Johnnie Ray Grimsley v. Ray M. Dodson, Sheriff J. Marshall Coleman, Attorney General of Virginia
696 F.2d 303
4th Cir.
1982
Check Treatment

*1 WIDENER, Before ERVIN and CHAP- MAN, Judges. Circuit WIDENER, Judge: Circuit from the appeal This arises Ray writ of habeas to Johnnie Grimsley, prisoner Virginia, peti- *2 Dodson, appellee F.Supp. (W.D. tioner below and here. We re- Grimsley verse. Va.1981).

In was that Grimsley probation appeals, arguing on state The Commonwealth Powell, following 1973 convictions for larce- Stone v. Counties,

inny Page Rockingham Vir- 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 bars the district ginia. In September year, deputies Grimsley’s of that court’s examination of Fourth Page from County, Virginia, accompanied petition Amendment claims in a for federal officer, by Grimsley’s probation searched habeas relief. The district court re- corpus Grimsley’s concluding residence that pursuant jected argument, to a search Stone warrant. The produced designed prevent search firearms was federal courts from marijuana. Grimsley subsequently reviewing was state court determinations re- charged with under possession marijuana, garding admissibility a of evidence Here, reasoned, controlled substance. At the trial the Fourth Amendment. for possession marijuana, suc- existed because the Grimsley a different situation cessfully moved to already Grimsley’s the evidence state court ruled had seized during ground regarding admissibility the search on the that favor of the evi- upon affidavit which the warrant was raised in the habeas question dence and the based was the constitutional effect corpus petition insufficient. The Common- was wealth’s motion for nolle at 103. We prosequi ruling. of that marijuana charge granted. disagree was then and conclude that Stone v. Powell court from consideration barred the district probation officer then to re- sought Fourth Amendment claim. voke Grimsley’s probation. proba- At the Powell, marked, tion revocation for most hearing, sup- supra, evidence Stone pressed in the criminal the end of federal court proceedings practical purposes, held admissible of Fourth Amendment following ruling by a reconsideration trial by way corpus petitions rule did claims of habeas not had an apply proceed- petitioner opportunity ings. claims in state Grimsley’sprobation litigate was revoked be- those court. cause he possessed firearms in violation of Court stated at 3052 that provided conditions of his “where the has an probation. Grimsley opportu- State litigation fair unsuccessfully sought appeal pro- nity of his for full and of a Fourth claim, bation Virginia prisoner revocation to the Amendment not may Court.1 no Apparently petition granted corpus for certio- be federal habeas relief on rari was ground filed the United States that evidence obtained in an Court, at least the record does not reveal it. unconstitutional search or seizure was intro- (Footnotes his trial.” omitted). duced at

Grimsley sought then a writ of habeas corpus in the ground applies district court on the We case before think suppressed Grimsley opportunity litigate evidence had been in- us. had an troduced at his revocation hear- the introduction of the evidence at his pro- ing hearing. fact, in violation of his Fourth and Four- bation revocation vig- he teenth rights. orously sought suppression. Amendment The district The state agreed, concluding against our in trial court ruled opinion Grimsley on the Workman, matter, ruling United States v. 585 F.2d 1205 which was affirmed by the (4th Cir.1978), exclusionary Virginia Supreme which held the Court’s refusal to a applicable to federal revoca- writ of error. Once the determination was hearings, prin- Grimsley created a made that had the opportunity a full ciple applicable granted to state courts. It and fair consideration of the question Grimsley. a writ of habeas in state court and that opportunity such proceeding. transcripts Page County hearing proceedings 1. The were in all re- spects any purpose revocation were introduced the same for considered agreement Rockingham County in the later here. impaired, compared, not district court should must be it seems there is less inquired have further into the merits of reason petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim. for, probation proceeding, while it is true Muncy, See Doleman v. 579 F.2d 1258 in both proceedings liberty Cir.1978). *3 petitioner stake, is at in the case petitioner the is also subjected conviction Grimsley nevertheless asks us to affirm felony. of on the district court’s that Work- conclusion man holding ’s is a constitutional rule and Thus, we Pow think that Stone v. thus binding upon States. 523 permit corpus ell does not habeas federal difficulty at 103. One with the district court to reexamine under the Fourth court’s conclusion is the Supreme Amendment admissibility evi Stone, Court in at two places, explicitly against petitioner dence offered in his decided that the rule is “not a Virginia probation proceedings, personal right.” at U.S. and we hold that the rule does Rather, judi- at it is “a to those proceedings. remedy.” created at n. cially at 3053 n. all that 96 S.Ct. 37. So of is judgment The the district court ac- decided, Workman have could and did de- cordingly cide, was that the exclusionary applied REVERSED. Amendment Fourth violations in federal probation proceedings. ERVIN, concurring: Judge, Circuit Stone v. Powell left the The court holds writ appeals

