318 F.3d 545 | 3rd Cir. | 2003
ROTH, Circuit Judge:(cid:13) We review two Orders entered by the District Court for(cid:13) the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in connection with a(cid:13) claim brought under the Individuals with Disabilities(cid:13) Education Act, 20 U.S.C. SS 1400 et seq. (2002) (IDEA). For(cid:13) the reasons set forth below, we will affirm both Orders.(cid:13) First, the Delaware County Intermediate Unit (DCIU), the(cid:13) defendant before the District Court, asks us to reverse a(cid:13) Contempt Order requiring it to pay plaintiffs John T. and(cid:13) his parents Paul T. and Joan T. (hereinafter "John T.")(cid:13) $1,100 in compensation for the costs of its failure to(cid:13) comply with a Preliminary Injunction. The DCIU raises(cid:13) various objections regarding the nature of the contempt(cid:13) proceeding, the requirements of the Preliminary Injunction(cid:13) and the process to which the DCIU was entitled. We(cid:13) conclude that none of these objections has merit.(cid:13) Second, in a separate appeal, John T. asks us to reverse(cid:13) an Order that denied him attorney’s fees. Before reaching(cid:13) settlement and voluntarily dismissing his claim, John T.(cid:13) had obtained preliminary injunctive relief and a civil(cid:13) 3(cid:13) contempt order to enforce that relief. We must determine(cid:13) whether John T. then qualifies as a "prevailing party" under(cid:13) the IDEA fee-shifting provision. We hold that he does not.(cid:13) I. Facts and Procedural History(cid:13) John T. is a twelve year old mentally retarded child with(cid:13) Downs Syndrome. He lives with his family in the Haverford(cid:13) Township School District in Delaware County,(cid:13) Pennsylvania. From September 1993 until June 2000, John(cid:13) T. attended the St. Denis Elementary School, a non-profit,(cid:13) private school in Delaware County. Although John T.’s(cid:13) parents paid his St. Denis tuition, John T. received some(cid:13) publicly-funded special education programs and related(cid:13) services at St. Denis from the DCIU.(cid:13) The DCIU is charged by Pennsylvania law with the(cid:13) provision of special education services to children with(cid:13) disabilities attending private schools within Delaware(cid:13) County. See 24 P.S. SS 9-972.1 & 13-1372(4) (2002)(cid:13) (charging the Intermediate Units with the provision of(cid:13) proper education, training and "auxiliary services" for(cid:13) exceptional children not enrolled in public schools)(cid:13) (collectively, the Pennsylvania Statutes).(cid:13) During the summer of 1998, a dispute arose regarding(cid:13) the programs and services that DCIU was obligated to(cid:13) provide John T. for the 1998-99 school year. While the(cid:13) DCIU was willing to provide services to John T. at a public(cid:13) school, it refused to continue providing them at St. Denis.(cid:13) John T. and the DCIU were unable to resolve their dispute(cid:13) before the school year began. During the early months of(cid:13) that school year, the DCIU provided no programs or(cid:13) services to John T. and refused to provide the state due(cid:13) process hearing procedures outlined in the IDEA. During(cid:13) that time, John T.’s parents provided necessary programs(cid:13) and services to John T. at their own expense.(cid:13) On November 2, 1998, John T. filed a Complaint in the(cid:13) United States District Court for the Eastern District of(cid:13) Pennsylvania. Proceeding under the IDEA, John T. sought(cid:13) inter alia (1) compensation for the cost of providing(cid:13) programs and services during the first months of the 1998-(cid:13) 99 school year, (2) provision of needed programs and(cid:13) 4(cid:13) services for John T. at St. Denis during the remainder of(cid:13) the year, and (3) a due process hearing and other(cid:13) procedural safeguards provided by the IDEA.(cid:13) After hearing testimony and argument, the District Court(cid:13) issued a Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum Opinion(cid:13) on May 8, 2000. See John T. v. Delaware County(cid:13) Intermediate Unit, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6169 (E.D. Pa.(cid:13) May 8, 2000) (John T. I). The Preliminary Injunction ordered(cid:13) DCIU to "provide John T. with speech therapy, occupational(cid:13) therapy, a teacher’s aide,1 and an itinerant teacher,2 for(cid:13) secular subjects only, at levels reasonably calculated to(cid:13) afford meaningful educational progress in his current school(cid:13) program at St. Denis." Id. at *31 (emphasis added).3(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 1. "A teacher’s aide is a one-on-one assistant working directly with the(cid:13) [disabled] child, full time, to help the child perform in a mainstream(cid:13) classroom. A teacher’s aide minimizes the burden on the classroom(cid:13) teacher of caring for the special needs of a disabled child; for example,(cid:13) a teacher’s aide takes the disabled child out of the classroom for breaks(cid:13) and keeps the disabled child’s classroom materials in order." John T. I,(cid:13) 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6169 at n.3.(cid:13) 2. "An itinerant teacher, by consulting with a child’s classroom teacher,(cid:13) aids the classroom teacher in modifying the regular education(cid:13) curriculum to teach the [disabled] child." John T. I, 2000 U.S. Dist.(cid:13) LEXIS 6169 at n.2.(cid:13) 3. The DCIU questions the District Court’s interpretation of the IDEA(cid:13) with respect to this requirement. However, the DCIU waived the issue(cid:13) when it withdrew its direct appeal of the Preliminary Injunction.(cid:13) Accordingly, we will not resolve the issue here. A brief summary of the(cid:13) District Court’s analysis is helpful nevertheless to understand the(cid:13) context of the District Court’s rulings.(cid:13) The IDEA, itself, does not mandate that local educational agencies like(cid:13) the DCIU provide special education and related services to disabled(cid:13) children who voluntarily attend private schools. See 20 U.S.C.(cid:13) S 1412(a)(10)(C) (2002). However, in analyzing John T.’s likelihood of(cid:13) success on the merits, the District Court concluded that the obligations(cid:13) imposed upon the DCIU by the Pennsylvania Statutes are incorporated(cid:13) into the IDEA. See John T. I, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6169 at *14-*21. The(cid:13) District Court based this conclusion on a provision that states "[t]he(cid:13) term ‘free appropriate public education’ means special education and(cid:13) related services that . . . meet the standards of the State educational(cid:13) agency [(hereinafter SEA)]." 