John Rodriguez v. Eric Holder, Jr.

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Jоhn Alexander RODRIGUEZ, also known as John Alexander Rodriguez-Burgos, Petitioner v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., U.S. Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 09-60308

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Feb. 19, 2010.

Summary Calendar.

Mary Nicole Morrison, Morrison Law Firm, Hоuston, TX, for Petitioner.

Before GARZA, CLEMENT, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:^*

John Alexander Rodriguez, a native and citizen of Colombia, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appеals (BIA) order affirming the Immigration Judges (IJ) decision that Rodriguez did not qualify for asylum. The BIA found Rodriguez was ineligible for asylum under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158, because Rodriguez did not establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. Additionally, the BIA concluded that Rodriguez did not establish that a protected ground was at least one central reason for his fear of persecution.

We reviеw the decision of the BIA and not that of the IJ, except to the extent that the IJ‘s decision impacted the BIA‘s decision.

Gonzalez-Maldonado v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 975, 976 (5th Cir. 2007).¹ We accоrd deference to the BIA‘s interpretation of the immigration statute unless ‍‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​​​​​​​‌​​​​​​​​​​​​‌​‌‌​‍there are compelling indications that its interpretation is incorrect.

Rivera-Cruz v. INS, 948 F.2d 962, 966 (5th Cir. 1991). Thus, absent dispositive error of law, we must affirm the Board‘s determination that Rodriguez was ineligible for asylum if we find that its decision was supрorted by substantial evidence in the record. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(4);

INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992).

To qualify for asylum, an applicant must show he is a refugee within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), that is, he is unable оr unwilling to return to his country of origin “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution” on account of a protected ground. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42); see also

Lopez-Gomez v. Ashcroft, 263 F.3d 442, 444-45 (5th Cir. 2001). The applicant must also establish that race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion “was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (emphasis added).

Rodriguez does not challenge the Board‘s finding that he failed to establish that he was persecuted in Colombia before leaving for the United States in March 2005. While in Colombia, he had no personal contaсt with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the group he now claims will persecute him if he returns. FARC‘s first contact with the Rodriguez family was аn incident in July 2004, during which Rodriguez‘s father told FARC guerillas who had come to his home that he was associated with President Uribe. Following this encounter, which, according to Rodriguez, ‍‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​​​​​​​‌​​​​​​​​​​​​‌​‌‌​‍demonstrates that FARC targeted his father, and by extension, will target him, Rodriguez remained in Columbia for eight months without incident. After leaving Columbia, Rodriguez lived for approximately one year in the United States, unaware of his father‘s ongoing problems with FARC. During this time, Rodriguez‘s brothеr was living openly in Colombia with no problems from FARC. Nevertheless, Rodriguez contends that he cannot return to Columbia because he fears persecution from FARC on the basis of his father‘s political views, which he argues that FARC will impute to him.

Substantial evidence supports the BIA‘s finding that FARC‘s interest in Rodriguez‘s father was not primarily on account of a statutorily protected ground. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). Rodriguez testified that FARC‘s interest in his father was duе primarily to his father‘s wealth. Rodriguez‘s father testified that he was perceived in Colombia as “not a political person but a moniеd comfortable person.” Although Rodriguez‘s father also testified that FARC beat him on account of his association with President Uribe, this encоunter was premised on FARC‘s interest in verifying the accuracy of a list of the father‘s business assets—a list which FARC compiled prior to the encounter, and thus prior to their knowledge of his association with President Uribe. We do not recognize economic extortion as a form of persecution under immigration law, nor do we recognize wealthy Columbian businessmen as a protected group. See

Thapa v. Holder, 2009 WL 4885138 (5th Cir. Dec. 16, 2009) (listing cases). Further, although Rodriguez alleges that FARC‘s motives for persecuting his father are “mixed,” substantial evidence supports the BIA‘s conclusion that economic interests were the primary motive. See

Shaikh v. Holder, 588 F.3d 861, 864 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Although a statutorily protected ground need not be the only reason for harm, it cannot be incidental, tangential, superficial, or subordinate to another reason for harm.“).

