OPINION
The court has before it The Metamora Group’s Motion to Intervene. The members of the Metamora Group (intervenor-appli-cants) seek to intervene as party defendants. Memorandum in Support of the Metamora Group’s Motion to Intervene (Metamora Mem.) at 14. For the following reasons, The Metamora Group’s Motion to Intervene is DENIED.
I. Background
In this case plaintiff John R. Sand & Gravel Company seeks compensation for defendant’s physical taking of plaintiffs property during the environmental remediation of the Metamora Landfill in Lapeer County, Michigan. Complaint (Compl.) ¶¶ 1, 2, 50-64. Plaintiff is a long-term lessee of property which includes the Metamora Landfill. Id. ¶5, 7, 13. Plaintiff mines sand and gravel on the property. Id. 119-10. The “Metamora Group” is a group of companies which, with one exception, comprise a sub-group of the companies that entered into a court-approved consent decree (Consent Decree) with the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) on March 17, 1993 (Settling Defendants).
In 1996, plaintiff denied Settling Defendants access to the Metamora Landfill site. Compl. Ex. 2 at 6 (containing a copy of Administrative Order Directing Compliance with Request for Access in In re Metamora Landfill Site, No. 97-C-379 (EPA Dec. 18, 1996)). The EPA issued an Administrative Order Directing Compliance with Request for Access (Administrative Order), which ordered John R. Sand & Gravel Company to “grant to U.S. EPA and U.S. EPA’s agents, contractors, subcontractors, consultants and representatives entry and access to all portions of the [Metamora Landfill] Site.” Id. at 7. The Administrative Order was necessary because, “to comply with the terms of the
The members of the Metamora Group assert that they are entitled to intervention of right and, in the alternative, that they meet the test for allowing permissive intervention. Metamora Mem. at 4. Plaintiff opposes the Metamora Group’s motion to intervene. See Plaintiff John R. Sand & Gravel Company’s Response to the Metamora Group’s Motion to Intervene (Pl.’s Resp.) at 7, 35 (“The Metamora Group fails to demonstrate that it meets any of the criteria for intervention of right or any of the criteria for permissive intervention.”).
II. Discussion
A. Legal Framework
Intervention is governed by Rule 24 of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (RCFC). Intervention may be allowed either as a matter of right under Rule 24(a) or permissively under Rule 24(b). Although “the requirements for intervention are to be construed in favor of intervention,” Am. Mar. Transp., Inc. v. United States,
The rule governing intervention of right states:
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action ... when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant’s ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant’s interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
RCFC 24(a). While it is true that “[i]f the movant satisfies the elements of RCFC 24(a), the court is without discretion, and the movant ‘shall be permitted to intervene,’ ” Fifth Third Bank v. United States,
Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action ... when an applicant’s claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common. In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.
RCFC 24(b). The rule specifically vests the court with discretion in deciding whether to allow permissive intervention. “Trial courts possess ‘broad discretion in resolving applications for permissive intervention.’” Moore, supra, § 24.10[1], at 24-55 (quoting Rosenshein v. Kleban,
B. Timeliness
Under both Rule 24(a) and Rule 24(b), the application to intervene must be “timely.” RCFC 24(a), (b). The court determines timeliness from all the circumstances and exercises “sound discretion” in making its determination. NAACP v. New York,
“(1) the length of time during which the would-be intervenor[s] actually knew or reasonably should have known of [their] right[s] ...;
(2) whether the prejudice to the rights of existing parties by allowing intervention outweighs the prejudice to the would-be intervenor[s] by denying intervention;
(3) existence of unusual circumstances militating either for or against a determination that the application is timely.”
Belton Indus., Inc. v. United States,
Intervenor-applicants argue that their motion to intervene is timely, Metamora Mem. at 6, while plaintiff argues that it is not, Pl.’s Resp. at 27. Neither intervenorapplicants nor plaintiff identify any “unusual circumstances.” See Metamora Mem. at 9 n. 4 (stating that intervenor-applicants are “unaware of any facts which would support the ‘existence of unusual circumstances’ ”); Pl’s Resp. at 31 (“The Metamora Group’s motion demonstrates no unusual circumstances why this Court should consider its motion timely.”). Because the court cannot identify any unusual circumstances in this case, the court will examine only the first two factors-the length of time' during which the would-be intervenors were on notice and the prejudice to would-be intervenors compared to the prejudice to the existing parties. As context for its examination, the court first provides the chronology of this case.