20 U.S.C.S 1401(8)(B). Because the IDEA(cid:13) 5(cid:13) The District Court explained that the crux of the issue(cid:13) between the parties was not the extent of the services that(cid:13) the DCIU was obligated to provide to John T., but whether(cid:13) the DCIU was obligated to provide services to John T. at St.(cid:13) Denis. See id. at *7. The court also set forth several findings(cid:13) of fact that supported its decision to keep John T. at St.(cid:13) Denis. Specifically, the court noted that previous attempts(cid:13) to move John T. to a public school had failed and that John(cid:13) T. benefitted from attending school at St. Denis because his(cid:13) two non-disabled siblings were students there. Ultimately,(cid:13) the District Court concluded that John T. "can only be(cid:13) educated effectively at St. Denis; he cannot receive an(cid:13) appropriate education at [the public elementary school]." Id.(cid:13) at *5.(cid:13) On May 25, 2000, the DCIU appealed the Preliminary(cid:13) Injunction and filed a motion to stay the injunction with(cid:13) the District Court. The parties apparently agree that the(cid:13) DCIU took no action to comply with the Preliminary(cid:13) Injunction between May 8 and June 19, 2000. On June 19,(cid:13) the District Court entered a second Order denying the(cid:13) DCIU’s motion to stay and compelling the DCIU to"comply(cid:13) with the preliminary injunction of May 8, 2000(cid:13) FORTHWITH under penalty of sanctions for contempt of(cid:13) court." The DCIU withdrew its appeal of the Preliminary(cid:13) Injunction on November 27, 2000.(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) requires states, under certain circumstances, to provide disabled(cid:13) children with a "free appropriate public education," the District Court(cid:13) reasoned that the IDEA effectively incorporates any higher, SEA(cid:13) standards into this obligation. (Implicitly, the District Court also(cid:13) concluded that the Pennsylvania Statutes created such higher, SEA(cid:13) standards.)(cid:13) Indeed, this Court, along with many other courts, has interpreted(cid:13) S 1401(8)(B) to incorporate heightened SEA requirements that are(cid:13) consistent with federal law. See, e.g., Michael C. ex rel. Stephen C. v.(cid:13) Radnor Twp. Sch. Dist., 202 F.3d 642, 652-53 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that(cid:13) a more stringent state pendency requirement would be incorporated into(cid:13) the IDEA, but concluding that the SEA regulation at issue was not more(cid:13) stringent than the IDEA). See also Geis v. Board of Educ., 774 F.2d 575,(cid:13) 581 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that an identical provision in the IDEA’s(cid:13) predecessor statute -- the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA) --(cid:13) incorporated heightened SEA standards).(cid:13) 6(cid:13) Over the remainder of the summer and the beginning(cid:13) months of the 2000-01 school year, the DCIU met with(cid:13) John T. and his parents and worked to develop an(cid:13) appropriate Individualized Education Program (IEP). During(cid:13) this process, the DCIU concluded that John T. needed a(cid:13) "life skills class" for 50% of his school day and that such a(cid:13) class could not be provided at St. Denis. For that reason,(cid:13) the DCIU issued a Notice of Recommended Assignment(cid:13) (NORA), proposing to move John T. to a public school(cid:13) within the Haverford Township School District.(cid:13) John T.’s parents refused to approve the NORA. They(cid:13) argued that the NORA and IEP conflicted with the(cid:13) Preliminary Injunction’s mandate that necessary programs(cid:13) and services be provided at St. Denis. On October 23, 2000,(cid:13) the DCIU filed a motion with the District Court to either(cid:13) vacate or modify the Preliminary Injunction in order to(cid:13) allow the DCIU to provide necessary programs and services(cid:13) at a public school.(cid:13) The parties dispute the extent to which the DCIU(cid:13) provided -- or even could have provided -- an itinerant(cid:13) teacher and a teacher’s aide for John T. at St. Denis during(cid:13) September 2000. John T. argues that no such services were(cid:13) provided to him by the DCIU during that month and that(cid:13) his parents located teacher’s aides at their own expense.(cid:13) The DCIU contends that it did provide some itinerant(cid:13) teacher services during September 2000 but that it had(cid:13) difficulty locating teacher’s aides during that month(cid:13) because of a shortage of job applicants.(cid:13) Dissatisfied with the proposed IEP and NORA, John T.(cid:13) sought and obtained a state administrative due process(cid:13) hearing. Pennsylvania Special Education Hearing Officer(cid:13) Linda Stengle presided over the hearing, which continued(cid:13) off and on from November 6, 2000, until January 4, 2001.(cid:13) On January 19, 2001, Hearing Officer Stengle released an(cid:13) order reaffirming the importance of John T.’s continued(cid:13) attendance at St. Denis and ordering the DCIU to modify(cid:13) John T.’s IEP accordingly. The DCIU appealed Hearing(cid:13) Officer Stengle’s order to the Pennsylvania Special(cid:13) Education Due Process Appeals Review Panel, which(cid:13) reversed Hearing Officer Stengle’s order on March 15, 2001.(cid:13) 7(cid:13) Before the Review Panel had ruled, however, the District(cid:13) Court ordered the DCIU to Show Cause why it should not(cid:13) be held in contempt for failing to comply with the(cid:13) Preliminary Injunction. On September 4, 2001, after(cid:13) conducting a hearing, the District Court entered an order(cid:13) finding the DCIU in civil contempt of the Preliminary(cid:13) Injunction for failing to provide an itinerant teacher or(cid:13) teacher’s aide during the month of September 2000. The(cid:13) Contempt Order required the DCIU to pay John T. $1,100(cid:13) to compensate him for providing services during September(cid:13) 2000 at his own expense. On September 18, 2001, the(cid:13) DCIU appealed the Contempt Order.(cid:13) Before the 2001-02 school year commenced, John T. and(cid:13) the DCIU were able to develop a mutually agreeable IEP(cid:13) pursuant to which John T. matriculated at a public school(cid:13) in the Haverford Township School District. Having thereby(cid:13) achieved the primary objective of his litigation before the(cid:13) District Court, i.e., obtaining a satisfactory IEP, John T.