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John S. Freund v. Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General
165 F.3d 839
11th Cir.
1999
Check Treatment

*1 part, part, in necessarily AFFIRMED VACATED counts which was these added REMANDED. Quintero’s in the first favor decided money involve Although counts and 27 account, bank from Swiss

transferred (which in- count 21 acquittal on money from the Swiss

volved the transfer account) government not

bank does bar 27. retrying Quintero 25 and on counts

Quintero argued that he not involved money bank from the Swiss

the transfer Remy’s The evi- trust account. account FREUND, Petitioner-Appellant, S. John Quinte- Remy, that it was not dence showed ro, money trans- requested that be who But the Swiss bank account. ferred from BUTTERWORTH, Attorney A. Robert prove government did not the fact that General, Respondent-Appellee. trans- Quintero conducted the financial trying preclude it from action does No. 93-5317. Quintero subsequent trans- financial deposits involving Appeals, from the Swiss actions United States Court of Eleventh Circuit. personal account account to bank $25,000 pay of credit. using off a line Jan. presented and docu- government direct in- showing Quintero’s mentary evidence Thus, those transactions.

volvement acquittal on count 21 does not resolve

an ultimate issue counts 25 and jury’s

Additionally, the determination

Quintero agree participate in the did not 1956(a)(1) gov-

§ conspiracy not bar does Quintero trying the sub-

ernment from 1956(a)(1) charged in §

stantive offenses 31, 33, 25, 27, 30, of the third

counts and 34 agree- indictment

superseding because 1956(a)(1) § an ulti- is not

ment violate Similarly, an

mate fact these counts. 1956(a)(1) §

agreement to violate is not conspiracy to or element of a

ultimate fact 1956(a)(2)(A). Accordingly, § collat-

violate estoppel apply counts.

eral does to these and our

Based on our review the record estoppel principles, collateral

application of

we court’s affirm the district 18(b), 18(c), refusing

order dismiss Counts superseding indictment. 19 of the third

However, part of the order we vacate that 18(a), 27, 30, 31,

dismissing Counts superseding the third

and 34 of indictment proceedings this ease for

and remand further opinion. with this

consistent *3 Gables, FL, Morris, for Peti-

Paul Coral tioner-Appellant. Fried, Asst. Flaherty, Myra J.

Melvina Beach, FL, Gen., for Re- Palm Atty. West spondent-Appellee. HATCHETT, Judge, and Chief
Before EDMONDSON, TJOFLAT, ANDERSON, BLACK, BIRCH, DUBINA, COX, MARCUS, CARNES, Circuit HULL and Judges.

HATCHETT, Judge: Chief appeals Freund John Appellant-petitioner petition for of his court’s denial the district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. corpus of habeas writ jury court Florida state § first-degree murder convicted Ralph Walker. stabbing death petition was that he crux of Freund’s right under the Sixth his deprived of assis- to effective Amendments Fourteenth lawyers because his trial counsel tance of interest significant conflicts under labored rep- from their primarily that stemmed non-testifying, sepa- resentation codefendant, Ad- Trent. John rately-tried concerning issues dressing impression first standard of law and applicable rules and no review, finding conflict no actual effect, affirm. we adverse murder, he the time of the area. Around FACTS1 I.HISTORICAL Palm Beach apartment in an at the lived on the Persons Background Six A. Although building doorper- had a Hotel. at the Murder Scene Present security son, attendants front desk John Freund usually his door answered guards, pistol. When loaded .45 caliber waving a practiced oncol- John Before visited, he often had them use cocaine Beach, friends cancer, in Palm treatment of ogy, the any- immediately before did him enjoyed reputation excellent Florida. He thing else. community profes- for both his in the medical personal demeanor. expertise and sional to have ties with the local Trent claimed colleagues, Freund to most of Unknown *4 through his work as a confidential police depression. In from severe bouts suffered bragged that he had the He informant. home, 1983, attempted suicide at he June Department and Palm Beach Police West large doses of narcot- injecting himself with County “in his Beach Sheriffs Office Palm unconscious, him found police A officer ics. significant influ- pocket.” He back wielded and CAT subsequent psychological tests persons, using them other ence over several significant brain brain indicated scans of his drug dealings, prosti- work as further his Among oxygen. a lack of damage due to tutes, him, out” those who entertain “take memory, impaired symptoms were Freund’s perform him trouble and various other gave behavior, intelligence, inappropriate reduced at persons such tasks. Four plan- foresight and judgment, lack of poor night apartment,-along with on the influences, and a amenability to others’ ning, murder: three testified Freund’s appreciate the ability reason and reduced trial and the fourth was the victim.2 Consequently, actions. consequences of his suspended, and never care officials health 3.Eleanor Mills reinstated, privileges. hospital was Eleanor persons The first of these Trent John ran a female escort service and Mills. Mills attempt, Freund be- the suicide Before drugs. early In an frequently used Trent, of his the son of one friended John police officer arrested her after undercover and Trent’s patients. Although Freund kilogram him a of co- attempted she to sell they point, rekin- friendship at some soured detention, pretrial Mills met caine. While attempt. Trent suicide dled it after Freund’s Trent, suggested that then a someone who regain hospital promised help his Mills, help stranger could her with the enjoyed reputation privileges. Trent April In weeks drug charges. several illicit, though influence wielding significant, murder, released Mills the court before community. in the Palm Beach bail, arranged to meet Trent at and she practice, design apartment. his usual legitimate interior Trent owned they greeted gun Mills with a hand and Draperies, but his called House of business immediately Impressing consumed cocaine. a full-time criminal. He occupation main (both community, power in drugs with his heavily in use Mills involved himself First, ways. sale), help in he offered at least two prostitution. When violence (Foley, Mills to the law Colton properties failed referred tenants of his several rental P.A.) Duncan, him. time, represented them and pay their rent on Trent had Second, having discussed her serve as kept than one resi- assaulted. Trent more (and police. with the local girlfriend) the Palm Beach informant dence persons testified at Trent’s 2. These three much the factual and collateral 1. We borrow background preceded verbatim from trial. Trent and review information which Freund's Butterworth, panel's opinion. See Freund v. testify at either trial. Freund did (11th Cir. 117 F.3d 1997), vacated, 1547-70 & nn. 1-60 (11th Cir.1998) 135 F.3d 1419 rehearing (granting suggestion en State's banc). room, adjoined. In the main kitchen that the Angelilli 4.Lisa consuming hours next several spent the Angelilli, also testi- daughter, Lisa Mills’s He re- also drank bourbon. cocaine. Trent Mills At the time that at Freund’s trial. fied in a shoulder with the .45 mained armed associated, Angelilli was and Trent became holster; lay on the magnum pistol also a .357 mother, she years Like her old.3 sixteen they sat. where table Angelilli Mills told frequently drugs. used op- anxiously awaited about Trent. She evening, Angelilli announced Later man drugs with a to meet and use portunity marijuana. Eager to im- that she wanted influence. of his and told Angelilli, Trent called Walker press marijuana apartment. him bring

5.Bill Daniell later, arrived. thirty minutes Walker About all snorted co- party continued: four third material witness Bill Daniell was the caine; marijua- Angelilli and Walker smoked ex-convict, An Daniell trial. at Freund’s bourbon; na; drank Trent drank Walker Draperies as an electri- at House of worked drank and snorted more tequila. Walker jobs” for performed several “odd cian and than the others. Trent, trafficking. He had including drug years, and for over thirteen known Trent point, Trent and started At some Walker *5 bodyguard him as his introduced Trent often past exploits. Trent and Walker to discuss “hit man.” and escalating increasingly loud. The became very Mills nervous. of tension made level 6.Ralph Walker night, p.m. p.m. and Between stabbing Finally, Ralph Walker was Angelilli that he wanted whispered to Walker tasks for performed various victim. Walker ignored her. she have sex with When Trent, drugs collect- He obtained for Trent. yelled him, jumped around and got upset, he that Trent properties ed rent on various implored Trent to at her. Mills obscenities Trent want- assaulted whomever owned and down, assured her but Trent calm Walker Trent, had a vio- Like Walker ed harmed. just “playing around.” was that Walker temperament. lent Walker, however, enraged. became more bat from an aluminum baseball He retrieved B. The Murder4 it onto the and slammed Trent’s bedroom Preceding Events everyone that announced to table. Walker Angelilli, and have sex with going he was surrounding the mur- of the events Most ignore it. just have to Trent would at Trent’s Palm that occurred der of Walker magnum picked up the .357 then in the Walker apartment. Hotel Sometime Beach Angelilli moved toward July from the table and early evening Tuesday, afternoon in the in hand and the bat gun one Angelilli arrived at with Mills and frightened and Mills became Angelilli other. Trent had invited Mills apartment.5 Trent. Trent hide behind and tried to come over so that he could Angelilli to and magnum out Walker’s Angelilli. knocked the .357 them and meet cocaine with use for the .45 reached course, his hand. When Walker the door with Trent answered Of holster, pulled out Trent Trent’s shoulder The entrance to the pistol hand. .45 Walker fired it toward Walker. A first and through the bedroom. apartment dining bullet hit a over a couch. The dining to a dived hallway led from the bedroom room”) (the chair, Trent missed Walker. room but living area “main and room room court, testimony light most favorable Angelilli their trial testified in 3. At the time she the State. eighteen years old. unclear. Mills of arrival is following 5.The exact time factual account of 4. We derive the they Mills, police arrived at 3 initially testimony told An- Walker's death from the they did not at trial that p.m., she testified We note but gelilli Daniell at Freund's trial. they Angelilli p.m. testified that light arrive before conflicted. where their conviction, however, p.m. at 4 view arrived we must Freund's couch, pills pointed gun at crushed the around the bottle of vodka. Freund walked head threatened to kill Walker. that he in the powder Walker’s into a dissolved vodka. Freund, Trent Daniell all took turns Walker, Keeping pointed at Trent the .45 After injecting Walker with the mixture. an get pair out instructed Mills to handcuffs injection, would Walker lose consciousness As Mills retrieved the of his kitchen closet. revived, they short time. When he handcuffs, con- she noticed closet inject again. him pills. guns, Trent instruct- tained knives gun while handcuffed ed Mills hold gruesome These events overcame Mills his back. then Walker’s hands behind Trent Angelilli, from the who retreated main Angelilli bring fight- him the told Gerber They room to Trent’s bedroom. could still ing knife from the closet. With the knife groaning agony, hear Walker other, pro- gun one hand and Trent begged Trent to let them Trent leave. re- (but Walker, lunge to kick ceeded fused, he and a but hotel doorman escorted stab) repeatedly yell him knife and with the apartment them to another within hotel. threats, Ralph dead including “You’re Walk- later, Approximately twenty minutes when you’re goin’ You’re ... and home er! dead returned, Mills, Angelilli Mills and Trent told your He gagged mama in a box.” take him “We had to out. He knows too strapped tape Walker with towel and duct much and we had run an air bubble to his mouth. around Walker’s vein.” point, picture. At entered the Freund injected Freund and Trent air had indeed called Daniell and Bruce Full- Walker, into but it did kill him. erton, henchmen, another his for assis- one of expressed surprise to Daniell and Trent come over tance. asked injections the air not caused bag” “little to sedate Walker. with his black *6 After watching embolism. Freund and Trent bring Trent told to come over and his Daniell repeatedly pull plunger way the all out the “piece.” bring He Fullerton instructed syringe pop stuck Walker’s arm and the trunk, sledge hammer a chain steamer and plunger hilt, in to the back Daniell decided Freund Daniell Trent’s saw. and followed joined anymore could not watch and instructions, ignored but Fullerton them. stayed the in the women bedroom. Freund first, minutes Freund arrived about fifteen Walker, room with the main while Trent (but kill) phone after the call. To sedate not split the time between main room and the ordered, injected as Trent Walker Freund bedroom. magnesium with sulfate from his Walker bag.6 shortly Daniell arrived after Stabbing 2. The injecting Freund while was still Walker.7 Walker, got When Daniell close to he heard bedroom, From the saw Daniell Freund through him mumble duet tape, the “Don’t pick up fighting as Trent’s Gerber knife if multiple injections, kill let them me.” After toy” “he found a new and walk in had magnesium Freund ran out of sulfate. Walk- of Walker. direction Trent entered bed- er was still conscious. room. asked Freund Daniell him what was replied diazepam doing, Trent found and Trent that Freund some his kitchen “was gave He along probably fucking Ralph closet.8 it to Freund awith in the ass.”9 Magnesium drug Diazepam a mild sulfate is muscle relaxer. is a used to counter the Oncologists frequently drug anxiety use this treat and effects of alcohol withdrawal. symptoms arising chemotherapy and to re- plenish magnesium body with lost jury 9. At Freund's court instructed during therapy. hearsay disregard Daniell’s re- counting quote this statement. Trent’s We out- arrived, 7. Daniell was when he soon not for sober but of-court statement the “truth mat- Trent, asserts, joined Angelilli consuming point ter" Mills and that he but to out that Trent cocaine. Freund did not use cocaine at Trent's was Walker, in the main room when Freund stabbed apartment knowledge night. expressed The record not re- and that Trent no does cocaine, killing veal whether that Freund him. Freund used other Daniell was Fla. intoxicant, (1998). (l)(c) § before he arrived. Stat. 90.801 them, joined began the three soon and Angelilli to the bath- point, At one walked however, They, left up apartment. way, see into the clean her she could room. On body the floor behind the couch. Although could not see Walker’s on room. she main removing and Fullerton discussed was the floor behind Trent because he Walker couch, body Freund in a steamer trunk. Freund arrived at could see Freund. she Thursday laughing apartment around a.m. morn- in his hand. He was had the knife Trent, stabbing ing. motions Freund and Mills sat around making up-and-down cocaine, dining snorting drinking Although Angelilli appar- room table couch. behind the landed, talking They the knife for several hours. dis- ently could not see where body. stabbing dispose of cussed how to Walker’s positive that Freund she Horrified, During night, Freund acted oblivi- Angelilli ran into the entire Walker. returning corpse sprawled close to ous to Walker’s and vomited before bathroom dining room table. Freund left the bedroom. early Thursday apartment sometime morn- Daniell, Trent, thereafter, Shortly when ing. bedroom, Angelilli in the Mills and room with blood on walked into the Freund body main remained room said, over.” Trent told “It’s his shirt Thursday. During this throughout much of wearing the that he could not leave time, Freund to kill Mills An- Trent threatened change bloody him to shirt and instructed they anything police. if He gelilli said washing his After into one of Trent’s shirts. that he the local also reminded them shirt, putting on a clean hands and Similarly, Trent police under his control. Freund warned Mills and started to leave. family kill Daniell’s he did threatened to him that Angelilli that had not seen body. help Trent conceal the At one door, way he told night. out On Angelilli point, Trent told that Walker had Trent, pleasure doing business with “It was a much. to die because he knew too deserved again.” telephoned about you. Call me He afternoon, Thursday Late after that he twenty minutes later to inform Trent apartment, Fullerton and his friends left the safely. home Trent let Mills had arrived sledgehammer a steamer arrived with a stayed Angelilli go home. Daniell purchased with Trent’s trunk that he had morning. point, At one through the next sledgehammer to girlfriend. Trent used the body living room Daniell saw Walker’s *7 body legs that his would so break Walker’s pool in a of blood. Trent closed Walker’s fit in the trunk. Once Trent, Fullerton, trunk, and body in Mills Body Disposing of Walker’s 3. Trent carried it to Trent’s another friend of day, Wednesday, Daniell drove The next Draperies. House of and drove to van Draperies pick up Trent to House of They to the Palm van. drove the van Trent’s Investigation Police C. bicycle that Beach Hotel to retrieve Walker’s Angelilli’s Cooperation 1. Mills’s and building. in front of the After he had left and the Police’s Searches Draperies, unloading bicycle at House of apartment Daniell drove to the Trent and Saturday, July morning They made ar- girlfriends. Trent’s one of police.10 to call the Angelilli Mills and decided Fullerton rangements girlfriend for the and surrounding the They related the events purchase a steamer trunk find police where to stabbing and told the body from Trent’s use to remove Walker’s police body. They not tell the did Walker’s apartment. day, Later Daniell’s involvement. about body in police discovered Walker’s up from the day, picked Mills Trent Later beginning Draperies, van at House of him the Trent’s Draperies and drove House of investigation. their apartment. Fullerton Palm Beach Hotel They thus that officer. he did not trust They squad had Mills that called the vice officer who unlikely be under Trent's thought trafficking charges. that he arrested Mills on cocaine influence. They Trent had earlier told chose him because Angelilli’s story. Also, Angelilli’s and- corroborated and on Mills’s and state- Mills based ments, police physical obtained and executed In addition to the evidence found at Draperies Draperies, for House of and apartment search warrants Trent’s and House of apartment. Beach Hotel At Trent’s Palm police had material witnesses three will- Draperies, police found: Walk- House of testify ing to about Walker’s murder. The decomposed body in the badly steamer er’s Mills, Attorney’s charge Office did not State van; empty beer trunk in Trent’s boxes Angelilli any resulting Daniell crime or with bottles; bags liquor trash contain- cans and their in the murder involvement wrappers, empty drug ing syringes, needle disposition corpse.11 of Walker’s magnesi- empty ampules four capsules and They um also discovered Trent’s sulfate. D. The Law Firm on the van. fingerprints and Fullerton’s years, thirteen For Trent extensive apartment, police At Trent’s found: dealings Foley, firm of pistol in a with law Colton tape; duet a loaded .45 shoulder firm”) Duncan, (the holster; pair a magnum pistol; a loaded P.A. .357 “law law—the handcuffs; diazepam bottles of eventually represent firm that would Trent; sledge- prescribed Freund had 1970s, early Foley trial. In the Robert bat; hammer; a dented aluminum baseball began representing in various criminal it; lodged in dining room chair a bullet matters, Roger and civil as did Colton and human blood fighting knife with on Gerber Douglas they joined Duncan after law towels; blade; bag of blood-soaked Overall, May firm. until the law firm fingerprints. empty can an beer with Mills’s represented Trent cases and in various ca- pacities ranging from civil collection actions Autopsy involving House Draperies Trent’s searches, Shortly after the the coroner Additionally, hotels to criminal matters.12 performed autopsy body. Walker’s time, during this firm and the law straight found wounds The coroner five stab relationship often attorney exceeded that of chest one into his lower into Walker’s employees and client. and his came inward upward that extended to- back basis, daily sharing on a the office the law heart. concluded that ward the The coroner copier equipment. and other office penetrated these stab wounds Walker’s heart performed design Trent also interior work and, therefore, death. The coro- caused his firm, Colton, Foley, for the and Duncan’s injuries to ner also noticed handcuff Walker’s parents. tape duet his mouth. Walk- wrists and over employees many Trent referred of his body high levels of co- er’s fluids revealed friends, caine, including Mills, diazepam. law firm! Ap- alcohol and a derivative marks, did not needle proximately The corner find two the stabbing, months before sug- *8 decomposition one area but advanced Mills met with Colton at Trent’s Palm Beach gested Walker have received multi- apartment an hour Hotel for less than and ple injections. explained to him the facts and circumstances trafficking charge. of her cocaine Colton and Flight Cooperation 3. Trent’s and Daniell’s provid- possibility Mills discussed the of her ing police. police body, assistance Colton and After the Walker’s discovered began eventually ap- professional relationship Trent fled to Illinois. Daniell Mills’s police proached meeting.13 about his involvement ended with this did, however, however, Attorney’s allege any 11. The State does not conflict of Office de- interest lay trafficking cocaine case until after stemming representation. Mills’s from that conclusion Freund’s trial. The record does Attorney’s whether not indicate the State Office 13.Also, 1988, prior to Trent referred Daniell to prosecution. ever resumed that a the law firm for on traffic viola- speeding. tion Trent, representing addition to firm 12. Freund, represented Trent’s mother’s estate. stabbing from Illinois after the represented May- until called Colton firm Trent The law 1984, did not discuss the facts months before for advice. Trent approximately three 19, 1983, earlier, murder, stabbing. yearA on June offered no advice and Colton gun public on a allegedly a a suggesting Trent brandished than that Trent was in lot other persons. threatened to kill two street and trouble he should surrender speed- Trent was alleged facts were that represent Roth continued to authorities. recklessly through a residential area ing throughout his murder trial. Trent halt. to a A woman the last screeched Freund to the law firm for advice went apartment of her name of Vana came out stabbing.15 At that first meet- soon after the neighborhood fearing Trent had struck Foley that he ing, Freund confessed why driving he was asked Trent child. Vana Walker to death. The law stabbed told him that small like that and children him, and agreed to Freund surren- defend her to mind played in the area. Trent told 31, July on dered to the authorities 1984. get hurt. her own business or she would arrest, days Ten after Freund’s authorities approached, Trent husband When Vana’s arrested Trent in Illinois. The court de- handgun pulled a holster in his out a from bail, and on tained Trent and Freund without and asked her if she “wanted waistband 23, 1984, jury August grand indicted both other,” gun motioning to a that he one or the first-degree murder of for the Walker.16 area. supposedly had his back waistband later, days advised of the assault inci- A few E. Freund Prosecution of and Trent dent, in his police stopped Trent car. diazepam in The officers discovered Trent’s 1. Press Conference for, police possession. The arrested Trent days arraign- after the Two or three court charged Attorney’s him the State Office press Foley called a conference ed with, aggravated possession diazepam rely on an to announce that The State also initiated forfeiture assault. however, insanity Formally, defense. against automobile in re- proceeding rely law firm file a notice intent to did not possession charge.14 lation to the nearly year until insanity defense firm, Colton, primarily initially The law later, time, By that June 1985.17 aggravated Trent represented in both the only to also to Foley, had but admitted diazepam possession prosecu- assault had Duncan he killed Walker. Freund tions, no but it withdrew as counsel later psychiatrist told that he stabbed prior May than to their resolutions. it. told him to do Walker because Mounts, Marvin Palm Beach The Honorable over County Judge, presided these Circuit Discovery and Freund’s prosecutions. repre- Colton and Duncan also to Sever Motion proceeding, the forfeiture sented Mounts, Judge through final also before assigned Trent and The clerk of court May judgment issued Mounts, Judge Freund’s case to murder judge presided earlier over Although David same who Trent had retained Roth assault, drug possession and forfei- aggravat- Trent’s defense counsel in his as substitute eases, hearings to possession proceedings. ture After several diazepam assault and ed instrument, sharp con- peti- with a other derive these ER knife or 14. We facts 782.04(l)(a).” trary corpus. Statute tion for writ of habeas Freund never Florida *9 proved any hearing. at these facts fact, press the time of the confer- 17.In around who, 1984, ence, 7, anyone, does if a September 15. The record not reveal the law firm filed on Filing the law Freund. of recommended firm to Time Notice "Motion to Extend Insanity,” con- Rely the Defense of Intent to on tending presently position to alleged "not in a Specifically, that that it was indictment unlawfully particularity if ... was in- pre- [Freund] state with Freund and Trent "did from a ..., alleged if design to a at the offense effect the death of human sane time meditated WALKER, insanity.” appar- The court being, so the nature of kill murder RALPH a hu- being by ently granted stabbing the motion. the said RALPH WALK- man Although Judge Bar. flict from the Florida competency to stand tri- determine Freund’s eventually al, competent severed Freund’s him on Mounts Judge Mounts declared trials, thereafter, 5, the record does not disclose February two con- Trent’s 1985. Soon ruling issued a on this during pretrial arose whether he ever issues flict-of-interest (Freund’s) motion. proceedings. deposi- issue arose at The first conflict Opinion 3. Florida Bar 16, April 1985. Mills refused tion on Florida Bar Duncan wrote the letter to the on any questions that Duncan asked answer day that the law firm filed the on the same prior ground that her consultation providing a After factual motion to sever. trafficking regarding the cocaine Colton ques- background, Duncan asked two related attorney-client re- an charge had established representa- the law firm’s tions about Mills, however, firm. lationship with the law First, essentially Duncan tion of Trent.19 disclosed, lawyer, already to Trent’s

