Virgil JOHN, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee.
No. A-7252.
Court of Appeals of Alaska.
Nov. 16, 2001.
The superior court ruled that the equal rights clause of the
IV.
For the reasons outlined above I would reverse the decision of the superior court and remand with directions to enter judgment in favor of the state.
Kenneth M. Rosenstein, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Special Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage, and Bruce M. Botelho, Attorney General, Juneau, for Appellee.
Before COATS, Chief Judge, and MANNHEIMER and STEWART, Judges.
OPINION
STEWART, Judge.
This appeal requires us to construe
The Alaska Supreme Court‘s decision in Alvarado, and the supreme court‘s effort to codify Alvarado in Criminal Rule 18
In Alvarado v. State,2 our supreme court recognized the “profound cultural differences [that] exist between the Native villages and urban areas of Alaska.”3 Because of the “gulf which separates the mode of life of the typical Alaskan villager from the type of existence led by most residents of [the larger] cities of the state,”4 the supreme court held that it was unlawful for juries drawn solely from those larger cities to decide the fate of defendants charged with committing crimes in rural villages. The court declared that the
- (1) The existing court location;
- (2) Nearest to the situs of the alleged crime;
- (3) Within the venue district;
- (4) That has a judge and facilities for either a six-person or twelve-person jury as is necessary to the case.
The supreme court‘s goal was that, by using
Subsections (c) and (d) of Rule 18 authorize the administrative director of the court system to augment the trial sites identified on the supreme court‘s venue map. Under
Although a defendant‘s presumptive trial site is still determined under
Finally, subsection (f) provides a “safety valve” for unusual cases where the above rules still do not yield a trial site that complies with Alvarado.
Our decision in Wilson v. State, and why the superior court scheduled John‘s case in Fairbanks rather than Tok
The defendant in this case, Virgil John, was charged with committing felonies in the village of Tetlin. On the supreme court‘s venue map, Tetlin lies within the Tok venue district, so it would seem that, initially, John‘s trial should have been scheduled in Tok. Instead, the superior court scheduled John‘s trial in Fairbanks.
In doing so, the superior court followed a long-standing practice in the Fourth Judicial District: setting all felony cases for trial in either Fairbanks or Bethel unless the defendant affirmatively requests a change of venue to another felony trial site closer to where the crime occurred. This practice appears to be based on the interpretation of
The defendant in Wilson was charged with committing a felony in Delta Junction. On the supreme court‘s venue map, the town of Delta Junction is identified as a suitable site for superior court trials, and the Delta Junction venue district is drawn around the town. Nevertheless, with the acquiescence of the parties, the superior court scheduled Wilson‘s trial in Fairbanks. On the morning of trial, Wilson discharged his attorney, elected to proceed pro se, and demanded trial in Delta Junction. (He claimed that his attorney had never informed him that the trial would be held in Fairbanks.) The superior court refused to move the trial to Delta Junction.9
Although the superior court‘s action might have been affirmed under the theory that Wilson‘s motion was untimely, this court affirmed the superior court‘s ruling under another theory: we rejected Wilson‘s underlying premise that he was entitled to have his trial in Delta Junction in the first place.
As explained above,
As interpreted in Wilson,
John‘s attorney did not object to the superior court‘s action, apparently because he believed the case would be resolved through a plea bargain rather than a trial. But several months later, when the parties could not reach a mutually acceptable plea bargain, John changed attorneys and announced that he would go to trial. At that time, John
Why we now conclude that the interpretation of Rule 18 in Wilson is wrong
As explained above,
- (1) The existing court location;
- (2) Nearest to the situs of the alleged crime;
- (3) Within the venue district;
- (4) That has a judge and facilities for either a six-person or twelve-person jury as is necessary to the case.
In Wilson, we focused on clause (4) and, in particular, the phrase “has a judge.” Based on this phrase, we concluded that no court location could qualify as a presumptive trial site under
At first blush, this may seem to be an obvious reading of the rule. But, on closer inspection, Wilson‘s interpretation of clause (4) appears to contradict clause (3). In addition, Wilson‘s interpretation of clause (4) leads to results that appear to be inconsistent with the supreme court‘s designation of felony trial sites on its venue map. Finally, and most important, Wilson‘s interpretation of clause (4) leads to results that are inconsistent with the supreme court‘s decision in Alvarado.
