*1 COLE, al., Mae et Johnnie

Plaintiffs-Appellants, POULTRY, INC.,

FARM FRESH

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 86-7316.

United Appeals, States Court of

Eleventh Circuit.

Aug. *2 RONEY, Judge,

Before Chief JOHNSON, Judge, Circuit and *, Judge. ESCHBACH Senior Circuit ESCHBACH, Judge. Senior Circuit appeal plaintiffs-appellants this ar- gue judge that the district erred deter- mining defendant-appellee Farm (“Farm Fresh”) Poultry Fresh Inc. was entitled to the of the Portal-to-Por- benefit agree tal Act’s defense. We and will reverse and remand the case to the district court.

I operates process- a chicken ing plant City, in Alexander Alabama. plaintiffs Mae the other Johnnie Cole and Ala., George Longshore, Birmingham, C. work, work, in this action or did on the plaintiffs-appellants. for eviscerating plant. line at the The line Pack, Appellate Linda S. Counsel for Jan occasionally during must shut down Solicitor, Dept, Litigation, U.S. of Office working day due to mechanical failures D.C., Labor, Washington, for curi- amicus breakdowns, plant, delivery trucks’ and ae. the like. Prior to the time at issue in this action Farm Fresh instituted a “thir- Smith, Constangy, Terry Brooks & Price ty-minute rule” reliance the oral Katze, Atlanta, Ga., for de- and Edward advice of a officer for the fendant-appellee. Department and Hour Division of the