had the law firm would have to conceded that Roth, any information presence in Duncan’s representing Freund withdraw conveyed during Colton she jointly: Freund and Trent court tried Nevertheless, Mills remained consultation. [Tjhere may appearance impropriety an of silent. professional under rules of con- [Florida’s less than a The second conflict issue arose being against a client. up duct] in former 13, 1985, May law firm later. month On joint trial, Specifically, if in a Mr. Trent Freund, behalf of a motion to sever on filed behalf, ... testify on his own his elects the State asking the district court order j attorneys[ clearly put be former would Attorney’s prosecute Freund and Office to him_ [Ijt position cross-examining grounds, separate As Trent in trials.18 may eyes appear- of some raise the law firm averred that impropriety. ance of [tjhere DR. that because exists a concern that severance But because he believed was attorneys represented FREUND’s “likely,” Duncan asked past and on unrelated MR. TRENT in the case, prob- ... there are ethical whether that there matters to the instant Dr. arguing lems in in defense of if in Specifically, potential be a conflict. alleged homicide he trial, the time of joint testify in MR. was to TRENT[ ] insane, obviously insanity behalf, and this was attorneys his former own Trent, accordingly known Mr. Mr. cross-examining position in a be manipulated Dr. commit Freund to granted him.... severance should be [A] he, stated, Simply the murder for Trent. ... avoid even the remotest scintilla of ethically wrong anything there with ar- appearance impropriety. This is not guing separate in a former say appearance impropriety that an [Trentj responsible for a client homicide exists. [Freundj. opposed to the new client as The law firm concluded the motion with a questions requesting that it an informal As to Mills’s refusal answer statement addressing possible posed firm opinion written con- the law behalf actually prosecution if the intended to use the 18. This motion was the second such severance Judge motion that the law firm filed on Freund's be- Because Mounts did statement at trial. February motion, motion dated half. its initial grant we a severance based on this sought the law firm a severance because of repudiated any prosecution in- assume that the that Trent made to the an out-of-court statement tention to use it. on television that media. announced argued saw Freund kill Walker. The law letter, proceeded Duncan under the 19. In his impli- that the admission of Trent’s out-of-court assumption firm's that the law joint in a where Trent did cation trial successive, opposed Trent and Freund was testify not right would violate Freund’s constitutional Further, premised Duncan simultaneous. to confront his accuser. See Bruton "[cjlearly, prior representations of Mr. Trent States, 123, 135-36, 88 S.Ct. United 391 U.S. way homi- are in no connected instant (1968). *10 hearing, 20 L.Ed.2d After a cide.” Judge grant Mounts ruled that would the he He any- charge.” unrelated criminal went on the inquired [is] Duncan whether “there the murder on to state that because occurred thing the one initial consultation virtue consultation, prior law firm’s Mills, my after the the preclude law with that would Ms. prohibit her relationship with would not it examining and' Ms. questioning firm from her questioning Mills about “observa- the homi- concerning knowledge Mills her concerning alleged the opinions tions cide[.]” Mills submitted to the law firm’s homicide.” opinion advisory staff Duncan received 24,1985. deposition on June (the “Bar May from the Bar on opinion”). Regarding the firm’s law Hearing 4. Severance Trent, Bar although the Freund’s motion to sever was still While to either opinion not offer a direct answer did 20, 1985, pending, August filed on Trent his advanced, outline question Duncan it did that own motion to sever on two different some considerations: relevant lawyer, grounds. Through discovery, Trent’s attorney matter which the [W]here [for the Roth, learned that Freund had confessed to represented the is so unre- client] former psychiatrist although his that lated, time, that either substance or as to Walker, him do stabbed Trent made it. attorney acquired infor- could have Thus, ground motion the first of Trent’s the former client which [from] mation testify, the that if Freund chose not to admis- detriment, attor- to his could be used joint trial of out-of-court sion in a ney may ethically representa- undertake inculpated Trent would vio- confession former client. If such tion adverse to his rights Trent’s under the Sixth Amend- late during acquired related information Bruton v. ment’s Confrontation Clause. representation, [the the course of former States, 123, 135-36, United 391 U.S. 88 S.Ct. pro- professional conduct] rules of would (1968). Judge L.Ed.2d 476 Mounts if a proposed hibit even to avoid a Bruton problem, ruled present severance of the former simply exclude this if statement granted. Therefore clients’ cases jointly. Freund and Trent were tried responsibility of the former client argued where present case could be ground in- Trent’s second for severance no information was obtained detrimental relationship the law firm’s with him. volved previous represen- distant unrelated acquired alleged that the firm had Trent law tation. it could information that use confidential joint Despite his own against him at a trial. question As to whether the firm could sever, pending initially motion homicide, opinion Bar Mills about the request- joined opposing Trent’s the State suggested long ques- that it could as as its severance.20 ed tioning reveal or confi- did not secrets firm it dences the law and Mills. As between hearing Judge Mounts conducted Trent, opinion the Bar cautioned did September severance motion on firm that Mills’s consultation with the law opened hearing to the The court was either close time or related to atten- public, significant media drew homicide, ethically the law could called to first witness that Roth tion. The question concerning homicide. Mills initially detailed was Trent. Trent the stand 3, 1985, attorney-client relationship that had de- relying opin- Bar On on the June himself. ion, the law firm and veloped order between Duncan moved court to Mills during the course deposition. Dun- Trent testified to submit to the law personal he had confided his Judge representation, Mounts the law firm can assured Foley business affairs to both the confidences and secrets secrets and would “maintain the law firm about told been disclosed Ms. Mills and Colton. activi- multiple criminal participation during Mr. Colton their initial consultation fact, granting the severance" days hearing, grounds exist for a few before try Freund and Foley, court should both Attorney's and that the State Office on behalf legal together. stipulated writing "no *11 testimony, drugs prostitution. and his Roth involving ties Even After Trent concluded “categori- stand. called Colton to the Colton Trent retained Roth after had to handle his totally” cally^]” “unequivocally and denied drug prosecutions, and assault he called Col- Trent every and accusation” that had “each stabbing. from after the ton Illinois Trent being forced off levied.21 To avoid telephone time explained at the of the case, Foley cross-examine Colton or did not call, he still Colton to be his attor- considered testify. Although both Duncan and as- ney. attorney declined to examine sistant state testimony then Trent’s from moved his Colton, him, question eliciting did court relationship with professional the law upstanding member of that Colton was personal relationship. lurid a more and He Bar, enjoyed reputation the Florida solid Foley and to be professionalism, had considered Colton close and for fairness and had Beyond involving lawyers. in to his served on several bar committees friends addition legal judicial ranging from discussing activities, issues ethics criminal Trent his would appointments. lawyers recount to the details his both exploits. Foley Trent even sexual showed During arguments that followed con- devices,” and Colton a number “sexual testimony, clusion Duncan announced that handcuffs, including whips, and chains his joining request Freund for a was Trent’s apartment. Trent Palm Beach Hotel changing severance. reason Duncan’s for Foley’s in inflammatory allega- contended that he used cocaine mind was not Trent’s Rather, including against in their law law firm. Duncan presence, and Colton’s tions feared that the court’s exclusion offices. psychiatrist out-of-court to his confession Trent, Foley According Colton did joint completely gut trial law just of devi- more than listen to Trent’s tales case, is, theory of the Trent ancy. allegations Trent several serious made controlled him to ordered kill First, against lawyers. claimed both he only problem joint Walker. Roth’s with a friends, some- have delivered cocaine their contrast, law firm’s cross- suggested times at the firm. He further examination of its former client “if and when lawyers pros- provided had both Judge Ultimately, Trent takes the stand.” occasions, payment many titutes on often granted Mounts the severance. Indeed, allegedly legal Trent services. many Trial provided Foley [prostitutes] with “so daily years ... [was] over almost The court Trent at- tried first. Duncan alleged attor- occurrence.” He that the two testimony tended trial and observed the many neys participated had attended Mills, Daniell, prin- Angelilli the three involving of his “sex cocaine and parties” cipal fact for the witnesses Neither State. occasion, prostitutes. example, one For nor Trent testified. The trial result- Foley allegedly Trent and invited several jury, hung ed in a and the court declared a prostitutes the close of to the offices after bargain, plea In a Attor- mistrial. State accidentally tripped business. of them One ney’s degree Office reduced the first murder burglar police-monitored When alarm. charge exchange for Trent’s pleading arrived, police that he guilty second-degree recounted murder. The court sentence, Foley 17-year to a answer the door because sentenced Trent prison authorities have since released him.22 naked. deny every following exchange I 21. The Roth and A. each accusation Mr. between deny has about me place: Colton took stated and I them uncategorically, totally. unequivocably and Q. You all have heard Categorically. THE COURT: Mr. Trent? A. Yes. transcripts to, not contain 22. The record does you Q. In discuss, what and I think we reference trial. Nor does record reveal legal Trent's can To some other than issues? made, deny direct involvement on Trent’s you further those accusations do prosecution. Freund's accusations? *12 stabbing Angelilli that Freund made testified Trial 6. Freund’s body. in the of Walker’s motions direction guilty second-de- pleaded After Trent couch, body behind Because Walker’s murder, Attorney’s of- gree the State Office did not see the Angelilli that she conceded Freund. deal to The fered the same body. actually Daniell knife strike Walker’s in- that the defense of advised Freund up pick that he saw Freund Trent’s testified sanity percent or less of was successful All three approach knife and Walker. wit- Rejecting the offer on behalf of the time. alone in testified Freund was nesses that Freund, state Foley stated to assistant time, room with for a short and main Walker attorney holding for the defense was out that afterward he came into bedroom that manslaughter guilty by or not a verdict of describing blood on his shirt. After with Thus, brought the State insanity. reason of cleaning up moving their roles and Walk- 23, 1985, and trial on October body, concluded their er’s witnesses each as his trial Foley Duncan served law- and through recounting how testimony direct and yers. why they police. went to the i. State’s Case-in-Chief many of the brought Duncan out inconsis- introduced most of the The State first testimony on tencies of each witness’s cross- testimony through the of physical evidence example, he elicited examination. For police who the in- various officers conducted they Angelilli origi- and that when both Mills presented vestigation. prosecution nally police, omitted alto- went autopsy through the the results of Walker’s gether any of Daniell. Mills and mention conducting testimony pathologist. He of the Angelilli explained they were afraid although body fluids Walker’s confirmed they thought he inculpate him was a because cocaine; alcohol and high revealed levels Only hit man who kill them. after stabbing diazepam, caused derivative and police Daniell went did Mills An- Walker’s death. gelilli acknowledge presence at mur- Mills, Through Angelilli der scene. Daniell, presented the details the State Mills, cross-examining Duncan While only minor inconsisten- murder. With how questions a series about she asked cies, essentially witnesses recount- three know about her came to Trent and leading up following to and ed the events Duncan trafficking had arrest for cocaine. I, stabbing as described section Walker’s background of that her recount B, basic They all opinion. this testified charge Trent’s assistance from pending present apart- at that Freund was Trent’s shortly until her one and that, after her arrest night ment the of the murder and meeting stopped Duncan direction, injected Colton. with Walker first sulfate, her consultation asking Mills about magnesium then with mixtures short with she, also admitted diazepam, finally air. with Colton.23 Mills of vodka and police Q. officers co- Specifically, questioned You tried to sell some Duncan Mills as fol- caine? lows: person. A. I like the middle you jury Q. to this heard of You testified you trying Okay. Q. were much cocaine How you you John Trent learned about while to sell? County jail? were Palm Beach requested, [the what he A. Four kilos. That’s A. Yes. police officer] Rosemary Q. Through a Lail? requested one kilo. he received A. cocaine, Yes. Q. Ms. Mills? How a kilo of much is Rosemary you Q. Okay. And what Lail told pounds. A. Two was, “Listen, looking you’re big at some time sorry, price? Q. I'm guy you and a want to see in town fine thirty-seven price? thousand I A. The About is John Trent”? price think the was. for, selling thirty- A. Yes. you Q. That’s what seven thousand? arrested, you you Q. I think And had been A. Yes. jury you trafficking you Q. understood jury, And told the cocaine? told you for carried been arrested that what had A. Yes. And, topless she worked dancer. except used co- everyone like else stabbing. Daniell admitted on cross-examination night of caine on that he he was an attested ex-felon of each the three On cross-examination go prison except on a “would never back to witnesses, personal elicited facts Duncan slab.” *13 impeach credibility. For their effort to instance, questioned Mills about “Port 0 he Insanity ii. Freund’s Defense Men,” for service she ran. Call escort case, cross-examining prosecution rested Dun- Angelilli, After Similarly, when insanity just Foley presented prior to can and Freund’s Duncan elicited year mandatory help A. He needed also. with a fifteen minimum sen- it you help? Q. What do he needed mean tence? A. He was an He was an infor- A. informant. Yes. something you guilty Q. were for the law so he needed too. that if mant You understood that, you day would would for He needed some assistance also. It convicted of day do Rosemary myself.- help Lail and years? him fifteen A. Yes. Okay. Q. Q. You talked about what it was You were also aware that carried with assistance, quarter though, whereby you years a it in to the fifteen of substantial addition somebody police would work to dollar fine? with set million up? A. Yes. it, yes. your Q. with A. We talked about So as a result of conversation Well, Lail, you looking you Q. Rosemary about the of were forward to talked mechanics going get meeting guy you who was out it? this year prison quarter of a sentence A. Yes. fifteen somebody get Q. up, would of a dollar fine? You set them million going get drug I in a A. sure he was me out. involved deal? wasn't you certainly going up? Q. But were A. No. He was to set someone I understand that. He, being going Q. it out? who? to check out, yes. going A. I A. John Trent. was check you got jail, Q. out In fact the first time of it, Mills, you, Q. John a cab didn't Trent sent for he? But the mechanics Ms. wrong, A. me if was Yes. correct using you I'm that John bring you somebody Q. up paid he for cab to would else in a And set get drug they Palm Hotel? deal and would arrested and Beach you help A. then would and the Yes. Prosecutor Mills, you get Q. jury, thing your problem? the first Tell the Ms. State and out of you you saying. did arrived what said and when at John A. That’s he was Now, got Okay. apartment day you jail you Q. out John Trent told that he what, paid Depart- the cab that he for. had the West Palm Beach Police apartment. Rosemary pocket? A. I went into Lail ment in his back there, was John there and Trent was the first A. Yes. cocaine, thing lay Q. he De- he did out some That had the Palm Beach Police Q. partment pocket? You did it? in his back A. He He Yes. A. Yes. had them all. said he had thing Q. good rapport off The first the bat? with them. Okay. up Q. A. Q. And set Yes. John Trent himself you jail you're being get you big The moment out ... man? Yes, doing cocaine? he did. A. things? Q. A. could Yes. He control me, Q. begin yes. John And did Trent then to talk to A. That's how it came off you day you jail Q. about a term use down here first came out and went we The it, courthouse, there, worry you, told Ms. "substantial assistance”? he "Don't about Mills, things you”? I going A. don’t know he mentioned that term or I’m to handle for say help not but he did he me. Yes. could A. it, you, Q. Okay. may legal great Q. He have used That was a relief to wasn't assistance,” terminology, "substantial but he ma’am? "Listen, explained you, Eleanor him I told him or Ms. A. No. Because I listened but Mills,” you, only way "the whatever he called that I didn't believe it until I seen it. you're going get you Q. under But the least relieved or out from this fifteen weren’t bit year mandatory encouraged going get you minimum and a out of sentence quarter year mandatory quar- of a million is to with fifteen sentence and dollar fine work me”? ter of a million dollar fine what he said said, going yes. you? A. to do That’s what he comfortable, yes. Q. Okay. I felt more A. may treated of mental condi- Through be “as evidence defense. several witnesses, only and they demonstrated that Freund tion not as evidence factual good oncologist reputation had a as an before truth” that contain. did They attempt. developed testify. suicide surrounding attempt, facts the suicide focus- personality

ing changes on in Freund’s iii. Rebuttal State’s damage Colleagues had caused. brain prosecution expert its own wit- The called that he seemed to be a Freund testified rebuttal, psychiatrist who court ness memory prob- person different with severe appointed compe- to determine presented lems. defense also the testi- tency psychiatrist opined to stand trial. This mony explained experts who several of his feigning that. Freund was most mental symptoms suscep- *14 damage, including of brain although problems. He claimed that the tibility of suggestion indepen- and a lack stabbing may result of have been the an Many experts of these had judgment. dent definitely impulse,” “irresistible Freund shortly after evaluated Freund his suicide killing that he was Walker knew knew attempt to determine whether not he was doing wrong.24 what he that was was The practice fit to to the of medicine. return reports witness also on the that commented of During its cross-examination Freund’s Freund psychiatrists who had examined through testimony the the witnesses and of competency determine his to reten to the rebuttal, prosecu- the witnesses it called on practice prepared. He medical inter- attempted tion to demonstrate that Freund indicating reports those as preted that doing knew when he what he was stabbed improving Freund’s and that condition was wrong. Walker and knew that was When it might Freund to return have been able psychiatrists cross-examining one of the who practice suggested He the medicine. called, Foley the elicited that Freund State psychiatrists on the who testified Freund’s psychiatrist had told that he the remembered exaggerated support behalf his condition night Spe- the of the events of the murder. insanity defense. cifically, psychiatrist jury heard the con- firm had admitted to that Freund remember- called The last that the State on witness ing following: Trent called him to come rebuttal, and the last witness of entire he over kill When arrived at and Walker. Stob, a friend of was James Freund. apartment, lying Walker was on the killing Stob testified that Freund denied injected floor in handcuffs. He Walker with jail. him At when visited on no Walker Stob diazepam knowing that it would not kill testify. Trent to time did State call Walker. He stabbed Walker several times opener. with a He did not letter know Walk- Closing Arguments iv. identity er’s he stabbed him. when He first back, stabbed but then turned Walker closing arguments focused The because, him him in the heart over to stab stabbing. insanity Freund’s at the time of the doctor, way really he knew that was “to attorney argued assistant state person kill a that is in handcuffs.” doing exactly knew he was Freund what falsely psychia- he to convince Foley objected tried Duncan nor Neither he Duncan focused trists that was insane. questioning. Judge line of in- Mounts did support- occasion, damage and the jury, on than one on Freund’s brain struct the more arguing psychiatrists ing psychiatrists, statements alleged insanity provide at the time an defendant 24. Some an defense for crime states infirmity, disease or crimes was reason of mental committed as a result of irresistible 4.01(1) (1995) impulse. § the nature and Code defect unable to understand See Model Penal consequences, or if (providing insanity quality of his he defense where “as act or a result it, incapable of distin- mental or defect did understand [the defendant] disease lacks right guishing from that which is capacity ... that which is substantial conform his conduct law”). law, wrong. requirements Florida (Fla. however, State, 245 n. permits insanity only Wheeler v. 344 So.2d the defense of 1977). where v. Verdict and Sentence did not know what he was Freund either or, doing did he stabbed Walker when receiving instructions After their doing, did not know that know what he was Mounts, jury Judge deliberated for Duncan asserted that vic- wrong. two days. No- total three hours over two On case, tims Walker Freund. existed 1, 1985, jury returned a verdict vember argued knew that Freund’s He that Trent guilty degree. of murder in the first At a susceptible him to influence condition left penalty jury subsequent phase, recom- accordingly manipulated and and that Trent through life of ten mended a sentence a vote robot, making like him Freund controlled Judge accepted recom- to two.25 Mounts kill Walker. and sentenced to life in mendation argument At Duncan point, one turned prison possibility parole without the contending Foley. After that reason- over years, minimum twenty-five sentence sanity, to Freund’s able doubt existed as could that Freund receive. Foley jury argued to ordered Appeal F. Direct it, something. to do did and because of He represented direct The law Freund on situation, Ralph Walker is stressful *15 appeal. grounds appeal, On unrelated this I really dead. don’t know who did it. We Appeal Fourth and both the District Court of always whether Trent did it and wondered Supreme Court of Florida affirmed guy, My it. poor told this “You did col- State, Freund’s conviction. See Freund v. you leagues telling you are it.” here did Dist.1987) (Fla.App. (per 4 So.2d girls lying they The same when (Fla.1988). curiam), aff'd, 520 So.2d they police told the didn’t even tell them in the about Daniell sworn statement. get years going to fifteen manda-

woman is II. COLLATERAL REVIEW tory parole for her without lifted if she PROCEEDINGS lies, cooperates, but she she is trouble A. State Court got and she lied about Daniell and Daniell figured he he get word and better failed, appeal After his direct Freund ob- on also so he the train runs down to the lawyers same who tained new counsel—the was, police Tuesday, I think it station after represent Freund collat- before us—to attack murder, gives and his statement and erally his conviction in state and federal okay. say 1990, 29, court. March filed a On Freund Remember, he lied about that so we sentence, judgment motion to vacate the happened don’t know what there. We pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Proce- guess happened. can’t what We can’t (the motion”), dure 3.850 “3.850 in the state guess man into the electric chair that him. circuit court tried and sentenced guess years we him can’t into 25 argued law conflicts of Freund that the firm’s penitentiary parole. without interest denied Freund his constitutional right to the effective assistance of trial coun- Foley insanity then returned to the defense. conflicts, sel. As sources of the Freund In the closing argument, State’s final in addi- pointed relationship with law firm’s tion to refuting insanity defense, it ad- Mills. “Now, Trent and The court conducted Foley’s dressed statements: Mr. Fo- (the ley 25, you evidentiary April tells hearing we are not even sure stabbed hearing”).26 Walker. ridiculous.” That’s “3.850 25. The resolving record before us does not his 3.850 motion because include tran- Mounts scripts “firm, penalty phase. judge’s fixed and select admitted opinions credibility feelings of” about Judge preside Mounts did not over rele- Trent. vant proceedings. state collateral review ' successfully disqualify Judge moved to just prior August Trent on Investigator