As we have already noted, the supreme court‘s venue map divides Alaska into twenty-five superior court venue districts, each one containing a city or town that the supreme court has designated as a suitable site for felony trials. Clause (3) of
Although there are twenty-five superior court venue districts, only half of them contain cities or towns with resident superior court judges.10 If clause (3) of
It is possible to resolve this conflict by interpreting clause (3) differently. Instead of reading clause (3) to mean that the presumptive trial site must be located in the venue district where the crime occurred, one could interpret the “venue district” provision of clause (3) as being the introductory clause to the “has a judge and facilities” language of clause (4). In other words, instead of requiring the presumptive trial site to be located in the same venue district as the crime, clause (3) would require the presumptive trial site
This, in essence, is the result we reached in Wilson. We held that a defendant charged with a crime committed in the Delta Junction venue district (or the Tok venue district) was not entitled to a presumptive trial site within that venue district. Rather, the presumptive trial site was Fairbanks—the designated felony trial site located in the closest venue district that had a resident superior court judge—and any request to move the trial elsewhere (such as Delta Junction or Tok) had to be made under
But if this is how the supreme court intended
Moreover, the result in Wilson is inconsistent with the lengthy table of venue sites that accompanies
This table does not say that Fairbanks is the presumptive trial site for felonies committed in Delta Junction and Tok. Rather, for crimes committed in Delta Junction and the surrounding smaller communities (Big Delta, Dot Lake, Dry Creek, and Healy Lake), Delta Junction is listed as the presumptive superior court (i.e., felony) trial site. Similarly, for crimes committed in Tok and the surrounding communities (Alcan, Boundary, Chicken, Chisana, Eagle, Eagle Village, Nabesna, Northway, Northway Junction, Tanacross, Tetlin, and Tetlin Junction), the table specifies Tok as the presumptive superior court trial site.
Finally, and most importantly, Wilson‘s interpretation of
But under the interpretation of
For these reasons, we conclude that Wilson‘s interpretation of
Admittedly, this interpretation has its own difficulties.
It is difficult to tell what the supreme court had in mind. On the one hand, the court defined a dozen felony venue districts containing no resident judge, but yet containing an identified felony trial site (for example, Tok and Delta Junction). On the other hand, the court specified in
But as we have just explained, if we interpret Rule 18 as we did in Wilson—attributing paramount importance to Rule 18(b)(4)‘s requirement of a “judge“—we end up with a rule that tends to defeat the rights guaranteed by Alvarado. So, instead, we must interpret Rule 18 in a new way—by giving paramount importance to the venue districts and the felony trial sites designated by the supreme court on its venue map, and by interpreting clause (3) to require presumptive trial sites to be located within the venue district where the crime occurred.
We now hold that when a felony is committed within one of the twenty-five superior court venue districts drawn by the supreme court, the trial should presumptively be held in the city or town identified by the supreme court as the felony trial site of that district—even though that city or town may have no resident superior court judge. If there is another felony trial site on the administrative director‘s list of approved sites that is closer to the place where the crime is alleged to have occurred, the defendant can ask to have the trial moved there under
Based on our revised interpretation of
Other issues in the case
Although we are reversing John‘s conviction, we take this opportunity to address certain other issues in the event John‘s case is retried. Before this case went to trial, John had entered a no-contest plea and the superior court had ordered a presentence report. John prepared a hand written statement about the offense for inclusion in the report. The superior court later permitted John to withdraw his plea, and John moved to suppress the statement on a number of grounds. The court denied relief, and the statement was admitted at trial. We now address the court‘s rulings on John‘s motion to suppress this statement.
The grand jury indicted John on three counts of second-degree sexual abuse of a minor.12 John then reached a plea agreement with the state, pleaded no contest to one count, and the State dismissed the other two counts.
The superior court scheduled the case for sentencing and ordered a presentence report as required by
Glenn Bacon, a probation officer, was assigned to prepare the presentence report. On October 1, 1997, Bacon sent John‘s attorney a letter to John, which included a presentence questionnaire. The letter provided in relevant part:
[The court] has requested I do a presentence report for your case[.] This information is helpful for [the court]. Please fill out the enclosed presentence worksheet to the best of your ability, sign the Authorization to Release form, and return everything to our office in the enclosed envelope. Call me as soon as you receive the forms. It is very important that you get this done right away. My target date for completing the report is October 24, 1997, so I will need your information as much prior to that time as possible. If you have any questions, please call our toll-free number listed above.