Labor, interpretative and bulletin by issued Under the division.1 * Eschbach, Honorable Jesse E. Senior U.S. Cir- 785.15 Circuit, Judge sitting by cuit designation. for the Seventh ON DUTY stenographer A who reads a book while wait- dictation, ing messenger for who a works interpretative The bulletin was to the 1. puzzle awaiting assignments, crossword while management and Farm Fresh was entitled Inter- plays waiting fireman who checkers while for Bulletin, pretive Part Hours Under Worked factory alarms and a worker talks to his who Labor Standards Act as Amend- the Fair waiting machinery fellow while for (the “Bulletin"). Interpretive ed repaired working during to be are all their following provisions of the Code contained periods inactivity. applies The rule also Regulations: of Federal plant. away who work from the § 785.14 example, repair working For man is while waiting Whether time is worked under the Act employer’s get for he waits his customer depends upon particular circumstances. The premises is in readiness. The time work- "scrutiny and con determination involves though employee time even is allowed to agreements particu struction of the between premises job during leave the or the site such practical parties, appraisal con lar of their during periods inactivity. periods working agreement by struction of the con unpredictable. They these occur are which duct, consideration of the nature of the ser usually are of short duration. In either event time, vice, waiting and its relation to the and employee is unable to use the time effec- may Facts show all circumstances. belongs tively purposes. to and for his own It employee engaged they to wait or was employer. is controlled In all of these engaged." may show that he waited to be integral part job. cases is an (Skidmore Swift, (1944)) U.S. 65 S.Ct. employee engaged to wait. questions "must be 89 L.Ed. 124 Such 785.16 determined in with common accordance OFF DUTY (a) general concept of work or sense and the employment." during (Central General. Periods which an em- v. Con Mo. Tel. Co. well, 1948)) (C.A. ployee completely relieved from 170 F.2d 641 compensated employees are when the line The district court bifurcated the issues of thirty for less than minutes but are is down liability damage and held a bench trial compensated periods not for inactive on February It concluded that thirty minutes or more. Farm Fresh need pay employees not periods long enough to allow the management the Farm Fresh ex- When employees to use the time effectively for pects the line to be down for minutes *3 more, purposes. found, their own It or the are informed also how- ever, they they please thirty are free to do as until a long minutes was not specified plant time at the which will re- enough use, for such effective and ruled operation. plaintiffs sume Most of the live “need at least one hour plant carpool 10 to 20 minutes from the and in order to use the time effectively for their day. Employees to work each who live in purposes, and, therefore, own vicinity go during sometimes home less than one hour in duration periods inactivity. these Others who is time under the Act.” The transportation occasionally go can find to a concluded, however, court also that Farm local convenience store for a snack or a good Fresh had compliance acted faith However, soft drink. most employ- of the regulation pursuant plant. ees wait the break room at the section and therefore denied all relief plaintiffs brought suit in federal dis- plaintiffs. note, to the The court did how- Fresh, against trict court in 1985 Farm ever, thirty-minute that “defendants’ rule contending thirty-minute that Farm Fresh’s should not be followed the future and wage violates minimum and over- that continued use of the rule would not compensation provisions Fair ‘good constitute faith reliance’ on these (“FLSA”), Labor Standards Act of 1938 as interpretations.” amended, 201, 206, 207, 29 U.S.C. §§ following The district court 215(a)(2). complaint prayed for in- good discussion of the faith defense of against junction future violations and dam- section 259: ages injury past for suffered from viola- enacting By section 10 of the Portal to unpaid tions in the wages form of minimum Portal Act 259 of Title 29 of the [section compensation July and overtime from Code], Congress United States made 1982. Farm Fresh denied violation of clear that it did not intend for the Fair the FLSA. It also raised an affirmative subject employ- Labor Standards Act to defense, claiming qualified that it for the penalties ers to for such faith re- “good exemption faith” of 29 U.S.C. 259 liance on administra- barring the action because it [as had acted Fresh’s] regulations, particularly tive where the conformity with and in reliance on the regulations interpreted have Wage by and Hour Division’s been the FLSA.2 29 U.S.C. officer of the and Hour long enough required employers’ proper- which are to enable him to use take care his effectively purposes ty, working waiting. for his own are he is also while In both completely employee engaged not hours worked. He is not re- cases is to wait. Wait- duty ing integral part job. lieved from and cannot use the time is an On the hand, effectively example, for his own unless he is other for if the truck driver is definitely may Washington, City, told in advance that he leave D.C. York sent from to New noon, job leaving arriving and he that will not have to commence at 6 a.m. and at 12 and definitely specified specifically completely work until a hour has ar- relieved from duty p.m. again goes rived. Whether the time is until 6 when he all enable him to use the for his trip for the return the idle time is not purposes depends upon all the facts and working engaged. time. He is circumstances of the case. (b) Drivers; 2. The defendants also asserted other defenses specific examples. Truck A truck judge job that were not reached the district in his or near the site driver who has to wait at opinion possible working during goods below thus were not sub- to be loaded is jects appeal. loading period. for discussion in this We of course the driver reaches his des- If awaiting trip express opinion the return on those issues. tination and while Department Labor, Division of the as Home Insurance (2d Cir.1982); in this case. Mayhew, D. Inc. v. Clifton Wirtz, (4th Cir.1969). implementation Because defendant’s The district court did not invoke this stan- minutes rule was a reasonable dard. interpretation of 29 U.S.C. 785.14- §§ 785.16, particularly of Mr. Rush- Instead, judge the district held that advice, ing’s this court determines that completely defense was sat defendant Farm Fresh has acted “in isfied if an reacted to an adminis in conformity faith and in re- pronouncement trative as reasonably pru liance on” 29 C.F.R. 785.14-785.16 at §§ person dent would react under similar cir all times relevant to this action. cumstances. query That is certainly a com plaintiffs appeal ponent from good-faith defense, the district but it only