1. Trent’s Private arrest in Illinois. case-in-chief, In Ms Freund’s counsel first two to the stand. The called witnesses 2. Duncan Dick. Dick was an auxil- was Thomas witness Duncan the second witness that Riviera Beach Police iary patrolman for the hearing. the 3.850 called at Freund’s counsel Dick Department a friend Trent. regard to the law With investigate him to Trent asked testified that prior May Duncan of Trent testified Vana, alleged background victim although handled most of that Colton charge. assault aggravated Trent’s 1983 work, appear he did with Colton Trent’s conducting any investiga- Dick denied ever Judge hearing before Mounts. forfeiture tion, obtaining police but admitted Duncan the law simulta- denied report meeting -with Trent and Colton neously represented and Freund. case. separately discuss the Neither asked his reaction Trent’s When about to do Trent nor asked Dick inves- Colton hearing, allegations at the severance Duncan diazepam tigative respect to work with appalled admitted he was possession charge. generally angry. firm was following Moving events the stab- testimony, however, The bulk Duncan’s bing, Dick learned that testified dealt with law firm’s investiga- murder fugitive Trent was a Foley Freund. Duncan and served as Dan- tion and that Freund had surrendered. preparation principal lawyers. Freund’s shortly Dick thereafter. iell went to see defense, Duncan for . observed [at Darnell Dick that “he was told Trent’s trial. that Trent’s He stated happened hap- apartment] when whatever he did not commit the defense *16 pened.” Daniell to turn him- Dick convinced this murder. did not consider de- Duncan Department. in to Beach Police self the Palm with completely to be consistent the fense in Illi- point, At some Trent was still while Trent, theory of the case that nois, permitted police Dick to record calls knowing organic damage, brain Freund’s police made to Dick’s residence. record- manipulated Freund into orchestrated and and ed several conversations between Dick stabbing Walker. days. Trent over the next few view, that, insanity Duncan his testified that These recorded conversations Freund only plausible and defense was the viable hearing played at the 3.850 confirmed that Duncan, According to to available Freund. following the Trent had contacted Colton on Freund’s behalf experts who testified stabbing. Dick that Trent also told he would and well known in “some of the best arrange pay Dick to to do some Colton Additionally, battery of psy- their field.” suggested investigatory work. Trent that Freund’s tests after sui- chiatric conducted possessed power attorney Trent’s Colton provided proof that attempt documented cide over some his assets. damage existed well before organic his brain Finally, pointed Duncan out Walker’s death. concluded, tapes After Dick testified committing the Freund to that confessed following that he had met with Colton meeting stabbing Foley at their first and to meeting, calls from At that Trent. Colton five four or months made similar confessions enjoyed power to Dick that he denied and psychiatrist Duncan.27 later to both Ms attorney any of Trent’s Dick over assets. physical Duncan that State’s although testified he assumed conceded that without knife, (e.g., apartment, hand- represented in late evidence doubt Colton Trent bat, cuffs, trunk and gun, steamer July August and never him baseball Colton told Trent, inculpated not body) of the represented spoke that he Trent. Dick location last Duncan, jail. Duncan stated that watch at the According never suicide during Freund recanted time, say simply would lawyers psychiatrist. Freund his to his confession happened period following what During he could not remember to five month the four night Foley, death. initial Freund Walker's confession to was on sought the coro- asserted that Trent no further further conceded that and Freund. He any legal advice the law firm about magnesium not sulfate ner did discover (one injected after drugs that into matter that date. Walker) body autopsy, and Walker’s corroborated Dick’s account of Colton also bloody never found Freund’s police that the fol- Dick’s and contact with Colton Trent’s bag brought that he shirt or the doctor’s lowing stabbing. Colton testified that he apartment. whether the Trent’s When asked lawyer. never told Dick that he was Trent’s Mills, Angelilli three fact State’s witnesses — Rather, him, according “sug- Colton credibility Daniell —lacked because gest[ed] strenuously” get that Dick not in- Trent, drug use fear of admitted their with and that if Trent called volved rigorous that even under Duncan testified again, try him Dick Dick should to talk into they trial Trent’s not examination at surrendering. further testified Colton they claim saw.” This “back off what only he told Trent that “his alternative was testimony that she Angelilli’s included saw in, repre- to turn himself didn’t [Colton] stabbing making with motions him did have an attor- [Colton] sent direction —testimo-

Trent’s knife Walker’s ney-client relationship with him.” Colton directly implicated ny that Freund. denied that he discussed the facts of the lawyer’s disagreed most, according

Duncan Freund’s At murder with Trent. suggestion Colton, not seek something that the law did have said it,” for the to Trent. He shift blame murder of “I the effect didn’t do to which Colton although plea argued “you’d yourself of insani- replied, turn in.” better Col- ty necessarily implied that Freund killed flatly allegations ton also denied the Walker, taking premised hearing. on Trent’s Trent had at the raised severance advantage mental condi- of Freund’s known relationship When asked about be- him a tion that “robot” Trent’s rendered representation tween law firm’s of Trent pointed to his unlawful commands. Duncan Freund, engaged the State Colton Mills, Angelilli cross-examinations of following dialogue: Daniell, sought to facts about where he elicit Q Okay. of John Was ability control Trent, your prior of him but also others. any way facts connected with the Finally, Foley’s when asked statement *17 the homicide? might during argument closing A No. have hurt committed the murder Freund’s Q any Did those the facts of cases insanity defense, Duncan admitted he bearing allegations what on the of Foley was shocked when made the statement July place taken at the time of on 24th help” that it “sure didn’t Freund’s case. this murder? Foley Duncan that he asked testified later you IA don’t what mean. know why Foley he the statement. an- made Q I there mean was connection “appease” it to swered he did brought in the court that somehow mother. being the murder was related to him charged aggravated with the assault in 3. Colton charged being 1983 or to him related presented After Freund Dick’s and Dun- guns with in 1983? testimony, can’s the State called Colton to A No ma’am. the stand its first dis- witness. Colton Mills, regard prior legal representa- cussed the firm’s Colton admitted that law With Trent, focusing diazepam tion of he had her about the cocaine “consulted” Colton, possession aggravated charges. trafficking charge. According to he assault pro- possibility Colton Dick’s of that she would corroborated account Trent’s discussed requested investigation alleged substantial assistance the Palm Beach assault vide County He emphasized victim. Colton that Trent sub- Sheriffs Office. insisted May meeting brief and that after stituted Roth for the law firm in with Mills was represented that he during the time fee, again her never saw her a he quoted Foley’s prior Additionally, Mr. [Freund]. capacity. official ... Trent matters representation a conclusion testimony drew to Colton’s this case. unrelated to exam- question on direct last the State’s with Appeal Fourth District Court Florida’s lawyer elected ination. Freund’s judgment without court’s the circuit affirmed Colton. cross-examine of Florida opinion, Supreme and the Court jurisdiction. appellate to exercise declined Attorney State 4.Assistant trial also from Freund’s prosecutor The District Court B. Federal hearing as 3.850 briefly testified at the 16, 1993, filed the instant April Freund On prose- The final witness. second and State’s corpus, pursuant writ of habeas petition for he received letter that recalled the cutor § States United to 28 U.S.C. Fo- wherein Foley on October District of for the Court Southern District it had law firm believed that the ley indicated motion, with his 3.850 Consistent Florida.28 and ... a insanity defense unique, valid “a alleged that the law firm’s conflicts Freund manslaughter jury ver- getting chance the effective assis- Freund of interest denied opinion, the Also, prosecutor’s dict.” time, For the first of trial counsel. tance Freund at trial. vigorously defended however, alleged about Trent’s facts Freund diazepam possession assault aggravated 5.Expert Witness charges. the rebuttal testi- hearing ended with The judge the record magistrate reviewed A defense law. expert in criminal mony of an recommendation. report and issued representation the law firm’s opined that He (1) stated, part, that: “the pertinent He stan- the constitutional Freund fell below finding supports the court’s [state] record because representation effective dard representation, of Trent firm’s the law the law interest with conflicts of presented prior [its] ended of Trent prior representations (2) [Freund]”; no evi- “presented of Tar- cross-examination Mills. State’s firm ever establishing that the law dence not a board that Tarkoff was revealed koff simultaneously represented [Freund] both lawyer, had never dis- certified criminal (3) Mills”; “failed to show ... scope and na- the law firm the cussed by failing to demon- ‘inconsistent interests’ Trent, and representation of of its ture representation of' prior' that the firm’s strate Trent. talked to had never substantially related to [Mills] Trent or [Freund] the firm’s Order 6.Court’s in- confidential relevant firm learned of order, the court denied a written represen- alleged prior from these formation stated, court motion. The Freund’s 3.850 (4) adoption of *18 tations”; the law and part: pertinent actual an did not evince insanity defense the from Trent’s stemming interest conflict of pre- the of evidence From a consideration at the sever- the law firm allegations against that no conflict finds sented Court defen- an alternative hearing because ance Foley ... any time. Mr. existed at the fatal ... inflicted “Trent theory that represented sive having of [Freund] accused in view of realistic “not wounds” was The finds same time. Court at the [Trent] eyewit- of uncontradicted that at unfounded and allegation to be that 1, 1993, the dis- November On ... Trent nesses.”29 Foley represent did Mr. no time rejected judge Freund's magistrate prior 29. The petition 28. Because Freund filed prior representation of law firm’s and Effective that the date of the Antiterrorism claim effective 1996, violation Penalty concerning pre-1988 amend- traffic Act of the recent Death Daniell Chapter States Code’s 153 of United ments to of interest. actual conflict created another v. apply case. See Lindh 28 do not to this appeal. Title Murphy, argument on Freund abandons 2059, 2068, 320, 138 U.S. 117 S.Ct. 521 (1997). L.Ed.2d 481 858 668, 687-88, objections, 2052, Freund’s U.S. 104 80 L.Ed.2d overruled S.Ct.

trict court (1984). report 674 and recommendation adopted petition. denied A. Rules of Law III. ISSUE of assistance The crux Freund’s ineffective encompassing issue that we discuss lawyers, trial the law firm of claim is that his court erred in conclud- the district

whether P.A., Duncan, Foley, un Colton labored denied ing Freund was not effective that of The first that der conflicts interest. issue of counsel because assistance brought this case en concerns the rules banc (1) arising from: firm’s conflicts interests involving apply of law that conflict cases (2) Trent; prior prior representation of its simultaneous, successive, opposed repr as to (3) Mills; Trent’s sev- representation Sullivan, Cuyler esentations.30 v. a case hearing testimony partners that two erance involving representations, simultaneous firm, Foley, engaged in Colton and of the law to Supreme held that order “[i]n Court dem embarrassing illegal conduct. onstrate a violation his Sixth Amendment IV. DISCUSSION rights, an actual [the conflict of interest petitioner] must establish that [2] adversely [1] lawyer’s performance.” 446 Amendment the United affected his U.S. The Sixth 335, 1708, Constitution, 350, incorporated through 64 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 333 States (1980). Although Process both Freund and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due State Clause, agree prong the “actual guarantees persons accused of conflict” of the enjoy right Cuyler applies represen ... “shall test a successive state crimes case, they dispute tation Assistance of Counsel for what means are [their] have the VI; petitioner prove it. U.S. Const. amend. Gideon available to Freund defense.” 335, 342-43, Wainwright, 372 83 S.Ct. contends that under this court’s decision in U.S. (1963). White, petitioner may This right, L.Ed.2d of Smith v. establish an issue, course, presently through includes the one actual conflict interest one of (1) pointing trial facts assistance of counsel. Un three means: and cir the effective lawyer’s rep forth Strickland v. cumstances that show the familiar test set der Washington, trial counsel resentation of the former client related sub establish defense, ineffectively stantially lawyer’s representation assisted the a habeas (“substantial (2) relatedness”); petitioner under corpus petitioner proceeding 28 U.S.C. ad (1) lawyer’s rep vancing § evidence that former client 2254 must show that actu objective ally fell standard revealed confidential information to the resentation below (2) prejudiced during prior representation of reasonableness that the de (“confidential (3) is, information”); fense, provided probabil relying reasonable performance, proof of interests.” ity that but for such deficient “other inconsistent (11th Cir.1987), denied, cert. the verdict would have been different. 466 Cir.1992) ("[S]tate petition, findings of fact can be In his 3:850 motion and 2254 court record.”). simultaneously opinion rep- contended that the law firm inferred from its On appeal, challenge both and Trent. Both the state Freund advances no serious resented court, however, Thus, implied findings. express and district that —as we court found these repre- presume finding that the law a matter of historical fact—the law firm’s correct firm's May sentation of 2, terminated no later than Trent terminated when Trent substituted Roth for the law commencement law firm's *19 2254(d) (1996) (state aggravated represent § 28 to in the assault of Freund. See U.S.C. him possession prosecutions. findings diazepam of fact made after evi- Addi- court historical correct); hearing tionally, dispute dentiary presumed are in that Freund Mar- record is not 422, 434, Lonberger, 459 103 became the law client soon after the stab- shall v. U.S. S.Ct. firm's Moreover, ("Title 843, (1983) bing July 28 implicit late in its 74 L.Ed.2d 646 USC 1984. order, 2254(d) gives § federal courts no the state found credible live habeas license court Colton's hearing although credibility witnesses de- at the to redetermine whose 3.850 murder, been observed the state trial Trent called him after the did not meanor has court, them.”); surrounding generally but not accord 117 discuss the facts it. See 1513, (11th Singletary, n. 61. v. F.2d F.3d at 1570 Cave 971 1516

859 representation 181, interests in a 863, 133 tent successive 98 L.Ed.2d 484 U.S. 108 S.Ct. Smith, Smith, (1987). at 1406. State, 815 F.2d The citing asserts ease. The may proof of incon- only are to situation call for “other the first two means available at 1406. they must sistent interests.” 815 F.2d Over- be em- petitioner (that all, is, inquiry fact-specif- petitioner the “actual conjunctive conflict” ployed ic, petitioner’s consistent with the ultimate prove relatedness and both substantial must information). prove “to that his conviction was argues The State burden confidential Smith, F.2d at showing unconstitutional.” 815 1406. forgo a of confi- that courts should pretrial disqualifi- dential information Contrary position, to State’s we preventing use of proceedings cation where compelling no reason to break with find privileged remains discussions essential. requiring necessary as a stare decisis proving to an “actual conflict” the reaffirm that condition hold and Smith We revelation of confidential information proving test for actual articulates this circuit’s representa prior during representation. rule of “actual in the successive conflict” be) (and We, in this will continue to circuit is tion F.2d at 1405-06. context. 815 however, [petitioner] par that “once the former client disagree with each somewhat Rather, subject pres proves in that the matters of ty’s interpretation we of Smith. prior representations are ‘substan terpret following. mean the An ent Smith to ' related,’ irrebutably tially pre court will of interest occurs when a “actual conflict” Smith, lawyer interests.” sume that relevant confidential information “inconsistent has during period prove an was disclosed the former 815 F.2d at 1405. In order Lynch, v. Merrill petitioner’s representation.” law Duncan “actual conflict” hindered Pierce, Smith, Inc., 646 yer’s performance, petitioner “must make a Fenner & F.2d (5th denied, 1020, Cir.1981), 1028 cert. 454 showing of inconsistent interests” or factual 895, 394, 70 L.Ed.2d 211 point “specific instances record” to U.S. S.Ct. (1981). impairment It is true that this rule has ori suggest an actual of his or her 1404; Smith, concerning gin pretrial proceedings mo interests. 815 F.2d at Oliver (11th opposed Wainwright, disqualify lawyers, tions to 1524-25 Cir.) concerning (emphasis quotation post-conviction proceedings Sixth and internal marks Duncan, omitted), denied, E.g., Amendment 479 U.S. 107 S.Ct. violations. cert. (1986). (vacating at 1033 court’s “[generally, it F.2d district order L.Ed.2d 287 disqualify granting motion to prove is more difficult to that successive defendant’s lawyer, plaintiffs of sufficient representation caused an actual conflict of for want evi representation representa lawyer’s current interest than that simultaneous dence Smith, substantially plaintiff F.2d at At related law tion did so.” defendant). minimum, yer’s former petitioner must “show that either (1) Yet, applies rule representation of the the rationale behind the counsel’s earlier The reason substantially particularly types proceedings. witness was re both practical or [pe presumption is that it is not lated to counsel’s later titioner], (2) subsequent {e.g., client actually require par counsel learned fair Freund) prove specific facts the for during what ticular confidential information Mills) {e.g., disclosed to prior representation mer client Trent and of the witness that was Smith, representation. lawyer during [petitioner’s] later case.” relevant added).31 Moreover, professionalism often (emphasis standards of at 1405 Even disclosing such in prevent proof of relatedness and con both substantial information, however, client’s cons may without the former fidential not nec formation upon complications, essarily To these enough be to demonstrate “inconsis- ent.32 avoid course, "witness,” rights waive clients Although speaks 32. Of forrrter Smith we find testify continuing confidentiality they about the no to extend its rule of law to non- reason not hearing (e.g., severance testi confidences Trent's testifying, (e.g., separately-tried codefendants testimony that mony, deposition Roth and Mills's Trent). generally presence). See *20 in Duncan's conducted (In Kraft, Corrugat Co. re Inc. v. Alton Box Board 860 relatedness, regard pre- Accordingly, with

showing we “adverse of substantial (and effect,” {e.g., the rule law in this circuit is former client Trent and sume that the be) Colton) Mills) panel lawyer {e.g., the same rule that the to the continues divulged employed: relevant to the all of or her confidences subject representation. The State effect, a prove petition habeas To adverse position prac- to' First, fails reconcile its with these satisfy must three elements. he er proof are equally tical difficulties of plausible point to must “some alternative present post-conviction context. might strategy or tactic [that] defense Appellee’s En Banc Answer Brief at 8 pursued.” v. have been United States Fa (“[T]he (1st 829, Cir.1985); presumption pur- no useful hey, serves 769 F.2d 836 see pose Wainwright, 930, context of instant case since Porter F.2d [v. 805 client, (11th denied, Cir.1986), representation of the i.e. new 482 939 - 40 cert. 3195, allegation 918, already 107 occurred when U.S. 96 L.Ed.2d 682 S.Ct. arose.”). (1987)]. Second, conflict he must demonstrate strategy

that the alternative or tactic was prej the facts. reasonable under Because accept Nor do we the State’s view Strickland, presumed, udice is see 466 U.S. Cuyler’s prong “adverse effect” should 692, 2052, petitioner 104 at S.Ct. “need apply representation in a successive case. not show that the defense would necessari points Fifth It Circuit’s decision ly if (5th have been successful alternative Scott, Cir.1995), [the v. Beets 65 F.3d 1258 used,” strategy or had been rather tactic] denied, 1157, 1547, cert. 517 U.S. 116 S.Ct. prove need he the alternative (1996), 134 L.Ed.2d 650 that a asserts “possessed a sufficient substance to be via (that is, “prejudice” analysis Strickland Fahey, ble alternative.” 769 F.2d at 836. probability reasonable that the verdict would Finally, he must show some link between conflict) have been different but for the forgo the actual conflict and the decision to appropriate Cuyler’s more than more lax strategy the alternative defense. (that is, “adverse effect” test counsel re words, other “he must that the establish reasonable, pursuing frained from alterna inherently in alternative defense was con strategy tive defense because an actual flict with or not undertaken due to the conflict). We, however, decline consider attorney’s loyalties other or interests.” First, argument. State’s State did 836], [Fahey, 769 F.2d at argument raise district before panel, court and the nor did it as a 117 at It bears serve F.3d 1579-80. re- peating, however, “[prejudice pre- for suggestion rehearing basis the State’s Second, only en banc. our sumed the defendant demonstrates required cases showing ... ‘an actual conflict of interest ad- of adverse effect in the successive ” versely lawyer’s performance.’ affected his E.g., Lightbourne context. Strickland, 692, (11th Cir.1987) 1012, 466 2052 Dugger, U.S. at 104 S.Ct. 358, Cuyler, (quoting (finding 446 U.S. S.Ct. upon petitioner’s “no adverse effect 1708). representation” though petitioner’s even law

yer, defender, public an assistant had to B. Standard Review formerly represented cross-examine “a client brought principal The second issue that office”), public the same defender’s cert. denied, en this case banc concerns the standard of 488 U.S. 109 S.Ct. parties Specifically, review. we directed the (1988). Finally, L.Ed.2d 346 a resolution of following question: to brief the this contention is not essential this case because under lax Cuyler even the more Is a lower court’s determination that standard, find no effect we adverse in this in a matter is case, IV, C, explain “substantially particularly we section or is not related,” White, opinion. subsection 2 of the see Smith v. F.2d at [815 Litigation), compelling prove very ed.Container Antitrust client to former (5th Cir.1981) (“The confidential.”). keep presumption things avoids seeks to