John‘s attorney forwarded the presentence report packet to John without advising John how to respond to the questions. Because John had otherwise failed to follow release conditions, the court issued a bench warrant for John‘s arrest.
On October 28, 1997, John called Bacon and scheduled an appointment for November 3. When John arrived for the appointment, he had the questionnaire with him and told Bacon that “he might get something to [Bacon] within a day or two.” Bacon then took John to the Alaska State Troopers’ office, where the troopers arrested John on the bench warrant. The next day, John called Bacon from jail and informed Bacon that he had completed the presentence questionnaire.
The last page of the questionnaire was entitled “Statement/Remarks.” It provided as follows:
This is your opportunity to make any statement you would like to have presented to the Court. It will be included in the pre-sentence report just as it is written and will not be changed in any way. It may help to know that the Court is particularly interested in your statements about the following:
- 1. Your version of the offense—what happened?
- 2. Why were you involved—why did you act as you did?
- 3. How do you feel about the offense, what you did, the results of your actions for you and others?
- 4. What are your plans or goals?
- 5. What are your thoughts concerning the possibility of any jail time imposed in your case?
John wrote the following by hand:
I feel very bad about the situation. It should never happen. Just something overcame me. I never did that before and never will again. I move from Tetlin to Mentasta and start a new life with Jesus. I met Jesus last June in Anchorage and living for the Lord. My plans are to go to work and start taking care of my kids and move to Anchorage with my girlfriend Phyllis Dahling.
If I get any jail time I deserve it because I violated God‘s child. If it‘s possible I would like to get a fine so I can pay for the kid[s] counseling. I can‘t do much in jail because I got child support to pay and they take all my money.
About a month later, the superior court appointed a new lawyer for John so that John could move to withdraw his plea. The court allowed John to withdraw his guilty pleas, and the case was reset for trial on all three counts.
John filed a motion to suppress the handwritten statement the day before trial was scheduled to begin. In the motion, John raised several claims: the State had obtained his statement in violation of Miranda,13 the statement was involuntary, the statement was obtained in violation of his due process
Instead of starting trial as scheduled, the court conducted an evidentiary hearing and heard arguments on John‘s motion. Before the witnesses were called, John told the court that his argument was narrower than the issues raised in his pleadings: “Judge, ... I‘m actually making a threefold argument. First is Miranda, second is voluntariness, third is kind of a probative value versus prejudice [argument].”
John and Bacon testified. John said that when he changed his plea he had not understood that a presentence report would be prepared. He also testified that he did not think that he had any choice but to complete the presentence questionnaire. John claimed that when he contacted Bacon, he did not understand that he had the right to an attorney or to remain silent.
After the court heard this evidence, John argued only the Miranda claim and the voluntariness claim. The State challenged John‘s Miranda and voluntariness claims. In reply, John concluded his argument as follows: “And for the Miranda violations, for the voluntariness, and for the prejudice, Judge, [the statement] should be excluded.” John did not argue due process or mention
John makes several claims why the superior court should have suppressed the handwritten statement. First, John argues that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated because he was subjected to custodial interrogation when he was completing the presentence worksheet, and he had not been advised of his rights under Miranda. John argues that he was subjected to custodial interrogation because he was completing the worksheet in connection with a criminal prosecution, because he had been ordered by a judge to cooperate with the Department of Corrections in preparing the presentence report, and because he had been told by Bacon, a probation officer, that he should complete the worksheet as thoroughly as possible to receive a fair sentence. John testified that he was not informed at any time that he could refuse to answer the questions in the worksheet.
The State argues that John‘s statement was not the product of a custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings, even though he was incarcerated at the time he filled out the questionnaire. The State contends that John was simply responding to Bacon‘s “broad request” that he complete the questionnaire and that there was no evidence that Bacon or anyone else suggested that John incriminate himself. The State argues that John could have left the page requesting the statement blank or could have refused to respond to the questionnaire entirely. The State also notes that the directions asked John to make any statement “you would like” to have presented to the Court. The State asserts that this language “clearly conveys” that it was John‘s personal decision whether or not to make a statement.
Before a person may be subjected to custodial interrogation, that person must be informed of the right against self-incrimination and the right to counsel.15 The supe-
Next, John argues that his statement was involuntary because he was presented with the choice of either fully answering the questions in the presentence worksheet or risking an unjust sentence. In support of his contention, John cites Beavers v. State17 and Raphael v. State18 for the proposition that a statement is involuntary if it is extracted by some action on the part of a State agent that is sufficiently compelling to overbear the person‘s will to resist.