intact in direct in criminal proceed- corpus Ray Grimsley of habeas Johnnie ings, concurring opinion as the of the Chief incorrect. was Because clear, Justice makes U.S. Powell, 428 decision in Court’s Stone seq., S.Ct. at 3053 et and the in petitioner perfectly case was to file his peti- free precisely tion in the forbade of federal collat- type for certiorari Su- States preme he so peti- Court had decided. The eral review of state determinations court admittedly court, tioner here fair had had full and in concur in engaged district I litigation of his Fourth sepa- Amendment claim. I write judgment of court. Indeed, he securing was successful in disagreement to indicate with rately my indictment, nolle of his prosequi almost cer- misreading of our perceive what I be a on that account. He has tainly presented Workman, in United decision his Fourth Amendment claim both F.2d trial Virginia court and the Supreme Court probation in of his the context revocation. I. The proceedings revoke his on probation late was Grimsley In the previous larceny charges are no more his convictions in multiple pursuant of proceedings than a continuation Virginia for courts of Commonwealth those criminal convictions. previous re- His officer larceny. those evidence proceedings, rulings on September information in ceived or obtained in an unconstitutional search marijuana his home and had Grimsley subject seizure would not have been to fed- proba- The it on his growing property. was eral reexamination of habeas cor- way depu- County Page officer contacted a pus, the Fourth claim although Amendment to a together they applied and sheriff ty appeal. direct subject to Since for a warrant. The magistrate search local habeas relief not be available corpus deputy, pur- was issued to the warrant evi- illegally account of the obtained officer, deputy, to it the suant in a criminal no reason proceeding, dence officers searched available and other exists to make it where marijuana Indeed, The search uncovered involved. if the two house. Powell court, concluding Stone to Grims- forbidden rifle, items both probation. of his court from consideration the terms the district ley under barred Amendment claim. Grimsley’s Fourth possession was indicted Grimsley this conclusion. agree with circuit court. County Page marijuana however, Commonwealth, dismissed “where Powell held that judge the circuit after indictment opportunity provided has the State motion granted Grimsley’s Fourth Amend- litigation of a full and fair in the search. evidence seized be claim, may not prisoner ment because was unlawful found that the search relief on the federal habeas granted search warrant supporting the affidavit uncon- obtained in an that evidence ground ap- therefore insufficient legally introduced or seizure was search stitutional exclusionary rule. plied the *4 465, 494, 96 trial.” 428 U.S. at his sought then officer Grimsley’s Al- Grimsley’s probation the revocation of holding this does not literally read though a firearm. marijuana of possession complaint is Grimsley’s petition cover —his the evidence moved to exclude Grimsley unconstitutionally obtained evi- that evidence, search, which seized in the fol- introduced at his trial —it dence was concedes, the sole basis Commonwealth corpus logically that federal habeas lows The state proceedings. for the revocation in a remedy an error relief is unavailable evidence was acknowledged that court is hearing revocation where it search, but held the result of an unlawful ordinarily rule is not at trial. that to correct an error unavailable hearings. revocation applicable Gagnon Scarpelli, v. judge distinguished The state 1756, 1763, (1973) (due L.Ed.2d 656 supervi- exercise of the v. Workman as an probationer of revocation process rights appeals court of powers of a federal sory of ac- are more limited than those justice of criminal over the administration trial). cused in criminal Finding that the viola- in federal courts. to be answered when question The crucial immunity constitutional Grimsley’s an prisoner a state raises was inadver- from unreasonable searches is petition in a federal habeas argument motion tent, Grimsley’s the court denied result, As a and admitted the evidence. “an petitioner was afforded whether revoked and he Grimsley’s probation was litigation” for full and fair opportunity was incarcerated. proceedings. the state Dole his claim in Muncy, 579 F.2d 1264-1265 sought