861 (such 1405], attorney what an actu pur- a later for habeas court as representation client), ally to which a did standard poses evaluating of an ineffective-assis- for applied deciding question a based on a conflict of law is mixed tance-of-eounsel claim (a) (b) 2254(d)’s fact; law, a a question interest: of fact and ... merit section of of (c) law; question a mixed of in a question presumption of of correctness federal habe- (internal quotation fact? proceeding!.].”) law and marks as added). omitted; emphasis citation In and case, present- In both courts have lower deed, repeatedly pe we instructed ed us with relatedness determinations. The showing titioners make a of “must “prior state court said that the law factual prove inconsistent interests” to the existence representation of was in matters Mr. Trent Mers, of an actual conflict. United States v. representation unrelated to” Freund. (11th Cir.) 1321, (emphasis 701 F.2d 1328 Likewise, the district court decided that the added), denied, 991, cert. 464 U.S. 104 S.Ct. representation law firm’s of Freund (1983); 482, 78 679 see also Burden L.Ed.2d “substantially particularly was not and relat- (11th Zant, 1298, Cir.1994); 24 v. F.3d 1305 firm’s prior ed” to the law 554, Singletary, Porter v. 14 F.3d 560-61 aggravated and diazep- Trent on his assault (11th denied, Cir.), 1009, 513 115 charges, cert. U.S. possession am but also no beared 532, Smith, (1994); L.Ed.2d 435 alleged S.Ct. 130 rep- “correlation between the firm’s Romero, 1404; F.2d at of ... a 815 United States v. resentation Mills on cocaine (11th 981, Cir.1986); charge[.]” 780 986 Barham v. (11th States, 1529, 724 F.2d United 1532 resolution of this issue will Our dic Cir.), denied, 1230, cert. 467 104 U.S. S.Ct. to these determina tate whether we defer 2687, (1984); 81 L.Ed.2d 882 and United analyze underlying arguments tions or their (11th Carter, 1514, v. 721 F.2d States 1536 Unquestionably, findings anew. state court denied, 819, 105 Cir.), 89, cert. 469 U.S. S.Ct. subject presumption of fact are (1984). L.Ed.2d 83 36 correctness, and district similar federal court clearly findings are deemed correct unless holding squarely Our fits within the 1277, v. Turpin, erroneous. Collier 155 F.3d Supreme growing list of issues that Court’s (11th Cir.1998). Questions of 1289-90 fact, of law questions involve mixed fact, questions and mixed of law and is, applications to historical fact. In of law hand, mandate de novo review. Bue other Mata, v. the Court held that “the Sumner (11th 1078, 1083 Singletary, 74 F.3d noano question constitutionality ultimate as to the — denied, U.S. -, Cir.), 117 cert. S.Ct. procedures pretrial used identification (1996). 520, 136 408 surprising, L.Ed.2d Not question case [a] is a mixed of law then, Freund contends that relatedness is a fact[,]” questions but of fact that under- “the State, contrast, pure law. question of governed are lie this ultimate conclusion pure question 591, asserts relatedness is statutory presumption!.]” 455 U.S. (1982). fact. 597, 1303, 102 71 L.Ed.2d 480 S.Ct. Fenton, Similarly, in Miller v. Court Upon scrutiny, close we hold that the ques- constitutional stated the “ultimate a lawyer’s prior representa of whether issue admissibility is a tion” of the confession substantially particularly related tion is subject question “mixed fact and law” subsequent representation is a mixed 112, 104, 474 plenary review. U.S. federal sure, question of law fact. To be (1985). And, 405 106 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d inquiry legal relatedness involves both Keohane, Thompson v. recently, more components. factual Reference to a law book custody’ “the ultimate ‘in Court found that cannot resolve alone the issue. Historical purposes” also determination for Miranda scope facts —such as nature and each fact. questions of law and involved mixed what did 99, 112, L.Ed.2d 516 U.S. S.Ct. necessary' predicates each client —are to link (1995). representations. ing the two See Thomas v. Zant, (11th Cir.1983) acknowledged Thompson, the Court n 2254(d), § in other (“[S]pecific regard “[i]n historical facts found state

862 and fact contexts, of are “mixed determinations of law proper characterization a the presumption fact or is entitled a correctness of law sometimes of question as one 2254(d) (1982).”). 110-11, § 116 457 at S.Ct. slippery.” 516 U.S. under 28 U.S.C. omitted). (footnote Essentially, though, short, the every equally we reason to treat find precedents limiting as its summarized Court ultimate of related- the conclusion substantial “basic, pri- presumption ness, of correctness the potentially dispositive of ele- one the in the sense mary, facts: facts of or historical stemming a ments of conflict claim from suc- credibility events and the a recital of external representations. The historical facts cessive Thompson, 516 U.S. at their of narrators.” conclusion, however, underlying that continue (internal 110, quotation 116 marks 457 S.Ct. subject presumption correct- to be of omitted). point- and The Court citations To would violate well- ness. hold otherwise instances questions where of ed to limited comity established notions of and federalism. beyond purely historical ones go can fact Balcom, generally v. See Mason labeling touching upon happened,” “what (5th Cir.1976) (“[Cjonsiderations of 721 heavily “depend[ on questions ] that them comity obligate federal in habe- do not courts credibility appraisal of witness trial court’s corpus to defer to state determina- cases Thompson, at 516 U.S. demeanor.” on obli- tions matters of federal law. The (citing competency 116 S.Ct. 457 issues of gation judge opposite: of the is federal juror impartiality as exam- to stand trial and apply proper federal constitutional stan- depend upon fact ples questions of of (cita- facts[.]”) underlying based dards on the assessment); credibility accord state court’s omitted). tion Singletary, 148 F.3d Provenzano (11th Cir.1998) (“The of question 1330 wheth- Merits C. actually attorney’s er actions were Finally, we turn to merits of Freund’s strategic product of a tactical or decision is brought claim—the case third issue fact, an issue and a state court’s decision of review, en banc. novo Under de we examine concerning presumptively cor- that issue alleged in turn the three the law sources of rect.”). firm’s conflicts of interest. Plainly, subject pri- linking the matters representations subsequent or and does not 1. Actual Conflict “basic, primary lend itself or historical” Representation i. advances, Prior of Trent factual review. The State neither find, anything special nor do about we Freund’s main contention is that the law prior relationship subsequent between a prior representation ag- representation that would necessitate defer- diazepam gravated possession assault ence to credibility the state court’s assess- charges presented inconsistent interests contrary, ment. petitioner To the once the representation concerning paints picture repre- the factual of the two stabbing Specifically, of Walker. death each, lawyer sentations and what did contrary to the district claims relatively dry and common sense evaluation judgment, court’s he established that these ensues to determine whether are suffi- representations substantially related. ciently Perhaps why linked. our We, however, are not convinced. suggest cases all the elements of an First, Freund failed to establish prem- ineffective assistance of counsel claim hearing concerning record the 3.850 ised on conflicts of involve interest mixed scope prior questions Porter, nature law firm’s fact. E.g., of law and generally Trent. (“Questions F.3d at involving conflicts of Duncan, “al (stating interest 646 F.2d at 1031 are mixed determinations of law and subject review.”); Oliver, though Lynch repeatedly fact as ha[d] Merrill to de novo repre F.2d at (“[Questions present serted that and former involving conflicts related, interest[,]” including substantially sentations [were] the “ultimate issue” “support whether the facts no more than a ha[d] the conclusion demonstrated surface existed[,]” that an actual superficial conflict interest the mat- connection between ters”) added). (emphasis nature of the law firm’s questioned law firm attor never Colton —the of Trent consisted of the of Dick initially regard ney represented Trent Dick, who expert and Freund’s rebuttal witness. drug possession aggravated ing the as part-time private investigator, testified that charges hearing. 3.850 sault completed he never work that Trent —at *23 any in lawyer Freund’s thus failed to elicit Colton) (and is, possibly requested, in- person likely to formation from the most Vana, vestigate background of the al- scope prior repr know the and nature of leged aggravated victim of Trent’s assault however, State, ques did esentation.33 The charge. Dick also testified that neither Col- prior representation of tion Colton about his requested any ton nor Trent that he do unequivocally testified that his Trent. He investigative respect work with to Trent’s way any of Trent was not in drug possession charge. regard to With to the facts of the murder. connected Cf. expert witness the area of crimi- States, 1529, 724 v. United Barham law, during nal the State elicited its cross- (11th Cir.) (affirming the district that he was not a examination board certified that no actual conflict ex court’s conclusion lawyer, criminal that he had never talked to isted, “that noting that the testified anyone scope from the law about the ‘had not [former client] of prior representation and nature of their of the remotest connection’ with [defendant’s] Trent, and that he had never talked to Trent. denied, trial”), 1230, 104 cert. 467 U.S. S.Ct. concluding The district court did not err (1984). 2687, Although 81 L.Ed.2d 882 to ... Freund “failed demonstrate that Duncan, questioned Freund’s counsel Col- prior representation .... the firm’s of Trent partner, neglected he to ask Duncan ton’s substantially repre- was related to the firm’s scope any questions about the of the law sentation of [Freund].”34 prior representation of Trent on mat than Duncan’s involvement with ters other allegations Even we consider the con- proceeding forfeiture that Freund the civil petition tained in Freund’s to the district substantially claim to related to does not be allegations clearly did court — the murder. attempt prove hearing— at the 3.850 support do not the conclusion that The substantive scope an actual presented regarding the and Freund’s counsel labored under course, ry hearing any the reasonableness of his coun- 33. Of conflict of interest attributable on venue, imputes equally part- forego change to "his current to Colton sel’s decision to a employees.” Coxv. American Cast Iron ners and regardless any prof- affidavit he Co., (11th Cir.1988); Pipe 847 F.2d see Jackson, Horton, Bundy deci- fered. Our 4-1.10(a) ("While Regulating Fla. Bar also Rule sions establish that the reasonableness of a firm, lawyers are associated in a none of them strategic question a choice is of law be knowingly represent a client when 1 of shall court, by subject decided not a matter prohibited practicing would be from them alone evidentiary proof. inquiry Accord- factual so[.]”). doing ingly, petitioner could it would not matter if a attorneys a assemble affidavits from dozen Permitting "expert” testimony in to establish strategy swearing trial that the used at his was rec effective assistance is inconsistent with our ognition question unreasonable. The is not one to be ques that the issue involved is a mixed affidavits, by plebiscite, by by deposi- decided We of law and fact that the court decides. tion tion, testimony. question by or live It is a recently explained as much in v. Sin- Provenzano courts, by by the dis- capital petitioner law to be decided state gletary, a case in which the court, Court, experienced by affidavit criminal each in its own offered the trict this (the attorney Orange Defender of defense County, Public turn. Florida) attempt Provenzano, Likewise, in an to establish 148 F.3d at 1332. change failure of trial counsel to seek a case, present a law firm rendered inef- whether of coun venue amounted to ineffective assistance because of a conflict fective assistance of counsel 1998). (11th 1331-32 Cir. In sel. facts, interest, given a is "a under set why enough discussing that affidavit was courts, by question to be decided the state petitioner evidentiary hearing on entitle to an court, Court, district each in its own assistance, we stated: ineffective Thus, Provenzano, F.3d at it is turn.” fundamental reason There is another more why testimony. subject expert a not matter to an evidentia- Provenzano is not entitled (1981). allegedly aggravated Trent brandished L.Ed.2d assault conflict. completely setting— different public street and threatened occurred a gun alleged city apart- than in persons. The facts were that on a street rather kill two recklessly through a speeding Although res- Walker Trent ment. Trent shot at before died, to a halt. area and screeched Vana neither hit nor idential bullet Walker apartment fearing Undisputably, of her that Trent came out caused his death. the cause of Furthermore, neighborhood child. stabbing. had struck She asked Walker’s death was driving why like that. Trent gun he was exists in the record that the no evidence told her to mind her own business she the same one that Trent used ap- get Appellants’ hurt. When Vana’s husband En aggravated assault case. See pulled handgun out a proached, Reply (conceding Banc Letter at 26 “the lack *24 in his and asked her if she holster waistband evidence that both cases involved the of hard other,” motioning or this one the gun”). equally “wanted It was uncontested that same his gun supposedly in back guns he and waved them owned several later, days A when the symbol authority. waistband area. few his around as of Trent, they arrested discovered dia- officers diazepam connection between Trent’s zepam in Trent’s car. charge stabbing and possession the foregoing description It clear from the equally Although as tenuous. the coroner aggravated the as- of Trent’s arrest diazepam found a derivative of in Walker’s Freund, Walker charge did involve sault not body, drug kill Again, the did not Walker. figured any who of the other individuals Moreover, it Walker died from stab wounds. the investi- prominently in Walker murder undisputed that Trent was the source of allege not gation, and Freund does diazepam injected the that was into Walker’s in- knew the Vanas or the other witnesses body night the the No of murder. one complaint. aggravated in assault volved the alleged that the Freund was one who possession charge, Similarly, diazepam brought Likewise, apartment. it to Trent’s ensuing proceeding, forfeiture did not and the fact witnesses testified that anyone actually involve connected injecting Trent and Daniell all took turns case, except Trent. There- Walker murder diazepam with Walker and vodka mix- fore, any determination of a “substantial re- Therefore, regardless ture. of Freund’s fail- lationship” the law firm’s prior between proof, ure meet his of burden district representation subsequent of Trent and concluding court not did err that “Trent’s of Freund can be based prior charges possession diazepam of of and on the nature of the offenses involved aggravated ‘substantially [were] assault is, fact that representations, particularly’ and related mur- [Freund]’s diazepam guns were involved both der trial.” representations. similarities, however, vague Finally, correctly do not Such district court relationship found that establish substantial between Freund failed demonstrate that subsequent representation espe the law firm “learned relevant confidential — where, cially here, myriad explained factors differen information from” Trent. As we IV, A, subject representa opinion, tiate the matter each section of this we cannot n (substantial Kraft, presume at tion. confidential information unless present relatedness, proved “the which relatedness exists when action Freund substantial very any past and the concern he did not. Nor did Freund elicit inde matter”) added); subject (emphasis pendent proof same confidential information. Martinez, 361, only arguably 362 The United States v. relevant information that (substantial (5th Cir.1980) Trent, relatedness exist the law firm knew arrest for about prior representation charges possession diazepam concerned ed because assault, public aggravated [criminal] “same transactions” “same were matters case), Regulating at cert. record. events” issue in defendant’s Under the Rules denied, Bar, knowledge 67 Florida U.S. S.Ct. law firm’s Representation of ii. Prior Mills charges cannot be the basis of a con- those flict of interest: Freund also contends that the law under an actual conflict of inter labored lawyer formerly represented a A who has arising prior consultation est from Colton’s not thereafter ... chent in a matter shah the facts of a cocaine with Mills about representa- relating information to the use charge.35 Again, Freund’s efforts disadvantage to the of the former tion hearing develop 3.850 the historical facts except [confidentiality] 4-1.6 client as rule surrounding consultation with Mills Colton’s respect permit to a client or Colton, lacking. questioned He never general- when the information has become provide could rele the witness who the most ly known. (since subpoena vant information he did not 4-1.9(b). Regulating Fla. In addi- Rule Bar testify). any Mills to The State elicited tion, provides the comment to rule 4-1.9 that: prior rep all about the law firm’s resentation of Mills. lawyer in acquired Information event, from Freund’s we know representing a client course of early police undercover offi- subsequently be used attempted after she to sell cer arrested Mills However, disadvantage of the client. *25 kilogram him a of cocaine. Duncan himself lawyer once served a client that has fact elicited this information on cross-examination lawyer using preclude does not addition, supra of Mills. See note 24. In generally known about information hearing provided 3.850 Colton’s admission representing when later another client that he had “consulted” with Mills about the client. trafficking charge. They cocaine also dis- Regulating (empha- cmt. Rule Fla. Bar 4-1.9 possibility provide cussed the she would added). “generally sis Just as known” was to the Palm Beach substantial assistance any disparaging Trent that information about County Sheriffs Office. He insisted that the himself, divulge at chose to the sever- meeting with Mills was brief and that after hearing. ance fee, quoted again her a he never saw her capacity. in an official best, potential At the law firm faced a attorney It is true that who cross- “[a]n conflict of interest before the court severed inherently a former chent encoun examines Trent’s and Freund’s trials. See United loyalty.” Lightbourne, ters divided 829 F.2d McCutcheon, 188-89 States at 1023. a successive “[I]n Cir.1996) (11th (affirming the district court’s case,” however, proof that a criminal “mere disqualification of defendant’s because previously represented a counsel defendant’s his of the codefendant witness is insufficient to establish ‘inconsis lawyer] certain [the who had “confided Smith, 815 F.2d at 1405. tent interests.’” personal concerning information his back- Rather, prove petitioner must inconsis ethically ground” prevented cross-examina- under the framework that we tent interest trial). joint tion in Consistent with the Bar IV, A, part opin reaffirmed in section of this however, Opinion, the court’s severance or- Thus, conflict ion. to show an actual stem prosecutor’s der and the decision not to call ming prior representa from the law firm’s testify possibility Trent to removed the Mills, very tion of Freund —at the least— firm former the law would cross-examine its prove related needed to either substantial Thus, at client. no time did the law firm’s or the actual revelation of confidential ness hypothetical of interest rise to the conflict information. level of an actual conflict of interest. See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 100 S.Ct. 1708 neither. As with Freund established (“[T]he Trent, vague than possibility nothing of conflict is insufficient to more similarities conviction.”). representations of Mills and impugn a criminal linked the deciding, assume, of a conflict of interest. 35. We without this brief purposes consultation constituted for "representation" damage Appellants’ Mills had admitted Col- that the was done. See Even if Freund. (“[0]nce kilogram of cocaine Initial Brief at at trafficked a testified ton she officer, hearing, information pretrial damage an [severance] undercover done[.]”). bearing Mills ad- allegations no on Freund’s case. Trent made the co- that she had used lawyers’ condoning drug partici- the stand mitted on use and night past and on the prostitution caine him in pating parties murder, referring to the law court, her and Trent’s open hearing at a that received undisputed that inconsequential. It is And, significant amount of media attention. any other media, not do Mills Colton did work in front of Colton was able Thus, any additional bias than “consult” her. deny every unequi- ... “each and accusation that Freund toward Trent on Mills’s vocably totally."36 Accordingly, was, lawyers aware of at claims allegations under Colton denied oath —that best, nominally probative. and Freund did not reiterate at 3.850 evidentiary hearing not cause actual information, Mills Regarding confidential —did firm’s and Freund’s conflict between rights to ev- when she testified waived her interests. deposi- in a erything had told Colton that she pres- in Duncan’s direction and tion Roth’s Therefore, divulged Mills had even if

ence. 2. Adverse Effect to Colton— information relevant confidential any alleged Even if conflicts no made little to showing that Freund conflict, interest rose to the level of an actual nature of to advance —the confidential effort flowing fail to find adverse effect we disclosed to a when she it ceased to exist from them.37 At time that party prior to trial. third Mills, his law firm’s Duncan cross-examined *26 i. to Blame to Failure Shift the Trent presented her no prior representation of hypothetical a conflict of interest. more than Freund that but for the contends court did not err Accordingly, district allegiance to Trent of its law firm’s because “failed to concluding that Freund establish him prior representation and extensive alleged the firm’s any between correlation public allegations and Trent’s of embarrass a prior of ... Mills on cocaine ing and illicit on the conduct Colton charge [its] ... and Foley, pursued would have blame- [Freund].” Trent, shifting opposed to defense that as Freund, actually to stabbed Walker death. Allegations