court’s decision. serves proper elucidate the defini tion of whether employer actually *4 II good showed faith under objective stan required by dard appeal plaintiffs-appellants On section showing 259. The objective of argue good that the district court faith under such invoked and a stan dard does applied satisfy not necessary an incorrect rule of the other law deter components of the mining E.g., Superior that Farm Fresh defense. could invoke the Pontiac-GMC, 80; protection good F.2d at of the faith see defense of 1579 — also, e.g., King Education, v. Board This, course, section 259 to bar suit. of of 295, (7th F.2d Cir.1970), denied, question cert. of law we de review novo. 908, 402 U.S. 91 S.Ct. good-faith The L.Ed.2d 649 defense of section 259 is an (1971). A court must also find that objective test that bars actions for viola employer acted “in actual conformity with tions of wage the minimum or overtime and in reliance on” the agency written in compensation provisions of the if FLSA the terpretation. 29 U.S.C. 259. The Second § pleads proves and that the act or Circuit has noted that complained (1) omission of was taken in good (2) This is not a faith of a showing and was of conformity with general good faith; (3) and the Portal reliance on a written Act lan administra guage, good ‘in with,’ faith in conformity tive by designated agency. precisely question links the of agency designated faith interpre to to an act in conformity, if and there tations of the is no FLSA is the Administrator of conformity, general good faith in Wage other and Hour Division Depart of the respects day. cannot save the ment of Labor.3 See 29 U.S.C. e.g., Pontiac-GMC, Superior Inc., Olson v. 765 Equal Employment Opportunity Com (11th Cir.), F.2d mission v. Home Insurance modified grounds (1985); other 776 F.2d 265 Equal (2d Cir.1982); see Employment Opportunity Pontiac-GMC, Commission v. 765 F.2d at 1579-80. provides pertinent 3. 29 U.S.C. part: spect § 259 employers to the class of to which he defense, belonged. established, Such a if (a) any any proceeding In action or based on shall be a bar to proceeding, the action or any 14, 1947, May act or omission on or after notwithstanding that after such act or omis- subject no any liability shall be to sion, order, regulation, such administrative punishment or for or on account of the fail- ruling, approval, interpretation, practice, pay wages or ure to minimum or overtime com- policy enforcement pensation is modified or rescinded under the Fair Labor Standards Act by judicial or is authority determined of seq.] as amended to be [29 U.S.C. 201 et legal pleads invalid or of no proves if effect. ... he that the act or (b) agency complained (a) omission referred to in was in faith in subsection of this with and in section shall be— reliance on writ- (1) order, regulation, ruling, ten administrative in the case of the Fair Labor Standards approval, interpretation, agency or Act of as of the amended U.S.C. [29 § 201 et (b) specified seq.] the United States in subsection Administrator of the —the section, practice this or Department or Hour Division of the of La- policy agency enforcement of such with re- bor. ... Interpretive Bulletin are to him use the A. enable effectively purposes for his own are specifically ar- Plaintiffs-appellants have not hours worked. Whether the issue, interpretive bulletin gued that the long enough to him to time is enable use Bulletin, Part Interpretive entitled for his own the Fair Labor Under Hours Worked depends upon all of the and circum- facts 1938, as Amended (the Act Standards of the case. stances “Bulletin”), require- satisfy the cannot defense under sec- ments for the Id. language 785.16. addition to this oper- insufficient to it was tion because denoting general applied rules to be compensable as an ate particular circumstances of all the FLSA. We requirements case, provisions provide many each also agree. specific examples of what and would would not constitute hours worked under the particular provi- contains The bulletin examples closely FLSA. None of the are Regula- from the Code of Federal sions analagous to the situation of the 785.14-785.16, tions, pro- 29 C.F.R. §§ working eviscerating on the line at Farm guidance employers regarding some vide pro Bulletin Fresh. Thus while the itself appropriate to a determi- considerations examples pertinent some waiting time is time vides nation of whether situations, guidance specific under the FLSA.4 worked provisions pro- bar, and the argues that the for the situation at necessary interpretations suited clearly recognizes vide the provisions itself necessary for them to particular situations provide only general guidelines therein *5 interpretation qualify as an administrative applied particular be of all the regula- Secretary’s under section 259. Bul of each case. the circumstances Thus otherwise; suggest while the intro- tions letin itself does not claim to establish a subparts ductory sections to other similar employer particular which an Regulations ex- of Federal of the Code may rely length in order to determine what interpretations in those pressly note that type