(cid:13) moved for voluntary dismissal of his Complaint pursuant to(cid:13) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a). John T. also moved(cid:13) for attorney’s fees of $136,172.79, arguing that he was a(cid:13) "prevailing party" under the fee-shifting provision of the(cid:13) IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. S 1415(i)(3)(B).(cid:13) By Memorandum and Order dated November 7, 2001, the(cid:13) District Court granted John T.’s motion for voluntary(cid:13) dismissal but denied his request for attorney’s fees. See(cid:13) John T. v. Delaware County Intermediate Unit, 2001 U.S.(cid:13) Dist. LEXIS 18254 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 7, 2001) (John T. II). John(cid:13) T. timely appealed the District Court’s refusal to award(cid:13) attorney’s fees.(cid:13) II. Jurisdiction and Standards of Review(cid:13) The District Court had jurisdiction over the instant case(cid:13) pursuant to 20 U.S.C. S 1415(i)(3)(A) (conferring jurisdiction(cid:13) over IDEA actions specifically) and 28 U.S.C. S 1331 (federal(cid:13) question jurisdiction). We have jurisdiction over this appeal(cid:13) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291.(cid:13) "The imposition of contempt is reviewed under an abuse(cid:13) of discretion standard and will only be disturbed if there is(cid:13) an error of law or a clearly erroneous finding of fact.(cid:13) 8(cid:13) [citation omitted] We determine on a plenary basis whether(cid:13) the district court committed an error of law." Harris v. City(cid:13) of Philadelphia, 47 F.3d 1342, 1349 (3d Cir. 1995).(cid:13) We typically review a decision to award or refuse(cid:13) attorney’s fees under the IDEA’s fee-shifting provision for(cid:13) an abuse of discretion. See Holmes ex rel. Holmes v.(cid:13) Millcreek Twp. Sch. Dist., 205 F.3d 583, 589 (3d Cir. 2000).(cid:13) However, where the legal standard applied by the district(cid:13) court is in question - as it is here - our review is plenary.(cid:13) See id.(cid:13) III. Discussion(cid:13) A. Contempt Order(cid:13) The DCIU makes several challenges to the District(cid:13) Court’s Contempt Order. First, the DCIU contends that,(cid:13) because it either complied with the Preliminary Injunction(cid:13) or at least made a good faith effort to comply, the Contempt(cid:13) Order was unwarranted. Second, the DCIU argues that the(cid:13) Preliminary Injunction was so vague and ambiguous that(cid:13) neither the DCIU nor the District Court could determine(cid:13) whether, as a matter of fact, the DCIU had complied with(cid:13) it. Third, the DCIU argues that the Contempt Order was(cid:13) criminal, not civil, so that the District Court erred by(cid:13) applying the wrong burden of proof in the contempt(cid:13) proceeding. Finally, the DCIU challenges the sufficiency of(cid:13) the notice for the contempt hearing. For the reasons stated(cid:13) below, we reject all of the DCIU’s contentions and affirm the(cid:13) Contempt Order.(cid:13) 1. The District Court did not Err in Concluding that(cid:13) the DCIU Failed to Comply with the Preliminary(cid:13) Injunction.(cid:13) "To prove civil contempt the court must find that (1) a(cid:13) valid court order existed, (2) the defendant had knowledge(cid:13) of the order, and (3) the defendant disobeyed the order."(cid:13) Harris, 47 F.3d at 1326. The DCIU appeals the District(cid:13) Court’s findings with respect to the third element, that the(cid:13) DCIU disobeyed the Preliminary Injunction. Because the(cid:13) District Court committed no clear error in making this(cid:13) finding of fact, we will affirm the Contempt Order.(cid:13) 9(cid:13) The Harris elements must be proven by "clear and(cid:13) convincing" evidence, and ambiguities must be resolved in(cid:13) favor of the party charged with contempt. See Robin Woods,(cid:13) Inc. v. Woods, 28 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 1994); Harris, 47(cid:13) F.3d at 1326. Notwithstanding this high evidentiary(cid:13) standard, the District Court’s finding was sufficiently(cid:13) supported. For example, the District Court credited the(cid:13) testimony of John T.’s mother that the DCIU failed to(cid:13) provide a teacher’s aide at all during September 2000.(cid:13) Moreover, Dr. Nancy Wybranski, the DCIU’s own Assistant(cid:13) Director of the Special Programs Division, admitted that(cid:13) there were some days during September 2000 on which the(cid:13) DCIU did not provide a teacher’s aide for John T.(cid:13) The DCIU’s related argument that the Contempt Order(cid:13) should be reversed because the DCIU made good faith(cid:13) efforts to comply with the Preliminary Injunction is also(cid:13) without merit. "Willfulness is not a necessary element of(cid:13) civil contempt," and, accordingly, "evidence .. . regarding(cid:13) . . . good faith does not bar the conclusion . . . that [the(cid:13) defendant] acted in contempt." Harley-Davidson, Inc. v.(cid:13) Morris, 19 F.3d 142, 148-49 (3d Cir. 1994).(cid:13) 2. The Preliminary Injunction is neither Vague nor(cid:13) Ambiguous.(cid:13) The DCIU next argues that the Preliminary Injunction(cid:13) was vague and ambiguous in its instruction to "provide(cid:13) John T. with speech therapy, occupational therapy, a(cid:13) teacher’s aide, and an itinerant teacher, for secular(cid:13) subjects only, at levels reasonably calculated to afford(cid:13) meaningful educational progress in his current school(cid:13) program at St. Denis." John T. I, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS(cid:13) 6169 at *31 (emphasis added). The DCIU argues that this(cid:13) vagueness and ambiguity made compliance so difficult to(cid:13) assess that the District Court committed legal error by(cid:13) entering the Contempt Order. See, e.g., Ideal Toy Corp. v.(cid:13) Plawner Toy Mfg. Corp., 685 F.2d 78, 84 (3d Cir. 1982)(cid:13) (" "[T]he person enjoined must . . .‘receive fair and precisely(cid:13) drawn notice of what the injunction actually prohibits.’ ")(cid:13) (quoting Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of(cid:13) Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 444 (1974)).(cid:13) The DCIU’s argument is significantly undercut, however,(cid:13) by the fact that "levels reasonably calculated to afford(cid:13) 10(cid:13) meaningful educational progress" is essentially the same(cid:13) standard by which any IEP is evaluated under the IDEA.