As to the length of time during which the intervenor-applicants were on notice, interve-nor-applicants “knew or reasonably should have known,” Belton Indus.,
The court must weigh the prejudice to the parties if intervention is allowed against the prejudice to the potential intervenor if intervention is not allowed. Belton Indus.,
In the differing circumstances of Freeman v. United States, this court found that “any prejudice to the existing parties would be minimal since there are no pending disposi-tive motions.”
Intervenor-applicants argue that they will suffer prejudice if they are not allowed to intervene because their ability to protect their interest will be impeded by a judgment or settlement. Metamora Reply at 5, 11. Plaintiff argues that intervenor-applicants “are free to litigate all the[ ] issues [raised in their answer] in the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan.” Tr. at 41. Numerous courts have found the prejudice to potential intervenors to be slight and intervention to be inappropriate “where relief is available elsewhere.” Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes of Indians,
C. Intervention of Right
In order to succeed on a motion to intervene of right under RCFC 24(a), in addition to showing timeliness, applicants “must show that: (1) they have an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action; (2) without intervention the disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede the applicants’ ability to protect that interest; and (3) their interest is inadequately represented by the existing parties.” Freeman,
1. Interest
The members of the Metamora Group and plaintiff agree that intervenor-applieants’ interest in this suit is that of a potential indemnitor.
The interest of applicants in the property or transaction must be “‘“of such a direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.’ ” The interest thus may not be either indirect or contingent. The interest must also be a ‘legally protectable interest.’ ” Am. Mar. Transp.,
The court finds that intervenor-applieants do not have an interest sufficient to support intervention of right because their interest does not “relat[e] to ... the subject of the action,” RCFC 24(a), and because non-property interests generally do not support the granting of intervention of right, see Moore, supra, § 24.03[2][b], at 24-31 (“[N]on-property interests usually are not sufficient to support intervention as of right.”). The interest of the members of the Metamora Group is in the amount they might be required to pay to defendant as reimbursement if plaintiff wins the present case. Numerous courts have found that a potential interve-nor’s interest in “the amount it will have to pay ... if [one of the parties] wins” does not constitute an interest in the subject matter of the action. Restor-A-Dent Dental Labs., Inc. v. Certified Alloy Prods.,
Intervenor-applieants cite two cases, Tri-Wall Containers, Inc. v. United States,
The situation of the intervenors in those cases is readily distinguishable from this case-where defendant has not paid interve-nor-applieants any money and the interest of intervenor-applicants remains contingent. See Tr. at 46 (statement of plaintiff: “That is not the situation here where we have the United States actually paying out money because they haven’t paid it yet, so the interest hasn’t arisen.”).
Additionally, the patent infringement cases often allow a third party into the case through RCFC 14(a)(1). See, e.g., Order of Oct. 15, 1997, in Earth Res. Corp., No. 97-375C (granting defendant’s motion for third party notice pursuant to Rule 14(a)(1)). Under Rule 14(a), the United States is asserting a claim against a third party. Rule 14(a) requires the assertion of an interest for the addition of a party to the suit that is different from the interest required by Rule 24(a). Compare RCFC 14(a)(1) (requiring the United States to have paid money to a third party “in respect of the transaction or matter which constitutes the subject matter of the suit”) with RCFC 24(a) (requiring “an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action”). Thus, the cases allowing the addition of a party under Rule 14(a)(1) are inapplicable to intervention under Rule 24(a).
2. Applicants’ Ability to Protect Their Interest
Intervenor-applicants argue that their ability to protect their interest will be impaired or impeded because if plaintiff prevails in this suit or if the parties settle, “the Metamora Group would be placed in the difficult and inefficient position of disputing the amount in a separate proceeding,” Metamora Mem. at 11, where the court will give deference to this court, Tr. at 25. Plaintiff argues that “[a]ny judgment adjudicating the rights of plaintiff and the United States does not collaterally estop the Metamora Group from asserting any rights it may have under the consent decree.” Pl.’s Resp. at 21. Additionally, plaintiff states that “[a] judgment or settlement in this action would have no stare decisis effect on the Metamora Group. This case is limited to a determination of just compensation.” Id.
“The potential stare decisis effect of a decision often supplies the ‘practical impairment’ required by Rule 24(a).” Anderson Columbia Envtl,
This case is limited to a determination of whether defendant took plaintiff’s property and whether plaintiff is entitled to just compensation. Both parties acknowledge that intervenor-applicants could, under the Consent Decree, challenge their liability for any award that this court may grant to plaintiff in the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan.