waiting period relied to establish subparts may be time worked under the facts of defenses, introductory sec- section 259 simply it was in fact im this case. Thus Subpart pointedly declines to tion to 785 rely possible for Farm Fresh to on it. representation. Compare, e.g., make that an administrative Where 783.3, 784.4, (all 788.5 ex- 29 C.F.R. §§ objective insufficient to allow reliance pressly allowing reliance for the prong 259 defense reliance of the section id. 259) (making with 785.2 no of section met; employer’s re cannot an actual noting only that mention of section 259 and upon his own incorrect liance “ subpart provide ‘practical a should vague general administrative of a ” Skidmore employers’ (quoting guide for Equal Employ guideline will not suffice. Co., 134, 138, 65 S.Ct. v. & 323 U.S. Swift v. Balti Opportunity ment Commission (1944)). 161, 163, 89 L.Ed. 124 Co., 632 F.2d 1107, Railroad more & Ohio Mayhew, D. (4th Cir.1980); 1112 provisions expressly declare that Clifton Inc., (holding test is worked 413 F.2d at 661 that time is time “[w]hether Education objective); King v. Board upon particular depends under [FLSA] cf. 785.14, (7th Chicago, circumstances,” City and the 435 F.2d 297 29 C.F.R. § denied, cert. Cir.1970), a 61 determinination involves consideration U.S. (quoting Skid circumstances,” (1971) (holding id. “all the 28 L.Ed.2d 649 S.Ct. Co., 134, 136-37, more v. & rely 323 U.S. could not on a tenta that an Swift 161, 163, (1944)). Wage 65 S.Ct. 89 L.Ed. and Hour Admin opinion of the tive Phillips expressly declare that Petroleum provisions istrator); also Martinez Co., (D.Idaho 1968) (good- employee is [p]eriods during which an the Adminis- faith defense allowed where from and which completely relieved 785.16). (setting supra §§ out text of 29 C.F.R. 4. See note 1 85.14— writing employ regulation trator in informed a certain and Hour Adminis- exempt response from er it was FLSA trator. The three documents all stated question therefore that section 259’s were not satisfied where the (holding by showing tion 259 would mean that situation. See opinion regarding Home Insurance Employment Opportunity Commission v. could tunity Commission v. Home Insurance (2d Cir.1982); ticular statutory definitive hedged tral Missouri standard). defense ic circumstances tiac-GMC, particular request Accepting satisfy (9th Cir.1970); conformity prong establish circumstances, that reliance was not must correct there failed to bar the reliance opinion necessary 765 F.2d at 1579-80 Administrative that it “relied” on a Farm Fresh’s qualifications, provides be tested King, 435 F.2d at Equal Employment Oppor of section 259. guideline Telephone answer Co., (8th Cir.1948). see also that set out detail), employer’s particular 672 F.2d cannot sufficient of the section 259 Act], under depends upon par provide Co. v. here defense argument interpretations aff'd any employer (2d Cir.1982) requirements guidelines to raise the possible See guidance Conwell, 424 F.2d objective relevant (holding general of sec 264-65 simply Equal caveat specif Pon Cen in fuge or a device to evade the Act.” the claim of a section 259 that 265. The court there ADEA retirement essence that “the retirement of employees on the Portal Act of dent Truman to his guilty of a not intended to “make each interpret the Act. But as stated in Presi- Cong. 1947). which to dent Truman’s ment fect Home was left to its own devices to They own reduction of the would tion in essence, None of the Administrator’s statements or does not constitute contained so signing judge basis [Age age thus long comply & Admin. 4(f)(2) Employment] rely each stated that an constituted plan of whether or not he has been Discrimination in violation.” as the gave of the Portal age pursuant to know whether or not its [a with the good-faith elaboration of what does message *6 accompany would not violate the section of the Home no plan News 1827 explained subterfuge. Act if it ^[1947] Message mandatory was not a subter- [Age subterfuge. Act, defense under to a bona fide the Portal-to- Congress guidance Employment Discrimina- U.S. Code (May of Presi- rejecting complied ADEA]. 10 was retire- In ef- Id. his on guidance). upon Bulletin “relied” 265; accord, e.g., King, Id. at 435 F.2d expressly recognizes here periods that “the 297; Telephone, Central Missouri during [waiting periods which these that Appalachian F.2d at Pilkenton v. are nevertheless occur are un worktime] Regional Hospitals, predictable.” attempts While the of em (W.D.Va.1971). reasoning expressed ployers to make correct decisions on the in applies equally Home Insurance Co. general guidelines prudent basis of is Nothing regulations well here. in the attempt commendable the alone not does printed within the any Bulletin contained statutory raise the bar of section 259. The dispositive regarding elaboration to how interpretation relied particular length waiting period choose a must particu a clear answer to the compensated beyond gen- that must be the lar situation order for the language “[p]eriods during eral that which rely on it. employee completely an is relieved from enough long and which are