(cid:13) See Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. for M.E., 172 F.3d 238,(cid:13) 247 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Board of Education v. Rowley, 458(cid:13) U.S. 176, 192 (1982)). In other words, the DCIU’s(cid:13) vagueness argument fundamentally attacks the courts’(cid:13) interpretations of the IDEA. Because the DCIU regularly(cid:13) develops and implements IDEA-compliant IEPs and the(cid:13) DCIU is, we assume, aware that any one of these IEPs may(cid:13) be subject to court review, we do not credit the DCIU’s(cid:13) claim that it is confused by this description of the standard(cid:13) required for John T.(cid:13) Reading the language of the Preliminary Injunction in(cid:13) light of relevant IDEA standards, the DCIU did have(cid:13) adequate notice of what the Preliminary Injunction(cid:13) required. See McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co. , 336 U.S.(cid:13) 187, 191-92 (1949) (holding that an injunction not to(cid:13) violate a statute is not too vague to serve as basis for(cid:13) contempt order and enjoined party could have sought(cid:13) clarification of injunction). Although the terms of the(cid:13) Preliminary Injunction may be vague or ambiguous when(cid:13) considered in a vacuum, they are given content by the vast(cid:13) amount of administrative and judicial interpretation to(cid:13) which they are subject. See Geis v. Board of Educ., 774(cid:13) F.2d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 1985).(cid:13) 3. The Contempt Order is Civil in Nature.(cid:13) The DCIU also argues that the District Court erred by(cid:13) failing to provide it with procedural safeguards, including(cid:13) the "reasonable doubt standard of proof " applicable in(cid:13) criminal contempt proceedings. This argument assumes(cid:13) that the contempt proceedings against the DCIU were(cid:13) criminal in nature, notwithstanding the District Court’s(cid:13) characterization of the proceedings as civil.(cid:13) In advancing this argument, the DCIU relies on United(cid:13) States v. Pozsgai, 999 F.2d 719, 735 (3d Cir. 1993), for the(cid:13) proposition that "[t]he purpose and nature of the sanction,(cid:13) rather than the label attached to it, determine whether [a(cid:13) contempt order] is civil or criminal." Id. The Pozsgai court(cid:13) held that a contempt order entered by a district court as a(cid:13) "civil" order was, in actuality, a "criminal" order which(cid:13) 11(cid:13) could not be entered without applicable procedural(cid:13) safeguards. Essential to the Pozsgai court’s determination,(cid:13) however, was its conclusion that the imposed sanctions(cid:13) bore two criminal characteristics. First, they were(cid:13) retroactive insofar as they sought to penalize previous(cid:13) violations. Second, they were punitive -- as opposed to(cid:13) remedial -- because they sought to vindicate the court’s(cid:13) authority rather than to compensate an aggrieved party.(cid:13) Pozsgai, 999 F.2d at 735. Because the Pozsgai sanctions(cid:13) had these characteristics, the court determined that the(cid:13) contempt could not be purged.(cid:13) The sanction imposed by the Contempt Order -- payment(cid:13) to John T. of $1,100 -- does not share the "criminal"(cid:13) qualities identified in Pozsgai. While the sanction is(cid:13) retroactive, it is not punitive in nature. The sanction was(cid:13) intended to compensate John T. for the costs associated(cid:13) with the DCIU’s failure to comply with the Preliminary(cid:13) Injunction, i.e., the costs of providing a teacher’s aide for(cid:13) one month.(cid:13) If civil contempt sanctions are not designed to punish,(cid:13) they may be retroactive. District courts hearing civil(cid:13) contempt proceedings are afforded broad discretion to(cid:13) fashion a sanction that will achieve full remedial relief. See(cid:13) McComb, 336 U.S. 187, 193-94. Often this discretion(cid:13) involves ordering payment for the costs of past non-(cid:13) compliance -- as, for example, in alimony contempt(cid:13) proceedings. See id. See also Pozsgai, 999 F.2d at 735(cid:13) ("Civil contempt is remedial in nature, serving to coerce(cid:13) compliance with a court order or to compensate the other(cid:13) party for losses sustained due to noncompliance.")(cid:13) (emphasis added). Moreover, the DCIU could purge its(cid:13) contempt by paying John T. the $1,100 and complying with(cid:13) the mandates of the Preliminary Injunction.(cid:13) The DCIU makes two arguments that the sanction was(cid:13) punitive, neither of which is persuasive. First, the DCIU(cid:13) argues that statements made by the District Court at the(cid:13) outset of the contempt hearing show an intent to punish.(cid:13) Specifically, the District Court stated that it was concerned(cid:13) with maintaining respect for the courts and coercing the(cid:13) DCIU’s compliance. Respect for the courts and coercion of(cid:13) compliance, however, may be legitimate consequences of(cid:13) 12(cid:13) any type of contempt proceeding. See Roe v. Operation(cid:13) Rescue, 919 F.2d 857, 868 (3d Cir. 1990). Even if the(cid:13) sanction had the tangential effect of increasing the DCIU’s(cid:13) respect for the District Court and coercing it to comply with(cid:13) the Preliminary Injunction, the statement alone does not(cid:13) render the sanction punitive.(cid:13) Second, the DCIU disputes the methodology by which the(cid:13) District Court arrived at the $1,100 sanction. The DCIU(cid:13) contends that if the calculation of the amount of the(cid:13) sanction was improper, it could not have been intended to(cid:13) compensate John T. Even if its methodology was not(cid:13) perfect, however, the District Court did articulate the(cid:13) relationship between the sanction and the actual damage(cid:13) suffered by John T. -- $1,100 is one-twelfth of the annual(cid:13) cost of providing a teacher’s aide. Accordingly, the District(cid:13) Court’s measure is consistent with its stated compensatory(cid:13) objective.(cid:13) Because the sanction imposed by the Contempt Order is(cid:13) not punitive, Pozsgai is distinguishable. Accordingly, there(cid:13) is no reason to upset the District Court’s characterization(cid:13) of the Contempt Order.(cid:13) 4. The Notice of the Contempt Hearing was(cid:13) Sufficient.(cid:13) Finally, the DCIU contends that the District Court’s order(cid:13) to Show Cause why the DCIU should not be found in(cid:13) contempt was not sufficiently particular. Specifically, the(cid:13) DCIU objects that the Show Cause Order neither identified(cid:13) whether the contempt proceeding would be civil or criminal(cid:13) in nature nor enumerated specific grounds for finding(cid:13) contempt. The Show Cause Order did, however, refer to(cid:13) both the Preliminary Injunction and Hearing Officer(cid:13) Stengle’s report. Because Hearing Officer Stengle’s report(cid:13) enumerated the specific instances in which the DCIU(cid:13) allegedly failed to comply with the Preliminary Injunction,(cid:13) we conclude that this notice was sufficient. Furthermore,(cid:13) the Show Cause Order indicates that the District Court(cid:13) conferred with both John T. and the DCIU on January 30,(cid:13) 2001, to discuss the implications of Hearing Officer(cid:13) Stengle’s report. To the extent the DCIU was not clear(cid:13) about the grounds on which it might be found in contempt(cid:13) 13(cid:13) or the nature of the contempt proceedings, it could have(cid:13) sought clarification at this conference.