JOHN MINOTT, Plаintiff-Appellant, v. M/Y BRUNELLO, Official No. 71147, her engines, tackle, and appurtenances, in rem, BRUNELLO YACHT CHARTERS, LTD., a foreign corporation, as owner of the M/Y Brunello, DEREKTOR FLORIDA, INC., a Florida corporation, XYZ CORPORATION(S), marine contractors, JOHN DOE, as captain of the M/Y Brunello, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 18-10374
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
June 6, 2018
D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cv-22856-KMW
[PUBLISH]
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
(June 6, 2018)
Before MARCUS, WILLIAM PRYOR, and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.
This appeal from the denial of a warrant in rem for the arrest of a vessel requires us to decide whether we have interlocutory jurisdiction, and if so, whether John Minott established that the injury he allegedly suffered while boarding the Brunello entitles him to a warrant in rem for the arrest of the vessel. Minott filed a complaint against the Brunello and other parties alleging that he was entitled to enforce a maritime lien against the Brunello for damages arising from a maritime tort. He then moved the district court to direct the clerk to issue a warrant in rem for the arrest of the Brunello, but the district court denied the motion. In addition to expressing doubt about whether Minott‘s claim fell within its maritime jurisdiction,
I. BACKGROUND
John Minott worked for Butch Kemp Designs, a marine engineering firm hired to perform maintenance and repairs aboard the Brunello while it was docked in navigable waters in Dania, Florida. Minott attempted to board the vessel, but when he was walking up the gangway “the [v]essel[‘]s captain or crew, suddenly and without warning, put the engines in gear, causing the gangway . . . to detach from the [v]essel and fall overboard, together with [Minott].” Minott suffered “severe injuries to his head, neck, and spine.”
Minott filed a “verified complaint to enforce a maritime lien for damages arising from a maritime tort” in the district court. See
The district court denied the motion without prejudice after finding that Minott failed to “establish good causе for the issuance of a warrant in rem.” It concluded that a maritime tort cannot “form the basis for a maritime lien” and cited a federal statute,
Minott moved for reconsideration and cited caselaw where plaintiffs filed in rem actions against vessels for maritime torts. The district court denied the motion. It explained that Minott‘s original motion sought a warrant only “based on
Minott appealed and invoked our interlocutory jurisdiction,
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Whether a party‘s claim[] give[s] rise to a maritime lien is a legal question that is reviewed de novo,” Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, 861 F.3d 1278, 1297 (11th Cir. 2017), as is “[t]he [d]istrict [c]ourt‘s application of admiralty law and the local rules implementing that law,” Isbrandtsen Marine Servs. v. M/V Inagua Tania, 93 F.3d 728, 733 (11th Cir. 1996). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Supplemental Rule C, we review the facts alleged in the “complaint and . . . supporting papers” to determine “[i]f the conditions for an in rem action [and warrant] appear to exist.”
III. DISCUSSION
We divide our discussion in two parts. First, we explain that we have interlocutory jurisdiction over this appeal. Second, we explain that the district court erred when it refused to direct the clerk to issue a warrant in rem for the arrest of the Brunello.
A. We Have Interlocutory Jurisdiction.
We have interlocutory jurisdiction over appeals from “decrees of . . . district courts . . . [that] determin[e] the rights and liabilities of the parties to admiralty cases in which appeals from final decrees are allowed.”
The refusal of the district court to issue a warrant in rem for the arrest of the Brunello falls within our interlocutory jurisdiction because it has the effect of a final order that “reach[es] the merits of the claim” and “prejudices [the] substantive rights of [Minott].” Id. (quoting Jensenius, 639 F.2d at 1343). To be sure, the decision refusing to arrest the Brunello did not resolve Minott‘s claims against the other defendants. But it resolved his claim against the vessel, and he is entitled to immediate review of that decision.