Equal Employment enable Opportunity Com him to use the time for his mission v. Home 672 F.2d Insurance (2d Cir.1982), purposes are not provides an in hours worked.” parallel. guidelines pro- structive In In C.F.R. 785.116. Thus the that case Home general surance claimed it relied vided some appropri- that two advice about published opinion published determining ate letters and a factors to consider in Pontiac-GMC, Inc., situations was particular time whether FLSA, (11th Cir.) D. they (quoting but left under the compensable Clifton Wirtz, in Mayfield, Inc. v. own devices employers to their individual grounds on other (4th Cir.1969), under all determining compensable time modified (1985)). specifical- not 776 F.2d 265 Thus it was circumstances estab particular the guidelines. essentially estoppel in the lished as an defense to examples ly mentioned as nothing in the Bulletin protect employers particular agencies’ even from And regarding interpretations particular to de- mistaken stat general guidance how waiting utory requirements; it does not come much would into termine how effect until after there has a circumstances been failure personal comply statute due to employees to make effective relevant allow agency interpretation. an erroneous Here period. use of agency interpretation was correct inso addition, Fresh also failed sec Fresh, however, far as it went. Farm went 259’s that tion beyond interpretation doing and in so with the administrative act comply may failed to with the FLSA. We Fresh did not choose regulation. Farm accept, arguendo, that Farm Fresh made enough employees its long to enable comply its effort to best FLSA effectively for their own to use Bulletin but and the that still does not judge explicitly district purposes.5 The undercut the crucial fact that the eviscerating line found guidelines general stated the of the FLSA’s hour Fresh “need at least one of Farm provisions compensable time and Farm in order to use the time effec period break apply correctly. them Fresh failed to and, purposes, there tively for their own Home Insurance Co. again instruc- fore, period less than one break that the insur- tive. The court there found time under hour duration company ance could not show in regulation provided no the Act.”6 The merely agency with an Fresh other than relative to Farm struction statutory requirements restated when the of the FLSA as restating requirements may have violated the statu- agency well construed the courts. requirements. The court there re- tory protect em in order to defense exists marked on “innocently and to his detri ployer who ment, jejunity of a Portal Act defense when the law as it was laid down followed purportedly relied agencies, by government him without repeat require- done no more that interpretations such were has notice that of the statute: if the has Olson or invalid.” ments claimed to be erroneous opinion opinion, read argues district court’s for the in fact that both the 5. Farm Fresh finding plaintiffs-appellants] its own of at least one hour and need court’s "these [the interpre- were reasonable minutes in order to use at least a one hour *7 interpretation, and the administrative tations of purposes....” for their own satisfy requirements that this should court did not find that one Thus the district However, the difference between section 259. thirty enough; only slightly it or more was hour undoubtedly and one hour is minutes necessary. one hour would be found that at least case, significant under the circumstances of this argue wrong thus the forum in which This is especially the district court found that at since necessary for exact amount of time that is necessary. The differ- least one hour would plaintiffs-appellants make effective use of it and one hour actu- ence between minutes purposes; plaintiffs-appellants for their own insufficiency ally points up the inherent argue what exact will be free on remand support a section 259 defense in this Bulletin to enough, it is one amount of time is whether guidelines general do not case—the Bulletin’s exactly longer period. plain- Neither or a hour any particular explicitly provide answer to the argues ap- tiffs-appellants defendant in this nor Fresh. circumstances faced finding peal should be that less that the correct personal would allow effective than one hour ap- plaintiffs-appellants also asserted on 6. The is, case, time, any and there in suffi- use of the concluding peal "in district court erred that the preclude support record to us from cient in the make employees at Fresh Farm can that clearly concluding court was that the district exceeds one effective use of down time which erroneous. the district This contention misreads hour.” 930 conformity interpreta- (E.D.Mich.1949).