3. Inadequate Representation
The final element that applicants must demonstrate in order to be granted intervention of right is that “their interest is inadequately represented by the existing parties.” Freeman,
Intervenor-applicants argue that an adversity of interest exists between defendant and intervenor-applicants because “the Government’s interest in minimizing damages is not as great as the Metamora Group’s because the Government intends to seek reimbursement of any damages from the Metamora Group.” Metamora Reply at 12. Intervenor-applieants have not asserted that there is collusion between plaintiff and defendant or nonfeasance by defendant. Plaintiff states that intervenor-applicants “fail[ ] to rebut” the presumption of adequate representation. Pl.’s Resp. at 24.
The court notes, first, that the difference in the interests of defendant and intervenor-applicants is, at most, one of degree and not of kind. The court also views with skepticism the suggestion of intervenor-applicants that, in effect, defendant has “nothing to lose” by failing to mount a vigorous defense of the sovereign. The ability of the United States to enter into cooperative agreements for remedial efforts, such as the Consent Decree, could be significantly compromised if the United States failed to defend against subsequent takings claims. Moreover, both defendant and intervenor-applicants seek to defeat plaintiffs claim for just compensation and, barring that, to minimize any just compensation that this court may award. Because the ultimate goal of both defendant and intervenor-applicants is the same, inter-venor-applicants have not demonstrated that there is an “adversity of interest” between intervenor-applicants and the United States.
Second, and perhaps most importantly, the court finds that defendant adequately represents intervenor-applicants because, in the actions giving rise to plaintiffs takings claim, intervenor-applicants were acting as representatives of the EPA. In 1998, the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan enjoined plaintiff from interfering with the right of defendant, “its contractors and representatives ... from entering on or at the Metamora Landfill Site.” Compl. Ex. 4 at 1 (containing United States v. John R. Sand & Gravel Co., No. 97-75497 (E.D.Mich. Mar. 23,
Intervenor-applicants have failed to meet any of the requirements for intervention of right under RCFC 24(a). The motion to intervene was untimely filed; intervenor-ap-plicants do not have an interest sufficient to grant intervention of right; intervenor-appli-cants’ ability to protect their interest will not be impaired or impeded by denying intervention; and defendant adequately represents intervenor-applicants’ interests.
D. Permissive Intervention
The court has broad discretion in deciding whether to allow permissive intervention. See Moore, supra, § 24.10[1], at 24-55 (“Trial courts possess ‘broad discretion in resolving applications for permissive intervention.’” (citation omitted)). In assessing whether a potential intervenor should be granted permissive intervention, the court must decide that a would-be intervenor’s application is timely and that there is a “question of law or fact in common” between the applicant’s claim or defense and the main action. RCFC 24(b). “In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.” Id. Because the court has already decided that intervenor-applicants’ motion to intervene is untimely, permissive intervention is inappropriate. However, even if in-tervenor-applicants’ motion was timely, inter-venor-applicants fall short of meeting the standard for permissive intervention.
Intervenor-applicants state that their interest and the main action “share a common question of law and fact to the extent that the Metamora Group’s ultimate objective is to dispute and/or reduce the liability associated with [plaintiffs] takings claim.” Metamo-ra Mem. at 14. The court agrees with plaintiff that “[s]haring the same objective is not the same as sharing questions of law or fact.” Pl.’s Resp. at 33. Intervenor-applicants’ claim or defense relates to their potential liability under the Consent Decree for any award this court may grant to plaintiff as against defendant. The main action here is a takings claim where the only issue is whether plaintiff is entitled to just compensation. In-tervenor-applicants seek to intervene in this case to assist defendant in its defense against plaintiffs takings claim. Intervenor-appli-cants cannot, however, contest their ultimate liability, whatever it may be, in this court. The claim or defense that intervenor-appli-cants’ have on their own behalf does not have a question of law or fact in common with the main action.
The court must also “consider whether an intervenor would burden or prolong the proceedings by filing a counterclaim or motions on extraneous issues.” Freeman,
The duplicative nature of the evidence will not shed any additional light on this issue. The ultimate objectives of the [interve-nor-]applieants and defendant are the*658 same, and there is a presumption that the government adequately represents the [in-tervenor-japplicants’ interests. Allowing the [intervenor-] applicants to intervene in this case would threaten expedient disposition of this action.
Freeman,
In situations similar to the one here, where a plaintiff has sued the United States and an applicant seeks to intervene as a defendant, courts have found permissive intervention to be inappropriate because the applicant does not have a claim against the United States. See, e.g., Hage v. United States,
jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.
28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2000).