corpus federal habeas man Grimsley The district relief under 28 U.S.C. Cir.1978). existing § If the “then state interpreta- court held that the state court’s provided petitioner with practice” incorrect, and that tion of Workman was claim, his raising vehicle” for “procedural our decision in that case rested on constitu- further, not inquire the district court need court further grounds. tional district allegation petitioner some absent Powell did not preclude held that Stone v. unfairly taking from was inhibited advan review of claim be- collateral case, Id. In this tage opportunity. of this completely cause the state had failed unquestioned Grimsley it was able is the constitutional standard estab- claim before the state court argue his Therefore, lished in the coürt Workman. the evidence at both motions granted a writ of habeas Grims- hearing. the revocation From the trial and F.Supp. (W.D.Va.1981). ley. record, and from the fact that Grims suppression granted, II. motion was ley’s initial judge1 court is evident that the circuit it Commonwealth, appeal by On claim careful consideration. gave Grimsley’s of the district judgment court reverses the hearing. judge presided over both the trial and the 1. The same per- ble). highly I find Gamble Furthermore, While provided the Commonwealth suasive, now to petition necessary I do not think opportunity (by with an Grimsley review of as an appellate validity decision appeal) for leave resolve cir- In these circuit court’s decision. v. Powell. There interpretation of Stone cumstances, op- was afforded an Grimsley distinctions between important factual of his litigation Gamble, for full and fair portunity case. In present Gamble claim,”2 and conse- “Fourth Amendment disregarded controlling the state courts from the district court barred quently its ignoring both precedent, Court reviewing that claim. very “the standard applying existence Gamble, rejected.” Supreme Court] [the suggested The district court that Stone contrast, F.2d at In is where “the state inapplicable Powell Grimsley’s probation stan- ignores proper considered and distin- hearing explicitly at 103. The court cited dard.” precedential basis for Grims- guished proposition for this the decision authority as claim, our in Workman. The Oklahoma, (10th ley’s decision 583 F.2d Gamble unclear, as case, decision is Cir.1978). Ap- import exact of that disagreement my colleagues for the Circuit affirmed with about peals my Tenth illustrates, a writ of granting prisoner meaning order see infra. Further- argument corpus despite more, Workman, it, the state’s habeas even as read precluded such relief. that Stone Powell *5 interpretation this court’s the Constitu- court of found that the Oklaho- appeals The searches, on tion’s ban unreasonable utterly had apply ma courts refused to con- authoritative Illinois, ruling in Brown v. Supreme Court’s fourteenth of the fourth and struction 2254, 590, 416 422 U.S. ignored which was in Gamble. amendments although directly decision (1975), was collateral review of v. Powell forbids Stone The to facts in Gamble. applicable exclusionary court rule decisions state reasoned v. Powell contem- court that Stone would “merely because the federal courts plated differently.” Maxey, 591 the issue decide applica- least recognition and at colorable 389; accord, Sands, Pignone v. 589 F.2d at of the Fourth Amendment correct 76, (1st Cir.1978); Hender- 80 Gates v. F.2d Thus, standards. a federal constitutional (en son, 830, (2d Cir.1977) 568 F.2d 840 considering is not from precluded court 1038, denied, 98 banc), cert. 434 U.S. S.Ct. claims in habeas cor- Fourth Amendment 775, (1978); Swicegood 54 L.Ed.2d 787 court where state pus proceedings Alabama, 1322, 1324(5th Cir.1978); 577 F.2d correct and wilfully apply refuses to (8th Auger, 550 F.2d 1097 Hines v. controlling standards. constitutional Cir.1977); 564 F.2d Cupp, Mack v. to court consideration of Deference state Therefore, Cir.1977). improper (9th was not re- Fourth Amendment claims does to issue the writ for the district court court’s federal to state quire blindness exception to reliance the Gamble apply appropriate wilful refusal rule of v. Powell. constitutional standard. III. appeals other 583 F.2d 1165. No foundation for Grims- precedential yet. has followed as But see Unit- Gamble argument and for exclusionary rule Morris, ley’s F.2d Maxey ed ex rel. of Gamble (7th the district court’s