acted ‘in with’ The second is that oral statute, obeyed the advice cannot qualify agency’s tion he will have as an writ Soler, interpretation. will be available ten E.g., F.Supp. the Portal Act defense 615 only Appalachian does not need it. at Pilkenton v. Region when the Hospitals, F.Supp. 334, (D.Va. al 339 at Home Insurance 672 F.2d 265. 1971); 29 (collecting sup C.F.R. 790.13 § sum, In Farm Fresh’s claimed re porting legislative history). citations to the liance on the Bulletin’s explicitly Section requires that the em compensable accept the time fails to Bulle ployer act “in conformity with and in re language foreswearing any tin’s own at liance regu on written administrative tempt provide correct determinations lation, order, ruling, approval, interpre- or time in circum tation_” (emphasis 29 U.S.C. § stances, and it also fails meet the re added). presented Counsel has argua quirements employer’s that the actions be ignore ble reason to explicit clear and in in with and reliance on the Congress. command of We hold that interpretation. administrative qualify order to for the defense of section 259 the statute’s B. The Oral Advice Compliance agency interpretation that the writing be in Officer obeyed. Soler, must be Accord argues Farm Fresh also that it re 747; Pilkenton, F.Supp. at lied the oral advice of a Hour Division officer estab lishing thirty-minute its rule. Farm Fresh Ill argues that this advice constitutes the opinion, Pursuant to this the district order, regulation, “written administrative opinion court’s is REVERSED and the case ruling, approval, interpretation, or is REMANDED to the district court for agency of the United States” the Por further proceedings consistent with this contemplates. tal Act Because we have opinion. already shown that the Bulletin did not provide interpretation upon an which Farm RONEY, Judge, Chief dissenting: rely satisfy could order to section I respectfully dissent because the cir- argument Farm Fresh’s here must de cumstances of this FLSA case the district pend solely compli on the oral advice of the court’s determination es- ance officer. Compli This oral advice of a tablished the Portal-to-Portal Act ance Officer cannot necessary serve as the defense, faith 29 U.S.C.A. is due to po written administrative statement of its be affirmed. reasons, sition for two both of which inde qualify order to for the Portal Act’s pendently argument. defeat Farm Fresh’s good faith defense must show The first is the case of the FLSA complained the act inwas the Administrator must the written faith, and in conformity with and reliance interpretation in order to regulation, written administrative qualify for relief under section 259. 29 order, ruling, approval, or 259(b); 790.19(b); U.S.C. see 29 C.F.R. agency of the United States. See Olson Laundry National Automatic and Clean Pontiac-GMC, Inc., Shultz, ing Council v. (11th Cir.1985); 29 U.S.C.A. (D.C.Cir.1971); United States v. Stocks *8 259; 790.13(a). 29 C.F.R. All of these § Inc., Lincoln-Mercury, 270- elements are at issue in this case. (10th Cir.1962) 71 (reviewing supporting legislative also, history); employer The e.g., see Soler v. satisfies the threshold G & U, Inc., (S.D.N.Y. good 615 F.Supp. by acting 747 faith element as a reason- 1985); Corp., ably prudent employer Ferrer v. 84 Waterman S.S. would have acted (D.C. 1949); F.Supp. Olson, 680 Puerto Rico under similar circumstances. 790.15(a). Anderson v. Arvey Corp., 84 55 F.2d at 29 C.F.R. regulations at permit issue this case correct, rule is finding negate does not policy to fashion a of non-com- the district court’s conclusion that the thir- pensable waiting time or downtime based ty-minute policy was reasonably in con- period on a durational that is formity with the agency’s waiting reg- time to enable the to use the time ulations for purpose of the Portal Act’s effectively for their own and on good faith defense. formity that action. quires officer’s advice At the rely ble downtime in not be 29 C.F.R. ployment situation. See ops constitutes officer’s the “facts and circumstances” of the em- contain a compliance stances” 14-785.16. The Administrator’s agency’s a durational that the Portal Act’s penalized very fashioning specific thirty-minute part least, written toas which the employer could of the “facts and circum- good period regulation when the employer devel- its receiving verbal advice the appropriateness of regulations, waiting faith in reliance on regulations for non-compensa- act in actual con- faith defense re- time policy. rule. The Marshall it should certainly which it wage liability. §§ do not 785.- therefore, bars F.2d ments of and section 259 of the the employer has established all the ele- trative interpretation, the Sixth Circuit ob- served: wage liability on employers in the face of insulating him from liability. See H.R. No. the employer could plausibly interpret as this Act indicate that courts should be an administrative interpretation which hesitant to impose retroactive minimum Code Confronted Cong. language 80th v. Baptist (6th with & Cong., Ad. News Cir.1981). imposition faith reliance defense 1st Sess. Portal-to-Portal legislative Hospital, Inc., ambiguous of any back ^[1947] this history of adminis- case, Act, U.S. Olson, 790.14(a); relied. C.F.R.

F.2d at Although 1579-80. the elements of

good faith and conformity synon- are not

ymous, Olson, 765 F.2d at where the

agency sets forth “facts and circumstanc- standard,

es” conformity regulation if its action is reason- This is able. the most that the law can America, UNITED STATES of expect of the employer. Indeed, this is Plaintiff-Appellant, what the district court concluding held in defendant’s implementation “[b]ecause the thirty minute rule was a reasonable CORLEY, Patricia Defendant-Appellee. C.F.R. 785.14-785.- §§ No. 86-5693. 16, particularly Rushing’s Mr. advice ... has acted ... ‘in United Appeals, States Court of ” with’ regula- Eleventh Circuit. tions. Aug. 19, 1987. The court holds that Farm thirty- Fresh’s minute policy failed section 259’s conformi-

ty because district court

also found production

“need at least a one hour period in break

order to use the for their purposes, and, therefore, than less one hour in duration time under the Act.” As-

suming that the district one-hour court's