 1361, L.Ed.2d Charter, prоcedures the delineated authority has no to set or arbitrator in any way “shall not be construed to af- any policy alter whatsoever. any any may fect other officer ... Alternatively, appellants contend that if pursue have to or assert and all other policy-mak- is found to be the “final Gates legal rights or remedies in relation to his ing authority,” ultimately no oc- violation 202(18). Although office.” § curred because Gates’ final act was to rein- reinstated, ultimately year his and one-half state Jackson. This contention also with- unemplоyment caused substantial fi- out merit. The fact that arbitration damage. nancial Under required Gates to reinstate Jackson board consequential entitled to sue for all way alters the fact that it was Gates no damages resulting from the violation of his and the Police Review Board who caused Fourth Amendment injury by firing constitutional Jackson’s above, light of the the district court refusing to follow an unconstitu- for refusing grant summary did not err in to tional order. municipal liability. judgment on the issue of Thorne, v. 768 Appellants cite Gearhart (9th Cir.1985), support to JNOV, Trial, III. Motions for New that not entitled to assertion Jackson was Directed and Verdict that and damages and reinstatement back grant to or adequate compensation The district court’s decision pay were because deny judgment notwithstanding the verdict only temporarily deprived Jackson There, de novo. Peterson v. Kenne property job. in his is reviewed his interest 1244, (9th Cir.1985),cert. remedy dy, and 771 F.2d 1256 held that the of reinstatement 1122, 1642, denied, grievance 475 106 S.Ct. 90 pay provided by U.S. back established (1986). apply therefore fully employ a L.Ed.2d 187 procedures satisfied state the district court same standard as did against the state under ee’s action 656 MOU, judgment not a motion for LAPD had notice considering

in appropriate applicable Denial of such of the standard the verdict. withstanding if the evidence and their officers. is appropriate motion whole, inferences, as a considered its $154,- The jury awarded Jackson light most favorable to in viewed resulting City’s damages 747 for from the reasonably sup cannot non-moving party, violation his Fourth Amendment moving in favor of the judgment port improper to his The ver due termination. Jeans, Jeanery, Inc. v. James party. The dict was not one that reached could be 1148, Cir.1988); (9th Inc., 849 F.2d in jury; a rational it was accord with the Corp., Parts Transgo, Ajac v. Trans. Inc. weight Accordingly, the of the evidence. Cir.1985), (9th 1001, cert. F.2d denying appel court err in did not denied, U.S. 106 S.Ct. lants’ motions for directed or verdict (1986). The district court’s L.Ed.2d 778 JNOV, and its did not abuse discretion deny new a motion for grant or decision to denying trial. new discretion. for abuse of trial reviewed R.R., 812 Burlington Northern v. Hard IV. Fifth Claim standard reviewing district court’s decision A. Due Procedural Process Claim for a directed vеr deny a motion grant proce- agree Both sides Ange as for a is the JNOV. dict same process rights due dural not violated Na Coliseum Comm’n les Memorial procedural in this received due matter. He League, 791 F.2d tional Football process grievance when heard and his denied, Cir.1986), (9th cert. addressed neutral arbitration. Under 92, 98 L.Ed.2d 53 826, 108 S.Ct. bargaining agreement the collective force, entitled to reinstate- that the district contend Appellants pay ment and back he received. —which judg of their motions court’s denial We have held that federal courts will verdict, tri notwithstanding the new ment estoppel municipal ad accord collateral improper. Pri- al, verdict was and directed hearings ministrative that have sufficient quali trial, granted the district Remas, judicial ’safeguards.8 Eilrich the individual officers immunity to fied Cir.) denied, cert. not that the law was ground on the Gates 102 L.Ed.2d 38 in 1986 on the issue of clearly established (1988). Any litigation concerning further right to be free from one had whether inappropriate this issue would be under drug testing in the absence of compulsory estoppel doctrine collateral beсause City con suspicion. reasonable necessary op already received the tends, reasonably have could (i.e., portunity process for due he “had his because ‍​‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​​​​​​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‍found the liable court”).9 day aware were not policy-makers How was unconstitutional. that the order B. Due Substantive Process Claim above, ever, one not intend need noted trial, granted tort to be held Prior the district court to commit a constitutional light judgment summary motion for result. liable League and the LAPD had on Jackson’s Fifth Amendment substantive fact procеss Although claim the issue of due claim. this specifically addressed trial, City asserted that the to determine the existence of 9. Before 8. The factors used safeguards collaterally estopped relitigating are whether an administrative these agency from whether judicial capacity and resolved City acted had in- substantial evidence properly it disputed fact before which issues gestion to order the test. adequate opportunity liti parties had an rejected basis sufficient this claim on the general estoppel gаte, and collateral whether judicial met that issue. standards were not as to Remas, v. 839 F.2d apply. criteria Eilrich trial, litigated resolved At this issue was denied, (9th Cir.), cert. favor of Jackson. 102 L.Ed.2d by appeal, was not raised on we

requested supplemental briefing on the. is- KATHRINER, Don W. Plaintiff- sue. Appellant, support

To a claimed violation of an indi v. process rights, vidual’s substantive due UNISEA, INC., Washington municipality’s have stated that the conduct corporation, Defendant- “ ‘clearly must arbitrary be and unreason Appellee. able, having no substantial relation tо the No. 91-35480. health, morals, public safety, general ” Henderson, welfare.’ F.D.I. C. v. United States Appeals, Court of (9th Cir.1991)(quoting Lebbos Ninth Circuit. Ct., Judges Super. Santa Clara (9th Cir.1989)). County, 883 F.2d Argued Aug. Submitted Sept. Decided Here, the district court found that conduct did not constitute such a City’s “obey grieve violation. The now— policy constitutionally later” is not defec

tive its face. the individual gave

officers who Jackson the order were

found to immune from suit because the regarding

“law urine drugs

not established at the time of alleged Although

violation.” RT at 5. City ultimately found to have violated Jack

son’s Fourth enforc him,

ing policy against it cannot be

maintained that actions were

wholly arbitrary or unreasonable.

we affirm the district court’s order dismiss

ing process Jackson’s substantive due

claim. F.Supp. See also 740

AFFIRMED.

RYMER, Judge, dissenting: Circuit dissent,

I I because believe we are bound Police League Protective (9th Cir.1990), to ask

whether the LAPD ever

adopted policy carrying out unconstitu- officers,

tional searches of

at 890. Because there is no evidence that did, ‍​‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​​​​​​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‍municipal there is no basis for liabili-

ty.

Case Details

Case Name: Johnny Lee Jackson v. Daryl Gates City of Los Angeles

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Date Published: Nov 27, 1992

Citation: 975 F.2d 648

Docket Number: 90-55728

Court Abbreviation: 9th Cir.