(cid:13) In seeking more particular notice, the DCIU argues that(cid:13) it should have been provided the notice required for(cid:13) criminal contempt, giving reasonable time for preparation of(cid:13) the defense. See Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal(cid:13) Procedure. As explained above, however, the contempt(cid:13) proceedings before the District Court were civil, not(cid:13) criminal. Accordingly, the notice requirements of Rule 42(b)(cid:13) are inapposite.(cid:13) B. Attorney’s Fees(cid:13) John T. argues that the District Court’s refusal to award(cid:13) him attorney’s fees was reversible error to the extent that it(cid:13) relied on Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West(cid:13) Virginia Dept. of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598(cid:13) (2001). John T. maintains that Buckhannon should not(cid:13) preclude an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to the fee-(cid:13) shifting provision of the IDEA for two reasons. First, he(cid:13) contends that Buckhannon does not apply to IDEA.(cid:13) Alternatively, and assuming arguendo that Buckhannon(cid:13) does apply, he argues that he is a "prevailing party" entitled(cid:13) to attorney’s fees under Buckhannon. We conclude first that(cid:13) Buckhannon does apply to the IDEA fee-shifting provision(cid:13) and second that the District Court did not err in declining(cid:13) to award attorney’s fees to John T.(cid:13) 1. Background.(cid:13) We begin our analysis of John T.’s appeal with the(cid:13) "American Rule" that parties typically are responsible for(cid:13) their own attorney’s fees. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v.(cid:13) Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975). Given this rule,(cid:13) we follow "a general practice of not awarding fees to a(cid:13) prevailing party absent explicit statutory authority." Key(cid:13) Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 819 (1994). As(cid:13) John T. and the District Court note, however, the fee-(cid:13) shifting provision of the IDEA does provide such explicit(cid:13) statutory authority. Section 1415(i)(3)(B) states,"In any(cid:13) action or proceeding brought under this section, the court,(cid:13) in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys’ fees as(cid:13) part of the costs to the parents of a child with a disability(cid:13) who is the prevailing party."(cid:13) 14(cid:13) The Supreme Court has held that "plaintiffs may be(cid:13) considered ‘prevailing parties’ for attorney’s fees purposes if(cid:13) they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which(cid:13) achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing(cid:13) suit." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)(cid:13) (quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-279 (1st(cid:13) Cir. 1978)). Accordingly, "[t]he touchstone of the prevailing(cid:13) party inquiry must be the material alteration of the legal(cid:13) relationship of the parties in a manner which Congress(cid:13) sought to promote in the fee statute." Texas State Teachers(cid:13) Ass’n v. Garland Independent School Dist., 489 U.S. 782,(cid:13) 792-93 (1989).4(cid:13) More recently, the Supreme Court further clarified its(cid:13) understanding of the term "prevailing party." In(cid:13) Buckhannon, the Supreme Court held that a litigant whose(cid:13) FFHA and ADA actions were mooted by intervening state(cid:13) legislation was not a "prevailing party" for purposes of the(cid:13) FFHA and ADA fee-shifting provisions. See 532 U.S. at 600-(cid:13) 01. Although the Buckhannon Court recognized that the(cid:13) plaintiff ’s suit might have been a "catalyst" of the(cid:13) defendant’s voluntary, legislative change, it held that the(cid:13) so-called "catalyst theory" was an insufficient basis on(cid:13) which to confer "prevailing party" status. See id. at 602.(cid:13) While the legislative change indisputably altered the legal(cid:13) relationship of the parties, it lacked an essential feature --(cid:13) namely, a "judicial imprimatur." Id. at 605 (emphasis(cid:13) omitted).(cid:13) The Buckhannon Court concluded that in order to be a(cid:13) "prevailing party," a party must be "successful" in the sense(cid:13) that it has been awarded some relief by a court . Id. at 603-(cid:13) 604. This concept of "success," however, is not inconsistent(cid:13) with a defendant’s concession or voluntary compliance. The(cid:13) Court acknowledged that a party benefitting from a(cid:13) settlement agreement, for example, could be a "prevailing(cid:13) party," provided the "change in the legal relationship of the(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 4. Although Hensley and Texas State Teachers Ass’n interpreted the fee-(cid:13) shifting provision of 42 U.S.C. section 1988, Hensley noted that its(cid:13) standards were "generally applicable in all cases in which Congress has(cid:13) authorized an award of fees to a ‘prevailing party.’ " Hensley, 461 U.S. at(cid:13) 433, n.7.(cid:13) 15(cid:13) parties" was in some way "judicially sanctioned." Id. at 605(cid:13) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court then reconciled this(cid:13) rule with its previous holdings, noting that it had"only(cid:13) awarded attorney’s fees where the plaintiff ha[d] received a(cid:13) judgment on the merits . . . or obtained a court-ordered(cid:13) consent decree." 532 U.S. at 605.(cid:13) Finally, in J.O. v. Orange Twp. Bd. of Educ., 287 F.3d(cid:13) 267 (3d Cir. 2002), we considered whether an IDEA litigant(cid:13) who obtained a stay-put order5 was a "prevailing party" for(cid:13) purposes of the IDEA fee-shifting provision. Noting that(cid:13) stay-put orders "function[ ], in essence as an automatic(cid:13) preliminary injunction" to maintain the status quo during(cid:13) the pendency of proceedings, we focused on the interim(cid:13) nature of the relief. Id. at 272 (quoting Drinker v. Colonial(cid:13) Sch. Dist., 78 F.3d 859, 864 (3d Cir. 1996)) (alteration in(cid:13) original). Although we recognized the importance of the(cid:13) interim relief that the IDEA provides, we held that such(cid:13) relief could only form the basis of an attorney’s fee award(cid:13) if it was in some way "merit-based." Id. at 273-74. Because(cid:13) the interim relief obtained in J.O. did not involve a(cid:13) resolution on the merits of a claim, we held that J.O. was(cid:13) not a prevailing party. See id. Significantly, the J.O.