Cir.1979)(distinguishing Gam- v. Work- Rose, our decision in United States ble); Dunn v. was ex- (1978), holding the man, 585 F.2d 1205 (dictum) (following Gam- (M.D.Tenn.1981) attempts government, Grimsley’s claim federal focus of striction constitutional exclusionary pro- is, course, rule in state Be- invoke the the fourteenth amendment. ceedings “fourth prohibition are referred to as on unrea- often cause that amendment’s authori- amendment” claims. sonable searches and seizures re- ties is identical to the fourth amendment’s excluding the evidence pro- rule in a federal rationale elusionary applicable where the unlawful state cir- Government’s hearing. strongest bation imposition as a conduct result judge interpreted Workman cuit court of the super- sanction on the victim general based on this court’s criminal decision 348, 94 Id. at at 620. Since a powers over the administration of search.” visory circuit is “a criminal justice in this rather federal may result in the loss of light proceeding on the than Constitution. ruled opinion that 585 F.2d at the court majority’s liberty,” in the statement applies rule does not that the “we hold that whose pro- probationary individual freedom probation revocation] [state seeks to revoke the victim ceedings,” majori- government it would appear that this view of search. I am con ty endorses Workman. Since of the unconstitutional ruling grounded ban on unreasonable this direct vinced that whether searches seizures is identical on some ly on the Constitution rather than to state officers the four- applied under of discretionary power supervise federal teenth amendment or to officers conviction is fortified ficers. This fourth, necessari- “holding”3 under that when was once observation Workman ly construes Workman as a nonconstitution- to this court our initial again appealed after power. of our supervisory al exercise decision, opinion the court’s referred aspects unconstitutional revo “[t]he this way. I do not read Workman in hearing” “constitutionally cation and to the applied prescribed by That decision the test proceeding.” void revocation United States Calandra, United States v. Workman, Cir.1980) F.2d 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 for deter- supplied). Workman, submit, (emphasis mining whether interpretation was an of the Constitution necessary in a given setting. Calandra in- valid, whatever extent it was correct at an attempt volved exclusion- invoke the courts, all, in all state as well as federal.4 ary rule to avoid based jury questions *6 unlawfully Weigh- obtained evidence. majority’s reading The of Workman damage of the ing application the rule seems stem from what I believe to be a might cause to the of the functions misunderstanding of the Supreme Court’s against the for deter- jury potential rule’s repeated exclusionary statements the actions, ring unlawful the personal “a right” rule is not constitutional extending concluded that exclusionary the “judicially remedy.” but is a rather created grand jury proceedings rule to would do Powell, 486, v. See 428 U.S. at 96 harm good more than and not therefore 3048; Calandra, 348, at 414 at 94 S.Ct. U.S. by mandated the Id. at 349- Constitution. 620; Peltier, at 422 S.Ct. 352, at 620-622. 538, 531, 2313, 2318, 95 S.Ct. 374 analysis majority apparently Workman followed the Calandra be- The Court closely. stressed the similarities lieves this distinction to mean that the ex- trial, between a criminal the guide- in which" exclu- rule is a clusionary nonconstitutional sionary evidence, and unquestionably applies, a line rather admissibility for the probation revocation hearing, and noted the remedy necessary than a in situations many Court’s in statement Calandra effectuate individual “the need for meaning deterrence and hence the But this is not of the rights. majority’s notwithstanding, Nonetheless, decision, language place. 3. The first sion in the a may say assertion that rule does not poem, like a more than those involved hearings in state Eliot, revocation recognize. genesis in its See T.S. dictum, only can be and dictum incorrect at myself, (1956) (“For Frontiers Criticism 13 I my reading if of Workman is correct. say knowledge springs that a can of the poem necessarily help which a is not a released recognize difficulty arguing against 4. I in understanding poem.”). towards interpretation propounded of a decision panel a member of the that deci- that reached