The refusal to arrest the Brunello resolvеd the question of the vessel‘s liability because “[a]ttachment subjecting the res to the jurisdiction of the court is a prerequisite to a finding of in rem liability.” Dow Chem. Co. v. The Barge UM-23B, 424 F.2d 307, 311 (5th Cir. 1970) (italics added). For example, in The Pesaro the Supreme Court exercised interlocutory jurisdiction over a “decree” that released a vessel from arrest but did not “formally” “dismiss the libel.” 255 U.S. 216, 217 (1921). The Supreme Court explained that although the “decree . . . [did] not dismiss the libel,” this detail was not “decisive” because “[t]he decree . . . declare[d] [that the vessel was] not subject to any such process[,] . . . direct[ed] her release . . . , [and] end[ed] the suit as effectually as if it formally dismissed the libel.” Id. In short, although the question whether to arrest a vessel arises at the beginning of litigation, it also “reach[es] the merits of the claim,” Sea Lane Bahamas, 188 F.3d at 1321
More importantly, a failure to arrest a vessel “prejudices [the] substantive rights of the parties” in the light of the mobile nature of vessels. Id. (quoting Jensenius, 639 F.2d at 1343). If a vessel leaves the jurisdiction while the district court is resolving claims against other defendants, the plaintiff risks forever losing his “substantive” right to “enforce a maritime lien,” Trinidad, 966 F.2d at 615, because “where the res is no longer before the court, . . . in rem jurisdiction is destroyed” and the district court “can[not] proceed to adjudication.” L.B. Harvey Marine, Inc. v. M/V River Arc, 712 F.2d 458, 459 (11th Cir. 1983) (italics added). The Supreme Court highlighted this concern in Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana del Caribe, S.A., when it exercised interlocutory jurisdiction over “an order . . . vacating a foreign attachment of a vessel.” 339 U.S. 684, 685 (1950); see also id. at 688–89. The Supreme Court explained that “[a]ppellate review of [an] order dissolving [an] attachment at a later date would be an empty rite after the vessel had been released and the restoration of the attachment only theoretically possible,” id. at 689, and it underscored that the question of attachment “f[e]ll in that small class [of orders] which finally determine claims of right separable from . . . rights asserted in the action . . . [that are] too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred,” id. at 688–89 (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949)); see also Puerto Rico Ports Auth. v. Barge Katy-B, 427 F.3d 93, 101 (1st Cir. 2005) (explaining that concerns of “effective finality” establish that “an order vacating an arrest finally determines the rights and liabilities of the parties within the meaning of section 1292(a)(3)“). Bеcause Minott‘s present inability to proceed in rem against the Brunello may become permanent if the vessel departs the district, we have interlocutory jurisdiction.
B. The District Court Erred when It Refused To Direct the Clerk To Issue a Warrant In Rem for the Arrest of the Brunello.
We divide this section in two parts. First, we explain that the tort alleged in the complaint falls within the admiralty jurisdiction of the district court. Second, we explain that this maritime tort entitles Minott to proceed in rem against the Brunello and obligates the district court to direct the clerk to issue a warrant in rem for the vessel‘s arrest.
1. The Alleged Incident Falls Within Admiralty Jurisdiction.
The Constitution grants federal courts power over “all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction.”
The “connection” element of this test for maritime-tort jurisdiction “raises two issues.” Id. “First, we are required to assess the general features of
The district court suggested, without deciding, that it lacked admiralty jurisdiction. It underscored that Minott‘s fall had “minimal” “potential[]” to “disrupt[] . . . maritime commerce . . . [because] any rescue effort would likely occur from land.” And it explained that “[t]he general character of [Minott‘s] activity—walking to the boat—[was] not significantly tied to maritime activity.” The district court concluded that its “uncertainty” about this question “weigh[ed] against issuing a warrant.” We disagree.
Minott clearly alleged a maritime tort. The incident “occurred on navigablе water,” id. at 1064 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), when the Brunello was docked in Dania, Florida. Although Minott was not yet aboard the vessel when the gangway collapsed, “[i]t is well established that traditional maritime law encompasses the gangway.” White v. United States, 53 F.3d 43, 46 (4th Cir. 1995). For example, in The Admiral Peoples, the Supreme Court explained that admiralty jurisdiction extended to an accident where a “disembаrking . . . [passenger] was injured by falling from a gangplank leading from the vessel to the dock,” 295 U.S. 649, 650 (1935), because the gangplank “was no less part of the vessel because in its extension to the dock it projected over the land,” id. at 651–52. To be sure, the Supreme Court mentioned that “while [the passenger] was on the gangplank, she had not yet left the vessel.” Id. at 652 (emphasis added). But this observation about the passenger‘s direction of travel does not affect the “basic fact . . . that the gangplank [is] a part of the vessel.” Id. at 651. If anything, Minott‘s injury is a stronger candidate for admiralty jurisdiction because he fell into the water, unlike the passenger in The Admiral Peoples who “was violently thrown forward upon the dock.” Id. at 652. Our predecessor circuit also explained in O‘Keeffe v. Atlantic Stevedoring Co., 354 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1965), that a plaintiff “sustained his injury over navigable water,” id. at 50, when he was “lifted . . . from the doсk” where he was working by a winch and struck either “the dock . . . [or] the side of the ship” before he fell into the water and drowned, id. at 49. And even if Minott‘s injury had occurred on land, it was “caused by” the vessel, Alderman, 95 F.3d at 1064, when its “captain or crew . . . put the engines in gear.” An injury caused by a vessel in navigable waters is a maritime tort.