(cid:13) decision was decided on this independent basis and(cid:13) without reference to Buckhannon.(cid:13) 2. Buckhannon Applies to the IDEA Fee-Shifting(cid:13) Provision.(cid:13) We hold that Buckhannon applies to attorney’s fee claims(cid:13) brought under the IDEA fee-shifting provision. In doing so,(cid:13) we follow the reasoning articulated by the Second Circuit in(cid:13) J.C. v. Regional School Dist. 10, Bd. of Educ., 278 F.3d 119(cid:13) (2d Cir. 2002).(cid:13) We agree with J.C. that Buckhannon heralded its wider(cid:13) applicability -- although it dealt only with the fee-shifting(cid:13) provisions of the FFHA and the ADA. Specifically,(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 5. In relevant part, the stay-put provision of the IDEA provides that(cid:13) "during the pendency of any proceedings conducted pursuant to this(cid:13) section, unless the State or local educational agency and the parents(cid:13) otherwise agree, the child shall remain in the then-current educational(cid:13) placement of such child . . . ." 20 U.S.C. S 1415(j).(cid:13) 16(cid:13) Buckhannon noted that Congress has used identical(cid:13) "prevailing party" language in numerous fee-shifting(cid:13) provisions, see 532 U.S. at 602-03 (expressly identifying(cid:13) the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act(cid:13) Amendments of 1975 and the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees(cid:13) Awards Act of 1976 as examples), and explained that the(cid:13) Supreme Court interprets these fee-shifting provisions(cid:13) consistently. See 532 U.S. at n.4 (citing Hensley, 461 U.S.(cid:13) at 433, n. 7 ("[The standards used to interpret the term(cid:13) "prevailing party" are] generally applicable in all cases in(cid:13) which Congress has authorized an award of fees to a(cid:13) ‘prevailing party.’ ") (emphasis added)).(cid:13) The fee-shifting provision of the IDEA is no exception.(cid:13) The term "prevailing party" as it is used in Section(cid:13) 1415(i)(3) is not modified in any way. Moreover, as the J.C.(cid:13) court noted, the IDEA’s legislative history shows that(cid:13) Congress intended that courts interpret the term"prevailing(cid:13) party" consistently with other fee-shifting statutes,(cid:13) including those expressly mentioned in Buckhannon. See(cid:13) 278 F.3d at 124. When the fee-shifting provision was added(cid:13) to the IDEA’s predecessor statute, the Senate Labor and(cid:13) Human Resources Committee explained "it is the(cid:13) committee’s intent that the terms ‘prevailing party’ and(cid:13) ‘reasonable’ be construed consistently with the U.S.(cid:13) Supreme Court’s decision in [Hensley]." S. Rep. No. 99-112,(cid:13) at 13 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1798, 1803(cid:13) (footnote omitted).(cid:13) John T.’s arguments to the contrary ask us to distinguish(cid:13) the IDEA fee-shifting provision from the fee shifting(cid:13) provisions at issue in Buckhannon. John T. argues that(cid:13) S1415(i)(3), unlike the fee-shifting provisions of the ADA(cid:13) and the FFHA, clarifies at great length the effect of(cid:13) "settlement offers" and "final resolution" on attorney’s fee(cid:13) calculations. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. S 1415(i)(3)(D)-(G). He(cid:13) argues that this clarification is consistent with the IDEA’s(cid:13) policy of encouraging parents and school boards to pursue(cid:13) all types of amicable resolution -- whether or not judicially(cid:13) sanctioned. From this premise, he then concludes that(cid:13) Congress also intended to make attorney’s fees available for(cid:13) all plaintiffs who achieve such amicable resolutions.(cid:13) 17(cid:13) To the extent that John T. attempts to resurrect the(cid:13) "catalyst theory" as a basis of recovering attorney’s fees, his(cid:13) argument is "simply not viable after Buckhannon, which(cid:13) considered and rejected various policy arguments in favor(cid:13) of the catalyst theory." J.C., 278 F.3d at 124. Additionally,(cid:13) as the J.C. court noted,(cid:13) it is difficult to reconcile [the] policy argument for(cid:13) awarding fees pursuant to informal settlements with(cid:13) the fact that, even before Buckhannon, Congress(cid:13) deliberately chose not to allow the recovery of(cid:13) attorneys’ fees for participation in IEP proceedings that(cid:13) were not convened as a result of an administrative(cid:13) proceeding or judicial action. 20 U.S.C.(cid:13) S 1415(i)(3)(D)(ii). The IEP Team is a mechanism for(cid:13) compromise and cooperation rather than adversarial(cid:13) confrontation. This atmosphere would be jeopardized if(cid:13) we were to encourage the participation of counsel in(cid:13) the IEP process by awarding attorneys’ fees for(cid:13) settlements achieved at that stage.(cid:13) Id. at 124-25.(cid:13) Moreover, the provisions that John T. cites for support do(cid:13) not relate to the "prevailing party" requirement. Rather,(cid:13) SS 1415(i)(3)(D) through (G) define situations in which(cid:13) attorney’s fees may be prohibited or reduced, e.g., when a(cid:13) parent has unjustifiably rejected a settlement offer or when(cid:13) a parent has unreasonably protracted the final resolution.(cid:13) John T. contends that our reading of Section 1415(i)(3)(cid:13) will create a perverse incentive for parents to protract(cid:13) litigation with the hope of receiving some previously-(cid:13) incurred attorney’s fees rather than settling with the(cid:13) certainty of receiving no attorney’s fees. This argument(cid:13) "puts the cart before the horse" as it assumes that litigation(cid:13) decisions are driven by a desire to collect or to avoid paying(cid:13) attorney’s fees -- and not by the litigants’ interests. Even(cid:13) under fee-shifting regimes such as S 1415(i)(3) and the(cid:13) "generous formulation" that the Supreme Court gives the(cid:13) term "prevailing party," Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433,(cid:13) attorney’s fee awards ultimately are awarded at a court’s(cid:13) discretion. Because attorney’s fees are never guaranteed, we(cid:13) question that litigation would be protracted for the sole(cid:13) purpose of winning an award.