309 or- in trials m which, believe,5 tutionally necessary criminal distinction, right/remedy issue, fourth fourteenth that of and to a different der effectuate is addressed not, however, rule is nec- per- It is why the amendments. explaining in others. but in some contexts essary right particular of its beneficiaries. sonal a situations, that of preeminently In some judicial obliga- settings, In other trial, necessary give the rule is criminal com- the Constitution’s implement tion to of the “right peo- systemic substance only marginally by mands would be served and unlawful searches security from ple” to rule, and the rule where permit- If the were government seizures.6 severely other constitutional- impede of a defendant to obtain conviction ted see, Calandra, functions, e.g., ly ordained subject- while using evidence it obtained 353-354, 94 at 622-623 414 U.S. at S.Ct. search, an unlawful the defendant to ing v. United (grand jury proceedings); Walder would be reduced to fourth amendment States, 62, 354, 74 98 L.Ed. S.Ct. 347 U.S. Lumber of words.” “a form Silverthorne (1954) (use impeach in criminal trial to 503 385, 392, States, 251 U.S. Co. v. United unnecessary. is defendant), remedy (Holmes, 182, 183, (1920) 64 L.Ed. 319 S.Ct. In the context for basis the Su- J.). The constitutional held that exclusion- hearing, Workman the exclusionary extension of Court’s preme safeguard in order to ary required Ohio, 367 U.S. Mapp rule to the states in rights. amendment This adequately fourth L.Ed.2d application of the rule court reasoned that implementation Court’s belief that was the result setting approximately in that “will ban on un- fourteenth amendment’s of the injury and benefit as potential the same required and seizures reasonable searches in” application prosecutions. exclusionary remedy of the frequently F.2d officials Since government trials. Denial to complementary will have alternative searches will dis- of unlawful the benefits against probationer means a proceeding acts, assumed, it is future courage lawless charges trial new after search—a encourage person- enforcement will law need incorporate “to Fourth Amendment nel —the Id. at especially for deterrence is acute. Stone v. system.” into their value ideals unlawfully obtained 1211.7 To Powell, 428 U.S. at 96 S.Ct. at 3051. it in admitting and is evidence the trial while Thus, remedy is eonsti- systemic, Agents, right/remedy meaning Named vens Six Unknown and effects 2012-2018, ambiguity. distinction not without 412— O’Berry Wainwright, (Burger, C.J., dissenting); (1971) F.2d L.Ed.2d 619 *7 J., Cir.1977) (ci- (Goldberg, dissenting) Wilkey, “Enforcing Cir. the Amendment M. Fourth omitted): Rule,” Exclusionary tation by 95 Alternatives However, significance (1982). Supreme precise this F.R.D. Whatever of 211 unexplained specifically remedies v. Powell reaf- limbo between Court in Stone “necessary firmed, a of a constitutional incident” a discernible lack of enthusi- albeit with liberty guarantee asm, of and those im- long-held individual is neces- belief that the rule supervisory powers, posed sary under the Court’s 428 of the Constitution. enforcement plain quite de- 493, Stone nevertheless made at at 3051. 96 S.Ct. have fendants are still entitled to state courts in violation of the exclude evidence seized police at the moment of search [When] amendment, requirement a that must fourth suspect they probationer, is a know that a ultimately be from the Constitution. derived may significant carry a incentive to out have exclusionary The fact that in sense the some though knowing illegal even an search “personal right” not a rule is any in crimi- evidence would be inadmissible simply begin explain in does not what police nothing proceeding. The have nal proceedings habeas circumstances in the crimi- risk: If the motion when will remain unavailable state denied, proceedings nal were defendant courts, rule, enforcing procedural in refuse a crime; a if of new stand convicted “remedy” to consider the Stone leaves intact. granted, were the defendant motion himself bars due to exclusionary empirical would still find behind value as a 6. The rule’s Thus, probation. cir- safeguard of such fourteenth amend- revocation fourth and exclusionary cumstances, See, e.g., frequently questioned. extension Bi- ments is 310 IV. who violated the officials allows action, their the fruits of