John asserts that the circumstances in his case were sufficiently compelling to overbear his will. He notes that he was ordered by the court to cooperate in the preparation of a presentence report, was warned by the court that there would be adverse consequences if he did not appear for sentencing, was told by a State agent (a probation officer) that he was to fill out the presentence report as completely as possible, and was remanded into custody at the same time he was directed to complete the report. John also notes that the probation officer testified that it was his practice to “suggest ... that the more complete the picture that the court has when it comes to sentencing, the ‘fairer’ the sentence will be.” John testified that he believed he had no choice but to answer the questions in the presentence worksheet.
A trial judge considering a voluntariness challenge to the admission of a defendant‘s statement must conduct a three-step inquiry.19 First, the trial judge must find the external facts surrounding the statement.20 These findings will be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous.21 Second, from these facts, the trial judge must infer the internal mental state of the defendant.22 Third, the judge “must have assessed the legal significance of this inferred mental state“—whether the defendant made a voluntary waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights.23 As to the second and third findings, we examine the entire record and make independent determinations, based on the totality of the circumstances surrounding the statements sought to be suppressed.24 The circumstances relevant to the court‘s determination of voluntariness are “the age, mentality, and prior criminal experience of the accused; the length, intensity and frequency of interrogation; the existence of physical deprivation or mistreatment; and the existence of threat or inducement.”25 The prosecution must prove the voluntariness of the confession by a preponderance of the evidence.26
Superior Court Judge Ralph R. Beistline found that John was not subjected to interrogation and that his statement was voluntary. He found that John was alone and “simply had to fill [the statement] out, or not, as he chose, and certainly could stop any time he wanted.” He found that John did not face “specific threats.” Judge Beistline‘s factual findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. From our own review
John also claims that the statement should have been excluded under
In the superior court, John cited no case law supporting his claim that his statement should be excluded under
We note that there is case law from other jurisdictions excluding statements analogous to those John made,27 and there is case law that does not exclude such statements.28 In addition, the Commentary to
To insure fair treatment for defendants whose pleas are entered and later withdrawn or overturned, this rule provides that the slate should be wiped clean and that no part of the plea process can be used for impeachment or any purpose against the defendant in subsequent proceedings (unless made in court, and they are voluntary and reliable) or in a perjury prosecution.
However, the record does not reflect a ruling by the superior court on John‘s Evidence Rule 410 claim. Therefore, we express no opinion on the merits of this claim.
John‘s remaining argument is that due process was violated because his change of plea was a contract with the State that any actions “after his entry of [the] plea relevant to sentencing would be limited to that purpose.” However, John has cited no authority for this contract-based due process claim. Accordingly, we reject it.
John‘s remaining claims are based on the conduct of the trial in his case and we need not address them.
Conclusion
The judgment of the superior court is REVERSED.
MANNHEIMER, Judge, concurring.
I agree with my colleagues that this court misinterpreted
Since the mid-1960s, American appellate courts have been issuing decisions that are designated as “memorandum” or “unpublished” opinions. The use of unpublished decisions was in full swing when the Alaska Legislature created the Court of Appeals in 1980, and one of this court‘s early administrative acts was to promulgate a standing order governing the issuance of unpublished decisions.
In Standing Order No. 3 (issued March 20, 1981), this court adopted “Guidelines for
Paragraph 2 of the Publication Guidelines clarifies this policy by specifying that Court of Appeals decisions should not be published unless they meet one or more of the following criteria:
- (a) the opinion establishes a new rule of law [or] alters, clarifies[,] or modifies an existing rule; or
- (b) the opinion involves a legal issue of continuing public interest; or
- (c) the opinion criticizes existing law; or
- (d) the opinion resolves or comments upon an apparent conflict of authority.
If this court concludes that an opinion does not meet any of these criteria, the opinion will not be published. And to make sure that our appraisal of the opinion is binding, Paragraph 7 of the Publication Guidelines states that our unpublished decisions “[are to] be considered ... to have no precedential value.”