iii. Trent’s closing argument points Foley’s Freund to Lastly, al he “wondered Trent did it” as points Trent’s, Freund where whether hearing of the law firm realized the legations pretrial at the evidence even severance against insanity. embarrassing superiority of this defense over illegal conduct responds light firm as a of an The State that in undis law source members of view, puted of all three fact witnesses of interest. In Freund’s actual conflict death, interest not that Freund stabbed Walker to it was in the law firm’s own best pursued theory antagonize for fear that he would viable points allegations argu case to it. It further out repeat again. Freund’s available defense, ment, however, insanity Concerning unique cannot stand. that Freund’s is, knowingly advantage of allegations on the that Trent took Trent’s of illicit activities damage organic manipu- lawyers, Freund concedes Freund’s brain part of the even allegations already Additionally, Although we no actu- have found that the truth of Trent's 37. existed, compelled we feel to address fact-finding necessary al conflict was irrelevant prong the adverse effect because our cases have Where, here, charge of murder. discussed, in the context actual sometimes conflict, witness, lawyer's not a fact out-of-court con- (namely, blame-shifting) that are issues pertinent duct is the crime with which never appropriately analyzed in the context of more charged. generally Fla. Stat. the client is See, Romero, e.g., at adverse effect. F.2d 90.401, (1997). §§ 90.402 sulfate, robot, injected magnesium with shifted the blame to Walker first him like lated refuting any suggestion diazepam, then with mixtures of vodka and somewhat — of interest motivat- alleged finally Angelilli conflicts that the with air. testified that strategy. stabbing ed the law Freund make motions the di- body testimony rection of that di- Walker’s — It is true that “a agree with the State. We rectly implicated Corroborating Freund. strategy shifting blame to one’s eodefend- Angelilli’s testimony, Daniell stated that he legitimate and often effective de- ant[] pick up ap- Freund saw Trent’s knife and Mers, strategy!.]” F.2d at 1330. fense And, proach Walker. all three witnesses tes- case, however, shifting of In this a wholesale tified that Freund alone in the main plausible not a defen- blame to Trent was time, a short room Walker for realistically available to trial “option sive he into the afterward came bedroom with counsel!,]” regardless of the law firm’s said, Carter, shirt blood “It’s over.” dealings with Trent. 721 F.2d at (internal quotation marks omitted and Mills, Attempting get Angelilli and Dan- added); emphasis accord change implication iell to their of Freund on (alternative strategy must be “rea- at 1580 proved fruit- cross-examination would have “possess! under the facts” and suffi- ] sonable Duncan less. had observed witnesses’ alternative”). cient substance be viable during testimonies and tactical- evidentiary at Duncan testified 3.850 ly that their determined stories would sur- hearing to him that Freund admitted rigorous In Dun- vive cross-examination. Walker, committing stabbed confessed view, professional can’s these witnesses stabbing Foley meeting at at their first simply “not off of their back testimo- offices, psy- the law firm’s and later told his sure, ny.” points To be to no evi- chiatrist that he stabbed Walker because dence that Trent —if the law firm had called him to do it. Freund not elicit Trent told did him, testify him to exculpated —would testimony from Duncan that either he or though pleaded guilty he had to second- even Foley factual basis to doubt degree murder before Freund’s trial com- Freund’s confessions.38 (De- Carter, 721 menced. See correctly points out that all of the “points fendant to no evidence that a code- is, physical apart- State’s evidence—that him.”). exculpated fendant could have That ment, knife, bloody trunk that con- steamer *27 may have been more motivated than body, sledgehammer, tained Walker’s hand- inconsequential. kill Freund to Walker is cuffs, bat, tape, guns, duct dented baseball (blame Oliver, shifting at 1525 See 782 F.2d towels, dining blood-soaked room chair with although not eodefend- realistic because it, lodged a bullet van with Trent’s and victim, ant had a to kill the no witness motive fingerprints, syringes, Fullerton’s bottles of holding him the knife or could corrobo- saw diazepam, empty capsules magnesium sul- so). opportunity Simply put, rate his to do fate, liquor belonged to bottles —either witness-including no fact Freund himself— property Physical or found on of Trent. innocence. could corroborate Freund’s evidence, however, only persuasive is as Additionally, light we observe that who authenticate tell the the witnesses Foley, Duncan and trial, Freund’s confessions to story it. At and from behind Freund’s psychiatrist, lawyers firm’s could the law police’s investigation, the start of the all they pursued if have been disbarred principal three of the fact State’s witnesses— Although Mills, complete blame-shifting defense. Angelilli against and Daniell —testified certainly argue be ethical to reason- They all it would Freund. testified that Freund was apartment put the to its burden present night at Trent’s the able doubt —and State that, direction, proof at would not be ethical to affirma- murder and Trent’s —it point (probably 38. We that Freund case to show consciousness of note did not to Stob’s rebuttal is, testimony during jail guilt), indicating just opposite, trial that killing his visit to the the Freund denied Walker as evidence that tactically determined that Stob the law firm the law firm should doubted his confession. credibility. lacked Indeed, testify the State called Stob to in its 868 (1986). 2907, prosecu- finger at someone else. 90 L.Ed.2d 993

tively See point (4); (c) 4-3.S(a)(1), get penalty it Fla. Bar tion even the death Regulating R. could (1) (“A lawyer knowingly: not Make a proved shall that Trent acted either with the in- ... to a false material statement tent that Walker die or with reckless disre- fact (4) tribunal; ... evidence that law See Enmund v. Flor- gard for Walker’s life. Offer (e) false[;] lawyer .... A yer ida, 782, 798, be 3368, knows to 73 458 U.S. 102 S.Ct. lawyer that the may (1982) offer evidence (intent die); refuse to L.Ed.2d victim (quoted false.”) in The reasonably is believes Arizona, 137, 157-58, 107 Tison v. 481 U.S. Regulating the Flori Florida Bar Re Rules (reckless (1987) 1676, 95 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d (Fla.1986)). 977, Bar, 1057-58 494 So.2d da life). best, disregard for victim’s At course, Amendment does not “Of the Sixth implicit that he commit- admission impossible require that counsel do what stabbing mitigate against the ted the If there no bona fide unethical. defense penalty for Trent. Fla. death Stat. one charge, cannot create counsel 921.141(6)(d). § Freund’s successful That the interests of his client disserve insanity joint trial plea of could have charade.” attempting a useless United relieved both he and Trent of criminal liabili- Cronic, 19, n. States v. 466 U.S. ty entirely reconciles with a conclusion that (1984); see 80 L.Ed.2d 657 S.Ct. provided the law effective assistance of Whiteside, 157, 168, 106 475 U.S. S.Ct. Nix trial counsel. (1986) (“[A]n attorney’s 89 L.Ed.2d Similarly, allegations timing of Trent’s duty the interest of the ethical to advance hearing at severance belie Freund’s con- equally duty an solemn client is limited the law tention motivated firm’s profes comply law standards of with the affirmatively point finger decision conduct.”). sional Foley’s press at Trent. Both conference and failed to establish first rely insanity formal notice of intent effect, elements of adverse but second pre-dated allegations Trent’s at the sever- is, prong, that “some link also the third be hearing. Also, ance learned actual conflict and decision to tween the psychiatrist of Freund’s statement to the be- blame-shifting forgo” defense. pretrial hearing, providing severance fore First, the record does not requesting the reason for the severance and support Freund’s contention that possibly giving Trent the motivation to make allegiance Trent under the rules of allegations against Foley and Colton at necessarily professional conduct colored ev Indeed, hearing. given undisputed ery that made from the outset of decision allegations “angered” that Trent’s of Freund. As the State firm, they arguably provided the law in- contends, did, fact, correctly the law firm centive for the firm shift more attempt to shift blame to Trent some Thus, alleged to Trent. the law firm’s blame proven joint degree. If in a the law *28 antagon- conflict with its own interests not to theory that Trent knew of defense that absolutely in “played ize Trent no role coun- organic damage brain rendered him Buenoano, strategy.” ... sels’ 74 F.3d at influence, susceptible manipu and he Walker, like to kill lated Freund a robot short, we conclude that conflict-free guaranteed certainly not have Trent’s counsel would have chosen the same defense acquittal first-degree charge. on the murder that the law firm Freund retained did. jury guilty of A could still find Trent killing, Because Freund confessed to capital accessory offense as an before the strong the firm had if, reasonable medical along helping fact Freund kill Walk insanity er, proof organic damage, of his brain kill Walker. intended Freund (1983). plausible law firm’s viable and § was the jury Fla. Stat. 777.011 A could also defense, at felony as Duncan testified the 3.850 guilty first-degree find Trent mur der, hearing. testimony killing. also credit Duncan’s even he did not commit the We (Fla. State, anything doing did refrain from See Cave v. 476 So.2d 186 that he denied, 1985), a result of the law firm’s cert. 106 for Freund as U.S. S.Ct. Porter, undisputed testimony that he elicited facts representation of Trent. F.3d Cf. Daniell) (and (finding court’s Angelilli at 561 no error district from'Mills show finding of conflict of interest that was no ability Trent’s to control others evinced. based, court’s credit part, in on the district Thus, every exists that tactical indication lawyer’s testimony that he did not ing the reasons, alleged opposed conflict of asking his former client refrain from interest, Duncan’s Ac motivated conduct. questions because of on cross-examination cordingly, Freund failed to a sufficient show client). prior representation Ac [alleged] “link between the actual conflict and not err in cordingly, the district court did the decision” not to ask Mills about her theory concluding pro that “the alternative and, firm, best,” “at referral to the law posed by not realistic view [Freund] [was] represen effect on the law firm’s omission’s eye of the of the uncontradicted tation of Freund was “de minimus.” witnesses.” 1580; Lightbourne, F.2d at 1024. Further Cross-

ii. Failure to

Examine Mills Finally, points Freund to Duncan’s V. CONCLUSION evidence that cross-examination of Mills as reasons, foregoing For the sum- adversely firm’s conflict of interest the law (1) mary, we hold that: the rules of law as Specifically, affected its defense of Freund. White, announced Smith v. 815 F.2d at lawyer argues that a conflict-free Freund 1404-06, govern claims of ineffective assis- could have used information that Trent re impeach premised tance of trial counsel on conflicts of ferred her to Colton to further Mills suggest of Trent. are stemming bias favor We represen- interest from successive (2) our recitation of the tations; not convinced. Under of whether a issue law firm’s IV, A, part law of adverse effect section prior representation of a witness or non- matters what conflict-free could testifying, separately-tried eodefendant done, but what he or she would have related, substantially particularly to its words, In other had the done. bur subsequent representation petitioner of the proving through preponderance den of question a mixed of law and fact that is not ques the evidence that Duncan would have 2254(d)’s subject presumption section referring Mills tioned about Trent’s her (3) correctness; and the law firm did not firm but professional the law for Colton’s provide trial ineffective assistance of counsel relationship with her. This he failed to do. prior representations Freund because engaged question in no at the line Mills, public of Trent and as well as hearing prove 3.850 this notion. allegations embarrassing activity and illicit anything, If Freund’s cross-examination of lawyers, give did not on the of two itsof hearing just Duncan at the 3.850 established ad- rise to actual conflicts of interest is, opposite, question that he did versely performance. affected the law firm’s assisting Mills about Trent’s her to reduce judgment Accordingly, affirm the we trafficking charge. the cocaine This cross- district court.39 entirely examination was consistent with the defense, theory

law firm’s as Duncan’s AFFIRMED. *29 judgment appeal:. 39. Freund raises three other on on issues without discussion. issues these (1) Judge whether Mounts’s failure conduct an But we do note See Eleventh Circuit Rule 36-1. inquiry issue, into the law firm’s conflicts of interest Freund concedes that that as to the third right violated Freund’s Sixth Amendment to ef- required was not to conduct "the district court counsel; (2) fective assistance of whether the law evidentiary hearing at bar[.]" an case pretrial investigation firm's failure to conduct a Reply Appellant's Letter at 14. En Banc guilt into the of Trent and the innocence of Also, holdings, light our we need not of right Freund violated Freund’s Sixth Amendment brought counsel; case en (3) reach the fourth issue that this to effective assistance of banc, any conflicts of whether Freund waived failing district court erred in dentiary hearing. to conduct an evi- part We interest on the of the firm. affirm the district court’s 870

TJOFLAT, garding proper application majori- of Judge, dissenting, in Circuit ANDERSON, DUBINA, ty’s determining for a BIRCH and test when such conflict which lawyer’s per- has an effect” on the Judges, join: “adverse Circuit light problems po- In of the formance. case, corpus a law firm In this habeas I, pitfalls part part II tential identified in in a murder a client represent undertook majority’s determination that reconsiders co-defendant the client’s prosecution which of facts this case do not meet either the of firm. long-standing client had been a prongs actual conflict or adverse effect of represented this co-defendant The firm Cuyler particular, part v. In Sullivan. II.B. variety in a of criminal and years for over ten explains Foley, the firm of Colton & matters, firm’s members had and the civil Duncan, P.A., represented which Dr. John him on interactions with a social extensive (the petitioner) initially faced professional of these a result As level. ethically-based two of interest conflicts interactions, privy to the firm became social representation of burdened its Freund. As information that could have great deal of II.C., part described in a third conflict arose quite damaging to its former client’s been began represent after the firm not murder but which the could defense III exacerbated this burden. Part then obligation of ethical of disclose because precedents interpreting Cuyl- returns to our confidentiality At to that client. the same er of these and determines none cases however, time, obli- the firm owed ethical lawyers, finding forecloses a that Freund’s and had a gations to its current client Sixth by these burdened as conflicts obligation provide Amendment this client interest, provided ineffective assistance obli- competent representation. These with Freund.1 profes- gations required that all of the firm’s in its current client’s best sional decisions be by conflicts inter- and untainted

interests I. interest, tance of tionally inappropriate our obligations. ing quarterback,” the writ tion, habeas rent client. that the firm made in conflict of resulting clash of the degree rent and former each client est. The firm’s client in the murder precedents addressing who Because the interests corpus murder, because, I prejudiced counsel interest. The respectfully ultimately necessarily Because now claims sitting it believes clients were was convicted of petitions this result is constitu- basis dissent. representing its cur- tainted firm’s based majority flies in the face of ineffective assis- of the law firm’s “Monday obligations on conflict of for a adverse, firm’s conflicting decisions prosecu- writ morn- client first- deny cur- whom a former client See, with yer’s terpretation primarily in two traditional contexts: F.3d 1419 cessive performance.” 335, (1980); interest F.3d recognized, sel because his that he was denied his est must show “that right to the As both 348, 100 e.g., adverse “simultaneous representation” accord Freund [2] McConico (11th effective assistance a habeas adversely of this standard has S.Ct. interests, lawyer panel Cuyler (11th Cir.1998). 1708, 1718, representation” of [1] and the Cir.1997), vacated, had a conflict of inter petitioner appears affected his- v. and a Alabama, v. an actual conflict of Sullivan, Sixth Butterworth, Our circuit’s 64 L.Ed.2d lawyer’s client majority as a witness. of trial Amendment who claims developed 446 lawyer’s against clients coun “suc U.S. law 333 in Cir.1990) (11th LA., (noting that a con part problems In I discuss context). majority’s determining flict of interest arise in either when a test types two The fact that these of conflicts has “actual conflict interest.” mean, I.B., frequently re- arise most does howev I offer some observations Butterworth, here. Freund v. majority the is- issue further 1. Because does not address vacated, (11th Cir.1997), sue whether of the conflicts interest 1582-83 *30 representation (11th Cir.1998). affected the law firm’s of 135 F.3d 1419 do discuss this were waived I

871 proving an actual exclusive test er, in circuit’s contexts that these are two repre- in of interest the successive de conflict lawyer’s of interest can which a conflict In establish an context. order to of sentation effective assistance prive her client of the test, peti- a habeas See, under this Dugger, 834 actual conflict e.g., Zamora v. counsel. (11th Cir.1987) showing ‘inconsistent must make “a of 956, (noting that tioner F.2d 960-61 ” Smith, F.2d at 1405. As interests.’ 815 Cuyler has been developed “the standard it, majority proof makes of sees Smith argue applied to cases in which defendants of relatedness disclosure either substantial lawyers were more interested that their necessary prereq- information a acquittal”); confidential obtaining publicity than McLain, 1457, finding interests. to a of inconsistent uisite v. 823 F.2d United States however, both,3 Cir.1987) proves (11th petitioner if a Cuyler require Even (finding 1463 may to establish actual pros not be sufficient lawyer possible faced ments met where proof inter- Attorney’s conflict—“other of inconsistent by same United States ecution client); required. Ante at 859. ests” also be Zuck prosecuting office was (5th Alabama, 436, interpretation of is the Implicit in its Smith 438-40 Cir. 588 F.2d v. 1979) majority’s proof that “other of inconsis- lawyers previous view (concluding that who interests,” alone, standing ean never be prosecutor tent ly represented the who of sufficient to establish an actual conflict client had actual prosecuting their current interest); interest. Fitzpatrick v. see conflict (9th

McCormick, 1247, 1251-53 Cir. 869 F.2d Smith, interpretation of which the This 1989) (finding assistance of denial of effective majority supports piecemeal quotations present failed to evi counsel where opinion, incorrect for two reasons. from the exculpate current client dence that would First, equivocal decision itself is the Smith client).2 non-testifying former expense of question proof “other on the of what role important keep this observation It is plays in inconsistent interests” supporting situations, we are faced with such mind when finding of actual conflict of interest. On one, conflict in which an asserted does as this hand, states: one Smith two precisely fit within either these case where [a successive situations, In such our traditional contexts. previously counsel a criminal defendant’s interpreting two-pronged prior cases witness], if fails to represented a defendant evaluated with Cuyler standard should be (1) repre- earlier that either counsel’s show imported are into the new care before substantially sentation of the witness context. later particularly related to counsel’s (2) defendant, or counsel representation A. in- actually particular learned confidential during prior prong Cuyler, formation respect to the first With White, to defen- that was relevant majority that Smith v. of the witness concludes (11th case, Cir.1987), has not later then defendant 1401 articulates our dant’s 815 F.2d Scott, 1258, attorney has breached in which an v. F.3d 1266 & n. cumstances 2. But see Beets 65 Cir.1995) (en banc) Collins, (5th ("Although duty loyalty.” 10 the feder- v. 986 Beets unblinkingly applied Cuyl- Cir.1993), 1478, (5th courts have modified, al circuit 65 F.3d 1481 stan- er's 'actual conflict' ‘adverse effect' Cir.1995). (5th alleged attorney dards to all kinds of conflicts, ethical reading Supreme a careful of the Court course, actually petitioner would never Of (footnote expansiveness.” cases belies this omit- majority prove acknowl- both. As the need to Beets, contrast, ted)). panel opinion petitioner edges, once the rule is that our following “Together, contained assessment: present subject "proves matters 668, Washington, 466 U.S. [Strickland 'substantially representations re- are and lated,’ 2052, (1984), and Wood v. S.Ct. 80 L.Ed.2d 674 irrebuttably presume that will the court Georgia, 450 U.S. 101 S.Ct. was disclosed information relevant confidential (1981),] suggest Cuyler that the anal- L.Ed.2d period representation." during the former ysis may not be limited to conflicts of interest Pierce, Lynch, & Fenner Merrill Duncan v. Smith, Inc., involving represen- or successive [simultaneous] (5th Cir. Unit Consequently, that this tation. it is no wonder 1981). recognized B June and others have numerous cir- court *31 872 (11th Cir.1994) (stating, of a in the context showing “inconsistent even close to

come arising a of conflict of interest from claim interests.” pe prior representation, that a simultaneous hand, the at 1405-06. On the other 815 F.2d by prove actual conflict titioner must ultimately holding described its Smith court “pointing] specific to in the record instances merely following way: hold that “We suggest impairment compromise or which an inter- failed to show ‘inconsistent Smith has of another he has failed to of his interests for the benefit ests’ in this case where proof relationship or have reached party”). adduce of substantial Other circuits See, Fitzpatrick or oth- e.g., relevant confidential information v. conclusion. same (9th F.2d proof McCormick, 1247, inconsistent interests.” 815 er F.2d 1252 Cir. 869 added). (emphasis 1989) (“In at 1406 representation, conflicts successive may arise the cases are substan ambiguity, of interest In to this order resolve attorney privi tially that inter if the reveals useful to review our other eases related or pret actual This re conflict standard. communications of the former client or leged that, (internal and after view reveals both before loyalties.” divides his otherwise Smith, added)). sanctioned additional our eases have omitted, quotation emphasis marks than substantial relatedness methods —other decisions, it seems incorrect light In of these or of confidential information —of disclosure say precedents prohibit a habeas that our establishing an actual conflict succes petitioner establishing an actual conflict Lightbo representation context. See sive unless she can show either sub interest (11th 1012, Dugger, F.2d 1023 urne v. 829 relatedness or disclosure of confiden stantial Cir.1987) that, in (noting light state tial information. ethics, legal a substantial principles of Assuming arguendo majority attorney question an existed as whether weight according little to “other correct crossexamining an former client had actual a interests,” proof interpre- of inconsistent interest);4 Wainwright, v. conflict of Porter from an additional (11th Cir.1986) tation of Smith suffers 930, (stating 805 F.2d 939 problem purports apply in that it “in the petitioner could show an the habeas successive context” as by demonstrating that at actual conflict Smith, at 859. facts of possible whole. Ante torney alternative “chose between however, merely presented the traditional eliciting failing courses of action such as representation pattern wherein a petitioner] successive helpful [the elicit but evidence client]”);5 previous lawyer’s appeared former client a witness lawyer’s harmful to [the addition, In Singletary, against v. 14 F.3d 560 his current client. Porter cf. observed, exist, Lightbourne conflict did court observed that 4. The court also and the actual panel opinion acknowledged, lawyer conflicting case that a duties” in this was "torn between Martinez, prior ethical rules de violation state criminal to his and current clients. See deprive lawyer necessarily her at fense does F.2d 630 client of the effective assistance of counsel. See Freund, (quoting Lightbo n. 117 F.3d at 1572 noted, panel our As the this formulation of Nevertheless, urne, 12). n. 829 F.2d at 1023 together the actual conflict test tends to blend the law ethics unable when renders inquiries of and adverse effect actual conflict separate the duties she owes to reconcile Cuyler. at 117 F.3d 1571 n. 65 clients, play important ethical an considerations (citing employed cases to Porter that this determining role in whether actual she test). merely here I mention it illustrate that recognized conflict of interest. This role was majority's unduly test for actual con- narrow only Lightbourne, v. but also in United States contrary precedent. to our flict is (5th Martinez, 630 & n. 2 Cir. F.2d Smith, 1980), noting recog It is also worth that Smith itself cited in at 1406 2. In F.2d n. Martinez, perform "possible courses of ac nized alternative circuit to the first case our Smith, analysis test actual conflict. See tion” a conflict of interest in the successive States, context, (quoting at 1404 Barham United facts demonstrated (11th 1984)). Without Cir. both substantial relatedness disclosure however, explanation, the Smith court failed The test that the court confidential information. subsequent this test in its list of applied include to these facts in order to determine existed, petitioner possible could interest methods which whether an actual conflict of however, finding actual conflict. Id. 1405-06. abstract. that an demonstrate more