In the present circumstances, the court finds permissive intervention inappropriate. Intervenor-applieants have failed to meet the threshold requirement for granting permissive intervention under Rule 24(b) because ' they untimely filed their motion to intervene. In addition, there is no common question of law or fact between intervenor-applieants’ claim or defense and the main action; allowing intervention would burden the proceedings; and intervenor-applieants do not have a claim against the United States.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, The Metamora Group’s Motion to Intervene is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Notes
. The facts presented are only those relevant to the court's decision on the intervenor-applicants’ motion to intervene. For additional background information, see John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 57 Fed.Cl. 182, 183-85 (2003).
. The following groups are identified as members of the Metamora Group: Ford Motor Company; General Motors Corporation; DaimlerChrysler Corporation; Brunswick Corporation; Seibert-Oxidermo, Inc. n/k/a S.O. Realty, Inc.; United Technologies Corporation for Inmont Corporation n/k/a BASF Corporation; Reichhold, Inc.; Foamseal, Inc.; Mercury Paint Company; La-peer Metal Products Company; Johnson Controls, Inc./Universal Die Cast; and The Glidden Company d/b/a ICI Paints. Metamora Mem. at 1 n. 1. In a subsequent filing, The Sherwin-Williams Company is included as a member of the Metamora Group and Foamseal, Inc. is not. The Members of the Metamora Group’s Response to the Court’s December 2, 2003 Order at 1-2. ”[T]he Metamora Group is not a separate legal entity [distinct from the individual members who make it up],” so if the court were to grant the motion to intervene, “each individual member of the Metamora Group would intervene in its own name." Id. at 1. Seibert-Oxidermo, Inc. n/k/a S.O. Realty, Inc. was not a signatory to the 1993 Consent Decree, but signed a 1996 Cost Recovery Consent Decree and participates in the Meta-mora Group. Id. at 2.
. "RCFC 24 is almost identical to Fed.R.Civ.P. 24 ....’’ Fifth Third Bank,
In this 2002 revision, the court has endeavored to create a set of rules that conforms to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as amend*649 ed through November 30, 2001, to the extent practicable given differences in jurisdiction between the United States district courts and the United States Court of Federal Claims. Consistent with this objective, interpretation of the court’s rules will be guided by case law and the Advisory Committee Notes that accompany the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court’s own Rules Committee Notes are intended primarily to state the source of a given rule but in some instances also provide interpretive guidance.
RCFC rules committee’s note.
. In Belton Industries, the Federal Circuit reviewed a motion to intervene under United States Court of International Trade Rule 24(a).
. The District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan has continuing jurisdiction over disputes arising under the Consent Decree:
This Court will retain jurisdiction for the purpose of enabling any of the Parties to apply to the Court at any time for such further order, direction, or relief as may be necessary or appropriate for the construction or modification of this consent Decree, or to effectuate or enforce compliance with its terms, or to resolve disputes in accordance with Section XIV hereof.
BASF-INMONT Corp.,
. Intervenor-applieants may be liable under paragraph 23 of the Consent Decree, see Tr. at 10-11 (containing a statement by intervenor-ap-plicants that paragraph 23 is the “probably the most relevant provision” regarding reimbursement), which states:
To the extent that the Facility or other areas where Work is to be performed hereunder is presently owned by persons other than Settling Defendants, Setding Defendants shall use best efforts to secure from such persons access for Settling Defendants’ contractors, the United States, the State and their authorized representatives, as necessary to effectuate this Consent Decree. If access is not obtained despite best efforts within 14 days of the date of execution of this Decree by Settling Defendants, Settling Defendants shall promptly notify the United States. The United States thereafter may assist Settling Defendants in obtaining access, to the extent necessary to effectuate the remedial action for the Facility, using such means as it deems appropriate. The United States' costs in this effort, including attorney's fees and other expenses and any compensation that the United States may be required to pay to the property owner, shall be considered costs of response and shall be reimbursed by Settling Defendants in accordance with Section XVI of this Decree (Reimbursement).
BASF-INMONT Corp.,
. Intervenor-applieants concede that if defendant loses in the present case, they will not automatically pay the defendant the amount of the judgment. See Tr. at 20 (statement by intervenor-applicants that they are "not planning on getting the checkbook out” in the event that defendant loses this case).
. The court also notes that neither case cited by intervenor-applicants discusses the application to intervene. See Tri-Wall Containers,
. In order for defendant to be reimbursed by intervenor-applicants for any award this court may grant, defendant would first have to submit a claim for reimbursement to intervenor-appli-cants. See BASF-INMONT Corp.,
. While these cases discuss the lack of a claim against the United States as a basis for denying permissive intervention, given the limited jurisdiction of this court, their reasoning applies with equal force to intervention of right under Rule 24(a).