The original idea was that unpublished decisions would truly not be published—ie., not widely disseminated, and not printed in the reporters. Copies would be sent to the parties and to all judges in the state, but the opinion would not be distributed to the public at large, nor would it be sent to any legal publisher. Paragraph 6 of the Publication Guidelines states that memorandum opinions are to be routinely distributed
only to the parties and/or their respective counsel, to justices and judges of the State of Alaska, and to the Administrative Director of the Court System, provided, however, that [memorandum opinions] shall be available upon request through the office of the clerk of the appellate courts to the press and to all members of the public.
But in practice, distribution of our memorandum decisions has never been as limited as Paragraph 6 might suggest.
Because this court‘s jurisdiction is confined to criminal cases and other litigation arising from criminal cases, and because only a small percentage of the bar practices criminal law, this court has a fairly well-defined readership. There are three groups of lawyers whose professional duties motivate them to follow our decisions: judges, prosecutors, and criminal defense attorneys. Most of the prosecutors work for one state agency, the Alaska Department of Law. Moreover, a large number of the defense attorneys—and the ones who are most likely to litigate criminal appeals—are employed by (or work under contract with) one of two other state agencies: the Public Defender Agency and the Office of Public Advocacy. Our clerk‘s office routinely delivers copies of all of our memorandum opinions to these state agencies (even the decisions issued in cases not involving these agencies). So although this court has traditionally distributed only a few dozen copies of our memorandum decisions, those copies have always gone to essentially every judge and lawyer who regularly practices criminal law in this state.
In addition, our memorandum opinions are now readily available on the Internet. They can be found (and downloaded) at the Alaska Court System‘s web site (www.state.ak.us/courts/moj.htm), and they are also available through at least one of the electronic legal research services (West Publishing‘s “Westmate“).
In other words, our unpublished opinions are in fact “published” in the normal sense of the word: they are distributed to practically everyone who has a professional interest in reading them, and they are readily available to anyone else. It would seem, then, that our decision not to publish an opinion has only one real effect: as declared in Paragraph 7 of the Publication Guidelines, unpublished opinions “have no precedential value“. But even here, the reality is not what the Guidelines suggest.
One of the important tasks of lawyers and trial judges is to evaluate what an appellate court has done in the past and then, based on
Another fact of legal life in Alaska is that this court has only three members. In many states, the intermediate courts of appeal resemble the federal model: the courts are divided into districts or divisions, and each district or division often has many judges. In California, for example, there are six appellate districts and ninety-three intermediate appellate court judges.4 In such states, a memorandum decision issued by a single panel in a single district may have comparatively little weight, even within that district. But in Alaska, the same three judges decide almost every criminal appeal. Thus, even though our memorandum decisions may not be citable as legal precedent, they are a relatively good predictor of how this court will evaluate future cases.
Given all this, it is hardly surprising that trial judges and lawyers use our memorandum decisions in ways not contemplated by Paragraph 7 of the Publication Guidelines. It is not unusual to read a transcript of trial court proceedings in which the lawyers and the judge discuss one of our memorandum opinions because the decision is seemingly pertinent to the case before them. If pressed, they will acknowledge that the memorandum decision is not “precedent“, but they treat it as if it were precedent—because, for the purpose of predicting our future action, it practically is.
This fact was brought home to me when this court was working on the venue issue in John‘s case. We were trying to figure out what
Our discovery of Wilson in the Rules Attorney‘s file demonstrates a pitfall inherent in our system of “published” and “unpublished” decisions: so many of our decisions are unpublished that, given enough time and enough change of personnel, the court “forgets” that we issued those decisions. West Publishing only recently started including our memorandum decisions in their databases, so any memorandum decision issued more than a couple of years ago is very hard to find through normal search techniques. Wilson was issued twelve years ago, in October 1989. Even though Wilson contains a direct ruling on the venue issue presented in John‘s appeal, we did not know about that ruling until we found a copy of the decision in the Rules Attorney‘s file.
This problem of “lost” decisions is exacerbated by the rules that seemingly forbid attorneys from bringing our prior memorandum decisions to our attention. I do not know whether the attorneys in John‘s case were aware of Wilson. But if they were, they knew that Wilson was unpublished and therefore not “precedent“, and they probably concluded that there was no proper way for them to apprise us of Wilson‘s interpretation of
I am aware of the growing controversy over the propriety—even the legality—of ap-
Wilson is an example of an opinion that should have been published. In Wilson, this court construed
In the future, I promise to pay close attention to the Publication Guidelines when this court decides whether to publish an opinion. In addition, I encourage litigants to ask for publication of memorandum decisions that appear to meet the criteria found in Paragraph 2 of those Guidelines.