873 counsel, peti- of ineffective assistance of represented apparently in Smith that there is a reasonable ease, “must show by tioner only once. In this former client that, unprofes- but for counsel’s probability contrast, of actual allegations one of Freund’s errors, proceeding the result sional type of successive conflict involves different A different. reasonable have been would the Freund contends representation. to un- probability probability is a sufficient Duncan, P.A., Foley, & of Colton law firm confidence in the outcome.” Strick- dermine trial, previously him at represented which 668, 694, 104 Washington, v. 466 U.S. land separately-tried co-de- represented Trent —a (1984). 2052, 2068, L.Ed.2d 674 As 80 S.Ct. appear as a witness who did not fendant however, recognize, majority claims to the range of civil and Freund’s trial —in a broad presumed for ineffective assis- prejudice is early 1970s until criminal matters from lawyer’s that are based on tance claims may majority be correct 1984. While the and that meet the two- conflict of interest interpretation of should never- that its Smith Cuyler In the conflict of interest prong test. presented by the context theless extend to context, therefore, from we are forbidden 31, claim, n. this does this ante at 859 claim rejecting an ineffective sim- assistance previ- legal interpretation our that the mean petitioner ply because we think given to the two elements of cases have ous again. probably guilty be found tried relatedness and Smith test —substantial information— apply confidential prejudice inquiry, disclosure of a we Instead mechanically applied be in this new three-part by majority should test outlined point I address this more actual factual context. in order to determine whether the H.A., fully alleged by petitioner conflict of interest infra. lawyer’s perfor- “adversely affected his Strickland, 692, at 104 mance.” 466 U.S. B. Cuyler, at (quoting at 2067 446 U.S. S.Ct. prong Cuyler, to the second As 1718); McConico, 348, 100 at accord S.Ct. panel’s of our majority adopts the statement (“A petitioner need not at 1548 919 F.2d effect.6 I test for adverse While circuit’s the trial would have show that the result of is faithful to our agree that this test interest, conflict of been different without the. decisions, unwary recognize I that an also adverse effect only that the conflict had some way effectively apply it in a court could v. performance.”); counsel’s LoConte prej- petitioner prove requires the habeas (11th Cir.1988). 745, Dugger, 847 F.2d 754 following on the udice. The observations recognized, how- Supreme Court has As help application of our test will courts to ever, precise “it is difficult to measure possibility. this avoid representation cor- effect on the defense Strickland, by conflicting interests.” petitioner required rupted habeas When 692, As a at 2067.7 a claim 466 104 S.Ct. prejudice in order to establish U.S. show sentencing plea negotiations requirements. pretrial and in test consists of three 6. This 1013, (11th Cir.1989) summary, petitioner process.’” a habeas must: 475, Arkansas, 1) Holloway U.S. point plausible (quoting 490, to some alternative defense strategy 2) might pursued; tactic have been 55 L.Ed.2d 426 or S.Ct. strategy course, (1978)). demonstrate that the alternative or the harm also lie in Of facts; tactic was reasonable under actually pursuing a does when what the advocate 3) show some link between the actual conflict might done strategy not have certain forgo and the decision to the alternative defense type strategy; harm under an alternative (i.e., strategy establish that the alternative was difficulty, Given this also to measure. difficult inherently in due conflict or not undertaken “unguided engage supposed to we are not interests). lawyer's loyalties other See (or situations both speculation” either of these Freund, 117 F.3d at 1579-80. quantify the de- together) order to situations representation received gree actual to which the measuring difficulty provides 7. The source of this by petitioner differed from the presumption prej- powerful our rationale for rep- received if hypothetically could have Alabama, that hé recognized udice. As we in Duncan v. Holloway, counsel. See conflict-free resented by conflicting the harm caused interests "is diffi- (concluding S.Ct. at 1182 435 U.S. at cult to measure because the harm 'is in what concepts prejudice harmless error compelled that the advocate finds himself refrain inapplicable conflict interest con- doing, possible at trial but as to are an impor- has result, has ineffective assistance contexts once an actual conflict of interest shown, supra 7. We should apply purpose. we must be careful to our note been tant petitioner’s carefully, in implement effect to the case these tests test for adverse therefore observations, foregoing as it before it was tainted stood accordance with the *33 example, lawyer’s applying conflict. in For the distinction does in to ensure that order requirement merely that the alternative our second become semantic. not strategy or defense tactic must be “reason- facts,” under the the decisive “facts” able II. rely upon which we be a cannot drawn from A. (or statement) pre-trial

trial record from a time the peti- that was made the after problems potential pit- light In slip case became tainted. tioner’s We would I, necessary part in it is falls identified dangerously inquiry to prejudice close a if we majority’s the determination that the revisit by hypothe- pinpoint tried tainted “facts” not of Freund’s case do meet either facts sizing at whether or not the evidence offered prongs or effect actual conflict adverse trial would have been the even if con- same possible to Cuyler. It would be undertake flict-free defense counsel had followed an by articulating an alternative test this task strategy. alternative mechanically applying actual conflict and for along test ad- this with the above for prejudice inquiry A de can also insin- test — facto underlying facts verse effect—to in uate itself into our adverse effect test Freund’s case order to determine whether way. regard our re- another With third effective assistance of he was denied the quirement the petitioner must link his however, approach, This has two lawyer’s counsel. lawyer’s with de- actual conflict First, it is difficult to significant drawbacks. forgo an strate- cision to alternative defense disagreeing articulate a reasoned basis for question: gy, danger following lies in the (or a to apply with court’s decision not to point at should a what labels, apply) abstract such as those that lawyer a court find that the has made such prior Cuyl- appeal’ interpreting our cases danger, In order decision? to avoid this er, given to a set facts without a clear conclusively decision must be deemed made appreciation of the constitutional lawyer, ethical and at first moment that influ- policies underlying difficulty interest, the labels. This by an actual conflict of elects enced majority’s disagreement is illustrated strategy. forgo reasonable alternative made, panel’s with the law conclusion the taint of Once this election has been prior representations firm’s irrevocably lawyer’s conflict of interest “substantially represen- related” to its later petitioner’s case. If we has affected Second, important tation of Freund. is imported an “cure” into element of instead note that two of the three of actual by asking sources linkage requirement whether this alleged conflict Freund —the law firm’s lawyer subsequently her reversed elec- prior (in and, so, of Trent and Trent’s part) this tion whole or whether allegations taint, against the firm’s members —do purge the we reversal was sufficient to correspond to either of the two unguided speculation in or- tradition- indulge in would interpreted al in which we contexts her initial tainted der to determine whether cautious, Cuyler. quite We need to be ultimately harmless. cannot We election therefore, applying any test derived from lawyer’s truthfully se- measure what prior interpreting Cuyler our cases quence petitioner, has of choices cost (introduc- present supra part facts. See I why type inquiry prejudice into that is tion). is forbidden. sum, approach our test A more distinction between informative avoids begins conflict of interest these drawbacks effect” in the a look over the “adverse firm’s “prejudice” other shoulder at the time and our test for when its context text). ceptible intelligent, regarding application.” speculation the cost of the evenhanded Such Id. petitioner 98 S.Ct. at is "sus- of interest conflict obligation was the A second ethical represent Freund. As members decided duty 5 of the Florida Code to under Canon part explains, this look reveals that the II.B. professional judgment independent “exercise initially ethically-based law firm faced two of a client.” Fla.Code of Profes- behalf repre- conflicts of interest that burdened its (1986). Responsibility, A law- sional Canon described in sentation of Freund. As yer required to avoid conflicts of interest II.C., arose after a third conflict of interest duty. Barclay v. in order to fulfill this represent Freund that began the firm (Fla.1984). Wainwright, 444 So.2d III re- this burden. Part then exacerbated Therefore, prohibited repre- interpreting Cuyler turns to our cases lawyer’s senting potential client when the to determine whether of these order be, judgment reasonably professional will *34 law- finding a that Freund’s eases forecloses financial, be, by his busi- affected “own by con- yers, burdened as were these interests,” ness, property, personal or unless interest, provided ineffective assis- flicts of gives client his informed consent. Fla. tance to Freund. DR Responsibility Code of Professional 5- 101(A) (1986). addition, lawyer In pro- a B. representing hibited from a new client likely representation is to have an adverse 1. lawyer’s judgment effect on the on behalf of Freund, deciding represent In to the law client, give their another unless both clients Duncan, P.A., a Foley, firm of Colton & faced informed consent. See Fla.Code of Profes- prior repre- difficult dilemma because of its (C) 5-105(A), Responsibility sional DR counsel to sentations of Trent and Mills. As (1986).9 Freund, duty provide him the firm had a to competent representation to which While the owed these two ethical obli- with the alone, gations a under the Sixth Amendment. to Freund it owed third he was entitled course, duty, obligation to to discharging the firm’s ethical Freund as well as its obligation obey Trent and This obli- lawyers had an to Florida’s former clients Mills. confidentiality legal gation duty ethical was the firm’s rules of ethics. One relevant Code, duty 4 which obligation was the firm’s under Canon 7 under Canon of the Florida requires lawyer “preserve the confi- the former Florida Code of Professional a to represent to client zeal- dences and secrets of a client.” Fla.Code Responsibility8 its (1986). 4 ously. duty requires lawyer Responsibility, Professional Canon This that a “be loyal every client and The term “confidences” refers to information to her ensure by attorney-client privilege, professional protected decision she makes on behalf of to other in- client is in the client's interests.” the term “secrets” refers best while Freund, professional re- lawyer gained during A who formation requested be intentionally prejudices lationship inter- the client has or harms the “that duty. or the disclosure of which ests of her client violates this held inviolate likely to Responsibility embarrassing DR or would be Fla.Code of Professional would be 101(A)(3)(1986). Fla.Code of be detrimental client.” 7— person byor to another client or to a third 8. At the time of Freund's members of interests,” governed by lawyer Florida Bar the Florida Code rea- lawyer's unless the own Responsibility. of Professional The Florida Code sonably represent client that he can believes replaced Chapter in 1987 4 of the Rulés Rules the client consents after consultation. Bar, Regulating the "Rules of Florida entitled 4-1.7(b) (1994). Regulating With the Fla. Bar Professional Conduct.” See 117 F.3d at involving respect former to conflicts of interest clients, 4-1.9(a) lawyer provides a who Rule in a matter must represented a former client has Regulating currently 9. The Rules the Florida Bar person "represent in the same not later another relating provide detailed a more restrictions substantially which that related matter in or a lawyer's duty independent profession- to exercise materially adverse to the person's are interests judgment. example, prohibit al For the rules client unless the former of the former interests lawyer representing from a client if the exercise Regu- Rules client consents after consultation.” lawyer's professional judgment "may of the be 4-1.9(a) (1994). materially lawyer’s lating responsibilities the Fla. Bar limited 4-101(A) Responsibility DR in Freund’s case who could have been Professional (1986). duty, lawyer arising her charged could with several crimes of this Because revealing participation surrounding a client’s subject discipline for events Walk- be using materially or for them ei- ad- secrets er’s murder11 —with interests confidences or interests, however, disadvantage of client or for ther to verse person a third the benefit of firm faced a substantial likelihood without the client’s informed consent. See obligations Freund would come into ethical Responsibility DR Fla.Code of Professional conflict with its ethi- direct irreconcilable 4-101(B) (1986); Piper Ford obligations The cal to its former clients.12 Aircraft (Fla. 5th DCA Corp., question So.2d initial that-must be answered 1983); Regulating the Fla. see also Rules significance order determine 4-1.9(b) (1994).10 Bar potential to our ethical conflict Sixth analysis Cuyler Amendment under is this: duty confidentiality affords broad lawyer’s duty Sixth Amendment does protection confidences and se client’s provide competent rep- its current client with Buntrock, 419 See Buntrock v. So.2d crets. require disregard resentation it to the rules (Fla. 1982) (noting 4th DCA respect governing of ethics its conduct protection attorney-client evi- than broader *35 to its former clients if to do so would benefit protection dentiary privilege). This “exists the its current client? If answer to this regard nature or source of without yes, question inquire is then we need not the the fact that others share information or further into the of whether firm issue the knowledge.” of Professional Re Fla.Code actually conflicting was confronted with ethi- (1986). sponsibility protection 4-4 The is EC case; obligations in cal this if faced with such lawyer pre must forever perpetual; a conflict, a firm simply the be forced to every and secrets serve confidences ignore its duties to clients. ethical its former client, ongoing or former. See Fla. whether no, however, If the is we answer should Responsibility EC 4-6 of Professional Code proceed to the firm actu- (1986); determine whether Regulating Fla. Bar 4- Rules 1.9(b) ally obligations in (1994); conflicting faced ethical Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. State (Fla.1991). K.A.W., adversely represen- this case that its 632 affected Co. v. 575 So.2d tation of Freund. client, a deciding accept to Freund as question it this required to determine that It seems clear that initial violating represent any negative. him be in the If we could without must answered obligations owed were to conclude that the Sixth above ethical Amendment represent- previously required lawyers him. Given that it to violate their ethical obli- had gations ed to in to people Trent, provide two Freund’s co-defen- former clients order — dant, Mills, prosecution competent representation a witness to their current lawyer a to a 10. The Code did allow reveal serve confidences and secrets of former two client's confidences or secrets in limited quite It client become irreconcilable. situations, neither which relevant in this likely lawyer that the obtained information in the Responsibility case. See Fla.Code Professional former that could be useful 4-101(D) (1986) (providing lawyer DR that a representation. current Duncan Merrill (1) may reveal a client's confidences or secrets Pierce, Smith, Lynch, Fenner & 646 F.2d when to do a tribunal after ex ordered so (5th 1981) ("Whenever an Cir. Unit B June (2) hausting appellate remedies or to intent com attorney represent an to seeks to interest adverse crime). amit client, possibility of a former arises attorney, intentionally or whether inadver with For list of the crimes which Mills could tently, present to client will reveal his confiden Freund, charged, been see F.3d at during pre to tial information entrusted him his n. 16. representation.”). lawyer vious If the used this client, 12. The above can three ethical duties discussed representing information his current place obligations conflicting lawyer on a cer obligation of would violate his ethical confiden example, tain circumstances. For when a cur tiality to If his former client. he refrained from adverse rent client’s interests are interests information, however, using the he would violate lawyer represented of a former client whom duty zealously represent his current client. his matter, lawyer's duty represent in related zealously duty pre the current client case, just beginning of Freund’s clients, conclusion At the lawyers who heeded our barraged lawyer lawsuits their would be time that his Robert prior to the and would face state bar disci- former clients rely on Foley announced that Freund would proceedings. Irrespective of whether plinary defense, insanity an unburdened and com- an successful,13 public’s these actions were petent lawyer could have chosen to follow profes- ability legal confidence in the of the following of the four reasonable defense would be sion to hold secrets confidence First, strategies. could have at- damaged. ability of the irreparably The plea bargain for Freund tempted to obtain stan- promulgate effective ethical states exchange cooperation in the for Freund’s regulate the conduct dards in order to people prosecution of the other who State’s substantially under- lawyers would also be night mur- present on the either (de- Duncan, at 1027 mined. See Mills, helped to conceal the der crime— context, disqualification scribing, in the civil Daniell, and Fullerton.14 Angelilli, allowing an at- consequences of the adverse torney of his former to reveal confidences possible strategy rely A second client). lightly consequences are not Such insanity effectively ad- defense and thus no reason to as- presumed, and there is be Ralph Freund murdered Walker. mit that by the are warranted Sixth sume significant damage that Given the brain Amendment. of his Freund sustained as result attempt, symptoms which caused suicide ability appre- such as reduced to reason and therefore, firm, ignore could not actions, consequences of his see ciate the obligations to its former clients ethical strategy 117 F.3d at compe- attempting provide Freund with *36 attorneys in some basis fact. As Freund’s that consistent with tent was already long him after informed obligations him. In order to its ethical defense, rely insanity elected to on an howev- determine whether the firm’s er, high proba- a such a defense did not have by obli- of Freund was burdened its ethical Freund, bility 117 F.3d at of success. See Mills, gations to Trent and should ask two we First, questions. should consider what 1568. we strategies competent or tactics a law- defense Third, impli- competent counsel could have

yer by obligations to not burdened ethical by indirectly in murder cated Trent Walker’s Trent and Mills would have considered. Sec- contending that Freund killed Walker but ond, competent should ask whether a we murder criminal intent to commit lacked the lawyer obligations ethical to Trent and with and con- was under the dominion because he prior represen- conclude that his Mills would Trent, killing and who ordered the trol of any way tation of these clients restricted— Freund, of his mental that because knew ability any or foreclosed —his to use even state, carry Freund’s strategies representing out the order.15 these Freund. would killing premeditated, possible lawyers of Walker was not would be able to obligation Freund's It is 13. their argument invoke their Sixth Amendment lacked the well as an that Freund as client as a defense in these actions. kidnapping. See necessary to commit intent Freund, at n. 89. subject prosecution 14. Fullerton was for his ultimately concealing convicted under the was role in the crime. For a list of the If Freund statute,- people felony-murder portion with which the other three could this conten- crimes of the Freund, charged, 117 F.3d at 1553 argument have been see support that Freund an tion could also n. 16. penalty he the death because could not receive die the intent that Walker act either with did not Florida, the crime in the first of murder 15. disregard life. See for Walker's or with reckless degree premeditated killing and a includes 782, 798, Florida, 102 S.Ct. 458 U.S. Enmund v. killing by person engaged in the "committed (1982) (intent); 3368, 3377, 73 L.Ed.2d of, attempt perpetrate,” perpetration in the or U.S, 157-58, 137, Arizona, 107 S.Ct. Tison v. felonies, including kidnapping. See Fla. certain (reckless (1987) dis- 95 L.Ed.2d 782.04(l)(a)(l), (2)(f) (Supp.1984). Stat. ch. The regard). that Freund under Trent's domin- contention was support argument that ion and control could landed.19 sup- not see where the knife See provided could damage would brain 1552,1567. id. at port for this contention. lawyers, bearing ethical Freund’s obli- strategy possible contend A fourth Mills, little gations to Trent and took time Freund, personally Trent, killed gather which of these evidence and consider directly implicat- strategy of Walker.16 This Only pursue. options they would two supported murder ing Trent Walker’s days arraignment, three after Freund’s facts, competent by all which a several deliberately lawyers locked their client into early quite have learned could options by calling press con- one of these discovery regime that under the liberal case rely to announce that Freund would ference in Florida.17 applies to criminal cases Before insanity This had the on an defense. defense murder, night on the Freund arrived potential to relieve both Freund and Trent actually example, shot at Walker for liability first-degree Trent be- murder: Freund, 117 at and missed. See murder, cause he did not commit the physical impli- the case All of the evidence insane he killed Freund because was when Trent, three the State’s cated and all n. 117 F.3d at 1556 & Walker. principal at trial tes- fact witnesses Freund’s question regarding A27. therefore arises everything control of tified that Trent was in pursue whether the decision to night transpired on the murder. ethical obli- defense was influenced Moreover, gations to Trent har- Trent. See id. negative feelings to- strong bored race-based readily apparent competent It is law- certainly played