The incident satisfied the first element of the “connection test” because the “general features of [this] type of accident . . . [had] a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Minott‘s employer had been hired to “perform maintenance and repairs aboard the
On the second element, “the general character of the activity giving rise to [Minott‘s accident] shows a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity.” Id. (citation аnd internal quotation marks omitted). The district court focused on the activities of Minott when it explained that his “activity—walking to the boat—[was] not significantly tied to maritime activity.” But this analysis considered the actions of the incorrect party because we look instead to “the activities of the [alleged] tortfeasor“—in this case, the Brunello. Id. at 1065 (emphasis added). Minott alleged that the gangway fell when “the [v]essel captain or crew . . . put the engines in gear,” and the operation and movement of a vessel in navigable waters are quintessential “maritime activit[ies].” Id. at 1064. That the incident occurred when the vessel was docked for “maintenance and repairs” also underscores its maritime quality, for “[w]ork upon ships . . . dоcked in navigable waterways is an indispensable maritime activity.” Id. at 1065.
2. Minott is Entitled to a Warrant In Rem for the Arrest of the Brunello.
A vessel is “an entity apart from its owner” that “is liable . . . for torts,” Merchants Nat‘l Bank of Mobile v. Dredge Gen. G. L. Gillespie, 663 F.2d 1338, 1345 (5th Cir. Unit A Dec. 1981), and a maritime tort gives the victim a lien against the vessel “by operation of the general maritime law,” Schoenbaum, supra, at § 9-1. This “lien is created as soon as the claim cоmes into being,” and the “principle [of an automatic lien] . . . [is] equally applicable to all claims . . . which can be enforced in admiralty against the ship, whether arising out of tort or of contract.” The John G. Stevens, 170 U.S. 113, 117 (1898); see also The Bird of Paradise, 72 U.S. 545, 554, 555 (1866) (explaining that “[s]hip-owners, unquestionably, as a general rule, have a lien upon the cargo for the freight” that “arises from the usages of commerce, independently of the agreement of the parties, and not from any statutory regulations“); Craddock v. M/Y The Golden Rule, 110 F. Supp. 3d 1267, 1276 (S.D. Fla. 2015) (“A maritime lien attaches and is perfected by operation of law when the claim arises.“); Riverway Co. v. Spivey Marine & Harbor Serv., 598 F. Supp. 909, 912 (S.D. Ill. 1984) (“The creation of a maritime lien requires no judicial action; the lien is a right of the injured party which arises at the moment of the breach or tоrt and attaches to the res.” (citing The Bold Buccleaugh, 13 Eng. Rep. 884 (1851))).
“Federal district courts obtain in rem jurisdiction over a vessel when a maritime lien attaches to it,” Crimson Yachts v. Betty Lyn II Motor Yacht, 603 F.3d 864, 868 (11th Cir. 2010), and “[u]nder traditional admiralty law, maritime property is subject to arrest in order to enforce a maritime lien,” Merchants Nat‘l Bank, 663 F.2d at 1345. “Upon [the] filing [of] an in rem complaint, the clerk of court issues a warrant for the arrest of the res.” Crimson Yachts, 603 F.3d at 868. This
The district court ruled that Minott “failed to establish that his negligence claim [gave] rise to a ‘maritime lien’ supporting the in rem seizure of the [v]essel.” It ruled that maritime liens are exclusively “governed by
The district court erred. The authority cited by Minott, Craddock, 110 F. Supp. 3d at 1276, correctly stated that a maritime tort gives the victim a lien against the vessel. See id. (explaining that the plaintiff “has alleged a maritime tort” and that “[i]t follows that [he] has a maritime lien” because “[a] maritime lien attaches and is perfected by operation of law when the claim arises“). Indeed, the “characteristic maritime liens recognized under United States law” include “[c]laims for maritime torts including personal injury.” Schoenbaum, supra, at § 9-1. And contrary to the reasoning of the district court that
IV. CONCLUSION
We REVERSE and REMAND with instructions for the district court to enter an order directing the clerk to issue a warrant for the arrest of the Brunello.
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