Appendix
GUIDELINES FOR PUBLICATION OF COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS
1. Statement of policy. It shall be the general policy of the Court of Appeals to avoid the use of lengthy opinions dealing with legal issues of little or no precedential value or of minimal public interest and to reduce the proliferation of published opinions. It is unnecessary for the court to issue fully explained, written opinions in every case. Similarly, it is unnecessary for the court to publish all decisions, whether explained or unexplained. The fact that a decision is unexplained or not published does not signify that the case is considered by the court to be unimportant. It does mean that, in the view of the court, no new points of law making the decision of value as precedent are believed to be involved.
2. Standard for publication of opinions. A decision of the [C]ourt of [A]ppeals shall not be designated for publication unless:
- (a) [t]he opinion establishes a new rule of law [or] alters, clarifies[,] or modifies an existing rule; or
- (b) the opinion involves a legal issue of continuing public interest; or
- (c) the opinion criticizes existing law; or
- (d) the opinion resolves or comments upon an apparent conflict of authority.
3. Decision to publish; publication of concurring and dissenting opinions. Decisions of the court shall be published only if the majority of the judges participating in the decision find that a standard for publication as set out in Section 2 of these guidelines is satisfied, except that an opinion shall be published if it is accompanied by a separate concurring or dissenting opinion, and the author of the separate opinion desires that it be published and distributed to regular subscribers. Dissenting or concurring opinions should be designated for publication only if the dissenting or concurring judge determines that a standard for publication as set out in Section 2 of these guidelines is satisfied. Any originally unpublished opinion, concurrence[,] or dissent of the [C]ourt of [A]ppeals may subsequently be published by order of the Alaska Supreme Court.
4. Partial publication. If a standard for publication as set out in Section 2 of these guidelines is satisfied as to only a part of a decision, the court may designate only that part for publication.
5. Time for deciding on publication. The members of the court shall, in each case, consider the question of whether or not to publish an opinion at the initial conference on the case[] and[,] at that time, make a tentative decision whether or not to publish.
6. Designation of decisions. All decisions that are found to satisfy a standard for publication as set forth in Section 2 of these
7. Precedential value of unpublished opinions. In keeping with the provisions of [A]ppellate [R]ule 214[,] unpublished decisions of the [C]ourt of [A]ppeals, whether in the form of MEMORANDUM OPINIONS [AND] JUDGMENTS or SUMMARY DISPOSITIONS, shall be considered by the court to have no precedential value.
Notes
First Judicial District (6): Angoon, Juneau, Ketchikan, Petersburg, Sitka, Wrangell
Second Judicial District (3): Barrow, Kotzebue, Nome
Third Judicial District (12): Anchorage, Cordova, Dillingham, Glennallen, Homer, Kenai, Kodiak, Naknek, Palmer, Seward, Unalaska, Valdez
Fourth Judicial District (4): Bethel, Delta Junction, Fairbanks, Tok
First Judicial District (6): Angoon, Juneau, Ketchikan, Petersburg, Sitka, Wrangell
Second Judicial District (3): Barrow, Kotzebue, Nome
Third Judicial District (12): Anchorage, Cordova, Dillingham, Glennallen, Homer, Kenai, Kodiak, Naknek, Palmer, Seward, Unalaska, Valdez
Fourth Judicial District (4): Bethel, Delta Junction, Fairbanks, Tok
By contrast, according to the 2000 census, the population of Tetlin is 117. Of those inhabitants, 111 identified themselves as Alaska Native, 3 identified themselves as mixed Alaska Native and white, and 3 identified themselves as white.
Tok has a population of 1393. Of those inhabitants, 1087 identified themselves as white, 179 identified themselves as Alaska Native, and 82 identified themselves as mixed Alaska Native and white.
This information is available at the following State of Alaska web site: http://146.63.75.45/census2000/Census-LV2.asp
(a) Evidence of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, or of an offer to plead guilty or nolo contendere to the crime charged or any other crime, or of statements or agreements made in connection with any of the foregoing pleas or offers, is not admissible in any civil or criminal action, case or proceeding against the government or an accused person who made the plea or offer if:
(i) A plea discussion does not result in a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, or
(ii) A plea of guilty or nolo contendere is not accepted or is withdrawn, or
(iii) Judgment on a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is reversed on direct or collateral review.