ward Walker yers obligations who to Trent bore ethical leading up to the murder and the events never have taken case. Freund’s Such provided a motive for the murder him with lawyers undoubtedly would have concluded indication, however, itself;18 there was no ability among their choose above feelings. that Freund had such options solely in with accordance directly implicating An- Freund was interests, evidence required by best their ethical gelilli’s uncorroborated that she duty representation, of zealous was restricted stabbing making motions obligations Specifi- saw Freund their ethical Trent. knife, cally, obligation confidentiality but she also testified that she ethical *37 this," "ignore strategy just was not foreclosed Freund's said Trent would to 16. This going Angelilli. he lawyers psychiatrist. but was to have sex with and See confession to his grabbed magnum pistol Walker then a .357 from part III.B.l. infra Angelilli gun table came with and toward one hand and the bat in the other. in Trent example, Fla. For this 17. See R.Crim. P. 3.220. magnum away and knocked the .357 shot at filing of states that after the an indictment or rule pistol, Walker a .45 but the bullet a with hit information, deposi- "the defendant take the dining gun pointed then room chair. Trent his any person upon of tion oral examination who Walker, him, yelled at handcuffed and of threats may have relevant to the offense information accompanied by epithets racial him. death — One of the threats that Trent —at charged.” yelled was: "You're dead, Ralph nigger, dead Walker! You're and appear majority do 18. These facts in goin' you’re your home mama in a to box." opinion. panel noted in of As the its discussion (one Trent then called Bruce Fullerton henchmen) of his murder, Freund, leading up the events see bring and asked him to a steamer 1550-51, (who Walker was 117 F.3d at African- trunk, sledgehammer, and a chain saw to American) began Angelilli whispering to that he apartment. ignored apparently Trent's Fullerton ignored to wanted him, have sex with her. When she evening, in these instructions. Later Trent loudly upset and Walker became demanded repeatedly epithets again used racial when he Mills, (one Trent then told ran a sex. who female employees) of confided to Daniell Trent's service, up your girls always fantasy killing to one of and escort "call that he had had a of a man girl Ralph get sodomizing over here for [Walker].” a black of race and then the man's Walker's Mills, body. any girls” danger, "her in put afraid to of pretended call and told to make the Trent course, anyone. she could not reach Walker then went 19.Of there was also evidence Trent Walker, lunged into Trent's bedroom and returned with alu- an at Walker had kicked knife, with his bat, yelled minum he Walker baseball which slammed onto and threats of death at earli- evening. at with table such force that he dented the bat. He er in history This of lawyers Trent restricted extensive that Freund’s owed firm still Trent meant owed an ability their to claim either that Trent killed obligation confidentiality extensive ethical killed Walker while Walker or that Freund during representation of Freund. The its This Trent’s control. obli- was under alia, inter prohibited, firm thus ability gation to obtain also restricted their disclosing any gained during information it Freund in a significant concessions for professional relationship Trent with In plea bargain prosecutors. with State or- likely such disclosure was to be detrimental necessary why, it is to der to understand prohibition particularly Trent. to This scope of the firm’s examine the nature and light broad in the wealth of potentially prior representation of Trent. gained detrimental information long-standing wide-rang- and Trent had a representing Trent. himself ad- while ing relationship firm. legal with the The mitted, hearing in at his held in a lawyers represented Trent firm’s broad his sever on motion to his and Freund’s range matters from the separate of civil and criminal dis- prosecutions for that he 1984; early they represented multiple in participation until closed his criminal 1970s involving drugs prostitution activities and many his referred mother’s estate. Trent they members of the firm after advised him legal needed employees his and friends who completely that all would be communications firm, including representation to the Eleanor Trent also confidential. discussed relationship Trent and Mills. The between exploits lawyers and his use of his sexual that of deeper the firm was also than attor- sexual devices handcuffs —a device such ney client. a fixture at and Trent became that Trent used to restrain Walker offices, employees his the law firm’s Furthermore, appropriate the murder. it is offices often in order use the came to the firm, ethically to assume that the bound to copier equipment. other office competent act as counsel zealous performed design Trent also interior work drug prosecutions, Trent in assault offices, Foley for as well as for information from its client obtained all parents Duncan. Colton and helpful working out a would have been prosecutions and, criminal agreement Two of the which plea the event Trent’s represented particularly conviction, argu- presenting the firm Trent were an effective A sentencing. competent the firm’s later of ment relevant to information, eliciting example, allegedly Freund. brandished indepth gain appreciation seek gun public on street and threatened character, good in- and bad sides Trent’s people. police stopped kill two When cluding past activity, in order criminal days car a few later in order to prepared be make surprises avoid charges, him on assault found the arrest possible arguments his client’s be- best drugs diazepam drug that was Walk- —a *38 half. er’s when bloodstream he died—and metha- possession. qualone in Trent’s Trent was confidentiality obligation This seri- broad possession aggravat- charged drug with ously ability hampered the convinc- firm’s assault, ed State initiated forfeiture ingly implicate to Trent in Walker’s violent proceeding against by Trent’s car relation to arguing that murder —whether Trent possession charge. represented firm The personally killed Walker or that did during proceed- by limiting the entire forfeiture so while under Trent’s control — ing. prosecutions, ability present jury In the criminal firm to a evidence of its to May history of vi- ultimately proclivities withdrew counsel in 1984 Trent’s as sexual olence, pretrial possession, and other filing ap- diazepam after motions several The firm also would be pearing in court on criminal conduct.20 Trent’s behalf. tive, intent, identity. knowledge, regarding prior opportunity, such bad While information addition, 90.404(2). § solely In generally prove to See Evid.Code acts admissible Fla. character, propensity even if information could not have been or bad conflict-free this counsel evidence, used things it could have been prove it to such mo- offered as could have used undercover kilogram of cocaine to an effectively to sell cross-examine unable to 1984, April In several weeks police officer.21 event that matters regarding these murder, of- Trent met Mills and before jointly Freund. Even he was tried ways with the co- help her two fered to they ulti- separately, as tried they were facing. trafficking charges that she caine were, be unable the firm would mately having as an First, her serve he discussed prior repre- in its anything it learned use Second, he police. the local informant for him. blame on to throw sentation of Trent to the firm for referred Mills confidentiality obligation firm’s broad The Roger met with charges. Mills then on the ability negoti- its also constrained to Trent apartment legal seek Colton agreement for Freund. plea ate a favorable charges, and she discussed the on the advice 1457, McLain, 823 F.2d v. See United States surrounding the circumstances facts and Cir.1987) (11th Holloway Ar- (citing Freund, 117 F.3d charges with Colton. kansas, 98 S.Ct. 435 U.S. at 1577 n. 82. (1978)) (“Exploring pos- 1181, L.Ed.2d 426 apparent begin- from the Because it was important part of plea negotiations is an sible prosecution that Mills would ning of Freund’s of a crimi- adequate representation providing witness, the firm was faced prosecution abe client, easily precluded by part is nal and this consulting In with Mills with a dilemma. interest.”). seeking such a a conflict of charges, trafficking about her cocaine lawyers for competent plea agreement, very likely information that it firm obtained attempted certainly would impeach her on cross- could use Trent, prosecutors that convince State example, For record examination. worthy pun- person most firm learned that strongly suggests that the Providing murder. ishment for Walker’s firm frequently used cocaine. The cer- Mills long on Trent’s information prosecutors with tainly learned that Mills was a friend of criminal conduct history of violence trying help her Trent and that Trent was very persuasive method of jail through cooperation would have been with the avoid time cross-examining the firm goal. police. this Because Mills on these accomplishing While questions issues would raise as to her credi- obligation of represented Freund had an bility pro-Trent bias and thus aid confidentiality prevented it from disclos- defense, it would also violate the likely ing to be detrimental information continuing obligation ethical of confi- firm’s Trent, however, use method. it could not ulti- dentiality Douglas Mills.22 Duncan therefore, Clearly, re- firm’s decision mately did cross-examine Mills about her garding to defend Freund was bur- how best assistance, trafficking charges and Trent’s from the start its ethical obli- dened having stopped short of Mills admit but he gations to Trent. that Trent had referred her to his law burdened, was also albeit less of Freund representation. a conflict-free Because severely, by prior representation of Mills. in order could have elicited this fact latter did not While this burden affect bias, suggest it is clear to discredit Mills and pursue insanity firm’s decision to defense obligation of confiden- that the firm’s ethical strategies one the other rather than dis- tiality representa- to Mills also burdened its above, cussed it did affect the firm’s tactics in tion of Freund. cross-examining key prosecution Mills—a witness at Freund’s trial. *39 demonstrates, representation

The firm’s of Mills related above discussion As the conflicting ob- early attempting lawyers in faced ethical to Mills’ arrest 1984 for Freund’s years effectively mandatory fifteen deposing minimum sentence of conflict-free counsel in Trent $250,000 cross-examining imprisonment fine. See Fla. him at trial. and a 893.135(l)(b)l.c. (1995). Stat. ch. 21. Mills testified at Freund's trial that she was majority’s suggestion, trying kilograms Contrary this ob- to sell four of 22. to the cocaine. by confidentiality police requested ligation was not waived undercover officer of received Freund, III.A.2.; only $37,000. kilogram, part pay one see for which he was to about Mills. See infra drug Mills’ 1578 n. 83. serious offense carried a 117 F.3d at that the argument could be made they began A second ligations the moment that hand, ethically-based con- effect of these representing On one adverse Freund. representation Freund firm’s of represent zeal- flicts on the obligations to Freund firm’s Mills, As one could de minimis. independent professional was ously and exercise Duncan’s was all of its claim that cross-examination on his behalf meant that judgment sug- impugn credibility her professional had to be Freund’s sufficient decisions revealing the fact gest of without conflict bias best interests untainted hand, her to firm. As to obligations referred Duncan’s the other Trent interest. On Trent, any adverse placed a it could be claimed that confidentiality to Trent and Mills of the law firm’s ability implicate Trent suffered because heavy on its effect Freund burden disregard murder, obligations initially led favorable to obtain a ethical Walker’s Freund, in Walker’s impeach option implicating Mills’ of Trent plea bargain for or to course of by suggest- murder was later cured in the testimony on cross-examination therefore, prosecution. prosecution ing surprisingly, Freund’s As Not bias. unfolded, example, against quite early for the eases in its decided trial, Trent and Freund were severed pursue any of not to of these strate- after did not pled guilty a mistrial and gies.23 the firm’s ethical dilem- Trent Given Freund, indirectly im- strategies testify against use Duncan that it could mas restricted Freund, during his plicated Trent in Walker’s murder defending conclusion seems closing argument firm’s to the portion inter- inescapable that an “actual conflict” of Foley directly “adversely perfor- jury at Freund’s est affected” the firm’s How, then, implicated during portion his of representing him. mance in claims, closing argument. Both of Cuyler under that Freund these could we conclude however, right to commit a mistake: Amendment fundamental not denied Sixth “Monday judge in of a put counsel as a the role assistance trial effective must determine ethically-based morning quarterback” conflicts of who result of the firm’s prejudiced by the firm’s possibilities men- Three deserve whether interest? I.B., explained part As conflicts. ethical tion. forbidden; prej- type inquiry supra, this First, precedent noted our it could be presumed once actual conflict udice clearly that a violation of state establishes effect have been established. adverse lawyer rules a criminal defense ethical that these two necessarily deprive Finally, it could be claimed his client of does not Freund, not establish conflicts of interest did of counsel. See ethical effective assistance “adversely affected” (citing Lightbourne, n. 66 an “actual conflict” that 117 F.3d at 1572 12). case, required by precedents our case as at 1023 n. In this howev Freund’s er, interpreted Cuyler in other con- merely state have have a violation of we do argue that we example, one could have a between the texts. For ethical rules —we conflict lawyers mechanically that the obligations that certain simul should hold ethical “substan- of Trent were not representations their and former taneously owed to current to its tially renders a related” later When the law of ethics clients. actually or that firm did to reconcile the duties he owes

lawyer unable rep- during its clients, information precedent our is consis learn confidential separate relevant Mills that was lawyer has the conclusion that the resentation tent with ad- are supra case. Such contentions note Freund’s actual conflict interest. See III, dressed infra. however, strategy claiming that Freund Ultimately, implicate did firm's defense the firm during indirectly in murder was insane. For Walker’s the murder but had committed addition, trial. why changes Freund's in defense these a discussion Foley suggested closing argument in his Robert strategy not alter the conclusion do jury at Freund’s trial that Trent ethically-based adverse- conflict of interest firm's *40 personally and then told committed murder Freund, part see ly affected its it; it was Freund who did this belat- Freund that and note III.B.l. infra. obviously suggestion with the was inconsistent ed occasions, many pay- often as prostitutes C. Finally, alleged legal services. ment ethically-based conflicts of inter- The two partici- lawyers had attended that both not the con- above were est discussed involving many parties” pated in of his “sex adversely repre- firm’s affected the flicts that light of these prostitutes. cocaine conflict, rooted A third sentation of Freund. again changed posi- allegations, than in its in own interests rather the firm’s argued the “deli- tion on severance party, arose obligations to a third ethical pertaining rules nature” of the ethical cate representation of Freund had the firm’s after made cross-examination conflicts of interest strongly rein- already begun. conflict This op- inappropriate. the State’s of Trent Over aversion, in initial rooted forced the firm’s judge granted a sever- position, the trial then confidentiality that it owed duty of the ethical ance. Trent, implicating strategy of to a defense murder. Trent in Walker’s gave strong the firm a allegations These hearing grew out of This third conflict incentive continue with additional grant whether to held to determine defense, pub- insanity which it had Freund’s prosecutions of the murder motion to sever early representa- in licly adopted quite separate trial. The Freund for Trent and (and easily reject any could not in tion thus ground for Trent’s motion involved main event), use a defense in rather than either that arose discussed above ethical conflict implicate separate trial that would Freund’s representation of Trent: firm’s from the plea agreement for Freund Trent or obtain infor- acquired had confidential law firm adversely impact that would Trent. Trent representation that it during mation quite it clear that he would re- had made trial. detriment could use to Trent’s any attempt by law firm spond to behalf) (on initially While the firm attempt harm such his interests. The next severance, it later the State supported joined produce certainly have incited Trent to could resisting separate in trial. See charges, support of his which evidence Trent, n. 1559. at 1557 & Foley and Colton be- could have resulted by law presumably upset his former ing disciplined by prose- Bar or the Florida by prospect opposition to severance and surprising, cuted the State. It him, against might that it use his confidences therefore, lawyers presented that Freund’s hearing. began He testified at the severance insanity an defense at trial. attorney-client relationship by detailing the true that Freund’s Rob- developed that had between himself and the While representa- Foley eventually suggest did his clos- During firm. the course of the ert tion, Foley ing argument at Freund’s trial that Trent Trent had confided to and Colton affairs, secrets, then personal may have committed the murder and his business it, who did participation multiple criminal activities told Freund that it was Freund Moving proposition involving drugs prostitution. this fact does not belie helped description personal relationship allegations convince the of his with Trent’s Colton, insanity Foley pursuing made several firm to continue de- seri- trial, Trent allegations against lawyers. By both He fense.24 the time of Freund’s ous guilty second-degree already pled claimed to have delivered cocaine to their Therefore, friends, following Fo- at the firm’s offices. He murder a mistrial. sometimes closing25 no provided ley’s spontaneous musings also claimed to have both men with claim, Foley’s point applies was not a can indicated that statement This Duncan's during portion closing planned made of the firm’s the firm’s defense of Freund. argument at Freund’s the evidence when Fo- Duncan admitted that he was shocked indirectly implicated Trent in Walker’s murder. ley the statement made the statement and that insanity tes- defense. Duncan hindered Freund’s Foley’s unsupported comments were Foley why he had made tified that he later asked evidence that Trent Walker. murdered statement; Foley that he did it to answered questioned hearing When at the held on Freund’s "appease" Freund's mother. judgment motion to vacate the and sentence in 3.850, pursuant his case to Fla. R.Crim. P. Dun- *41 A. potential to harm Trent’s longer had the interests. rejects majority the claim that the The

III. firm, faced an actual representing obligations of because of conflict interest demonstrated, has As the above discussion history arising long representing from its of conflicting allegations the firm’s Trent’s and majori- arguendo Assuming Trent. that significant obligations re- imposed ethical analyze by applying this ty is correct to claim ability pursue cer- on the firm’s strictions problematic interpretation Smith26 its of options that conflict- tain reasonable tactical solely prior representation of the firm’s defending could have used free counsel posses- diazepam on the assault words, the use of these Freund. In other charges,27 apparent it the result sion that options with the firm’s would conflicted analysis majority’s supported is not of (its obligations loyalties” “other ethical precedents. our (in Mills) avoiding and “interests” Trent and consequences any potentially harmful of Smith, majority’s view of Under the Freund, 117 allegations). F.3d at petitioner may habeas be able to demon- (quoting Fahey, United States if he first strate an actual conflict of interest (1st Cir.1985)) (noting that in represen- establishes that “counsel’s earlier effect, a to establish adverse habeas order substantially ... particularly tation petitioner that a must demonstrate reason- later of related to counsel’s strategy or able alternative defense tactic Smith, at 1405. the defendant.” “was might pursued have been inherent- “substantially The Smith court derived this attorney’s ly in with ... other conflict particularly primarily from related” test interests”). firm thus loyalties or The decid- addressing prior standard for our cases of early ed lawyer in a matter con- disqualifying a civil It pursue options. seems these client, ABA cerning a as as from former well therefore, clear, that an “actual conflict” of Professional 1.9. See Model Rule of Conduct “adversely per- affected” firm’s interest 2; supra see note id. at 1406 n. also defending part Freund. This formance equivalent profes- of (quoting Florida’s rule cases considers whether of our conduct). majority relies sional The Cuyler interpreting finding forecloses disqualification sup- part on a case civil lawyers, burdened Freund’s port its that the assault determination above, pi'o- of the conflicts interest discussed charges which the diazepam possession Freund. ineffective assistance to vided were not previously represented firm particularly to its “substantially and related” part of this organizational scheme de- The following Freund. representation of As majority’s analysis liberately tracks of however, shows, disquali- civil our discussion part Ante IV.C. Part III.A. the merits. support the jurisprudence does not fication separate three sources of actual reviews the majority’s conclusion. by Freund. Part conflict demonstrated argu- majority’s thrust adverse essential III.B. then examines two effects ment the similarities between conflicts. can be linked these I.A; part supra note previously, problematic see also explained it is under Smith. See 26. As accompanying supra, text. mechanically apply majority Smith—and interpreting cases the two elements of our other argument test—to the Smith H.B.2., part supra, firm had 27. As revealed in gave prior representation of Trent rise to relationship extend- with Trent that an extensive troubling It is also actual conflict interest. prosecutions. beyond two As ed well these that, precedent despite contrary, great our relationship, deal learned proof majority gives weight potentially little to “other detrimental of information that diazepam proof majority’s interests" —such as conflict- focus on the inconsistent Trent. The unduly obligations principles legal prosecutions ing eth- assault alone thus seems under the establishing actual narrow. a means conflict ics—as *42 884 not need to [past representation] does prior repre- in The involved the firm’s

offenses in subsequent repre- present action] the the [to and its be “relevant” sentation of Trent “substantially es- evidentiary are not sufficient to re- sentation of Freund sense be present relationship because be akin to the a tablish substantial It need lated.” subject mat- persons “myriad the way reasonable factors differentiate action in a Ante at 864. representation.” important in- ter of each understand as issues the majority support cases to The cites two a volved. The existence of “substantial related- general proposition that substantial relationship” case before the [in court] the subsequent prior and exists when the ness parts Where is self-evident.... very the same representations concern past present action and transactions, subject events, mat- criminal or matter, very subject rea- the same concern v. United States ter. Ante (citing at 864 agree they are sub- minds must sonable Martinez, (5th Cir.1980); 630 F.2d 362 stantially related. (In re Kraft, Inc. Alton Box Board Co. added). sharing Id. (emphasis While the Litig.), 659 Corrugated Antitrust Container subject matter is thus sufficient to es- same Oct.1981)). (5th A 1346 Cir. Unit relatedness, the tablish substantial Kraft however, cases, support Neither of these necessary. clearly states that it is not court ex- proposition that substantial relatedness All that need be shown to establish substan- supra note only situations. See ists these past is that action rea- tial relatedness the Martinez applied court (noting 4 sonably important as could be understood substantial test more abstract than Smith’s present one. the issues involved Kraft, test); see also relatedness Applying the definition to the facts fact, provides case In Kraft Kraft case, apparent the firm’s of this it is substantially definition of substantial broader prior representation of Trent on the assault disqualification civil con- relatedness in the diazepam possession charges28 reason- text: (1994) ("Unless § majority Freund failed to case. See 28 U.S.C. 2255 28. The contends that hearing records of the case at the Rule 3.850 motion and the files and conclusively introduce evidence concerning prisoner scope of the firm’s show that the is entitled to and nature relief, grant including rep- prompt prior representation its no the court shall ... of Trent— thereon....”); diazepam hearing Governing on the assault and Rules Section resentation of Trent failure, possession charges. however, Proceedings Ante at 862-63. This the United States District Courts, ("It prevent -just advisory as it did not *43 police.30 facts murder, cooperation with the These in the it er’s information learned suggest have been used to on cross- could diazepam posses- the representing Trent on of that Mills was biased in favor in examination charge proving useful sion would be likely to and thus accuse Freund Trent injected diazepam. with Simi- Walker in falsely pro- murder in of Walker’s order firm larly, information that the learned charge tect Trent. the representing Trent on assault that Trent com- proving be useful in majority if the firm argues even part killing. supra See mitted the violent learn relevant confidential information did firm the (describing information that II.B.2. Mills, representation of confi during its the Trent); learned from see nature of information “ceased to dential the (discussing infor- n. F.3d at 1576 how this “everything exist” when Mills testified in a mation could be used at trial deposition firm in that she had told” the Trent). therefore, Clearly, the deposition of by in pres counsel Duncan’s taken Trent’s representation sub- prior of Trent and firm’s trial. at prior to Freund’s Ante 866. ence representation sub- sequent of Freund were argument incorrect for two reasons. This stantially sub- related under While Kraft. First, testimony the Mills’ did not relieve always stantial relatedness is not sufficient duty confidentiality her. firm from its of an of under establish actual conflict interest by duty A of confi remains bound majority’s the view of can —at the Smith dentiality though “even the same information precedent our does very least —be said that sources,” Bun discoverable from other firm the foreclose the conclusion that not trock, regard 419 So.2d at and “without of an actual conflict of interest because faced fact the [infor ... that others share representation of Trent.29 prior its Respon Fla.Code of Professional mation].” Second, 4-4 if Mills’