(cid:13) 18(cid:13) Finally, to the extent that John T. invites us to interpret(cid:13) anew the term "prevailing party" in light of the IDEA(cid:13) policies, we decline to do so. Section 1415(i)(3) in no way(cid:13) alters the term’s established meaning. The Buckhannon(cid:13) Court expressly warned that(cid:13) [g]iven the clear meaning of "prevailing party" in the(cid:13) fee-shifting statutes, we need not determine which way(cid:13) . . . various policy arguments cut. In Alyeska , . . . we(cid:13) said that Congress had not "extended any roving(cid:13) authority to the Judiciary to allow counsel fees as costs(cid:13) or otherwise whenever the courts might deem them(cid:13) warranted." To disregard the clear legislative language(cid:13) and the holdings of our prior cases on the basis of . . .(cid:13) policy arguments would be a similar assumption of a(cid:13) "roving authority."(cid:13) 532 U.S. at 610 (citations omitted).(cid:13) 3. The District Court did not err in Declining to(cid:13) Award John T. Attorney’s Fees because John T. is(cid:13) not a Prevailing Party.(cid:13) Having concluded that Buckhannon controls the(cid:13) interpretation of "prevailing party" as it is used in(cid:13) S 1415(i)(3)(B), we next consider whether John T. is, in fact,(cid:13) a prevailing party to whom attorney’s fees may be awarded.(cid:13) Because we conclude that he is not, we will affirm the(cid:13) District Court’s Order denying him attorney’s fees. In doing(cid:13) so, however, we adopt a somewhat broader view of(cid:13) "prevailing party" than did the District Court which held(cid:13) that a prevailing party must have (1) received a judgment(cid:13) on the "merits" of the litigation, or (2) obtained a court-(cid:13) ordered consent decree. Our broader view is consistent with(cid:13) our holding in Truesdell v. Phila. Hous. Auth. , 290 F.3d 159(cid:13) (3d Cir. 2002), where we held that a stipulated settlement(cid:13) could confer prevailing party status under certain(cid:13) circumstances. See id. at 165 (finding stipulated settlement(cid:13) "judicially sanctioned" under Buckhannon where it (1)(cid:13) contained mandatory language, (2) was entitled "Order," (3)(cid:13) bore the signature of the District Court judge, not the(cid:13) parties’ counsel, and (4) provided for judicial enforcement).(cid:13) Under this interpretation, John T. is still not a prevailing(cid:13) party under Buckhannon and J.O. We begin our analysis by(cid:13) 19(cid:13) focusing on John T.’s successes. Specifically, John T.(cid:13) obtained three forms of relief during the course of this(cid:13) litigation: the Preliminary Injunction, the Contempt Order,(cid:13) and the acceptable IEP that prompted him to seek a(cid:13) voluntary dismissal. As discussed below, none of these(cid:13) forms of relief will serve as the basis for conferring(cid:13) prevailing party status upon John T. We address each in(cid:13) turn.(cid:13) a. The Preliminary Injunction(cid:13) The Preliminary Injunction is an insufficient basis on(cid:13) which to award attorney’s fees to John T. because it is(cid:13) interim relief not based on the merits of John T.’s claims.(cid:13) Like the stay-put order at issue in J.O., the Preliminary(cid:13) Injunction was "designed to maintain the status quo during(cid:13) the course of proceedings." J.O., 287 F.3d at 272.(cid:13) Specifically, it required the DCIU to continue providing(cid:13) John T. with special education programs and related(cid:13) services at St. Denis.(cid:13) Also like the stay-put order in J.O., the Preliminary(cid:13) Injunction was not merits-based. Although the District(cid:13) Court concluded that John T. "ha[d] shown a reasonable(cid:13) probability of success on the merits," it did not resolve any(cid:13) merit-based issue in John T.’s favor. John T. I , 2000 U.S.(cid:13) Dist. LEXIS 6169 at *9. In fact, all of John T.’s claims(cid:13) against the DCIU ultimately were dismissed with prejudice(cid:13) at his own request. See John T. II, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS(cid:13) 18254 at *23.(cid:13) Accordingly, J.O. controls, and John T. cannot be deemed(cid:13) a prevailing party based on the Preliminary Injunction(cid:13) alone. J.O. binds us independently, and Buckhannon does(cid:13) not require a different result. While J.O. presents IDEA(cid:13) claimants with a hurdle unidentified in Buckhannon, it is(cid:13) not inconsistent with Buckhannon. Before this Court,(cid:13) therefore, the requirements of both J.O. and Buckhannon(cid:13) govern claims brought under the IDEA fee-shifting(cid:13) provision.(cid:13) b. The Contempt Order(cid:13) Similarly, the Contempt Order will not confer prevailing(cid:13) party status upon John T. This relief is, however, more(cid:13) 20(cid:13) difficult to analyze within the framework of our existing(cid:13) precedent. While the Contempt Order certainly effected a(cid:13) "judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the(cid:13) parties," Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605, it is difficult to(cid:13) ascertain whether it is "interim" or "merits-based" relief in(cid:13) the sense contemplated by J.O., 287 F.3d at 273.(cid:13) On one hand, the District Court finally determined the(cid:13) DCIU’s contempt by applying the "merits" of civil contempt(cid:13) -- that (1) a valid court order existed, (2) the DCIU knew of(cid:13) the order, and (3) the DCIU disobeyed the order. See Harris,(cid:13) 47 F.3d at 1326. Accordingly, the Contempt Order may be(cid:13) characterized as both non-"interim" and "merits-based"(cid:13) with respect to the law governing contempt orders(cid:13) generally.(cid:13) On the other hand, John T. seeks attorney’s fees(cid:13) pursuant to the IDEA fee-shifting provision -- and not, for(cid:13) example, as an additional sanction for the DCIU’s civil(cid:13) contempt. From this perspective, it is decisive that the(cid:13) Contempt Order was merely a mechanism to enforce the(cid:13) Preliminary Injunction. With respect to the IDEA claims,(cid:13) therefore, the Contempt Order can be neither less"interim"(cid:13) nor more "merits-based" than the Preliminary Injunction,(cid:13) itself.