Additionally, even if we were to assume that his father‘s persecution was primarily politically motivated, Rodriguez “cannot rely solely on the persecution of [his] family member[ ] to qualify for asylum.” See

Arif v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 677, 681 n. 15 (5th Cir. 2007). Indeed, the statute requires “the applicant [to] establish that ... political opinion ‍‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​​​​​​​‌​​​​​​​​​​​​‌​‌‌​‍was or will be at least one сentral reason for persecuting the applicant.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (emphasis added); see also

Tamas-Mercea v. Reno, 222 F.3d 417, 424 (7th Cir. 2000) (concluding that while persecution of family members can directly affect an applicant seeking asylum, the asylum statute requires sufficient individual persecution of the applicant);

Faddoul v. INS, 37 F.3d 185, 188 (5th Cir. 1994) (requiring an asylum applicant to demonstrate “a good reason to fear that he or she will be singled out for persecution.“). In light of the fact that both Rodriguez and his brother lived openly in Columbia without problems, the BIA‘s decision not to impute his father‘s persecution to Rodriguez is well-supported.

In sum, the BIA‘s determinations are supported by substantial evidence.

Rodriguez‘s petition for review is DENIED.

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Stevon ARCHIE, Plaintiff-Appellant v. James LeBLANC; Pat Book, Warden, Catahoula Correctional Center; John Doe; Joan Doe, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 09-30651

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Feb. 22, 2010.

Summary Calendar.

Stevon Archie, Kinder, LA, pro se.

Paula Ellis Miles, Office of the Attorney General, Harry ‍‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​​​​​​​‌​​​​​​​​​​​​‌​‌‌​‍Bradford Calvit, Provosty, Sadler, Delaunay, Fiorenza & Sobel, Alexandria, LA, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before JOLLY, WIENER, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:^*

Stevon Archie, Louisiana prisoner # 439157, moves this court for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal. We construe Archie‘s motion as a challenge to the district court‘s determination that the appeal is not taken in good faith. See

Baugh v. Taylor, 117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997).

Archie does not challenge either the district court‘s determination that he failed to comply with its discovery orders, nor does he challenge the court‘s dismissal of his complaint based on his failure to comply with such orders. He argues that his claims against Warden Book were barred in federal court on the basis of sovereign immunity and, thus, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his complaint.

The Eleventh Amendment does not limit jurisdiction as to suits against parishes.

United Disaster Response, LLC v. Omni Pinnacle, LLC, 511 F.3d 476, 479 (5th Cir. 2007). In Louisiana, the operation of the parish prison is the responsibility of local parish authorities, not of the State. See

Fairley v. Stalder, 294 Fed. Appx. 805, 811-12 (5th Cir. 2008), cert. denied,

--- U.S. ---, 129 S.Ct. 1619, 173 L.Ed.2d 995 (2009). Archie‘s contention that he is prohibited from suing Warden Boоk in federal court is thus without merit.

Archie‘s appeal is frivolous. Accordingly, his motion for leave to proceed ‍‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​​​​​​​‌​​​​​​​​​​​​‌​‌‌​‍IFP is denied and the appeal is dismissed as frivolous. See 5th Cir. R. 42.2.

IFP MOTION DENIED; APPEAL DISMISSED.

Notes

1

Rodriguez dedicates a substantial portion of his brief to arguing the timeliness of his application. Howеver, the BIA‘s holding was without regard to the issue of timeliness. Since we only review the IJ‘s decision to the degree that it impacted the BIA‘s opinion, the timeliness issue is not before us. See

Mikhael v. INS, 115 F.3d 299, 302 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting the court only has authority to review the BIA‘s decision, unless the IJ‘s conclusions impacted the BIA‘s decision).

*

Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except undеr the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4. Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.

Case Details

Case Name: John Rodriguez v. Eric Holder, Jr.

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Date Published: Feb 19, 2010

Citation: 366 F. App'x 555

Docket Number: 09-60308

Court Abbreviation: 5th Cir.