sibility EC even (1986). operated could have to relieve confidentiality duty from its as to firm prior argues Freund also we subjects deposition, she disclosed Mills, who as a representation appeared deposition not that her still could be sure an prosecution in his witness created actually with coextensive disclosures precedent conflict of interest. Our actual told” firm. “everything had that she that an not foreclose the conclusion does fact, despite having supposedly ev disclosed under be- conflict was created Smith actual response firm in erything she told the actually the firm learned confidential cause deposi by her questions Trent’s counsel at representation Mills during its information tion, any of Mills then to answer refused repre- relevant in the firm’s later that was ground deposition questions on the Duncan’s of Freund. sentation firm had prior her consultation relationship. attorney-client at Mills with the law firm established consulted When fully that she regarding suggests This refusal did apartment the cocaine Trent’s majority again did claims that Freund that the 30. The Because Freund has demonstrated substantially representation hearing develop of him firm's little at the Rule 3.850 Trent, prior representation it is to its related surrounding the consulta- facts firm's historical necessary argument majority's refute 28, supra, Mills. mentioned in note tion with however, As did the firm not learn confidential informa- that tion glean appropriate to these facts it is during representation its that was prosecutor at the developed evidence representation of later relevant firm's prior hearing court record of state and from the Nonetheless, supra See note 3. it seems Freund. majority ulti- case. The proceedings Freund's plain that the firm did learn relevant confidential setting mately out does use sources these during of Trent. information its surrounding consultation. Ante facts (discussing supra part the wealth See II.B.2. IV.C.l.ii. firm potentially information that the detrimental Trent). representing gained while pursuing particular had told compromised by de- everything that she disclose McLain, theory. 823 F.2d at fense infor all of the confidential firm—much less where de- (finding actual conflict ... 1463-64 learned “actually mation that investiga- was under criminal [Mills],” fense counsel representation of during [its] delay added)— tion had incentive to defendant’s Smith, (emphasis at 1405 plea bargaining hopes trial and avoid questions posed answering the Fulton, himself); delaying against indictment Therefore, information that the counsel. (“A in which the 5 F.3d at 609 situation during firm learned attorney’s diverge own interests from those at her Mills did not disclose Mills but that presents problem the same core of the client certainly retained its confidential deposition multiple representation presented in the nature. *44 attorney’s fealty the to the client is cases: clearly has compromised.”). Freund estab- 8. this definition. lished actual conflict under argues the firm faced Finally, Freund that oppose Trent’s After the firm decided to of interest because actual conflict behalf, motion for severance on Freund’s hearing of em- allegations at the severance allegations against Foley Trent made serious by Foley barrassing illegal and conduct hearing. If the and Colton at the severance strong gave firm a incentive Colton the by antagonized again defending firm Trent by implicating antagonize Trent to further theory Freund on the that Trent murdered him in murder as Walker’s Walker, certainly possible it was that Trent majori- respond to defense. In order allega- produce support would evidence to his claim, ty’s rejection of this it is first neces- Foley and would then be at tions. Colton of our circuit’s sary to the nature determine by being disciplined risk of the Florida Bar an actual conflict of interest proving test for then, prosecuted by Plainly, the State. it majority neglects The to this context. was the firm’s best interests not defend mention that the successive by implicating Freund Trent in Walker’s case of Smith v. White—which even the ma- murder. apply beyond jority not construe to does claims, however, majority ac- The no arising “a cases of actual conflict because tual conflict was created because “the dam- previously rep- counsel criminal defendant’s age allega- was done” once Trent made his non-testifying, a witness”31 or a resented Ante at hearing.32 tions the severance separately-tried inapplica- co-defendant —is By making allegations only 866. his after Instead, assessing ble in this claim. cases oppose firm his motion for sever- decided McLain, States v. such as United ance, however, quite it clear Trent had made (11th Cir.1987), States v. United any by respond attempt he would Fulton, (2d Cir.1993), provide 5 F.3d 605 any law firm to harm his interests. At time assessing proper framework for claims that second-degree pled guilty before Trent personal attorney interests of “the therefore, mistrial, following murder his of the client are in actual con- interests by risky firm was for the to defend flict.” Id. at 609. implicating murder. If the Trent Walker’s defense, pursued might support proposition such a These cases responded by producing evidence to actual conflict has been established when a have by making lawyer’s personal support allegations or addi- own interests would be his Smith, ever, would still have been im- 815 F.2d at 1405. Freund's defense Fulton, ("[E]ven paired. F.3d at 610 if the out, 866-67, gov- attorney demonstrably points innocent and the majority 32. The ante at false, allegations plainly every are that Colton denied accusation ernment's witness’s each impaired "unequivocably totally” because vital cross-exam- made the defense is defendant.”); obviously front the media—a denial that he ination becomes unavailable to Freund, (applying obliged prose- 117 F.3d at 1579 n. 86 this to make if he wanted to avoid noting disciplinary proceedings, particularly case and cution observation to Freund’s given hearing. although at Freund's heavy presence Trent was not a witness media at the false, been). certainly allegations actually could have Even if the how- he Trent, in Shifting the blame to eence. allegations against the firm’s members. tional view, majority’s an unrealistic therefore suppose majority has no reason strategy. against ammunition to use Trent was out of made once he had law firm’s members majority’s difficulty argu- with the One hearing allegations, or that severance possible is that it is conclude ment inclined to manufacture not have been get attempting to confidence that if he against the firm allegations additional on change their stories the witnesses wrongdoing no disclose. actual knew proved fruit- cross-examination “would less,” judgment ante at when

B. being made on a record that was taint- based supra part conflicts of interest. See. ed (noting consider that when we whether I.B. above Turning'to effect adverse strategy or tactic is an alternative defense performance repre- conflicts facts,” under the decisive “reasonable claims that two senting rely upon which we cannot be drawn “facts” arising obligations conflicts—the firm’s these the time from a record made after history representing Trent long tainted). partic- petitioner’s case became *45 against Foley and allegations and Trent’s ular, self- it is to credit Duncan’s difficult. may linked to the firm’s decision be Colton — serving post hoc at the Rule 3.850 statement strategy of forgo defense to the reasonable not he have hearing that he did think could personally claiming stabbed Walk- that Trent effectively impeached the witnesses based on majority’s Despite the efforts to death.33 er he saw at Trent’s trial. what otherwise, this claim is foreclos- prove to precedent. by our ed majority’s is that the problem A second credibility ignores argument the serious both that majority first a strate- The concludes principal witnesses problems of the State’s murder shifting the blame for Walker’s gy of significant competent, that and several facts two not meet the first elements to Trent did impli- have used counsel conflict-free could it was test adverse effect because of our for may the witnesses cate Trent. While State’s strategy plausible defense that changed their on cross-ex- not have stories the under facts. See United reasonable amination, by effective cross-examination (11th Carter, 721 v. F.2d States certainly could have dis- counsel conflict-free Cir.1984) Mers, (quoting United States sufficiently credited the witnesses Cir.1983)) (“Failure (11th F.2d disregard testimony as bi- jury would their strategy shifting blame well adopt Trent, by in favor of influenced ased interest, but actual give rise an conflict used on drugs that each witness and alcohol strategy have so must been to do murder, deliberately night realistically available to trial coun- option own to reduce their in an effort orchestrated sel.”). arguments support It offers two Freund, 117 prosecution. See chances First, argues that while conclusion. (listing the crimes with at n. 16 physical evidence all of State’s Mills, have Daniell could Angelilli, and which belonged or was murder either Walker surrounding charged for their conduct Trent, been all belonging to property on found death). addition, the facts that In Walker’s principal fact of the witnesses— three State’s impli- have used to counsel could conflict-free Mills, Angelilli, against and Daniell —testified beyond physical Trent went well cate predicted Duncan Freund. Because by majority. Coun- change mentioned their sto- evidence these witnesses would not con- have shown viewing them also could after sel ries on cross-examination transpired fact trolled events at Trent’s no witnesses murder, powerful had a that he night inno- Freund’s available to corroborate agreement II.B.2., plea for negotiating supra, a favorable As discussed obligations also to Trent constrained ethical ability Freund. strategy pursue the reasonable defense Walker, suborning perjury, lawyers his know- race-based motive to murder that he using testimony or ingly perjured false evi- lunged shot at Walker Walker with dence, knowingly making or false statements knife, history and that he had a of vio- Fla.Code of Professional Re- of fact. See lence, possession, diazepam and other crimi- 7-102(A) (1986). sponsibility DR Even if supra part II.B.2. nal See There- conduct. lawyers absolutely had been certain fore, defending strategy of that Freund —and Freund —had stabbed claiming Trent killed Walker cannot be however, Walker,36 these rules would not unreasonable based on the ma- dismissed as prevented putting them from the state jority’s argument.34 first proof by vigorously to its burden cross- majority argues that a defense examining by argu- witnesses and State’s shifting for strategy of the blame Walker’s ing jury closing the evidence Trent was unreasonable because murder presented at trial did not establish Freund’s Foley Freund admitted to and Duncan that beyond guilt vig- a reasonable doubt.37 This psy- admitted to his stabbed Walker and orous cross-examination could have extended chiatrist that he stabbed Walker because lawyers about even to matters which the result, told him to do it. As a either knew or believed that the witness was reasons, majority lawyers the firm’s could telling the truth. ABA Standards have been disbarred defended Freund 4-7.6(b) (3d Criminal Justice Standard ed. 1993) claiming (“Defense that Trent murdered Walker.35 knowledge counsel’s belief or certainly It is true that the ethics rules in telling that the witness is the truth does not cross-examination.”).38 prohibited preclude effect at trial closing, the time of Freund’s strategy merely lawyer’s 34. This defense was not a viable is not the role to determine a client's one; innocence, potential guilt it had be at least as effective and 'reasonable cause to be- insanily lawyers as an defense. Freund’s own guilty ethically lieve’ a client cannot affect a *46 insanity estimated that the was effective defense lawyer’s representation.”); Regu- see also Rules only thirty percent of the less. In addi- time or (1994) ("A lating lawyer the Fla. Bar 4-3.1 shall tion, prosecutor Foley a letter to the from reveals bring proceeding not or defend a ... unless there particular insanity that the firm felt that Freund’s doing is a basis for so that is not A frivolous.... potential only guilty defense had the a to lead to lawyer proceed- for the defendant in a criminal charge complete verdict aon lesser to relief —not ing may proceed- ... nevertheless so defend the Freund, liability. from criminal See 117 F.3d at ing require every as to that element of the case defense, blame-shifting 1581 n. 91. A on the established.’’); be ABA Center for Professional hand, other have could led to verdict of not Responsibility, Annotated Model Rules of Profes- guilty. (3d 1996) sional Conduct Rule 3.1 comment ed. ("[The exception proceed- in rule 3.1 for criminal majority's theory, Foley 35. Under the would have ings] principle reflects the constitutional that the subject discipline suggesting been to in his prove every state must element of the crime closing argument might that Trent have mur- not, charged by procedural rule or dered Walker and then told Freund that it was otherwise, shift its burden to the defendant.... Freund who did it. Accordingly, lawyer the criminal defense has the obligation government ethical to force the to upon lawyers 36. One basis which Freund’s could case.’’). prove its have disbelieved their client's confession was that jail Freund told a friend who visited him in addition, that he had not killed Walker. In some commentary helpfully 38.The to Standard 4-7.6 statement; symptoms of the by caused Freund’s brain dam- expands upon this age impaired were memory amenability to unquestionably many There are cases in which influence others. See 117 F.3d at provide defense counsel cannot the accused lawyers 1563-64. Even if the did believe precluded with a defense at all if counsel Walker, however, that Freund stabbed it certain- engaging vigorous from cross-examination ly possible that Freund was not the of witnesses either believed or known to have person murder, night who did so. On the of the truthfully. example, testified For where the lunged Trent had at Walker with his knife while guilt defendant has admitted to the yelling epithets. threats of death and racial plan testify, lawyer simply does not and the State’s witnesses at Freund’s trial also confirmed put proof intends to the state to its and raise a periodically that Trent was alone with Freund doubt, reasonable skillful cross-examination of and Walker in the room where Walker was prosecution’s witnesses is essential. In- stabbed in both the back and the chest. deed, circumstance were counsel this See, e.g., Yelardy, forgo vigorous prose- United States v. of the cross-examination (6th Cir.1978) J„ (Peck, ("It witnesses, dissenting) counsel would violate the cution's that, lawyer] pull argued [the failed to sure because lawyers then have Freund’s could his punches questioning [in former jury any from some “reasonable inferences client], support his current for the benefit of in the record”39 client evidence others.”). not Two prosecution pulling had estab- addi- claim that refrained from guilt beyond majority’s argument problems a reasonable lished Freund’s tional Therefore, been probative it would have entire- that negate any doubt. minimal value lawyers argue permissible might for Freund’s ly otherwise have. Duncan’s claim doubt existed closing reasonable First, majority’s argument falls under jury infer guilt could to Freund’s because weight one realizes that Trent its own once had killed that Trent from the evidence already pled second-degree guilty Walker. separate Freund’s trial be- murder before unconvincing argu- making After these lawyers, although still con- gan. Freund’s ments, ele- majority turns to the third insanity follow the defense that strained to con- effect and ment our test for adverse early represen- they publicly adopted link Freund did not establish a tends that tation, thus free at trial to abandon of the two actual conflicts either between insanity in favor of a defense pure defense not above and the firm’s decision mentioned implicated by argu- indirectly Trent40 — by claiming that to defend ing advantage took of Freund’s that Trent first As personally murdered Walker. kill mental state ordered Freund to conflict, argues the firm’s majority worry having to this Walker —without arising long history obligations from negatively affect Trent. Tell- defense would wide-rang- representing Trent did did this ingly, lawyers support in repre- made ing effect on the decisions it by offering any evidence that latter defense senting support argu- of this Freund. Im obligation confi- could have violated their ment, majority notes that the firm did dentiality arising lengthy repre- their indirectly in attempt implicate Trent supra part Trent. II.B.2. sentation of during Freund’s trial. murder Walker’s (noting the firm’s obligation limited discussing during por- the evidence While ability support argument that Freund closing argument tion control killed Walker while under Trent’s jury at Freund’s Duncan claimed procliv- presenting of Trent’s sexual evidence that Freund’s mental condition Trent knew *47 violence, diazepam pos- history of ities and susceptible that him to influence and left conduct). session, other criminal manipulated make him kill Trent Freund to claim could have re- Walker. Because this argu- majority’s the problem Another for in a criminal conviction sulted employs the artifice of “Mon- ment is that it joint ma- hypothetical in a the proven importing an day morning quarterbacking,” jority the decisions were believes that firm’s adverse “cure” into our test for element of by “allegiance to “colored” its Trent.” not by claim in suggesting that Duncan’s effect Ante 868. argument trial was closing at Freund’s firm did sufficient to demonstrate ar- problem majority’s An with the initial rep- pull against Trent while punches not its implication gument is that Duncan’s indirect resenting suggestion, This howev- Freund. very helpful trial is not of Trent at Freund’s er, any way in affect the conclusion does not answering question the. of whether the II.B., supra, firm—influ- part of may obligations to Trent be linked of inter- by ethically-based conflict enced forgo argument decision to the firm’s Freund’s beginning at the of est —elected directly personally that Trent murdered de- forgo the alternative case to reasonable insanity in favor defense. See Walker (“[W]e claiming per- Martinez, strategy at 363 cannot be fense 630 F.2d 4-7.7(a). duty representation Id. clear Standard of zealous owed client. possible de- 4- are the second third ABA Criminal Justice Standard 40. These Standards for II.B.2., (3d ed.1993). supra. strategies "commentary described fense 7.6 (or inherently If sonally murdered Walker. we were to was conflict with not under to) loyalties subsequent partial conclude that Duncan’s taken due the other or interests lawyer. supra reversal of this election was sufficient to re- of the client’s actual See note test, majority’s move initial taint that the firm’s conflict 6. The statement by of the contrast, imposed representation requires on its engage interest Freund to in “un indulging prohibit- guided speculation” we would be in order quantify inquiry prejudice.41 supra part degree ed into to which the actual I.B. received differed hypothetically that he could have received if conflict, majority As to the second represented by conflict-free counsel. Be argues that the firm’s actual conflict of inter- speculation prejudice, cause such smacks of allegations against arising est from Trent’s require 7; supra we must not it. See note Foley hearing and Colton at severance Strickland, 694, 104 see also 466 U.S. at S.Ct. did not motivate the firm’s initial decision to (noting prejudice at 2068 is established reject that Trent the defense murdered by showing “that proba there is a reasonable allegations Walker. that Trent’s Given that, bility but unprofessional counsel’s yet been made when the announced errors, the result proceeding defense, rely insanity that it would on an added)). (emphasis have been different” majority certainly may be correct.42 This conclusion, argument Applying proper reading does affect of our test for however, claim, allegations that Trent’s adverse effect to Freund’s it is undis- reinforced rely puted the firm’s initial decision to on an eliciting insani- that the tactic of that Trent Thus, ty supra part defense. See II.C. referred Mills to the firm was reasonable cannot actual might be said that this conflict under the facts pursued have been “played absolutely no ... lawyer. role counsel’s a conflict-free As to the link strategy.” Singletary, Buenoano v. between the firm’s conflict and its decision (11th added). Cir.1996) (emphasis information, not to elicit plain this it is asking tactic of Mills whether Trent re- very ferred her to the law firm that was cross-examining her at trial Freund also claims that the conflict of inherently in conflict with the firm’s continu- arising interest obligation from the firm’s ing obligation confidentiality to her. See confidentiality to Mills be linked to its supra part majority’s II.B.2. The claim that forgo decision to the reasonable alternative link no was established because Duncan’s defense tactic suggesting on cross-exami cross-examination of Mills was consistent pro-Trent nation that Mills had a bias insanity theory with the firm’s of defense is eliciting the fact that Trent referred Mills to simply sequitur. a non The fact that claim, rejecting the firm. majori effect of one of the firm’s conflicts of inter- ty states that our test for adverse effect *48 est —its failure to elicit certain information required that, Freund to show but the ultimately from Mills on previous professional cross-examination — relationship with happened to be consistent with the effect of Mills, the firm questioned would have Mills pur- another of its conflicts—its decision referring about Trent’s her to the law firm. insanity sue an probative defense' —is of noth- Ante at 869. This is an incorrect statement of ing. our test for adverse effect. All that be must shown under our test is that an alternative IV. strategy or tactic that was reasonable under might the pursued reasons, facts have been a foregoing For the we should va- lawyer, conflict-free but this alternative cate the district court’s denial of Freund’s 28 true, however, response apply allegations This would also claim 42. If Trent’s the Foley, by suggesting closing argument in his might anticipated very begin- from the jury may that Trent have committed the ning of its of Freund that Trent murder and then told Freund that it was Freund public would make these if the firm matters it, fully who did reversed the firm's initial elec- seriously harmed his interests. tion and removed the taint. beneficiary to benefit another right of one this case § and remand petition U.S.C. lawyers were bur- beneficiary. Freund’s instruction court with the to the district conflicts of interest irreconcilable dened corpus. of habeas grant writ it Freund a representation constitu- their that rendered tionally defective. dissenting: BIRCH, Judge, Circuit dis join Tjoflat’s Judge I well-reasoned majority opinion the A of both

sent. review highlight the Tjoflat’s response Judge designed to

difficulty rules interpreting must problems. Lawyers who

resolve ethical fre

analyze responsibility issues professional the law of

quently have chose between Thus, a general law. choice ethics and the CORPORATION, GAMING MIKOHN resolving that problem presented. is In Plaintiff-Appellee, ethical process, particularly where selection arise, approaches one of two concerns rules solve consists of be taken. Since law INC., GAMING, Defendant- ACRES analyze the rule problems, fortiori, one can Appellant. analyze problem to which the one the can 98-1216, 98-1217. differently, one is does Nos. rule directed. Stated apply apply rule as or does one written Appeals, United States Court purpose.* rule in accord with Federal Circuit. analyze-the-rule approach works when- jurisdiction, the rule’s but facts are within Dec. beyond the rule’s the facts are fails when How such deter jurisdiction. then should made?

mination be for determin-

I submit that workable test jurisdic- are

ing the facts within whether applica- is of a rule of ethics whether

tion rule creates dilemma for

tion Thus, problems professional re-

lawyer. jurisdiction rule’s tend within a

sponsibility ones; not within the problems simple be Ac- jurisdiction to be dilemmatic.

rule’s tend simple, problem

cordingly, when adequate; when

analyze-the-rule approach dilemmatic, analyze-the- problem is productive. most In the approach is

problem majority, wrong analysis by the

foregoing analysis pursued has been be-

approach to ap- analyze-the-rule emphasizes

cause the facts are outside of

proach where problem set jurisdiction. fact

rule’s *49 lawyers clearly dual in this case the

out respect clients. several

fiduciaries manifestly dilemmatic.

Their situation analysis con- Judge Tjoflat’s persuasive

As negate

cludes, fiduciary cannot a dual

* 1998). Patterson, Lawyer's Ray er Procedural Mal- Law: L. (Matthew Bend- Disciplinary Issues practice and does not notes is Rule committee us— hearing— prevent judge likely held the the state who the court will feel the need to less expand concerning pri- considering proceeding § facts the firm's in a ... record (or representation of Trent from three other sentencing) judge the one because the trial is prosecutor (see 4) that the elicited from hearing sources: facts and should al the motion Rule hearing, who testified at the facts of ready complete witnesses file on the case in his have a judge judicial took notice at the which hearing, state possession.”). appeared and facts that in the record of Recognizing prior proceed- that the record relating proceedings state court to Freund’s ings properly proceeding in a before court prosecution. pro- 3.850, The record of these murder ceedings motion under Rule Freund's Rule 3.850 part became of the record of the Rule quoted extensively from Trent’s at the hearing by operation of law. Fla. 3.850 hearing deposition and from Mills' tes- severance ("If P. the motion and the responding R.Crim. 3.850 timony prior to Freund’s trial. files conclusively motion, deposition records in the case show that the State attached Mills’ relief, prisoner entitled to no the motion shall transcript portion of Freund's trial and a added)). hearing.” (emphasis be denied without a During hearing ultimately as exhibits. motion, judge expressly statutory provision upon The federal which was held on Freund's motions, (1994). transcripts pleadings, § Rule 3.850 is based is 28 U.S.C. 2255 made the (Fla. prosecution part Bolyea, of the record. See State v. 520 So.2d from Freund’s 1988) ("Rule judicial nearly judge notice of the court 3.850 was taken word-for- also took 2255], aggravated diazepam plainly assault and word from and we files on Trent's [section hearing, given scope possession prosecutions. After the sev- the rule the same as federal broad Moreover, parties counterpart. explicitly were filed both we have rec eral memoranda ognized precedent interpreting the record of contained additional references to [section federal persuasive authority construing prior proceedings in case and to the as Rule 2255] (footnote omitted)). plain, prosecutions. It is 3.850.” and citation Like court files on Trent’s therefore, 3.850, requires this court also refer to these Rule section 2255 the trial court prior proceedings materials. consider record of II.B.2., trafficking important charge two described ably could be understood certainly Mills supra, learned that representa- later involved the firm’s issues a close friend of Trent and that to was If the law firm chose of Freund. tion jail through helping her to avoid time implicating in Walk- defend

Case Details

Case Name: John S. Freund v. Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Date Published: Jan 22, 1999
Citation: 165 F.3d 839
Docket Number: 93-5317
Court Abbreviation: 11th Cir.
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