(cid:13) We conclude that we must consider the Contempt Order(cid:13) in its relation to the underlying relief that it enforces. In(cid:13) many respects, the scope of any civil contempt order is(cid:13) both defined and limited by the relief it enforces. For(cid:13) example, it is well settled that the viability of a civil(cid:13) contempt order entered either to remedy past non-(cid:13) compliance or to coerce future compliance with a(cid:13) preliminary injunction hinges on the validity of the(cid:13) underlying injunction. See United States v. United Mine(cid:13) Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 295 (1947) ("The right to [a civil(cid:13) contempt order’s] remedial relief falls with an injunction(cid:13) which events prove was erroneously issued."); Latrobe Steel(cid:13) Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 545 F.2d 1336,(cid:13) 1345-46 (3d Cir. 1976) (extending rule to coercive-- as(cid:13) opposed to remedial -- civil contempt orders). Additionally,(cid:13) under some circumstances, the appealability of a civil(cid:13) contempt order is contingent on the finality of the(cid:13) proceedings giving rise to the order. See, e.g. , 15B Charles(cid:13) 21(cid:13) Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and(cid:13) Procedure S 3917 (1992). We extend this general principle(cid:13) to conclude that a contempt order may not confer(cid:13) prevailing party status for purposes of the IDEA fee-shifting(cid:13) provision unless it enforces some IDEA relief that could,(cid:13) itself, confer prevailing party status. In any other situation,(cid:13) the party seeking the contempt order must seek relief for(cid:13) costs and fees as appropriate in the contempt proceeding --(cid:13) as indeed the District Court indicated in denying the(cid:13) attorney’s fee under IDEA: "Plaintiffs, should they(cid:13) successfully defend the contempt finding on appeal, may(cid:13) resubmit a motion for fees on that issue alone . . .."(cid:13) The Supreme Court’s instruction to consider that"which(cid:13) Congress sought to promote in the fee statute" underscores(cid:13) the importance of focusing on the underlying IDEA relief.(cid:13) Texas State Teachers Ass’n, 489 U.S. at 793. By enacting(cid:13) the IDEA fee-shifting provision, Congress surely did not(cid:13) seek to provide attorneys fees to any party who could prove(cid:13) the "merits" of civil contempt independent of an IDEA(cid:13) success. More likely, Congress sought to provide fees only(cid:13) to those who prevailed with respect to an IDEA claim. When(cid:13) the IDEA fee-shifting provision authorizes attorneys fees "in(cid:13) any action or proceeding brought under this section," it not(cid:13) only limits the universe to which it applies but also clarifies(cid:13) the type of proceeding on which a party must"prevail." 20(cid:13) U.S.C. S 1415(i)(3). Under J.O., the Preliminary Injunction is(cid:13) an insufficient basis on which to deem John T. a prevailing(cid:13) party. Accordingly, the Contempt Order that enforces it is(cid:13) also insufficient.(cid:13) c. The Acceptable IEP(cid:13) Finally, John T. is not a prevailing party by virtue of his(cid:13) having obtained an acceptable IEP. Although John T.(cid:13) undoubtedly realized an objective of his litigation upon(cid:13) obtaining an acceptable IEP which placed him in the public(cid:13) schools, this result was not "judicially sanctioned" as(cid:13) required by Buckhannon. 532 U.S. at 605. John T. and the(cid:13) DCIU developed the IEP through negotiations out of court,(cid:13) and no court has endorsed the agreement with a "judicial(cid:13) imprimatur." Id.(cid:13) 22(cid:13) John T. argues to the contrary that we are not bound by(cid:13) Buckhannon’s requirement that settlements must be(cid:13) "judicially sanctioned" in order to confer prevailing party(cid:13) status. For this proposition, he cites Barrios v. California(cid:13) Interscholastic Federation, 277 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir.) cert.(cid:13) denied 123 S.Ct. 98 (2002).(cid:13) In Barrios, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed(cid:13) Buckhannon’s conclusions regarding settlement agreements(cid:13) as dictum. See 277 F.3d at n.5. In doing so, however, the(cid:13) court distinguished Buckhannon on very narrow grounds. It(cid:13) argued that Buckhannon applies only where litigation is a(cid:13) catalyst for policy change, such as intervening legislation,(cid:13) and not where litigation is a catalyst for mutually agreed(cid:13) upon settlement. See id. (In fact, the Barrios court(cid:13) discusses settlement as if it fell outside of the"catalyst(cid:13) theory" framework altogether.) Instead, the Barrios court(cid:13) relied on the Ninth Circuit’s pre-Buckhannon rule that(cid:13) settlements could confer prevailing party status with or(cid:13) without judicial sanction. See id. at 1134 (citing Fischer v.(cid:13) SJB-P.D. Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1118 (9th Cir. 2000)).(cid:13) We will not follow Barrios’s narrow reading of(cid:13) Buckhannon. Although Buckhannon did warn against(cid:13) relying on dictum, see 532 U.S. at n.5 (implying that the(cid:13) "catalyst theory," itself, was spawned from Supreme Court(cid:13) dictum), it also cast a very broad net. By expressly linking(cid:13) its holding to other "prevailing party" fee-shifting statutes,(cid:13) the Buckhannon Court encourages an expansive reading.(cid:13) See id. at 602-03. Moreover, we read Buckhannon to reject(cid:13) the "catalyst theory" whole hog. While Barrios differentiates(cid:13) between policy changes and changes achieved through(cid:13) voluntary settlement, the Supreme Court’s own(cid:13) understanding of the "catalyst theory" does not reflect such(cid:13) a distinction. See 532 U.S. at 601 ("[T]he ‘catalyst theory’(cid:13) . . . posits that a plaintiff is a ‘prevailing party’ if it achieves(cid:13) the desired result because the lawsuit brought about a(cid:13) voluntary change in the defendant’s conduct.").(cid:13) IV. Conclusion(cid:13) We will affirm the District Court’s Contempt Order. The(cid:13) District Court’s finding that the DCIU was in contempt is(cid:13) 23(cid:13) sufficiently supported. The Preliminary Injunction was not(cid:13) overly vague or ambiguous. The DCIU was not entitled to(cid:13) the procedural safeguards applicable in criminal contempt(cid:13) proceedings. In addition, the Show Cause Order provided(cid:13) the DCIU with sufficient notice of the contempt hearing.(cid:13) We will also affirm the District Court’s denial of the(cid:13) petition for attorney’s fees. Under J.O. and Buckhannon,(cid:13) which we apply expressly to the IDEA fee shifting provision,(cid:13) John T. is not a "prevailing party" by virtue of his having(cid:13) obtained the Preliminary Injunction, the Contempt Order or(cid:13) the acceptable IEP.(cid:13) A True Copy:(cid:13) Teste:(cid:13) Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals(cid:13) for the Third Circuit(cid:13) 24(cid:13)
