51 U.S. 218 | SCOTUS | 1851
Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the court.
This is a writ of error to the Supreme Court of Arkansas, under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act of J789.
A judgment was rendered, in the Pulaski Circuit Court, against the plaintiffs in error, on the 23d of December, 1847, for six thousand one hundred and nineteen dollars and costs, on bonds payable at different times, given for the purchase of a part of certain lands granted to the State by Congress, for the support, of a. seminary,, and which lands were sold by the Governor, as .the agent of the State, under the authority of the General Assembly. The bonds were made payable and negotiable at the State Bank of Arkansas, “ in specie or its equivalent.”
The defendants pleaded a tender in the notes of the State Bank of Arkansas, and relied upon the twenty-eighth section of the charter of the bank, which provided “ that, the bills and notes.of said institution shall be received in all payments of debts due to the State of Arkansas ”.; that the notes of the bank tendered were issued while this section was in full force, and which constituted a contract to receive them in payment of debts by the State, which the State could not repudiate, &c.
There was a demurrer to the plea, which was sustained by the- court. The case wai submitted to a jury, whose verdict was for the plaintiff, pn which a judgment was entered. A writ of error was prosecuted to the Supreme Court of Arkansas, on which the judgment of the Circuit Court was affirmed.
By the act of the 2d of March, 1827, the Secretary of the Treasury was authorized to set apart and reserye from sale of the public lands, within the Territory of Arkansas, a quantity of land not exceeding two entire townships, for the use of a university, &c. And by the act of the 23d of June, 1836, it is provided, “ that the two entire townships of land which- have already been located, by virtue of the above act, are hereby vested'in and confirmed to the General Assembly of the said State, to be appropriated solely to the use of such seminary by the General Assembly.” Under the act of the State of the 28th of December, 1840, these lands were sold by the Governor of the State, and the bonds now in question were given on the purchase of a part of them, as above stated.-
In the case of Woodruff v. Trapnall, decided at the present term, this court held that the twenty-eighth section in the charter constituted a contract between the State and the holder Of the bills of the bank. That the pledge of the State to receive the notes Of the bank, in payment of debts, was a standing guaranty, which embraced all the paper issued by the bank until the guaranty was repealed. And that this construction was founded upon the fact, that.the bank belonged exclusively to the State, was conducted by its officers, and for its benefit. That the guaranty attached to the notes of the bank in circulation at the time of the repeal, and such notes the State was bound to receive in payment of its debts. That in .this respect' the obligation of the contract applied to a State equally as to an individual. And that; as to the binding force of a similar guaranty by an’ individual, there would seem to be no .ground for doubt. But that under this guaranty the State is bound to receive the notes of the bank only in payment of debts in its own right.
The lands sold did not belong to the State of Arkansas, but were held by it in trust “ to be appropriated solely for the use of the Seminary.” The money, of course, secured to be paid by the purchaser, partook of the same character. The bonds weré made, payable to the Governor or his successor in office. And it appears, as stated in the plea, that the money to be received was intended, under the act of incorporation of the bank, to constitute a part of its capital. The Governor acted as the agent' of the State in making the sale of the land, and in' collecting the money; but he could only represent a trust interest. The., manner in which the money was intended to be' appropriated can in no respect affect the question now under consideration. In law, the money did not belong to the State, in any other capacity than as trustee, and consequently the debt was not due to the State in its own right. No court can sanction the violation of a trust, but -will always act on the presumption that it will be faithfully executed. And this is especially the case when the trust is vested in a State, which is not amenable to judicial process. To hold that the State of Arkansas is bound, under the provision in the charter.of the bank, to receive its notes. in payment for the Seminary lands, would violate the trust, as it would greatly reduce the fund, Should the. money be invested by the State, and lost, it would be responsible for it. No-hazard incurred in the appropriation
The bonds were given payable “ in specie or its equivalent.” This shows that it was the understanding of both parties, that currency less valuable than specie should not be received in payment of the bonds. If by a contract the State was bound to receive the notes of the bank in payment of its debts, by a contract this obligation might be waived. And no waiver could be more express than an obligation by the debtor to pay in specie, or its equivalent.
We are therefore of opinion, that, as this fund is a trust-in the hands of the State, it cannot, within the twenty-eighth section of the charter of the bank, be considered a debt due to the State; and we think by the condition of the bonds to discharge them “ in specie or its equivalent,” the notes of the bank are also excluded. On both these grounds, the contract set up in the pleading not being impaired, we think the judgment of the State court must be affirmed.
Concurrence Opinion
I concur in 'the judgment of the court on the ground, first, that the. act of the legislature of the State of Arkansas, repealing the provision of a previous act, by which the bills of the Bank of Arkansas were authorized to be taken in payment, of the public dues and taxes, was constitutional and valid, and the defendant therefore bound to discharge his obligation
I concur with.my brother Nelson.
Order.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from thé Supreme Court of the State of .Arkansas, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this court, that the judgment of the said Supreme Court in this cause be; and the same is hereby, affirmed, with costs and damages at the rate of six per centum per annum.
Concurrence Opinion
I concur in the conclusion adopted by the court in these causes (Paup et al. v. Drew, and Trigg et al. v. Drew); but Whilst I do this I cannot claim to myself the argument upon which that conclusion professes to be founded. The principles and reasonings propounded in these cases, and in that of Woodruff v. Trapnall, appear to me to place all three of the cases essentially upon the same platform, and establish no valid or sound distinction between them, but should, if those principles and reasonings be correct, have led to the same conclusion in them all.
I concur-with my brother Daniel.