the Constitution is that Workman is not My conclusion the victim of the incarceration binding of this court precedent value search, the deterrent and undermines but is a sound panel, suppression.8 of the initial fourteenth) (and hence the amend- fourth exclusionary apparent rule. The con- this court ment brief to The Commonwealth’s understanding of flict between Workman’s majority its claim that a emphasis on lays and that held the Vir- the Constitution ques- that have considered the of the courts courts, confusing as it must be to ginia taken in rejected position tion have officials, have conscientious law enforcement Workman. many It is true that courts authoritative resolution exclusionary rule must await apply refused Powell forbids Stone v. Court, for Supreme probation the board in revocation across However, through our view the vehicle searching impose us to hearings.9 Arizona, v. Mincey See corpus. of habeas probationer’s officer10 is aware of the sta- 403-404, 2408, 385, 98 2419- tus, indicates that 437 U.S. my reading of the cases 2420, (Marshall, J., (1978) 57 L.Ed.2d 290 require suppres- most of these courts would concurring) (nonuniformity fourth sion of evidence.11 497, 19, (1979); proceeding probation 26 Ill.Dec. 387 N.E.2d 849 State revocation rule to the may Davis, necessary (La. 1979); People Fourth be to effectuate 375 So.2d 69 v. v. safeguards. 171, Jackson, 884, Amendment 412 46 N.Y.2d N.Y.S.2d 385 Winsett, 51, Lombardo, 54 (1978); United States v. 518 F.2d n. 5 N.E.2d 621 State v. 295 (9th Cir.1975). (N.C.1982). courts have stat S.E.2d 399 Other generally ap ed more that the rule should be rule, Any values the rule is whatever plied where there is evidence of official harass designed promote, necessarily must be See, e.g., ment or bad faith. United States v. compromised and its effectiveness reduced in (5th Cir.1978); Wiygul, 578 F.2d 577 proportion exceptions direct to the number of Farmer, (6th Cir.1975), exceptions States v. 512 F.2d 160 to it. As more are creat- attached denied, application, ed to a rule’s the weaker the rule cert. 46 State, say (1975); becomes. It makes no sense to that a v. 270 L.Ed.2d 305 634, Harris Ark. hearing exception 1980); (Ark.App. People 606 S.W.2d 93 v. Wilkerson, (1975); rule does not reduce the 189 541 P.2d 896 Colo. Inexorably State, deterrent value of the rule. Ind.App. Dulin 346 N.E.2d will. Proctor, (1976); Wash.App. 746 865, State v. Lombardo, (N.C. State v. 295 S.E.2d (1977); Gwinn, Hughes 559 P.2d 1363 J., 1982) (Exum, dissenting). (W.Va.1981). supreme One 290.S.E.2d require sup court has indicated that it would Lombardo, 9. See the cases collected gathered purpose pression of evidence for the 6. The Court has S.E.2d 405 nn. securing revocation. See State yet addressed the issue. Nettles, Or. 597 P.2d 10. It is from the clear record Appeals Justice Miller of the of, instigator officer Virginia reading of West has noted that “[a] behind, moving force the search which led to in this field discloses that courts have cases Grimsley’s probation. the revocation of question.... greatly been troubled over this adopted am of no court which has aware applied proba 11. The rule is to all per absolute se that the hearings four states. will never revocation hear [in State, (Fla. (on 1979) Grubbs v. 373 So.2d 905 Gwinn, ings].” Hughes 290 S.E.2d at 11 n. State, grounds); *8 state constitutional Adams v. J., LaFave, (Miller, concurring). See also 1 W. (1980); Ga.App. 264 S.E.2d 532 Mi 1.4(g) (1978) (“If Search and Seizure § State, (Okl.Cr.App. chaud v. 505 P.2d 1399 by person particularly search is made who is State, (Tex.Cr. 1973); Moore v. 562 S.W.2d responsible for the individual on conditional App.1978). specifically require Several courts release, parole such as his officer or where, here, as the rule officer, then it is clear that there is a need to conducting officials the search were aware of deter, persons primarily such will be inter probationer’s status. See States v. question of whether the individuals ested Vandemark, (9th Cir.1975); 522 F.2d 1019 supervision under their will have their condi States, (D.C. Thompson 444 A.2d v. United they tional revoked than whether release rather Sears, 1982); (Alaska State v. 553 P.2d 907 offense.”). of a new will be convicted 1976); Towle, State v. 125 Ariz. 609 P.2d Watson, (1980); People Ill.App.3d

3H undesirable questions obviously amendment Powell, remedied

but, can be after Stone Court).12 the court judgment

I concur in

reversing the writ. OF AMERI

PEANUT CORPORATION

CA, Marketing International Associ

ates, Inc., Respondents, BRANDS, INC., Consoli

HOLLYWOOD Corporation,

dated Foods Petitioners.

No. 82-1574. Appeals,

United States Court

Fourth Circuit.

Argued Oct. 1982.

Decided 1982. Dec. startling Attorney rectly. our to be It would be abuse of the trust It is informed system places officials for the in state General Commonwealth “[i]f procedural against federal mandate of Stone v. means latter to utilize a bar Powell disregard correctly apply with must federal con- review order state courts collateral law, impunity standards. In- stitutional then v. Powell becomes federal constitutional disregard meaningless.” Appellants standards would Brief tentional those *9 oppor- a denial to a Stone v. Powell could not and did not absolve constitute defendant tunity litigation and fair mandated officers —from for full state courts —or executive Gamble, duty 583 F.2d at constitution cor- Stone v. Powell. their